GHANA: THREAT FROM THE EXTREME LEFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100190001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 March 1985
GHANA: Threat From the Extreme Left
Summary
We believe Head of State Jerry Rawlings is likely to come
under mounting pressure from the extreme left in the coming
months to reverse the moderate policies that he has followed
since 1983. Radicals--led by Kojo Tsikata, the regime's
Marxist oriented security advisor--believe popular frustration
with Ghana's Western-supported economic austerity program gives
them an opening to regain lost influence, according to the US
Embassy. Rawlings' search for accommodation with the West,
cooperation with the IMF, and reduction of Ghana's enthusiasm
for the Soviet Bloc and Libya prompted the extreme left to
charge him with betraying the original principles of the
We believe Rawlings will try to stick to his moderate
policies, but that he will revert to his earlier radicalism if
necessary to preserve his position. If he does so, we believe
economic reform would slip, radical models for restructuring
Ghana would reemerge, and foreign policy would regain a
distinctly anti-Western tone. Should Rawlings be ousted,
This memorandum was prepared for the Director, African Affairs,
National Security Council. It was written by West Branch,
Africa Division of the Office of African and Lain American Analysis. It
has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and
comments are be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
ALA,
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assassinated, or resign, we believe Ghana would enter a
prolonged period of instability, affording the Soviets,
Libyans, and Cubans new opportunities for exploitation and
influence.
Limann administration, which had ruled from 1979 to 1981.
States and Britain for supporting the country's incompetent and corrupt
The Setting
Former Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who seized power in a 1981
coup, initially launched Ghana on a radical domestic and foreign policy
track that tried to pick up from his short-lived populist regime in
1979. In renewing what he termed his "holy war," Rawlings pledged to
distribute wealth more equitably and announced a campaign against
mismanagement, corruption, and black marketeering as part of a new social,
economic, and political order to reverse Ghana's 25 years of decline.
Rawlings was highly critical of the West, and publicly blamed the United
the extreme left's more radical policies.
The record shows, however, that Rawling's preoccupation with his
personal survival and the consolidation of his power prevented much
headway on his reform program. He found himself in an uneasy partnership
with radical factions that helped return him to power. Rawlings provided
the charisma and mass appeal that the radicals lacked, while the radicals
provided Rawlings with needed expertise in intelligence and security. The
partnership was uneasy, however, because Rawlings consistently rejected
commitment to "nonalignment."
At the same time that Rawlings was trying to work out a relationship
with the radicals, the ruling military council was paralyzed by
indecisiveness, which fell hardest on the economic front. Rawlings failed
to attract sufficient financial assistance from the USSR and Libya. US
Embassy reporting indicated that Moscow declined to commit substantial
resources to an unstable regime with a questionable commitment to Soviet-
approved development and foreign policy positions, while Tripoli--faced
with falling oil revenues-- offered some oil credits and food aid, but
refused to subsidize chronically-poor Ghana. As a result, Rawlings sought
to improve relations with the West out of economic necessity. Ghana
signed an agreement for IMF support in 1983 that resulted in one of the
toughest austerity programs in sub-Saharan Africa. In public forums, he
also toned down his anti-Western rhetoric and emphasized Ghana's
Since taking those steps in 1983, the record shows that Rawlings has
pursued more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, has demonstrated a
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better grasp of policy planning and goals, and has reduced the influence
of the radicals. Indeed, Rawlings has managed to attract some important,
Western-leaning officials to the regime and placed them in economic
management while removing some hardline Marxists.
in the revolution.
The Growth of Moderation
Rawlings' more pragmatic outlook, in our view, underscores his
maturation in office, greater grasp of reality, and improved self-
control. Rawlings now privately admits his earlier errors, according to
the US Embassy, and he recently told the US Ambassador it was "too bad
that the marginals and incompetents" had played such a large initial role
Political Moderates in Ascendancy
Rawlings has relied increasingly on the moderate, Western-leaning
officials to run the day-to-day operations of government, according to the
US Embassy. Moderates now gaining prominence include Dan Annan, a former
chief justice who serves in Rawlings' absence as acting chairman of the
ruling Provisional National Defense Council, and Dr. Kwesi Botchway, who
as Secretary of Finance and Economic Planning is the architect of Ghana's
IMF-supported program of economic austerity and recovery. Rawlings,
moreover, has purged many of the extreme leftists who dominated the lower
and middle levels of government. The US Embassy reports that one of the
most dramatic signs of moderation was last year's restructuring of the
previously radical "defense committees," which the extreme left had used
to monitor and indoctrinate the Army and potentially troublesome civilian
groups.
Economic Reform
In his first two years, Rawlings pursued largely rhetorical economic
policies that provided no remedy for major economic problems, according to
US Embassy reports. For example, he exhorted farmers to produce more,
temporarily placed restrictions on bank withdrawals, and called on market
traders to lower their prices, while rejecting badly needed devaluation
and other long overdue reforms. As a result, the economy continued to
deteriorate.
Falling production of cocoa--the principal source of export
earnings--together with rising inflation and food shortages, declining
industrial production, and swelling unemployment finally prompted Rawlings
to depart from these ineffective ad hoc economic policies and to cooperate
with Western-backed international lending institutions and donor
countries. According to the US Embassy, since 1983, with IMF and World
Bank support, Accra has:
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-- Devalued its currency five times.
-- Reduced the budget deficit.
-- Emphasized the rural sector and food production.
-- Reorganized some inefficient state enterprises.
-- Reduced urban consumer subsidies.
-- Devised a new investment code to encourage private enterprise and
foreign investment.
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The US Embassy indicates that these measures, although politically
unpopular, have produced some positive results. Last year, inflation fell
from 115 percent in 1983 to 35 percent, Ghana had its best corn crop in 10
years--as a result of good rains--and real GDP growth was 5.5 percent, one
of the highest growth rates since independence.
Limits to Economic Reform
In our judgment, recent economic growth--largely the result of
increased cocoa and wood exports--has had little impact on the average
Ghanaian. The US Embassy observes that the urban and working classes have
not benefited directly from the new economic policies and have been hard
hit by falling real wages. At best, according to the US Embassy, Ghana is
only "at the beginning of the beginning of economic recovery." Cocoa
production--though up, and the mainstay of the economy--is far behind its
record production of 400,000 tons in 1964. Ghana, once the world's
largest cocoa producer, is expected to be only in fifth place this year,
industrial capacity is being utilized as a result of spare parts
shortages. And despite an impressive corn harvest last year, Ghana must
Only 10 to 15 percent of the country's
still import foodstuffs.
The longer-term prospects are bleak and, in our view, pose a
challenge to Rawlings or any successor government. Ghana spends almost
half of its foreign exchange earnings on oil imports, and the US Embassy
reports that prospects are not encouraging for discoveries of local crude
in quantities to cover more than a small fraction of the country's energy
needs. Moreover, officials of international lending institutions believe
a debt bulge will occur in 1987 or 1988, when debt service payments will
equal 40 percent of exports. Beyond these adverse economic developments,
census data indicate that Ghana's population of 13 million is growing by
2.6 percent annually, and the urban population is growing at a 5 percent
average, challenging the government's ability to create enough jobs and
provide sufficient food.
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present.
Challenges to Stability
While Rawlings has brought more pragmatists into the government and
adopted more moderate policies, we agree with recent US Embassy reports
suggesting that he is likely to face increasing pressure from the extreme
left, which is seeking to exploit what it perceives as growing popular
frustration with economic austerity. In our judgment, neither the regular
armed forces nor militant exiles pose a substantial threat to Rawlings at
The Left. In our judgment, the radical left will try to exploit any
failure of Rawling's economic program to yield tangible results. We agree
with US Embassy reporting that hardship that would follow further
substantial currency devaluations could catalyze leftist-led opposition to
Rawlings. US Embassy reporting emphasizes that extreme leftists, both
within the government and those who lost their posts in earlier purges,
are waiting for the opportunity to regain their influence. Radicals still
control three key positions: Kojo Tsikata is the chief of security and
counter-intelligence; Obed Asamoah is the foreign minister; and Kofi Djin
We believe Tsikata may pose the greatest challenge to Rawlings's
moderate course and possibly to the regime itself. In the past year,
Z according to the US Embassy, Tsikata has consolidated control over the
security apparatus and, with Soviet Bloc assistance, established an
effective counterintelligence organization. The US Embassy reports that
Y this security force--and not the military--was responsible for the
impressive series of arrests last year of dissidents involved in at least
one abortive attack by exiles and several additional coup plots.
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ial Ewe tribesmen--are drifting apart over the course of Ghana's revolution.
We believe that while Rawlings is a fervent nationalist who seeks an
"African" solution to Ghana's woes, Tsikata--who lived in Cuba in the late
?JNt 3 1960s--is impressed with Soviet Bloc models and favors a Marxist-Leninist
revolution. Moreover, Tsikata did nothing to prevent the publication and
distribution by radical organizations of anti-Rawlings tracts earlier this
year, which accused him of betraying the regime's revolutionary goals. We
believe Rawlings probably finds it safer to include Tsikata in the regime
--where he can be watched--rather than to have him outside the system
where he could pose a greater threat.
-A key unknown in the Tsikata-Rawlings' drift is which can garner the
military. Its leader is Major Courage Quashigah, who is a rival of Army
Commander Major General Arnold Quainoo, a key associate of Rawlings. We
regimes primary line of defense against coups by exiles and the regular
Rawlings and Tsikata each regard the Cuban-trained unit as the
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ly
between Rawlings and Tsikata.
do not know where his loyalties would lie should there be a confrontation
The Military. For its part, the regular military appears to lack the
unity and the leadership to directly challenge Rawlings. Nonetheless,
should serious intra-regime conflicts erupt, we believe Army elements in
the vicinity of the capital could be tempted to intervene, and not
necessarily on behalf of either Rawlings or Tsikata. Army Commander
Quainoo has been portrayed by US defense attache reporting as consistently
trying to limit the influence of regime radicals over the regular
military, and to curb the influence of radical officers and NCOs in the
armed forces. Attache reporting suggests he has the support of portions
of both the enlisted ranks and officers, and that he played a leading role
in the recent restructuring of the previously radical-dominated military
the US Embassy.
Exiles. We believe exiles based in neighboring Togo, Ivory Coast,
and Nigeria are likely to remain a minor irritant rather than a major
threat to Rawlings. Indeed, the US Embassy reports that Tsikata's
effective intelligence and security apparatus has penetrated the exiles'
ranks. Moreover, the exiles are divided by differences between officers
and enlisted men, tribal rivalries, and ideological outlook, according to
continued access to intelligence and security training.
pressure, we believe Rawlings will try to maintain good ties with the
Soviet Bloc and Tripoli to preserve his revolutionary image and to secure
Foreign Influences
We suspect Rawlings will come under growing pressure from the extreme
left to foster closer ties with the Soviet Union, Libya, and Cuba
especially if, as we expect, links with the West do not result in a
substantial improvement in the Ghanaian economy. As a consequence of this
The USSR
Since 1982, Accra has accepted limited arms from the Soviet Union an
intelligence training from its allies.
for security training. Rawlings,
US Embassy reports that 100 to 200 Ghanaian intelligence officers--
selected by Tsikata--have been sent to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Cuba
continues to reject a wider military relationship with the USSR and
appears to us to be warier of Moscow's intentions and various aid offers
than is Tsikata.
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Educational assistance programs afford the USSR some opportunities
for influence that, in part, compensates for Moscow's inability to cement
a deeper military relationship. According to the Soviet Ambassador in
Moscow's economic assistance has been limited to a $10 million loan
extended in 1982. According to the US Embassy, this loan will be used to
complete Soviet projects begun before the overthrow of the late President
Nkrumah in 1966, including a gold refinery at Tawarka and a technical
institute at Tema. A small number of Soviet technicians is in Ghana to
yt0 help reactivate aid projects, according to the US Embassy. Trade between
the two countries is limited to barter deals, predominantely Ghanaian
cocoa for Soviet agricultural equipment, machinery, and medicine. We
believe the general low priority accorded West Africa, plus continuing
Soviet caution in dealing with unstable African populist regimes limits
its economic commitments.
students in Moscow at the time of Rawlings' coup at 650.
Accra, some 1,000 Ghanaian students are currently in the USSR on
scholarship. Past US Embassy reporting put the number of Ghanaian
Libya
We believe the Libyans--in their quest for regional influence--will
seek better relations with Ghana, and Accra may be responsive in order to
placate the extreme left. US Embassy
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reported that after the 1981 coup, i yan ettorts to cultivate Accra
included a $95 million oil creait, food aid during Ghana's drought, and
military supplies--lincludina mall arms, ammunition, uniforms, and
military vehicles.
Ghana's relations with Libya cooled in 19d3 and 1984, due largely to
Rawlings wariness of Qadhafi's intentions and inability to attract
meaningful development aid. In 1983, the US Embassy reported that
Rawlings rejected a mutual defense pact that would have allowed Libyan
troops to be based in Ghana. Libya responded by cutting off badly needed
credits for oil supplies, according to US Embassy reports.
We believe that harrassment by exiles or a coup attempt might cause
Rawlings to turn to Tripoli for new military assistance. Libya, in our
view, is likely to offer small military and economic aid packages from
time to time, but is unlikely to offer the low-cost, long-term oil credits
Ghana seeks. Libyan leader Qadhafi probably will continue his close
relationship with Tsikata, who has visited Tripoli on several occasions,
as a means of influencing Ghanaian developments. We note that Ghana has
not criticized Libya's African policies, including its de facto annexation
of northern Chad.
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Havana's most important role is the provision of intelligence
training and academic scholarships.
The US Embassy notes that some 60U Ghanaian students were enrolled
in Cuban schools last year. We believe that the Cuban-Ghanaian
advisers are now present.
relationship rests largely on Tsikata's admiration for the Cuban
revolution and on Havana's proven security expertise. Previous US Embassy
reporting indicated Tsikata at one time favored the stationing of Cuban
troops in Ghana. We have no evidence that Cuban troops or military
Cuban economic influence is minimal, and we do not expect it to
increase. The US Embassy reports that Havana has been providing limited
technical aid and training to the Ra
the areas of agriculture and health.
thus helping to temper some of his actions.
Outlook
We believe Rawlings will try to maintain his current moderate
policies in the near term in order to preserve the aid and trade
relationships he needs with the West. In our view, however, he will back
off, if necessary, to preserve his position rather than lose all popular
support or risk a total break with the radicals, whose security expertise
he needs. In our view, should Rawlings return to his earlier radicalism,
Tsikata, the Soviets, the Libyans, and the Cubans will be afforded new
opportunities for influence at the expense of the regime's moderates and
the West. Economic reforms would slip, radical models for social and
military restructuring would be revived, and Rawlings would lash out at
the West, particularly the United States, to demonstrate his revolutionary
zeal. We believe, however, that an even more radical Rawlings would still
require massive Western economic assitance to keep the country afloat,
Should Rawlings be removed in a palace coup, assassinated, or resign,
we strongly believe that a prolonged period of instability would ensue.
In our view, there is no immediate leadership alternative to Rawlings,
including Tsikata, who could build as broad a popular base or possesses as
much ability to stir popular support. Both the extreme left and the
factions in the military representing diverse ideological and tribal
aspirations would likely jockey for power. In our view, such chaos would
afford the Soviets, Libyans, and Cubans new opportunities for influence.
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Should Tsika to come to power, he probably would rule by force of
arms, providing he received quick and substantial Libyan and Cuban
military support and had the loyalty of the Force Reserve Unit. In our
view, however, a Tsikata-led regime would prove more unstable than one led
by Rawlings because it would be even less popular with Ghanaians anu cause
greater fissures within the military.
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Original -- Philip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department
of State
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State, Department of State
1 -- Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Africa Bureau, Department of State
4 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa,
INR, Department of State
4 -- Edward J. Perkins, Director, West African Affairs,
Department of State
1 -- Thomas J. Burke, Ghana Desk Officer, Department of State
1 -- Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr., Director, Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
1 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs, Department of
Defense
1 -- Defense Intelligence Officer for
Africa, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADD I
I -- DUO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- PUB Staff
1 -- ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
3 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
2 -- ALA/AF/W
4 -- ALA/Af/W
ALA/AF/W
(29 March 1985)
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