THE MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Len ra Intelligence ency
an ~'
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 March 1985
The Mozambique National Resistance
Summary
The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) is a rural-
based insurgent group with 12,000 or more armed guerrillas.
Formed in 1976 from several small groups opposed to the ruling
FRELIMO Party, RENAMO received direction and support from
Rhodesia and, by 1980, South Africa. The insurgent group has
expanded rapidly and now operates in'all ten provinces of
Mozambique. RENAMO's military success, distributions of
captured food, and opposition to FRELIMO's attempts to
collectivize agriculture have gained the guerrillas some
measure of popular support. Despite increased insurgent
activity since implementation of the Nkomati Accord in March
1984, we doubt the group is being activel supplied by South
Africa. RENAMO is depending
on weapons and ammunition stockpiles supplied by Pretoria just
This memorandum was prepared at the request of the Director, African
Affairs, National Security Council. It was written by
Africa Division of the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the Office of Central Reference. Questions and comments
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
COPY OF
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prior to the Accord, as well as captured munitions.
some limited and
selective South African resupply cannot, of course, be ruled
While scoring some impressive gains on the military front,
RENAMO's political infrastructure and ideology are undeveloped,
and it has no leader with the stature of President Machel.
Moreover, RENAMO's military wing, largely black Africans,
distrusts the group's exile-based and mostly Portuguese
political spokesmen and backers, who themselves appear divided
by personal ambitions.
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The civil war in Mozambique is currently stalemated, with
neither side able to defeat the other, but Maputo's military
strength is eroding. Negotiations for ending the insurgency
remain deadlocked; RENAMO seeks a power-sharing arrangement,
while FRELIMO offers only amnesty and discussions toward a
Background
After Mozambique became independent under FRELIMO in 1975, several
anti-FRELIMO elements came together to form what later became the
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). Included were conservative
whites who had fled black-ruled Mozambique, blacks from small political
parties that refused absorption into FRELIMO, disenchanted FRELIMO
officials, colonial Army veterans, and tribal
leaders. With direction and support from Rhodesian
military officials, the guerrillas in early 1977 began sabotage and
reconnaissance operations in central Mozambique against units of Robert
Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union. Soon, however, RENAMO began its
own hit-and-run attacks against Mozambican economic targets. During this
period of Rhodesian assistance, the insurgents operated with marginal
success in Manica and Sofala Provinces, as their forward bases in the
Gorongosa mountains of central Mozambique were overrun by government
forces in 1979 (see attached map).
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As Zimbabwe neared independence in 1980, however, South Africa
assumed sponsorship of RENAMO. The South African armed forces created a
logistics infrastructure to support insurgent operations in Mozambique,
and they established a headquarters and training base in the northern
Transvaal. "The Voice of Free Africa"--RENAMO's radio station previously
located in Rhodesia--began broadcasting from South Africa at that time.
With South African assistance, RENAMO expanded north and south from
central Mozambique, spreading to nine provinces by early 1983 and to Cabo
Delgado Province in the extreme northeast last year. Insurgents also
operated out of sanctuaries in South Africa and Malawi. We believe that
antigovernment sentiment has been partly responsible for insurgent
recruitment: FRELIMO has neglected rural areas hard hit by three years of
alternating drought and floods, and its efforts to impose collectivization
have been unpopular with the peasants
Leadership
RENAMO's President and Commander-in-Chief is Afonso Jacama, a black
Mozambican and ex-FRELIMO guerrilla leader. Jacama has headed the group
since 1979 when Andre Matsangaisse was killed in a clash with government
forces. Jacama has the respect and
loyalty o R NAMO s militar forces, but he is uninterested in political
affairs. he is not charismatic but is a proud and
competent commander who is basically a black nationalist with vague
democratic ideals and a strong bias against Communists and white
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Evo Fernandes, RENAMO's Secretary General and second ranking
official, heads the political wing. Born in Mozambique of Portuguese and
Goan parents, Fernandes has held his position since shortly after his
predecessor, Orlando Christina, was killed by unknown assailants at his
residence in South Africa in April 1983.*
He rest es in ortuga , unlike his predecessor
who lived in South Africa, and has handled most negotiations with Pretoria
and FRELIMO on RENAMO's behalf.
in general RENAMO's military leaders distrust the
politicians. Jacama limits Fernandes' contacts with other guerrilla
commanders,
Jacama, southern commander Raul
Domingos, and probably most guerrilla officers, are blacks from central
Mozambique who have little in common with political leaders such as
Fernandes and his Portuguese deputy in Lisbon, Jorge Correia.
*Orlando Christina, a white Mozambican
directed overall REN'AMO activities and headed its
fledgling political organization until his death. He served as the
insurgents' spokesman and handled relations with the South Africans.
Details surrounding his murder remain obscure. Mozambican agents may have
been responsible, or his demise may have been the result of an internal
power struggle,
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Popular Support and Ideology
In our judgment, RENAMO could not have grown and expanded as it has
without at least some measure of support from the rural populace, much of
which is among the Shona-speaking tribes of central Mozambicae_
FRELIMO has long neglected the countryside,
and the insurgents have gained supporters in some areas by distributing
food and other commodities--either provided by South Africa or stolen from
local government stores-
Aside from these sorts of local "civic action" efforts, we have no
evidence that the insurgents--unlike UNITA in Angola--have established
"liberated areas" in the sense that they provide civil administration or
engage in systematic political indoctrination in areas under their
control. Moreover, they have alienated the Catholic Church, which exerts
considerable influence over the country's Christian minority. The Church
had considered RENAMO a viable political fgrce until the recent murders of
several priests and nuns. Church spokesmen now say it is an ill-
disciplined group with no real political ideology and little popular
support, according to Embassy reporting.
In our judgment, RENAMO has little appeal beyond the rural peasantry,
in large measure because its political ideology is undeveloped and
simplistic. The insurgents' pronouncements are little more than
vehemently anti-Communist sloganeering, describing Machel as an agent of
Soviet expansionism and condemning his acceptance of Soviet, Cuban, and
East German advisers. RENAMO professes vague support for a democratic
form of government and a free-market economy, and it swears allegiance to
the Mozambican nationalism of the late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first
president, but it has not articulated these views in a well organized
fashion. In our view, RENAMO remains essentially an anti-FRELIMO
Military Situation
As a political movement RENAMO is unsophisticated, but on the
military front it has grown and expanded impressively since 1979 when a
few hundred guerrillas were on the run from government forces in
Mozambique's two central provinces. In fact, RENAMO may have more than
Ocvi
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the 12,000 guerrillas that we estimate.
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government forces, transportation routes, power lines, and foreign
workers, and to demonstrate RENAMO's reach throughout Mozambique in order
to expand popular support and demoralize the Army.
the guerrillas select operations that will tie down
more Mozambican troops guarding routes and convoys, gain publicity, and
capture usable military equipment. RENAMO has murdered approximately 42
foreigners over the past two years, and kidnapped others, which has caused
many foreign workers to flee and set back dev s throughout
the country, according to Embassy reporting.
Reports of guerrilla incidents--including sabotage, ambushes, raids,
and terrorist attacks on civilians--increased by more than 50 percent in
1984, according to a CIA data base that records insurgent incidents back
through 1983. Most incidents have taken place in Zambesia, Mozambique's
richest and most populous province, and also near the capital (see
attached graphics). Attacks recorded in Maputo Province alone increased
from six in 1983 to 100 last year. The data base slightly exaggerates the
*The South Africans also calculate that the incident rate rose
sharply in 1984, according to Embassy reporting.
the insurgents seek to isolate Maputo by attacking
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increase in guerrilla activity, however, because our data collection has
improved.
In addition to insurgent attacks against FRELIMO, RENAMO's activity
also includes some banditry. The insurgents have looted stores and
civilian homes, and they bayonetted dozens of civilian passengers during
ambushes near Maputo in January, according to the international press.
The brutality seems to increase in the south, however, and it may reflect
looser control by RENAMO headquarters over remote units, as well as some
ethnic hatred for southerners and foreigners by guerrillas recruited
mainly in the central provinces.
Maputo's response to RENAMO's attacks has been ineffective, and we
expect additional government reverses in the months ahead. The Army
continues to mount sporadic offensives in the countryside, but it has
generall transportation
routes. of about 20,000
troops tie poorest he has seen, partly because the USSR has not provided
e ui ment a ro riate for a-perrilla war during its nearly ten years of
The force is mostly conscripted, and morale
suffers from poor food, quarters, training, and medical care. Embassy
sources report that it remains in garrison and is avoiding combat.
Outlook
RENAMO's unabated guerrilla activity over the past year has shattered
President Machel's early hope that implementation of the'Nkomati Accord in
March 1984 would cause the insurgency to wither and die. In our judgment,
the civil war in Mozambique is at a military stalemate in which neither
side can defeat the other, but the government's military stren th
eroding.
IEmbassyl
sources that some Mozambican officials are dissatisfied with
Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord, and it is possible that some
Army officers are hedging against a RENAMO victory by establishing contact
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We judge that, confident of its military prowess, RENAMO is unlikely
to abandon its hard-line in the deadlocked negotiations.
RENAMO wants an internationally
supervised cease-fire, direct talks with the government to choose a
president, and free parliamentary elections. It also demands that Maputo
suspend arms agreements with the Soviets and send all foreign troops home
within a 15-day period. Maputo so far has offered only a general amnesty
and discussions toward arranging a cease-fire. Talks mediated by South
Africa broke down in October, ostensibly because Maputo refused to admit
publicly that it was negotiating with the insurgents,
')ZV-I
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Copy 1 of 40 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC
Copy 2 of 40 -- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
Copy 3 of 40 -- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of African Affairs
Copy 4 of 40 -- Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
Copy 5 of 40 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
Copy 6 of 40 -- Morton Abramowitz, Director, State/INR
Copy 7 of 40 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State
Copy 8 of 40 -- Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Copy 9 of 40 -- Robert Gelbard, AF/S, Department of State
Copy 10 of 40 -- DCI
Copy 11 of 40 -- DDCI
Copy 12 of 40 -- SA/DCI/IA
Copy 13 of 40 -- Executive Director
Copy 14 of 40 -- NIO/Africa
copy 15 of 40 -- NIC
Copy 16 of 40 -- DDO/Africa
Copy 17 of 40 -- DDI
Copy 18 of 40 -- ADDI
Copy 19 of 40 -- PDB Staff
Copy 20 of. 40 -- I LS
Copy 21 of 40 -- C/DDI/PES
Copy 22 of 40 -- D/ALA
Copy 23 of 40 -- ALA Research Director
Copies 24-25 of.40 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
Copies 26-29 of 40 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB
Copies 30-33 of 40 -- ALA/AF
Copies 34-35 of 40 -- ALA/AF/S
Copies 36-40 of 40 -- ALA/AF/S
ALA/AF/S:I I(4 March 1985)
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