THE OLD-LINE GROWS THINNER IN HAVANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 19, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OIT'?:CE OF NATIONAL ESTIMA'].?2S
19 February 1965
STAFF MEMCRANAUM NO. 9-65 (Internal ONE Working Paper --
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: The Old-Line Grows Thinner in Havana
The recent sacking of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez., head of
INRA and one of the moat important old-line Cuban Communists,
is but the latest reflection of Castro's increasing concern
over Cuba's failure to gain momentum and of his willingness
to purge his subordinates. In our view, Castro is trying not
only to put his economic house in order., but to remove any
possible old-line Communist threat to his dominance. In so
doing., he doubtless wishes to impress on Moscow that he - and
he alone -- is Cuba's master. Castro will almost certainly
continue to purge additional personnel., and we believe that he
will remain in charge of the situation.
1. Things did not go well for Castro during 1964.
Cuban economic conditions and prospects re rained poor, and
popular enthusiasm for the regime remained low. The fall of
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Khrushchev introduced new uncertainties corzerningr the degree
to which the USSR would support Cuba in the event of a new
Cuban-US crisis.
2. Castro accordingly became increasingly conQerned with
means ;o restore momentum to the Cuban revolution. To this
end, he made a number of dram, '?ic changes in the regime' a in-
ept a(tninistrative system. In June he replaced his Minister
of Foreign Trade. In July he created a new minictrjr to deal
with sugar problems. Later that month he fired the Minister
of Economy, who was also head of the Planning Board, and put
President Dorticos in charge of both. In December Castro
fired the Minister of Labor.
3. These shake-ups were accompanied by increased poli-
tical jockeying between Fidelistas and old-line Communists.
In March, the two groups squared off at one another during
the Marcos Rodriguez trial. The personal intervention of
Fidel hims..Lf saved the old-liners from a political drubbing
on that occasion, but they clearly lost ground. Moreover,
important old-line Communists, Joaquin Ordoqui and Edith Garcia
Buchaca, his wife, were left vulnerable to charges of dis-
loyalty to the regime. Garcia Buchaca was soon quietly eased
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out of her pcbt ac; head of the Cultural Institute. And last
November, Castro tsk;cippcd Ordoqui of his high posts in the
Armed Forces and in the revolutionary party. It appears that
Ordoqui will be charged with betraying the revolvAdon, and he
may be tried publicly. If so, the old-line Communists will
undoubtedly ~inare the public d:!. pproh tion that ;ri_ll follow.
i. Now, Cacitro has cut down another leading old-liner:
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, head of INRA. Castro has assumed
personal control of INRA, leaving Rodriguez in charge of
"economic studies." It is not clear whether Castro chopped
Rodriguez because of his old-line Communist background., or
because of economic inefficiency, or both. What is clear is
the dow,agrading of one of the most influential old Communists
in Cuba. This fact will nDt be lost on the Fidelistas., who
may now become even more vociferous in their opposition to
the old-liners; or on the old-liners, who may read it as the
final sign that Castro is out to crush them; or even on the
Soviets, who must once again realize that Comrade Castro is
a strong, nationalist leader over whom they have little levrer-
age. Indeed Castro's ousting of Rodriguez is., to some extent.,
doubtless part of a larger scheme to remove any possible
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old-line Communist threat, and to impress on Moscow that he --
and he alone -- in Cuba's master.*
5. In our view, Castro will almost certainly continue
to purge additional personnel, for both political and admin-
istrative reasons. We think it unlikely, however, that there
will be any sudden, widespread purge. Two likely purgees,
both old-line Communiata, are Lazarc Pena, head of the Cuban
Workers Confederation; and Manuel Luzardo, Minister of Inter-
nal Trade. Castro may become somewhat more vulnerable to an
assassination attempt as the number of those ousted or
threatened ;-.nereases. All things ecnsidered, however, we
believe that the key elements in the military and security
forces w.,.11 continue to support Castro, and that he will thus
remain in charge of the situation.
Castro's sensitivity over t1sis latter subject may, in part,
explain his strong public remarks this January that, "what
each party must do must be done in a specific concrete
circumstance, and nobody anywhere must tell it to do so . .
if any party were to try that with us, it would meet with
e decisive and. complete rejection".
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