CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #17

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
JANUARY 1985
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #17
Uncharacteristic tactical miscalculations by President
Duarte coupled with the military's growing anxiety over the
Duarte 's perceived
tampering with the military institution and that senior officers
had never intended actions that would jeopardize US assistance.
Nevertheless, the pronounced military disgruntlement with the
Executive has given extreme rightist political leaders
opportunities to build upon their already strong influence with
key officers, and the events of December underscore both the
antipathy that Duarte continues to engender and thus the
inherently fragile nature of his administration.
Despite the military's public backing for the peace process,
armed forces' distrust of Duarte apparently has increased since
the first round of talks with the guerrillas in October. The
President's subsequent lobbying for a cease-fire and his
insistence that a notorious junior officer be cashiered for
alleged human rights abuses--even though the officer had been
exonerated by the Salvadoran Supreme court--generated strong
resentment in'the military. Ultimately, however, the catalyst
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North
and South Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations. It contains information available as of 5 January
1985. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed
to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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for the plotting was Duarte's efforts to promote Colonel Lopez
Nuila, the Deputy Defense Minister for Public Security, despite
strong military opposition stemming from Lopez's lack of combat
experience and the perception among officers that his loyalty was
to Duarte rather than to the institution. 25X1
Notwithstanding the ommission of Lopez's name on the final
promotion list, the incident has offset earlierlimproved
relations between the officer corps and Duarte.'; It has also
raised questions about the President's judgment,! especially
during a period of delicate discussions with the guerrillas when
any sign of dissension` plays into the hands of the extreme
left. We further believe that the sense of unease in military
circles has been reinforced in the political arena. Here, Duarte
apparently miscalculated the strength of opposition in the
Assembly to his line veto of provisions in the new electoral law
aimed at damaging Christian Democratic prospects in the
legislative and municipal election scheduled for March. Recent
reporting from the US Embassy indicates that Duarte's action has
increased cooperation between moderate rightists and extremists,
and at month's end 'theiChristian Democrats were Ianxiously seeking
a means of minimizing their political quandary.
A major beneficiary--and prime instigator-;of Duarte's
jextreme rightist
difficulties.at this juncture appears to be the
circle of former Assembly leader Roberto D'Aubuisson.
Although their roles remain enigmatic at this point, senior
officers clearly had knowledge of the plotting.;
We. believe fear of jeopardizing the war a fort
would be likely to override most personal and ideological
animosities in the military toward Duarte, but that the rumblings
at a minimum were intended to-convey the seriousness of
institutional disgruntlement to the Salvadoran President--and to
Washington. Duarte, meanwhile, probably anticipates that
D'Aubuisson and his extreme rightist followers will continue to
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foment dissension in the militar through ties with leading
officers While Duarte probably would 25X1
like to remove these officers, their effectiveness in the field
and his own political weakness preclude such action. 25X1
With the Lopez issue behind him for now and with the
Christian Democrats assuming an increasingly conciliatory posture
in the Assembly, the immediate threat to Duarte apparently has
passed. The respite is likely to be temporary, however, as the
next round of talks with the guerrillas--tentatively scheduled
for late January--will again heighten military sensitivities and
anxieties. Such an environment will present extreme rightists
and military malcontents with good opportunities to vent their
frustrations, and the security threat to the President--including
the risk of assassination--will escalate accordingly. ~I 25X1
Military
With the exception of several minor clashes, the holiday
truce was generally observed by government and insurgent
forces. Nevertheless, there are indications that fighting may
Meanwhile, numerous reports reflected rebel plans to
increase economic warfare throughout the country. Insurgents in
the western departments of Santa Ana and Ahuachapan were to
establish or reactivate logistic networks to support a "sharp"
increase in activity
Some 800 to 1,200 rebels reportedly plan small-scale attacks and
harassment actions there aqainst economic targets, especially the
coffee harvest. Guerrillas in Santa Ana, where a large coffee
processing plant was destroyed in late November, continue
extorting money from local coffee rowers
Several terrorist actions in December in the heretofore
quiescent capital may be part of this overall tactic of stepping
up operations against the economy.
all five guerrilla factions have been ordered to target the
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capital's transportation, electrical, and telephone systems. In
addition, a rebel splinter group--the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez
Front (CERF)--has been responsible for a number of terrorist
incidents in San Salvador since November,
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The insurgent clandestine Radio enceremos
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confirmation of the CERF's responsibility for one recent
assassination suggests insurgent leadership appr
oval of its
activities.
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The Salvadoran Army continued sweep operations against
guerrilla strongholds in December to keep pressure on the
insurgents. Several operations--including an advance on northern
Morazan--produced little contact with the enemy,
Salvadorans boarded,
registered several civilian
searched, and
ships in the area. I 25X1
Economic
Attempts by the guerrillas to disrupt harvesting are not
seriously hurting overall economic performance but are
contributing to rural unemployment and losses for some growers.
The US Embassy estimates that the cotton harvest for 1984/85 will
increase slightly while coffee production is expected to fall by
7 percent. Export revenues will be unaffected, however, since
production still exceeds the amount El Salvador is able to sell
on world markets. The smaller coffee harvest is due more to
inadequate production incentives than to destruction by
guerrillas, according to the Embassy. 25X1
Meanwhile, exporters should benefit from the monetary
board's decision in early December to allow a larger percentage
of foreign exchange transactions at the parallel market rate.
Approximately 40 percent of all imports and exports will now be
traded at the parallel rate of US $1=4 colones, and all others
will continue to use the official rate of US $1=2.5 colones,
according to the Central Bank president. The new regulations
should help ease the shortage of foreign exchange and pave the
way for an official devaluation after the March election. 25X1
Militarv
Insurgents of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) again
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seized the initiative in early December against Sandinista forces
in the north, especially in Madriz and Esteli Departments.
The Sandinistas evidently used three of their new MI-24
helicopter gunships--presumably flown by Cubans but not
confirmed--against insurgent forces near Wina in northern
Jinotega Department on 18 December.
According to press accounts, special Ministry of Interior
(MINT) troops carried out effective ambushes.
In another development, the FDN is endeavoring to activate a
southern front component based in Costa Rica under the aegis of
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the insurgent umbrella organization, Unit for National
Reconciliation, 25X1
Political
Sandinista maneuvering and internal differences within the
democratic parties dimmed. prospects for the domestic political
opposition in December. Managua began the month by announcing
that all participants had consented to suspending the national
dialogue. The exercise gave the Sandinistas a valuable
propaganda boost--several Western leaders endorsed the talks as a
step toward pluralism--hut the impasse following the initial
sessions probably convinced the government that the dialogue had
outlived its usefulness.
The coalition's effectiveness was hampered by the
indecisiveness of several key leaders. Former presidential
candidate Arturo Cruz annarently has not decided on his future
role, and La Prensa editor Pedro Chamorro has given mixed signals
on whether he intends to go into exile. Moreover, Eduardo Rivas,
the newly-chosen president of the opposition coalition, lacks
charisma and strong leadership skills, according to the US
Embassy.
The regime also had some success in coonting the
Conservative Democrats and the Independent Liberals. Both
parties may send delegates to the National Assembly, according to
the US Embassy. F__1
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room for significant concessions.
Meanwhile, the Sandinistas held another meeting with Miskito
Indian insurgent leader Brooklyn Rivera in Colombia. This
meeting failed to produce any agreements, but Rivera apparently
believes he can obtain concessions that will improve conditions
for his people on the Atlantic coast and gain a position of
influence for himself. Talks are scheduled to resume in
mid-January, but, in our judgment, Sandinista statements that
autonomy will be guided by parameters set in 1982 leave little
Economic
Talks with Nicaragua's bank advisory committee scheduled for 25X1
mid-December were again deferred until January
no payment on its commercial bank debt since December 1983, 25X1
The Sandinista regime, which has made
another rescheduling to avoid legal actions by the banks.
Meanwhile, Planning Minister Ruiz's four-week visit to seven
Soviet Bloc-countries in December--his fourth such trip in
1984--underscores Sandinista anxiety about ensuring continued
economic assistance to offset declining Western financial
support. Ruiz apparently got no more than renewal of current
trade and nonmilitary aid agreements. F_~
Shortages of crude oil, caused by Mexican delays in
releasing a chartered Nicaraguan tanker, caused another temporary
shutdown of Nicaragua's only refinery at the end of the month.
Lack of crude oil earlier this year had closed the refinery at
least twice while Managua, Mexico City, and Moscow wrestled over
supply arrangements.
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Political
Chief of State Mejia's efforts to reduce Guatemala's
international ostracism were boosted in December by a state visit
to Costa Rica and talks with Colombian President Betancur, who
briefly visited Guatemala. Mejia met with Guatemalan exile
leaders in San Jose, probably to demonstrate the military's
commitment to hold fair elections next year. According to press
reports, he discussed with several Social Democratic Party
leaders their possible return to Guatemala to resume political
activity. While a final decision on the party's participation
apparently has not been reached, Mejia's willingness to talk with
the group--which had previously collaborated with leftist
guerrillas--should enhance his credibility with other political
parties at home. Although the meeting with the Colombian
President produced few tangible results, we believe Betancur's
praise of Guatemalan progress toward democratization will
encourage Mejia to continue efforts to end his country's
isolation.
Military
Government offensives in recent months have pushed the
rebels into more inaccessible areas, resulting in greater Army
resupply difficulties and an erosion of morale field
units. = military 25X1
officers are increasingly frustrated over their inability to deal
the guerrillas a crippling blow because the Army lacks the
equipment to pursue the insurgents farther into the hinterland.
declining morale among line 25X1
officers stems from inadequate helicopter support for medical
evacuation and resupply operations. Troops returning from action
in northern Guatemala also have complained that poor support from
contributing to casualties, 2.5X1
We believe many officers will attribute the 25X1
difficulties to lack of significant US military assistance. In
view of the military's role in moving Guatemala toward political
liberalization, some officers are likely to become increasingly
resentful over the lack of US aid. 25X1
Economic
Mejia used his meeting with Costa Rican President Monge to
help settle trade differences between the two countries. US
Embassy and press reports indicate that an agreement was reached
whereby Guatemala will immediately repay some $19 million of its
C;T
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outstanding $62 million commercial debt to Costa Rica. This
would allow normal bilateral trade--now halted for some two
months by the repayment issue--to resume. The new trade
arrangement is likely to soften domestic criticism of Mejia's
economic policies, which have failed to reduce unemployment,
resolve foreign exchange difficulties, and meet IMF guidelines.
Political
The conservative United Democratic Party's overwhelming
victory in national elections on 14 December dealt a serious blow
to the small but influential leftist faction in former Prime
Minister Price's People's United Party. Virtually all the ruling
party's leftist candidates, including pro-Cuban Health Minister
Shoman and Education Minister Musa, were defeated. Although the
leftists probably will continue to work within the party
structure in hopes of taking over once Price steps down, the
electoral setback may prompt the group's more radical elements to
consider forming a new party to challenge the government more
directly.
In the vote's biggest surprise, Price--a moderate who had
never lost a national election since Belize attained self-rule
from the UK in 1964--lost his own seat in the House of
Representatives to a 25-year-old political novice. Price says he
will remain active in politics in an effort to regroup his party,
which returned only six incumbents--a mixture of moderates and
conservatives--to the 28-member House. The opposition, however,
returned all four of its incumbents and swept all 10 of the new
electoral divisions in garnering 21 seats.
We believe the opposition's victory is likely to produce
somewhat closer cooperation with the US on a broad range of
issues, including drug eradication and regional security
policies. New Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel alreaey has
announced that his government will crack down on the country's
growing drug problem, and that it would consider the relocation
of the US Army School of the Americas--recently closed in
Panama--to Belize if such a proposal were put forth. Although
Esquivel probably will drop his predecessor's more neutral
position on East-West issues, he is not uncritical of US policy
and remains wary of Washington's political and military power.
Moreover, Esquivel's longheld suspicion of Guatemala suggests
that he will adopt--at least initially--a much harder negotiating
line on the two countries' border dispute. Esquivel recently
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stated that earlier proposals are no longer valid. anq that
"dialogue with Guatemala must start from zero." ~ I 25X1
recovery.
Economic
Economic matters, in our view, will be a high priority for
the new government. Esquivel says he will seek increased foreign
investment in Belize and closer economic ties with the US.
Meanwhile, the former government's recent success in securing a
$7.2 million IMF standby arrangement should help the new
administration in its initial efforts to bring about economic
Political
President Suazo's public endorsement of a controversial
former cabinet member for president in the November 1985 election
has divided the ruling Liberal Party and rekindled speculation
that he intends to seek an unconstitutional extension of his
term. The US Embassy reports growing opposition to Suazo's
endorsement of former Minister of the Presidency Carlos Flores,
whose ethnic Arab background, imperious style, and reputation for
political intrigue are unacceptable to many
Hondurans--particularly the armed forces. Several top Liberal
Party leaders said that Flores is Suazo's personal preference,
rather than the party's, and the President of the National
Congress broke partisan ranks and launched his own presidential
campaign. More significantly, a Tegucigalpa newspaper with close
ties to the military editorialized that Suazo's choice of Flores
was intended to destabilize Honduran politics and make an
extension of his own presidency more attractive. The Embassy 25X1
reports the president sent an emissary in late November to sound
out the military on an extension but was turned down.
problems make it necessary to postpone the elections. We believe
the military is unlikely to back such a move and instead will
press Suazo to refrain from manipulating the electoral process.
believe Suazo will again solicit their support for an extension,
arguing that political party factionalism and voter registration
senior military officers
Economic
We believe Honduras is more likely to adjust its overvalued
currency following recent moves by Guatemala and El Salvador that
effectively devalued their currencies without sparking political
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protests. Honduras is now the only country in the Central
American Common Market group in recent years neither to devalue
nor legalize a parallel foreign exchange market, putting both
exporters and import substitution industries at a competitive
disadvantage. Although the Suazo administration continues to
express it opposition to exchange reform, it will come under
increasing pressure from international aid donors and the private
sector to establish a legal parallel market. The untenable
position of exporters was highlighted this month when Standard
Fruit Company decided to sell an uncompetitive pineapple farm in
Honduras.
Political/Economic
The political and economic crisis sparked by President
Barletta's efforts to introduce austerity measures continued
during December. A coalition of professional, teacher, business,
and labor leaders continued to protest austerity measures enacted
in mid-November and rejected an alternate fiscal program that
Barletta proposed on 6 December. In addition to demanding the
total repeal of austerity proposals, the coalition called for
disclosure and reduction of the military budget and an end to
corruption and government mismanagement. For the second time,
Barletta placated protesters by unconditionally withdrawing the
legislation. He promised a compromise measure that, according to
the US Embassy, probably will pass after the Assembly reconvenes
in January. To secure short term economic support to meet debt
payments, Barletta negotiated a 90-day extension of payments with
the banking community so that an IMF agreement and a restructured
loan for 1985 and 1986 can be completed. F_~ 25X1
We believe Barletta's inept handling of the fiscal issue has
weakened his administration and rekindled popular dislike of the
Defense Forces. The opposition, shifting its attention from
strictly economic issues to government corruption and
accountability and the military's role in society, probably will
demand legislative inquiries into government spending,
specifically the defense budget. Although Defense Chief Noriega
has given the civilian administration a relatively free hand, he
is likely to seek greater control by pressuring Barletta to
replace some Cabinet members with advisers linked to the
military.
Political
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The US Embassy reports that, following a period of relative
quiet, San Jose early this month charged Managua with several
border incursions. According to a Civil Guard officer,
Nicaraguan aircraft and patrol boats violated Costa Rican
territory on the Atlantic coast. Security officials believe the
Nicaraguans were pursuing Sandinista Army deserters who--along
with their Soviet-me launch--were later picked up by Costa
Rican Guardsmen.
Meanwhile,) (leaders 25X1
of four Costa Rican leftist groups met in Havana in November to
sign a unity pact in return for a promise of $1 million from Cuba
and Libya as well as 1,000 rifles and ammunition. The equipment
is to be shipped through Nicaragua in January. The Cuban-
inspired agreement reportedly is designed to improve the left's
electoral prospects and probably to increase violence in Costa
Rica over the next few years. In our opinion, Havana believes
pressure from the domestic left will force San Jose to he more
accommodating toward Managua. 25X1
Economic
The Monge administration fears considerable economic
dislocation and leftist labor unrest if United Brands follows
through with plans to close its banana production facility on the
Pacific coast. The company's decision follows several years of
decreased profits, banana disease, and a recent two-month,
Communist-inspired strike that cost several million dollars in
lost revenue. Before 1984, the Pacific plantations produced some
S40 million annually in foreign exchange earnings--almost 5
percent of national export receipts--and the loss of these
revenues probably will adversely affect Costa Rica's proposed IMF
standby agreement. Moreover, government officials told US
Embassy personnel that the loss of some 2,500 jobs will increase
the 10 percent 77loyment rate and probably result in some
social unrest.
The Contadora Group continues to pay little heed to the Core
Four proposals for changes in the draft treaty of 7 September. A
joint Colombian-Mexican communique during President Betancur's
visit to Mexico City in early December obliquely dismissed many
of the Core Four reservations and implied that US military
cooperation with Central American governments is an obstacle to
the peace process.
The Contadora nations apparently have decided to pressure
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the Central Americans to accept a minimally revised treaty. L
the Group is working for a meeting with
the Central American Foreign Ministers in January.
Contadora members have agreed on
a division of labor. Mexico is to take the lead with Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia each will host
one of the other Central American countries in bilateral talks.
Four countries.
The Group's rejection of most of the Core Four proposals
leaves a number of key issues--including foreign military
advisers, bases, and maneuvers--unresolved. Honduras and Costa
Rica will be reluctant to sign a-treaty without further
guarantees protecting them from Nicaraguan military power, and El
Salvador will be particularly difficult to persuade. The US
Embassy reports that the Salvadoran Government, angered by
Mexico's sponsorship of a UN resolution on human rights in El
Salvador and continuing bias in favor of Nicaragua, intends to
confront the Mexicans at the Contadora talks. Guatemala, while
likely to maintain an ostensibly neutral position to avoid
offending Mexico, probably will follow the lead of the other Core
"flexibility."
Nicaragua may be the only one to accept the new version.
Because the changes endorsed by the Contadora Group are minor,
the Sandinistas will have little to lose. Moreover, by embracing
the revised draft Nicaragua will reap favorable publicity for its
If no agreement is forthcoming at the combined Contadora-
Central American meeting, the Group will propose a presidential
summit to decide whether the US and Cuba should be invited to
participate in the talk The 25X1
Contadora countries probably believe the US would refuse, and the
proposal appears intended to pressure the Core Four by placing
the onus on them and indirectly on the US for the success or
failure of the Contadora process. 25X1
KEY NICARAGUAN TRAVELS/VISITS
agreements.
20 Nov-17 Dec Planning Minister Ruiz traveled to East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, and the USSR for discussions
on economic assistance but apparently got no
more than renewal of trade and nonmilitary aid
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25 Nov-12 Dec Foreign Trade Minister Martinez headed a trade
delegation to Libya, Algeria, and Canada.
Dec Junta Secretary Reyes and Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs Talavera toured Mexico,
Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia to extend
invitations to President-elect Ortega's
10-12 Dec
Vice President-elect Ramirez met with
President de la Madrid in Mexico. F___] 25X1
Domestic opposition leaders Arturo Cruz and
Pedro Chamorro and insurgent leader Alfonso
Robelo attended a conference in Spain on the
problems of democracy in Nicaragua.
Former French Prime Minister Mauroy visited
Nicaragua for meetings with regime
officials.
CHRONOLOGY OF ARMS FLOW INTO EL SALVADOR
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3 January
7 January
8-9 January
9 January
10 January
20 January
23 January
Salvadoran Supreme Court reconvenes and will
likely rule shortly thereafter on the
constitutionality of President Duarte's line
item veto of the electoral law
Honduran and UNHCR officials to meet in Geneva
on repatriation of Salvadoran refugees
Contadora Group foreign ministers to meet in
Panama
Nicaraguan National Assembly convenes
Inauguration of Nicaraguan President-Elect
Ortega
Meeting between Nicaraguan Miskito leader
Rivera and Sandinista officials
US-Honduran talks on security issues continue
with meeting of ad hoc group in Tegucigalpa
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CENTRAL AMERICA MONTHLY REPORT $17
Copy #1 - Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
2 - Mr. Donald Gregg
3 - Ambassador Shlaudeman
4 - General Paul Gorman
5 - HPSCI
6 - SSCI
7 - Lt. Gen. James A. Williams
8 - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
9 - Mr. Constantine Menges
10 - Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
11 - Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau
12 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
13 - Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley
14 - Doug Mulholland
15 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
16 - DCI - 7D60
17 - DDCI - 7D601.1
18 - Executive Director - 7D44
19 - SA/DCI/IC - 7D60
20 - Executive Registry - 7E12
21 - DDI - 7E44
22 - DDO - 7E26
23 - IAD/SAG/SOIC - 1E4846
24 - NIO/LA - 7E62
26 - Controller - 7C21
27 - C/DDI/PES - 7F24
25 - NIC/AG - 2G40
28 -
29 - Director, Legislative Liaison - 7D43
31 -
30 - Legislative Liaison - 7B04 (attn:
32 - PDB Staff - 7F30
33 & 34 - D/ALA - 3F45
35 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
36 - DDO/LA
37 -
38 -
39 -
C/DDO/LA
C/DDO/LA
C
F 3C3
203
- 3B44
40 - I- 3D00
41 - - GH62
42 & 43 - ALA/PS - 3F38
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44 - ALA Research Director - 3F44
45 - 48 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
49 - DDI/CPAS/ISS - 7G40
50 - CPAS CDPB CC - GH25
51 - C/LA~ 11H39
52 -
53 -
54 -
55 -
56 -
57 -
58 -
59 -
60 -
61 -
62 -
63 -
64 -
65 -
66 -
67 -
68 -
69 -
70 -
71 -
72 -
73 -
74 -
C/MCD
DC/MCD/CU
DC/MCD/CA
C/CAN
C/CAS
DC/CAN
C/MX
C/CAR
C /Cu
75 - MCD Files
76-77 - CA Files
DDI/ALA/MC/CA/
(11 January 1985) 25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100010001-4
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100010001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100010001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100010001-4
El I
Salydor
1 Ghont les ,Rama
lnsurgen~am.bushes
Lago
Nicaragua
Rivas
Wine
fns rge fs killed Segovaa IP10I g8
/ La Rosita
~ mi fielkds
Santa Clar
T aaueca, Minor
i ead# g 6i 9 - ', skirmish s
rs used r. Sandinista inista units f.
Cohlbe Estefi We We La Cruz de
' F~teli. Rio Grande
Chinande \\siilledc
minefields- C~?~1
!?/ `~~ S' ilea rb r ...
Lemp"ifa
Nnave Guinea
Atlant
Rio
N an Juan
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100010001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100010001-4
Secret
Election Results-14 December 1984
La
North
Orange
Walk
South
Cayo
Central
San
Ignacio
Chetumal
Chetumal
Il Corozal ) C.io:aL
Louthwest Bat_
Orange Walk
Central
Corozal
Southeast
Belize
Rural
North
arty - /t
ree leftist o fi 1
eted. B
Rural South
Toledo
West
Punta Gorda Gulf of
Honduras
Puerto Barrios
Age 44 ... leader el conservative United
Den o rube forty since 1983. ucceeds
George Pric as Prime Minister
moderate, generally pro-US, likely to
cooperate mole closely with Washington
and drug-related is
buteapp ehecnsive about strong military
relations . lava negotiated settlement
of longstanding border dispute with
Guatemala, but-like Price-will resist
making a land concession ... British
wife .. two children.
Boundary rap resentet ion is
not necessarily authoritative,
District with People's
United Party winner
District with United
West candidate was defeated
- District boundary
The Bahamas
25X1
25X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100010001-4