IMPACT OF CLARK AMENDMENT REPEAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100360001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
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19 July 1985
IMPACT OF CLARK AMENDMENT REPEAL
Summary
In our judgement, repeal of the Clark Amendment in a vote now
scheduled for August could be a crossroads in the stalled US-
brokered negotiations for a regional settlement in southern
Africa. In response to preliminary House and Senate votes on
repeal, Luanda suspended discussion with the United States and we
believe it is unlikely to resume talks until it has assessed any
changes in US policy towards UNITA. Moscow and Havana likely will
use repeal of the Clark Amendment to strengthen the arguments of
MPLA hardliners who oppose negotiations. We believe Savimbi will
regard a repeal as a significant political victory that will
reduce UNITA's diplomatic isolation and will help ensure that his
interests are protected in future regional negotiations.
Furthermore, it may encourage him to push aggressively for US
military and financial assistance, including more sophisticated
weaponry. South Africa will react favorably to repeal of the
Clark Amendment, but we think Pretoria is likely to interpret it
as reflecting domestic US politics, not a change in policy.
This typescript memorandum was prepared at the request of the :SC
Director of African Affairs by
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of 0 erations.
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For now, the prospect of repeal has further complicated the
already stalled settlement talks. Over the longer run, the impact
of a repeal on resumption of negotiations depends in large measure
on whether Angola views it--and any subsequent US actions--as a
turning point in US policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that Luanda could interpret repeal as a signal to
resume talks if only to forestall further US moves.
Status of Settlement
US efforts to negotiate a regional settlement in southern Africa
appeared close to a breakthrough last year when Luanda--apparently with
the grudging approval of the Soviet Union and Cuba--accepted linkage of a
conditional Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence. In a letter
to the UN Secretary General last November, Luanda proposed to send home
the 20,000 Cuban troops stationed in southern Angola over a three year
period while retaining the 10,000 or so remaining Cuban troops as a
residual force in the north. Luanda demanded, in return, that South
Africa withdraw its forces from southern Angola, implement the UN plan for
Namibia, cut off aid to UNITA, and cease attacks against Angola.
There has been little movement in the negotiations since Pretoria
rejected the specifics of the Angolan proposal and demanded that all of
the Cubans be withdrawn simultaneously with South African troops frora
Namibia. In March, the US proposed a "synthesis" of the two positions
that was intended as a starting point to move the process off dead-
center. Luanda promised to consider the US proposals but had not
responded officially. Pretoria accused the US of retreating from its
previous understanding on a total Cuban withdrawal and emphasized that
South Africa would not be a party to an agreement that jeopardized UNITA's
position. The South African raid in Cabinda Province in May prompted
Luanda to announce in late May that it had suspended bilateral talks with
South Africa, pending an explanation from Pretoria.
Reactions to the Repeal
While the key players--except for Angola--have yet to react
officially to the Senate (10 June) and House (10 July) votes to repeal the
Clark Amendment, past public statements and negotiating positions give us
some insights into their likely views. In our judgment, formal repeal
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will be seen as a positive statement of US support for UNITA and encourage
suspicions that materiel or financial assistance is being or will be
provided. The perception that the United States has taken sides probably will
lead to repeated challenges to the US role as a neutral broker.
Angola: On 5 July, in a speech for the visiting Yugoslav president,
the Angolan leader said that talks with both South Africa and the United
States had been suspended. In extending the suspension to the United
States, dos Santos cited the UNITA-hosted gathering in Angola of
anticommunist insurgents, some of which are US-backed, and the Senate vote
to repeal the Clark Amendment. Luanda reacted immediately to the House
vote by announcing on 12 July suspension of "contacts" with US envoys,
although it did not close the door on a resumption of negotiations. Based
on their track record in the negotiations, we believe Luanda probably
found the Congressional action to be a convenient excuse for avoiding
further talks that may have created expectations of additional Angolan
concessions concerning a Cuban troop withdrawal--moves we believe Luanda
is not prepared to make at this time, given the growing military threat
from UNITA.
We believe it likely that Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners in the
MPLA will portray repeal of the Clark Amendment as vindicating their long
held views that the principal US objective was to install a Savimbi-led
regime in Luanda and that only Moscow and Havana are reliable allies. We
believe that those in the MPLA leadership most closely tied to the
negotiations, such as Minister of Interior Rodrigues, are likely to come
under increasing criticism and their arguments supporting closer ties to
the United States will come under sharp fire.
South Africa: Based on its support of UNITA, Pretoria will portray
repea of the Clark Amendment as Washington's recognition of South
Africa's position that UNITA is a key actor that must be included formally
in the negotiating process. Privately, however, Pretoria is likely to
assess the repeal as reflecting US domestic politics and not a fundamental
change in US policies.
UNITA: The Angolan insurgents, in our view, will see repeal as a
significant political victory and a step tantamount to official
recognition. Despite UNITA's growing military prowess, the insurgents
have been unable to break their diplomatic isolation. Only South Africa
openly supports UNITA; a few Black African, European and Arab countries
have provided behind the scenes encouragement and la
small amount of materiel or financial support.* Savimbi probably is aware
that this assistance is most likely a hedge in the event of an ultimate
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UNITA victory, and could disappear suddenly if the donor's political
interests alter or if UNITA's military fortunes are reversed.
In our judgement, the repeal will no doubt be a psychological boost
for Savimbi. Based on his actions and speeches to date, we believe that
Savimbi is concerned that he might be sold out as part of a settlement in
which he was not a formal participant. Luanda's proposal to trade a Cuban
withdrawal for Namibian independence was probably viewed by Savimbi as an
Angolan attempt to cut his supply lines to the south and make him
vulnerable to a protracted war of attrition. Savimbi has said repeatedly
that peace in Angola will only be settled by an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation
at which time Cuban troops will no longer be needed and can be
withdrawn. Savimbi may see repeal of the Clark Amendment as a sign that
Washington is starting to come around to his views.
UNITA undoubtedly would hope that repeal will lead ultimately to US
materiel support. Although their battlefield performance suggests that
Savimbi's insurgent army is well stocked by Pretoria, he has openly
commented that the insurgents need certain sophisticated weapons--antitank
and antiaircraft rockets, for example--that are not readily available from
South Africa. At a minimum we believe that Savimbi will push for US
assistance if only to pin down a US commitment to his cause.
USSR and Cuba: We believe repeal of the Clark Amendment will be used
by Moscow to further its efforts to dissuade Luanda from participating in
the regional negotiations. It also will add weight to Soviet arguments
that the United States was all along covertly working hand-in-hand with
South Africa to install a UNITA regime in Angola. Moscow probably also
hopes the repeal will strengthen the political positions of the MPLA
hardliners who promote pro-Soviet policies.
In addition, we believe Moscow probably will seize on the repeal in a
vocal propaganda campaign to promote Black African unity against US
policies throughout Africa. The Soviets may also argue that repeal
implies a stepped-up US role in aiding UNITA and requires the continued
Cuban troop presence in Angola, if not an even greater Cuban and Soviet
* These countries have included) (Morocco,
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From Havana's perspective, we believe that Castro will view the
repeal as an ominous confirmation that the United States is adopting a
tougher foreign policy in general towards Cuba and Cuban interests. His
public statements lead us to believe Castro is convinced that improved
relations with the Reagan administration are not possible, a conviction
that may harden his position on several issues, including Angola.
Following the South African raid on Cabinda, Castro publicly reaffirmed
his commitment to the MPLA and asserted his willingness to even increase
the Cuban contribution until a "just" Namibian settlement is reached.
We do not believe, however, that the repeal of the Clark Amendment
itself will necessarily prompt an increase in Soviet or Cuban support for
Angola. In the past, increased deliveries of Soviet weapons and
additional Cuban troop arrivals have followed regime-threatening military
setbacks, not diplomatic ups and downs. Even so, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that Moscow or Havana could use the repeal as a convenient
excuse to boost military support.
Black African States: Based on their reactions throughout the
settlement talks, we believe most Black African states will roundly
condemn repeal as a statement of support for UNITA, inconsistent with the
US role as mediator. They are, also likely, to charge the Uniteu States
initiatives in regional forums.
States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe that have been most critical of
the linkage of a Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence and US
dealings with South Africa probably will see the repeal as vindication of
their positions. There could be some negative fallout from more moderate
states, such as Zambia, that have supported US diplomatic efforts and
leaders in these countries may be more hesitant to back future US
Outlook for the Negotiations
At a minimum, we believe that the MPLA will sustain its suspension of
direct contacts with US officials over the near term and will want to
assess the direction of US policy vis-a-vis Savimbi. Luanda, which has
clearly been unwilling to see its Cuban protectors leave, probably would
interpret any increase in UNITA's strength as circumstantial evidence of
US involvement and would be even more reluctant to return to the
negotiating table. Over the longer run, the impact of a repeal on
resumption of negotiations depends in large measure on whether Angola
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views it--and any subsequent US actions--as a turning point in US
policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Luanda could
interpret repeal as a signal to resume talks if only to forestall further
US moves. If the Angolans were to resume talks, the atmosphere would
probably be one of intense suspicion of US motives and with the moderates
in the MPLA discredited, prospects for compromise would be limited in the
near term, in our view.
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Original
-- Phillip
Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC
1
-- Donald G
regg, Office of the Vice President
1
-- Chester
Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
African Affairs
1
-- Frank Wi
sner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1
-- Robert C
abelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1
-- Anthony
Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
1
-- Noel Koc
h, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1
-- William
Struck, Defense Intelligence Officer,
Defense Intelligence Agency
1
-- Robert G
elbard, AF/S, Department of State
1
-- DCI
1
-- DDCI
1
-- Executiv
e Director
1
-- NIO/Afri
ca
1
-- NIC
1
-- DDO/Afri
ca
1
-- PDB Staf
f
1
-- ILS
1
-- C/DDI/PE
S
1
-- D/ALA
1
-- ALA Rese
arch Director
2
-- ALA/PS
(one sourced copy; one clean copy)
4
-- OCPAS/IM
D/CB
4
-- ALA/AF
2
-- ALA/AF/S
4
-- ALA/AF/S
ALA/AFI I(19 July 1985)
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