THE CORING STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE USSR: THE SCENE AND THE SUCCESSORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 26, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTrL' LIGIrNCE AGENC7C
2t~ : cbrua,ry 1964
STAB ~ MEMORANDUM NO.. 13-6~E (Tn?cernal 01~ Working Paper --
CIA Distribution Only)
SULaJECT: T'ne Cor?.ing Strugrgle for Yower in the USSR: The
Scene at.d the Successors
IChrushchev reaches his 71st year this spring. This could
mean, if he is another Adsnauer, that he has as yet to reach
his politics]. prime and his anothsr seventeen years of party
?_eadership left to him. But it could also mes.n, if he is a more
norme,l actuarial sta~istic, that his allotted span may end in
eight years or so. Or, of course, it could be that his luck
will run out and Ise will leave us tomorrow. In an;r case, his
70th birthday seems an appropriate time for come consideration
and con3ecture concerning the possible political climato at the
time of his departtk e Arid the nature of those wro will seek to
succeed himo
GIROUP 1
xeluded from automE~~tic
B-E-C-R-E-T downgrad??.nQ and
declassification
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C0~?PT~T:ivl~;5
P~?re
I . IJ.Vi'RODUC: ~~ION . ~ 1
7'hc cu.trent CPaU rm,~ ~h abot~.t "politic,s over ec?o~.~omi~:s" is
e.~cposed for whr~,t it ia; a fraad wtzlch ~~i.l~. be revecleu most
dr~.:a~,~ice,:L~:,;f duri.n~ the next ruccc^s1.on crisis.
J~Z. Jrt~ 1~mX'1 ~7tiJ~ivLUiiyV1Y V~f J.L~ : 1111 1?IL' 1V . . . . u o 0 0 3
Ln zahich the c~.~~,re.cte.r of t.~^ r~c;1 at ~,",c t.~p is
discussed; their essential conservr.~tic~ ;iso~.~;.'~eCi
III. TiiL SET':~.'I7dv: plfi'.~" ' ~C)LITIC3 . . 7
An exaWin~ttion of tiie ~olltical forces ;. ~levan?t to '.,:.t~
next succession strugC:le' in ?te:c~s of si~.i3-a:citi~~s and c:.;:?:tra?_~ts
to the situation in 1953; t,~e 2~svo corcli.c~~? tk~:~t tale cr.+-.,,~.F;e
in en~~ir~rsent sine the post-uti~,lin strt;~gie iac,y .lead to
some inter%t~tin~ politicn?. diff~sence~.
N. GT_'iIII~ GR~TJPS o . . 11
1'h~ possibJ.e infiuerc ~ of other ele~en?t3 in Soviet
society is considered in terns of the rtru~C;1e at the top,
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P~,r
with pa,rtic~~l,na- attenti~;z p^ id t;.; the }?~te~~ticil rile
of thn pear.,].e rind t~.e in~t.e:lZ`ctu~e.la.
V. POhICY POLITICS . . 1.6
The role o'" p:,licy is by iefly 9.iaeu~cr:cad a;~d t;.e
pesai'ailit~~ ~f a bifurcr~,~tJ:,~.i aetween "cors~r;rativ;:L'' ^,r,u
I~rushehevites is su~~este%.
VI? 11`![~L1LIi~L.~~lUS I~~I~,L\ 1 l.~I ~/t7 0 ? e ~ e o .l~
Tne t~S ~!mpa.ct ou tn~ s~~~~ces,ion strug~7_e ms.y ~e
indirect e~*^_n f~:rtuitnz.s~ bn~i: will Lea irrpor-~?~,nt nonettic:less.
~37:c)GWIPH,'C ~NTJ'X
T. IN~ODTJ,C'~ON .. . Al
Onme remarks concern.nC the i~npwct of hu~,n 7~er-
s~nalities on the course oi' Soviet events
II. TEF' Two T'Jti COA1~!'ETr)FRS ~ A-6
Brezhnev and Podg~rg3r
III . T4T0 OLD I;ANio . A-' 0
Mtkoyan and Suslov
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I'l. TIIIiL'L' SCCOND-TEAM CIa.ATILLN~RS ? A-13
ICirilenlt~~ Kosygin~ Land Varonnv
V. T[iP ~; ~ YOt~~G COMEI?S A-18
Demichev~ ~a].yanslty, and She].epin
VI. A P?~'GIONt'~L S!i'RONCI~T1'~: ;, ~ ~ A-22
Sbelest
VIi',, Two OTJTSIi~LRS . . A-23
Ma.lin~vsky and Tvr~rdovsk;~
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1. Rrot~omics have more or less auaumed primn,cy over: politi~:R
in the 5ovict sche;ne of.' things evor since the fall of 1962, when
an obscure 5oviat re~searchet~ is said 'co hn.ve a'tur~bled upon a
long lost s~ta,tement o~1 the subject by' someone who should know,
~,enin. `true, there wa.s a period during tale winter months of
1963 (coinci~'.erit with ether signs of Khrushchev'r~ ;political diffic-
ulties) when this slogan r3Qems `~ r~.-re bo,en forgotten, and a
subsequent z~eriod when the party philosophers and rationalizers
sought to ~~wove that economics were, and then again were not,
primE in Soviet society. But since then the haggling has apparently
ceased and the official line once again asserts the notion of
f~conotnics f'ixst.
2. IJo doubt the Soviet powers that be have their own good
reasons fc~x u~ avowing, but from our point of view, and partic-
ularly ~r3.thin the context of this paper, the new formula. could not
be a balder mis~i;a,tement of the facts. Politics are supreme in
the USSR especiaLl.y within the dominant political group (the party),
and politics, furthermore, are likely to remain supreme at "least
ao long ate the party does. The truth of this axiom can be no
better demonstrated than by the events which twice took place in
the a~tea.m~.th of the death of the Soviet leader. Certainly the
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man~::uvars which followod T,enin' o deo.th und, later, Stn~.in's. were
politics in their starkest foam; the goal ~,na simply grid neatly,
power. Ard so it will be, we thin}c, durint3 the next great
succession c~,xsi ~, n.f't-er the death of Khr~tshchev.
The Next Sucre asia.i Cr :sis; The Men
3. It :~ a for th~~ re,~y~ paa-t the nature oP the Soviet system
which predetermines the shape of political. tension at the top,
and so long as that F~yrtem remains one which is dominated by a.
single institution, inc~: party, and a mere handf'.ul of men at its
apex, there is little alternative to strugglle a.nd crisis when the
leader himself is removed or. dies. Khruahcrev has sho~m himself
on r,:cre than one oc~.r~sion t;o be aaare of both his own mortality
and the struggle likely to follow hi.s dett~ise. So long a.a he wishes
to remain undisputed leader, however, there a.re severe limits
imposed on his abi:l..~ ~,y to establish ~r. pL1.it?rCl ai succession; he
cannot afford to giant too much po`:er ;o e.ny other single leader
in the party lest he himself lose ccntml in the pxocess.
~. Anything can happen daring a stxugg:t.e for the succession
-- accidents wi3:. ~,3most certainly play a xo].e -- and any attetript
to name the probable winnex c~~n on:ly be con~ectu~~e. Certainly i:-~
1953 ne onP named Khrushchev, the Politburo clo~cm, as the most
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lilcely to succeed, Find,, its fact, it tools over four yearn for hint ?to
connvl_?ldate h:1.u posittior.. M:1.erkoti- wa.s Stalin's cho:lce ttnd the
favorite candidate of Western analysts and, in truth, he r.E=~ita.ined
a contoncl.er unt3.l 1955 and an a,ct3.ve opponent o:C ICl:ruahchev' a
until 1957. brezhnev now's^rr~s i>'! aott!a ways to occupy the position
once he13 by f~alenlcov (apparent hey x? a;~parent,, and perhapc~
Mikoyan could be likened to Mo1~i'~~? 'in that Mikoyan ? s chrxncos for
anything better than cl high pas~.tion during cn interregnum seem
faix'ly remote. Podgorny, the mari from the t;l:rai.ne,
could in sot~e ways he cotttpare~. to
the eaxlier Khrtashchev. Kosygin and ICag~novitchy l~~ozlov and
%hdanov, Suslov and Suslov, etc., etc., ~- t,re cota_td go on (and, in
fact, do so iri the Biographic re~riew at Arine~t~.
5. Despite individual differences betwavn the men now at thr:
top, moat of them seem to fit a more or less general. mold. Unly
two of them (excluding a couple of elderly non-entities), Mikoyan
and Suslov, were in high positions dt?ring the last succession crisis
in 1y53. Kosygin served at the time in an imposing post (candidate
member of the Politburo), but his role in the contention could have
been on?y relatively minor. The other men who are likely to figure
in the next crisis were out in the oblasts or down in the Moscow
apparat in 1953; they were largely impotent insofar as their
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ability to brinU dixert power to bear on the; struggle then underwray.
Some of these men have ho.d good, pxactical schooling in e,pecia.li~ed
affaix?s (eng:ineeritlg, agriculture, etc. ), oti~ers hove served almost
exclu.r~ively as party ha~ks? riJith {;hP possible and partial exception
of t~iko~ran and Kosygin, however, el.l appear to be almost Pxclusively
paz'ty caieeraafis, and all of them could he expected to cotupate
with ors another iri ?rhe first inatr3,nce within the upper reaches
of the p~.~xty itse:l.f. This background and this party interest will
serve to lZmj.t both their initiative and their imagination. None,
for exsnmle, is likel.,y to repeal a, basic law of Leninism, such a.s
agricultural. collectivization, ut least not unlebs forced to by
economic chaos ox political desperation.
6. Indeed, one could ~o,y with considerable ,justice That the
group as a whole is :in.;;lined toward conversatism. This does not
suggest to us by any means that they wou.'Ld be inclined to revert fo
anything so horrendous as Stalinism, 'liven if th?y iia,d. the caps.city,
but it does suggest within the limitt~ of our imowledge that they lack
the zeal and the talent of a Kh.?ushchev. ~ x'urtl~er, they may well
lack the incentive; o.oing awa,u with. S+,a.iinism, or. even Leninism,
It could be that there is a. sort of dynastic law far suoh regimes,
that the talents of the leaders decline in dirzct ratio ?to '`heir
distance from the revointion. Such a rule, howe?rer., would no
doubt be tested by more than one exception.
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is quite a, d3.fferr?nt older of work than do:i.ng a~ra.y Z?yi-h Kllrushchevir~m.
I~'ollowitig Lenin e.tid 3ta1~1-n ore the bi11 cer~~a,inly posed more individual
pz~oblema Char. axe liltely fo:~l,::ring 1Ch~rtzshchev. (Idote, incid.entc~l:ly
the diffcxent wad- x.11: which Stalin and 1Qlrushchev ;landed. this
Utlrt:i^t]lar problem: Stalin at first pretended. to be the executor of
T~enin's will and., even after his power wn.s comp3etely consolidated,
uevcr admit~tecl.ly re jetted either Lenin's pol9.cies or his image;
Khrush4hev, on the other hand, faced with a not totally dissimilar
problem, seized the first feasible oppor-ttulity to ,~opi;,_-~,5. the
lr~Qend of his prec.ece~sor and to claim for his otrl shoulders the
mantle of Lenin).
7. If the Central Committee forms are important arena of
contest, the character of this body is also of.' import for the
sue _essiat~ struggle. Wh:i]_e it has changed. its composition by more
than half since 1956, anc~. b;~ roughly^ two-th3.rds since 192, it
does not seem w~i the main to have altered its cre.rs.cter veryrtuch
Elie members ~t_lll seem 'to be drawn from rotaE;hly the same jobs and
the same strata ar--, the; were during Stalin's titn~~s; th:y are party
functionaries (over 1+0 ~aercent} governlannt officiate (roughly a
thi.xd), and a conglomeration of military men, "leading workers",
and "-intellectual w.~rkers" . Chances axe, then, that the prevailing
conservative attitude of the 'c'residium (And of the Secretariat as
wail )axe mirrored with'.ti the Centxal Committee. A11 in all, the
top three hundred or so officials of the CPSU strike one a3 relatively
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ill-prepaxcd for the rhan~,-ng times; they ceom to be an essentj.rslly
conservat:i.ve vested interested group function:{.nor, within a gotentia:~ly
dynamic society.
7a. Indeed, the important members of the Cenral Committee
and party functionaries in the provinces were for the most part
serving in cadre functions during Stalin's times and were psyc~aol-
ogicaJ.~y prepared and formally trained in the Stalinist school.
Robert Conquest recently commented on the character of these men
in S~~s~vey; he descxibed them as "philistine, hypucritical, short-
sighted, bigoted, r'athlesa, total7_y indoctrinated with their own
right to rule." This description may reflect Conquest's own
poetic sersibtli t:tes as well as his K.xemlinolog7 cal acumen, but,
individual zr~ember~.~ of rea,t auilit;~ and for
with some a.llowancc for~poat-Stalin improvements in geac,ral soph-
istication; he probably is not very tirido of the marls. Tt goes
4d.thout saying that such a group will xesist change; it its also
txue, however, that change ?nay be forced upon them.
The Setting: Party Polita.cs
8. If we thus cannon chose the next Soviet leader, can
merely dN, cribe in genexaT. the political temper~antof the leading
group, perhaps we can usefully examine the environment in which the
succession stxuggle will by waged. What are the broader forces
likely to operate on this group: do they differ escentiaily from
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tlaoso of 19537 In some ways, of course, they Ci,o not: there still
are no establiuhed proce~i~.zres or statutory provisions which pan
serve to prevent a s~truL,gle or determine its outcome . (indeed,
conatitutiona?.1y, there is no ouch man as the; iesa~r. of the Soriet
t~tate and part;y). As in 1953, the struggle will at least_ in its
early r~tages be centered on and conducted within the elite
appa.rca:tus, the pr~ri:,y.
9. I'urthex, in ti~rms of possible similar9 ties between 1953
and the next compaxable ;t~eriod, and despite the aforementioned lack
of formal procedures, thert~ may stall be sn unwri~tton consensus
among most of the probable contenders which may serve to define the
router limits of the struggle, a:t least during its initial stages.
TY.e system ha,a twice undergone the xigorg of a succession crisis and
in neither case did it involve either a palace coup or an open resort
to violence. Rather, it was marked icy period of intense contention,
fierce political infighting, and then by purge, but only after the
bati;le had really been won. Stalin's resort to muxder ire the early
and mid-thirties enabled him to elimina.te~ his oppcn~nta, but he had
already achieved a preeminent position in 'the party; later, the
blood purges of the late thirties removed all potential opposition
but he had already achieved absolute powex. In a sense, then,
Stalin's use of terror was more of a means to preserve power than to
attain it.
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lC. Why this relatively restra,:ined approach by politicians who
otherwise demons'tra.~te little inclination toward re:~ta~a.int?
Partly, we thinlc, because the Sovl.et leaders have always feared
the people, specifically popular reactions and possible public
participation should the struggle within the leadership ever spill
out into the open; partly because of the longstanding myth, carefully
cultivated lsy aL1 the leaders, that the top men stand locked in
monolithic unity, and, in this union, represent the fall flowering
of democratic centrr~.lism and the scientific will of the party and
the workers; E.nd partly because the men involved in such a struggle
are by nature secretive (the revolutionary tradition) and in this
have bee~z encouraged by- the conspiratorial character of the system
Itself. In short, at least to the outsider, the Soviet regime,
despite its almost absolute au'..hority and its propensity for pur-
e 3.n.g uvowedly morn.l ends through blatantly im~oral means, has to
upon
some extent imposed itself certa:tn rules which apply to the period
of the succession struggle. Because of altered circumstances, these
motives may not figure so heavily during the next succession crisis
(see belcw). Bu::, on the whole, we believe that the various players
of the game are likely to agree that -their problems should be
settled without resort to such methods as coups, civil wars, and
terror; there is, in effect, a sort of honor among thieves.*
~Thievse fs,ll. o~zt when honor is violated. Thus it was in 1953 when
Beria's apparent effort to violate the rule proscribing coups forcdd
tho other contenders to band together in order to effect his removal
and execution.
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].:L. ]3ut beyond poarcible s'irnl.l.n.rlti~a aixch as these, the
actt:I.nE; fbr i,hc next auccea;iion crisis io lalcely to be quite
dii'{'crcnt i'rom that of cloven yer.I,ra ctigo. Moat impori;ant, neither
3ovie t; eoc:Ie ty a.s ~~ whole nor the top leader. a of the o ociety arc
conctrrl-lnru by terror. ~^t~u~rc is no 13e1~ia 1.n 1g6~~ anc7 one is
urI].i1ce].y ?t;o emerge ao long as rrhruahchev is in control. This
ahouad produce n notoble political and psychological chnnge in the
next aucreaaion cris-Ea, :.f only becn.use the stakes should no
longer include purely pe-rsona,l suz^t:ival. This, in turn, might
induce the vn.rioua eandidntes to race even more c:mpha,ia on
political maneuvering, leas on avoiding per:~onai risk. It; also
implies that the strong bond t'na.t united the goat-Stfl].in collegium
(excepting Deria~, their common fear o:' a reversion to terror, will
no longer cement the grc~ap during the initial stages of the
contention.
12. Aoso~~iated with St~lin'B terror wus the r_ollective
concern of the top leadership in the spring of 1553 about the
temper of th~~ people; we know now, though w~ did not at the time,
that t:Ie Soviet leaders feared a popular uprising, not only in the
satellites but also within the USSi] itself. This too constituted
a powerful bond and has a major impact on policy. While the
Soviet people have demonstrated trn?t their current mood is testy,
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it does not seem to be explosive, and ~;he lcnd~~rs a.re unliY.el~r to
fear open revo'it. Th~i.s, Ir~.cking a comrnon concern about texror and
a common dread of the p?_~oplc, the immediu.te I~ost-IClxruchcYrev lcader-
sh9.p may have both leas xeason and leoo desire to Z~ork in puhllc
harmony. lend this, might lead to a morn open and more incense
political struggle during the first few months of contention than
was th:: case in 19:;3.-~?
Other Groups
13. she growing complexity of Soviet Society, tor;ether with
the end of ~talini~t rule, Y,as in effect increased the stature and
the latent power of groupe which do not in their o~m minds owe
first e,llegiance to the ~el;tn~, party. It is to tY.ece groups that
potential leaders will loolr for support; the degree t;o which they
in fact do so is moat likely to be a function of both the presumed
*?Flhile this is our bes% ~iudr~nent a3 to the most likely course of
events, we cannot exclude 1:i1c'_ po:~sibility that these diffci?ences
in environr,,,~~lt bet~;~een 19;3 and the present era, will facilitate a
more pee,ceful succession. The more relaxed general a?`;mo.~phere and
the relative confidence a.s to personal surtrivr~l even in political
defeat, may ha~?e so permera.ted the top councils; that the old cutthroat
r~:J_es h__^.ve become obsolets. `t'hus, pt~r-ticula-rly if k'hrushchev
shoul.:i clearly dec~igrate a "wecond secretary" and ae, in turn,
,~Y~o~rl?3 develop a s+x?ong and loyal fol].ocring ?crithi z the apparat,
the leadership might acquiesce in the assumption of power by the
recogri~.zed leading contender f~, the top position. Dut, if co, we
would estimate that the struggle would sooner or later burin again.
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-L-c-r~-1~?-`r I
a~trenCrLYt of thci3e L;rou;~n n.ncl., cc~ually important. the auratJ.on of tt.
euceesct:lon :~ti~uL;Cle. 7.`l.:.' l.onL~er ri c~:r?ic;:ls survives, the grco.tcr ~t;hc
rode to be played by interested "outrliders".
14. 1'he govert~men~ and ecouontl.c apparatus, i:hcugh no lonL,er
ao much the nep~aratc identity it conotitutea in Malenkuv's time.
nonetheless -rcrmains an 'itrT~oxtr~,n.t element. :It could becom~? a more
hor.ioL;Cilhlls ~ Croup :li' events encoul?a.red it r, m~mbera to assert their
common iraerects, many of which diverl3e from these of the pnrty.
N.'ore so than in 1953, the military wi11 almost certa-:.n1y platy nn
important role :irt any protracted sue^ess:Inn crisis. W'hilc we do
not believe that the ha.r;h cotrnnand a,a yet wishes to ^.~ercise the
powers of an ind.epenaent political force, it could a;~pir~: to such a.
position i~: the event that it felt its interests jeopardized by
the ernerCence of forces basically inimicn.l to matters of military
concern, an area which, iniz:identally, becomes v'~' Creates. and Greater
scope with the passage of time. ~lthouCh certainly not united on
all questions of strategy and no doubt rife with personal rivalries,
the military does foxm a relatively homogenous Qroup, one which,
furthermore, controls powc:c:fu1 rassete of i?ts own.
15. T1ext, and of potentially the greatest impora:wnce, the people
thetnEelv;.s could play a major, if largely indirect, solo during a.
period of extended crisis,. Since 1953, tna~or changes in Soviet
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 __ _.~. ~ ~ ~...~ -.aa~mar~ .,--.-.,. .._ .~-aoc . -,., vim ~'nL-1,~.~6 ..:. 1..n _ +~YF.~'-. ~~ - rc yU~~~~e~~?y~~~~,',
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society, nncl 9.n the rcrime' n attitude toward, that noriety, brave had
a profound ei'!'cct- on Lhc ,Mood un1 dcs:ires oi' the pcop7.r, and on the
wi.l.l:ingnesa of cex-tain element~~ in the Population, the "opini~~n
leaders", to express those desireu. Tl-.%~c~c people arc not imprensed
w.f.tli the do6-ni and are increr~sinCly aware that the limits of
permicnible expxesaion mra.y be tested (and e,cpanded) Z~rltr,out fear
of d'ixe punishment; thus the sound of discontent has become almost
communplace and, flee it or not, the regime ha.a round itself
listening,
16. ~.`~e most strik'ng e.'prensionc of discontent have, of
course, con:,: from the ~rotiring and increa.r~~.ngiy sophictica.a;,ecl
intelligensia,? Chi,,#'i.ne under >;he controls of an :institution, the
party, which to them seems more and more to represent an anachron-
istic and inefficient weighs,; on the; body politic, members of the
intellectual vanguard have been looking for something better,.
Their voice. ~ of protest has found for itself a, syrrmathetic audience
among students, scien~ists and various other 1eve13 of literate
society. given among the people at large, where discontent has
mainly economic roots, the intellectuals can probably find a
fairly sympathetic environment for tho#.r ideas; if nothing else,
the post- Colin changes in attitude may have ended the popular
s~:epicion that it is (or will be considered) unpnt;iotic, even
treasono~is, to Eive vent to one's feelings of diasa.tiafaction.
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17. In a nciiac, i;'~,:~n, one i~ar;ht sn.,y tl~ai; for the 1'irc~t I;im
?ln pout civil wnr Sov.t~rt; hiato:ry t~zex~; has appeared cry t;lie acme
an only pari:ially hidden popular oppo~:it,.on oi' sort:, one wh:l.ch
has over the years become of ancreaaingly vital concern to the
regime. (It is one th5.ng 't;o 1?uild steel plants and assemble small
ar-na with a disgruntled labor i'oree, moved mainly by coercion: it
is quite another proposition to build nuclear rcr ~to,ra and acaemble
roc}tets to the moon with unwilling workers, i. ~:,aufSiciently moved
by incentive.) Thin "opposition" ia, of course, by no mcnns
uaitod and ras as yet to draft an opposition prograTn. Indeed,
much of it is no doubt apolitical, moat of its "members" consider
themselves to be loyal Soviet citizens, and probably few would
seriously contemplate the liquidation of "socialism" (as variously
defined). The i;caca~.?~ would probably be most interested in land,
the worltera in higher wages and less wor}ting time, th ~ economic
managers in more responsibility and freedom from central (and
doctrinal) restraints. The intelligentsia,, particularly the
intellectuals, probably Homes the closest to forming a more or
less unified group anal to que~ `inning the right reason of the Soviet
system.
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1E~. llccordln~; to U?orno c~bserv^r~.~, howe~?cr., we ahouJ.cJ not
intex~ret thin dcvc].ol,m%:nt as nccecsca.ri].y :i~~dl.cativc of a rca.l
growth of freedom in the USSR. According tc: Richar~} Pi];o~, for
exaiaple: "4Je like ?L?o interpret a.ny mnn:i.Pcctatiox~ of .lihcrtarJ.an
tendcncie~ a.~ tin indication of liberty it;~cli'. That such apro-
cedux?c cannot be ;justified on loi;icaJ. grounds requires no e].c~'~or-
ai;:i.on ."~- Yet, of. amore sangu:i.ne mind than PireB, we should add
here 1;hat libertarian tendencies must, in both logic and 1if.'e,
~~`ilie whole ';uestion of thn political meanint; oi' these "J_iT.ertarian
t ndencies" in Soviet litera~cure r.Lmaiu:~ for the moat p~.rt unex-
plored. terri-toi~y. Various observers have recorded their impressions
(as has Pip^a) and some who are in fairly c].oce contact with Sovl.ct
writers have provided ua tirith good descriptive reports from tl:e
"inside" (a.s h~zr Priscilla, Johnson in the Ju].y-1'~ugust '.9C3 issue of
Yrebl?m~ o? CoillMUni:im). Bllt what ilas not been provided is a. com-
prehen~iv? Luxti~ey ot`rthe political content and political impact.
of Soviet literature (not to mention an estimate as to its possible
future implications ). In ar~y event, until that ha.s been done, and
tire are proved wrong, it is our feeling that Pips underplays the
political nature of the Soviet intellectuals' ideas . )Ie claima,
for example, that the cu.rren~t crop of Soviet writers are, unlilco
their ].9th centu~.-y predecessors, essentially apolitical. As he
says, Once the L Russian intellectual had tried to change the
State and society, now he tries to e..^.cape the:.." Our feeling is
that writers, such a.3 PTekraso v, I~bramov, even Ehrenburg end
Y.evtushenko, represent in different degrees voices of protest and
axe certainly considered by tl,e party to represent po]itical
tendencies. That most may be anxious to reform the system, ~?a+,h~r
than ovel-thro~?~ it, does not reflect an apolitical approsch. And, of
course, there are some Soviet writer. s, sad students, who co,ll for
revolution. Fina1J_v, in disagreement wit'z 'pes, we would suggest
that the reformist notions of the intellectuals have had effects on
other literate groups in Soviet society, that there i.s considsable
sympathy among students, scientif3ts, and various professionals
for the more liberal outlook of the writers.
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prccec~c 1:tbcrty 1.tr;clf. }?ussir~ i.s no crtranr~cr to ttic ctronf;
pol'Ltical iir;-ri.ct oi' a diaaiclant :i.nt;cll:t~enLsi.a, ~~,ncl ohoul_d present
?treudr3 to Sovic;; literra,~ture co:ztinuc, ohould this ar-:;iculate ~~oice
of skepticism and protest continue to mount, 1.t could hipper. again.
be
Tts chances cf doing uo, moreover, might~a:~; their zenith d.urint; a
period of uncertainty and con~bention at t;h.c top.
Policy Polit:tcs
19. Tt is perhaps irrrpossiblc: to place Soviet party politics
and Soviet policies into tYeparate cotrrpiz?r;ments. Some obc~~xvcrs feel
that Chia can be done at least to tb.e exi;ent: neccescry to decide
which of the two is prime. Thus, for exaTmple, Robert Conquest has
implied that the formulation and execution of policy i.s suboxdinate
to the game of political maneuver, IIc cJ.tes a.s evidence the
switch in policy concerning the consumer made by Khrushchev after
he had defeated the consumer's champion, Malenlcov. Other Sovl.et-
o7_o~ists, however, rr:airrtai:~ that policy (and the forces khich
determine it) are the ~ l.r:i.r.?.a:cjr ? factors. :Ln rebuttal to Conquest,
they suggest that +he fact that I4lrushchev finally swung r~.rc~und t;o
a policy appznximatin that or Mal.enkov indicates that he had no
choice in the matter and demonstrates that broad forces, rather than
the men involved, were responsible for the USSR's post-Stalin
increase in e~aphasis on popular welfare. '
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.Lju. '1'o urn ?~hcre in tX?i!:tt~ on both oides. Thus, ceri;al.nly the' state
of the Soviet economy in 1953 art;ucd 1'or ~rcater investment ln,
for example, agriculture and. the politicians at the :;op were we11
aware of this. ]3uh~ ?thio was perhaps equally true in the itnrnediate
post-war period, and the fact ?that ouch a policy wan not then
aaopted can be a?ctribu?ted to the man, Stalin. Forces c--eate tYie.~
weather buL? men uelect the shelter.
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20. If policies axe thus impoxtant, if not independent of the
men who chose and execute them, we should turn to another mn.jor
difference between the pest-Stalin and 13._ely poet-Khrushchev
environments; the na;;arP of the prevailing policy winds. StA.lin,
.in 1953, Bras setting the stake for another massive purge (the
"doctor's plot' and relations z,rith the West had sunk into a deep
trough. The reactions of most of the contenderswerc away from the
i~rends G;:t in motion by Stalin, away from pure and confrontatio7
t~rith the West. There is a danger, of course, that hi3tory w~.ll
repeat itself, that the potential successors will seek to halt or
reverse IChrushch~v's moves tozrard internal moderation and external
relaxation. There has been considerable unease in the party about
Khruahchev's policies, his relatively relaxed attitude to-,~rard the
people, and his efforts to reform the apparat. "here thus ha.s been
a pronounced tendency for Khrushchev's opponents to resist innovation,
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to rt:7.vocate a consei-vn?tive stanr_e; iniloed, since he is the reformer,
they have 1ie.d little choJ.ce but to be the traditionalists. Almost
certainly this tendency will perUist after his der~.th. Some con-
tenders, fo~.~ example, hoping to xally supporters to their cause,
may adapt a platform calling for retrenchment at home and at least
verbal militancy abroad.?~? Qn the other hand, the opposing
Ithrushchevian line, while not so strong as to be irreversible, has
by now become we11 entrenched and there will also be contend^rs
advocating a platform of continued anti-Stalinism, i?efo~~n,and
rap:~rochement.
21. This ?t:1en is ?the struggle as we foxesee it. Initially,
there may be a period. of it tence individt.~al maneuvering and ~oclceying
??give may have been treated last year to an unusual preview of the
sort of policy favored by consdrvatives. The pAriod December 1962
to A;~ril 1963 was an e:~:traordinary one and polic~r at this ti,?~e
seemed to reflect anon-HIirushchevian conservative concenst:s ot, the
J'residium which czystalizeu. in the wake of the Cuban missile crJs3.s.
Various signs -- pixblic atra.tements, pxopa,;anda, 4ecrees, diplomatic
activities, and actt:.~zl events -- suggoscecl, that IChrushchev's
policies were being s';,ymi.ed or rcverr~ec? . .'t'hus, 1'or example, his
chemical progrr-gym *aa,s ~?irtually forgotten, to the ba_nefit apparently
of more traditional areas of. inves?tmen~t, ouch as defen.;e, Th;.is
the campai~ against the liberal intellectttala rnn.ch^d a shy?ill
fren'~y and involved even a partial posthumous rehabilitatio,z of Stalin.
A'~.d thus a new stridency ir_ the USSR's relations wii;h the US became
manifest and include3 a. warning that disarmament (including a test
ban treaty) might be forestalled for another decade. This hiatus
in IQ.rushchevian policies and style ended in April, ,~hortJ;,r after
the incaptxcitation of ItozJ.ov.
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for position, perhaps manl~ed by public statemcnta pwearirt{ fidelity
to tl:e notion. of l;eninist collectivity. /lssuming, ae we think likely,
tizat no one mnn will be able to become the ungtiesti.oned ain~le
leader during this period, the leadership as a whole will tend. to
divide into t:,~o ox tht?!~e policy factions, each w.Lth its own principc~.l
champion. The longer nzch a situation exists, the more probable
is a process of bipu:larization between the con3orvativca rind the
Khruahchevites, each appealing increasingly to other c~~.ements
of the body politic for support. l;ven~tt:ally, as i.n Juuie 157,
one or another of ther,~ factions must oast the ether and establish
the dominant tone of Soviet life, at least t,,;r.il the next :uccension
crisis .
i licat:[ons for the US
22. P1o matter the precise shape of the a~;ruggle to come, cr
Sts ulti;nate resolu~i.cn, considerable uncertainties are like:!y to
aseail the succeseora to Khrushchev. Thus we believe that a
succession crisis will present the West with a nu;nber of notable
opporttul.ties and, perhaps, g,~ro,ve risl~s. Although there may be no
way in whit 1~ the U3 rt~n dire,:tly influence the eventiv~,l choice of a
successor to Khrushchev, Western recponsee to Soviet policy could
have a major bearing on the outcome oi' i;he s~'~ruggle. It shoald not
by thought that events and Soviet policy will remain in stasis
solely because of high-levr;l ~~?ispui~-~ and uncertainty. In the three
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odd years following Stalin's :]oath, a period when tl~.e ,Quiet ].eaderas
were at each othe?~s throa'Lrs and in pra~~'aund disagroetnent over
policy, 1;he USSR agreed to the Korean armisL-ice, suffered through
the io,.~lin riots, ended its occupation of Rs,rstern flustria, and had
its brief moment of truth in IIunlary.
23. Thus we bell.eve with Myron I',unh that US policy, deliberate
or not, will have a profound impact on the Soviet leaders and on
their policies. l1nu., to paraphrase Ruch, the problem of uoviet
aucceseipn should appear to We;r~ternero in somewhat -t;he sa~rie way as
the problem of eco:~omic ratability in the Wast ap~aears (or at least
once appeared) in the USSR, that is, "portending a crucial and
systematic vulnerabi_lity."
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13rOC,r/1P~ItC 11~1IVI7C
Introduction
1. One does not have to be a be1!.ever of the "great mran"
school to appreciate the it~rpact oi' human personality on history.
Ltiren if a le~~der's policies are to a Large extent determined by the
exigencies and requi.remcnts of the times in which he livee, he none-
thelc+ss re3poncts to his environir:~,twith individual style and pre,~udiees.
Thus, even if Sta:Lin and his policies represented in the ma.wn a
reaction to Lhe needs of a society bent on xapid induetric~lyzs,tion,
certain'~r tl~iere would hceve been differences in degree and in tactics
had someone less ruthless been in command (and Stialin's ruthlessness
antedated the xevolution). Similarly, even if Khrushchev's reign has
been one characterized largely by a necessary reaction against Stalin
at a time when the USSR could afford such a xes,ction, his policies
have nonot7:oles~~ home the stamp of his own fl~~~? r and his own pro-
clivitiec~
2. So it wl.ll be with the next Sovie ;, leader. The broad
outlines of the current Soviet Environment have ul-ready been. indic-
ated here, and the two most likely alternatives of response to tra?t
environmen?E -- continued moderation or a reversion to harRher forms
of rule -- ha~re been suggested. Within either alternative, however,
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NNIJC
policies and events will be nhaped by the ?l.ndividu~l leader. Consider,
for example, the pro4able differences in o.~roach c;P a Mikoyan and ox
a Suslov, e?~ren assuming that each would peek to follcw a Khrushchevian
course. The decline of ideology, A lready apparent on the Soviet acere,
would almost certainly be accelerated under the former, retarded or
even reversed unde;.~ the latter, i3ecause of this, and other rnnsons,
the next US-Soviet dialogue, if Milcoyan were running thingb, might
we11 be at the negotiating table and be concerned with matters of trade
and credit. If, however, Suslov were the leader, such a dialogue
would be more likely to take place over the hof line. And qui?t~~ the
contrary might be true of the Sino-Soviet dialo ;tte .
3. Theso considere?,ions indicate one reason why we feel that
the outcome of the next sueceaAion crisis is of crucial interest to
the US and why it would be wise to know as much as possible about the
characters who will be in contention during that crisis.
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4. Of more vital concern are arenas re:?lccting not only
behaviour but also policy preferences. What of the repozYtc that some
Presidium members (and Malinovslsy) were opposed to Khruahchev's
withdrrawa,l of mis:ailes 'from Cuba? It would. be more than. revealing
to know, for example, that, ICozlov and Suslcv ccaustituted ouch an
o;;,position. At the verti~ 1ee,st, it would su~~{e5t to the uS thnt
neither man would be our favori~t;e canciida.te for Sov3 ~?t leadership.
On the othei hr~~d, should we leaa.-n that, say-1~'~il;oyan had been opposed
to the introduction of missiles into CL~ba in 'the first place (we
have no indications of t;iis ), then he wrould aprear to be a. good man
to support. And, finall~r, it is at. least a possibility that indirP;t
suk~rport of one or am~;tl:er cer3idate through calculated responses to
Sovwe~ ~olic-les could tip the scales in the way desired by the US.
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what does Brezhnev really
think, really want? A11 we low is, in effect, that he and his
superiors have wanted to tell us. Certainly he is not in the business
of public confession: Chances do not seem very good, for ekample, that
h.' will someday noon stand up to tell us that he is in fundamental
disagreement with Khrushchev ovex the direction of the Soviet econom6r.
Once in a while (and Kozlov can probabJtiy be included in this ca+egory)~
a leader will openly disagree with his boss about specific matters
(in Kozlov's case this happened in xegard to the question of new
investment in the machine building industxy). B~~t when this happens
it does so in a disguised manner, and Western observers are left to
quarrel. among themselves as to its portent, if any.
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7. Do all thin ac i?L? may, we append a selective set of bio-
graphics of top Soviet officials. `t'hey give the bare banes data,
the sub~ect4~ personal clia,ractcriat:tcs and a
con3ectuxal commentary concerr.~.ing the rota the sub;}ect might play
durinOr a period of contention. Leaders who~do not appear destined
to p7.ay an important role, either because of their aQe (e.g.,
Presidium members Shvernilc and I:uusinen) or their probable lack
of real political power (e. g., candidate member of the Pr~stdium
G.rishin), have been excluded regardleso of tYzeir titula r positions.
We hrwe, however, added some names to the 1:Lst because of their
a,~, that is, have inclined come younger men in high positions who
are unlikely to succeed to the top spot immed:~~.tely, but whore
support will be cultivated. finally, for interest and contrast,
we have included a represent~~,tive of the militaxy and one of the
intelligentsia; the former may play an active role in the struggle,
the latter may not (but it would be nice if he did. )
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"r'~~'~'r'T nNN~~c
T. TIi1; 7.'WO TOP CON`iTND~~IZS; D1~1ZHMs'V AND PODGi)RNY
Tn the itmnediate ai'terma.th of IthrusYichcv' a death, one of these
two men is mot+t likely to succeed to the top party post. We have no
idea whether one would be willing to stand asida for the other or
whether they would contest ~,r3.th one another for the position. Tf
I4iruahchev has made clear his choice and moat of the other' leaders
seem to go along with it, and if Brezhnev and Podgorny (and their
wives, if Podgorny ha.s one) do not actively dislike ;,..e a,nocher,
then perhaps a peaceful decision will be possible. ~?ven with ouch
preconditions, however, chances would re~~..a.n good that, sooner or
later, the lists would be entered.
Tf one comperes the careers of the two men, Brezhnev emerges
as thF young man who made good under both Stalin and Khruehchev.
At age I+6, he was appointed to Stalin's large Po7.itburo as a candidate
member in 1952. Viand not many members of that organ are still around ),
at a time when Podgorny (tl~en ~~9) was slowly easing himself up into
the top levels and had 3ust reached the Central Committee. Brezhnev
got back onto the Presidium in 1956 and became a full member in 1957?
Podgorny did not become a car_di8.a.te until the following year and a
fuL member until 1960, and ero?en then it `ra,s clear that (aside from
his friendship with Khrushche~r) he owed his position to his secretary-
ship in the Ukraine. If these facts suggest anything, they suggest
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that Drezhnev may be tltc more opportunistic and the more slcillful of
the two, and neither talent would be a handicap 'to a c~~ntender for
top power. Thus, if' the two someday ent3age in compet~.tion, we would
place somewhat better odds on IIrezhn~av, le.rgcly because he appearu
at thin distance to be the beti;ex and more personable politician
(and also seems to hove a wider variety of contacts.)
Brezhnev
1. With his election to the CPSU Serxetariat in JuT.1e 1963,
Leonl.a I. Brezhnev, already titular head of the Sovdet government
(Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme So?tiet ) and full member of
the Presidium, returned to a past which gives him a direct voice in
the execution of policy and an opportunity to increase his own following
within the party appare,t. He now ocoupies more top party and s'ta'te
posts than any Soviet leader other than Khrushchev.
2. An old crony of IQZrushchev's, Brezhnev seems to owe his
career to his boss and to have modelled his life and even his person-
ality after 1Chrushchev's. He is said to possess considerable charm
and to have e. talent for dealing wi t'a crowds . IIe is apparentl~r
bright and a good udrainin~;rntior:
If we: had to guess, we wou33 say that Brezhnev as the leader, would
push policies resembling those of Khrushchev, but probobl.y with more
caution and leet~ imagination.
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3. Dxezhnev'a baclcgrocnd in party work, his long oervice in
the army, and his Oua.lifications as an engineer provide him with an
unexcelled background for the top fob. If he is, indeed, to be
deaignater?, as informa,]. heir apparent, we should coon see some s1 gns
that he is playing a more active role on the Secretariat, particularly
in regain to control over the cadres. The two "second secretaries"
(ICirichenko and ICozlov) once favored by Khrushchev both exercised this
important poorer.
4. Drezhnev (born in 1906 in tb.e Laraine) had an e~z~?ly
bacltground in metallurgical angineer3.ng and later studie3 agriculture
a,s well. He served as an obla; ?i; secretary in the Ukraine until 1941,
w17en he received a commission as a political officer in the army.
He worked under IChrushchev in the Uitrainian party organizn,tion until
1950, then was named first secretary of the Moldavian party, and in
152 S?ras appointed to tY~ CPSU Secretariat and the Presidium as a
candidate member. He returned to the army as a lieutenant general
after the death of Stalin, having lost his top party posts in the
post-Stalin ahuff]_e. In 1954 he was sent to Kazakhstan, where, as a
party secretary, he carried out Khrushchev's virgin lands program.
Re-elected a candidate member of the Presidium and a CPSU secretary
in 19;6, and a full Presidium member following the ouster of the anti-
party group in 1957, he was made Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet in 1.960 and was shortly thereafter relieved as party
secretary, a move which at the time suggested some decline in his power.
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Poi orny
1. Penc~zp3 IChrushchev'a oldest colleague (he began aervin6
under blm before the war), Nilcolay Podgorny has been a member of the
i'arty since 1930 and of its Central Committee since 1952. Re has had
a ion~r uclt~ini;~trr~;tivo career in 'the food industry and did not begin
to serve as a full-time party functionary until 1950, when he wes
appointed First Secretary of the Kharkhov Oblast. He was named
First Secretary of the Ukrainian Farty in 1.957, a candidate member of
the rPSU Pxesidium; in 1958, and a full member in 1gG0. He was sub-
~ected to serious criticism for a bad agricultural harvest in the
Ukraine in lg6o and was accused of mismanagement by Khrushchev himself,
but retained all of his top posts in the party. I~ruahchev presumably
gave his old friend another chance, and since then he has been appointed
to t;he Secretariat (June 1g63), along with Brezhnev.
2. Seemingly solemn and aloof, Podgorny born in the Ukraine
in 1803) does not fit the image of the Khrushchevian politician 'but
almost cer~ainly has gone along with Khrushchev's policies. With a
background both in industry and the apparat, his qualifications for
leadership are good. Further, he is a powerful man in his own right
and could probably count on the Ukrainian party organization to
support hirsfor the top CPSU spot.
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3. ll 13rezhnev-Podgorm- alliance could probably dominate the
leaderohip :['or quite some ?titne after IChruohchev' o clatai;h. But oince
each than undoubtedly has high atnbitiona of hl.s own, :itu a IChrurthchev
favorite, and probably has support w3.tltin ?the party, ouch an alliance
tniQht be short lived.
II . TWO OLD FL~T~TDS : MIICOY~1 ATJD SU^LOV
Chances axe that neither of these then, despite their long
service :in the cause, oould achieve the top position in the party
(unless, of course, one or the other served tet-ipoxarily as titular
chief of a Presidium collective). Nii:oyan.and Suslov offer a study
in contra.ats,both in terets of Choir personalities acid their interests.
Mikoyan is well known for his wit and intelligence and if Orders of
Lenin were ever awe.rd.ed for socialist charm, he would be a winner.
In terms of political tt>Etneuverability, his :~etnarkable staying power
must reflect, among other things, e, shrewd and opFor~~unis?t;ic approach;
hi^ appaxent disinclination to seek the top spot also EsuFgests
considerable realism. He has never been regarded as a dogmatist; his
interests have baen very largely in practical a,c?tivities, such as
txade, and he appears to be far snore concerned t~rith results than
doctrine. Suslov, on the other hand, is dour and doctrinaire; he
has spent almost all his career in ideological woxk of one sort or
another. Indeed, though his surviving power testifies both to his
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S_z;_C_g_r;_~r AN:JP;X
uuefulneas nncl hLc abiltien, ilia mind seems to xeliah a ponderous
and detailed approach to ma,tterc of very little immedir~~te or practical
consequencq.~x' HIs ability 'to maneuver himself to the verf top may
thus be gcite 13.mi~ted.
AI3.koyr~n
1. AsL~,stas Mlltoyan (born Tiflis Oblast, Armenia, la9j) is the
aenlor member of the Soviet readership and has served on the top
policy making body of the CPSU since his appointment to the Politb u1b
as a candidate member. in 196. Iduc'Y of his activ% aex^rlce, however,
has been in the government as cYiie~' of the UaSR's ta~ade program and
he stiles serves as a First Deputy Premier. i~ii2coyan has survived
innumerable purges grid remwins a pe'~sono,l friend of Khrushchev.
2. Mikoyan seem: to work well with his boss and is probably
devoted to the Khrushchevian line concerning both foreign affairs
~A colleague has suggested that Suslov is the sort of leader who
hides his light from outside observers. It ma,y be that he is disliked
by his contemporaries and certainly, even by Communist standards,
he 3oes not appear to be a very 1ik~.ble fellow. But they may find
him particularly valuable (perhaps for the very reason that he i.s not
likable) in disunssions with other Communist parties; and this is
a function he has offer performed, c:.s with the Chinese. In any event,
his colleagues may have ~t:~at old, familiar feeling that "sc.mebody
has to go to those meetings:"
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,r ~., ;,. ~ ~ ~..
S-~r-C-It-I.-`P taNNIsK
and domestic, development. IIe does not owu his career to the ~1.rat
~ecretniy, however, and at times almost cerl;ainly hau expresred his
disagreement ?~*ith Como of I~hruchchev's proposals. He, Suslov, and.
others, fcr example, seemed to form a group (in 1961 ant 1962) united
to prevent further denegration and moves againni; their old colleagrueo
on the an?~i-party group.
3. Isis age
would seem to prec~ade
him from the top po;~f ?I;a~on in the party following Khruc~hche;v' a
demise, unless he were chosen to serve for a time ae titular leader
of a collective. P.s ~rlth Suslov, however, cis sulrport a.nd h3.s
political skill would presumably be much soul3ht after py the other
leaders.
1. One of the leading members of the CPSU Presidium ar~d the
Secretariat a,:a3 the leading Soviet theoretician, t~ii?chai3 A Suslov
(boxn Shakovsl,y, T~SF'SR, 1902) has been a prominent party leader since
1947, when he was appointed by Stalin to the Secretariat. He may
be content with his role as doctrinal apologist for the regime and
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r~.n.y not anpixe to ~tre top Pont himself, w~h:1.c1,, l.f no, 1.a ;}uat rtir; well
since in rl.s pon:Lt:ton he harl had 1l.ttle opportunity to bu:tld a personal
rollowing. SuGlov has long been identified. a.s a conservative and hao
probabl~r opposed a number of IChxunhchevian 1.ni?t:Latiues(:Incluling the
M'.PS reform in ].9~T) pexh:aps r;ometimes in leo.gue with ICozlov.
2. n onetime editor of P:?av3a and head o? the party's agitprop
commission, Sua]_ov was closely identifie3 with Stalin'r~ anti--
Yugoslav campaiim and, akbsequently w.tth Stalin's incipient purge of
the party leadership Imown as the "Doctor's Plot" . IIe has g1 ven the
impression to Westerners of being dogmatic, bitter, and anti-Western;
he probably would not be trustod by his colleagues to follow a genuine
Khrushchevian line in either domestic or foreign affairs.
3. Suslov, whose health is declinin6, and w'zo apparently has,
].Argely
boen~inactive since last summer, is almost certainly not in a good
position to costpete for the top fob, but his support may be sought by
other conservatives. It is possible, however, chat Khrushchev ms.y
remove him this year from the Secretariat or even the Presidium.
III . ~ ~ ST;COPID-TI;I1M CI~.4LT~NGERS : ICIRILI;NKO, ICOSYGTN, AND VOR0.10V
powerful figure and will almost certainly play an important role in
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the nc;rt? succession criai.o.
w:.' have dec~.~lec~ that i:Ut3~rl,:tn nvty' b^ the moat able oi' ~t;he thxce and.
the one currently playing the moat aignificctrtt policy role (mainly
in economics). I{irilenko may be a man of manifold talents, but seems
for the moat r,art to ati7ear in public as a Sycophant. Voronov, though
Prebab~,y ambitious, has been used mainly as a high party overseer of
agri .ult;ure . Of a miG.ci .e generation, too young to have been part-
ic:lpr~n",:r! in ~.he October Re~r~;7?ut:Ion, too old to dispute with their
eld~.ra on a father-eon baeis, they may lack the peal of ~t;he Bolsheviks
s.nd the enthuaiam (or cynic?Sm) of the youtr~ in shore, they strike
us as neither fish nor foil but essentially as successful careerists.
I~irilenko
1. One of Y.hruehehev's stalwarts, Audrey P. Kiril~:nko (born
Voronezh Oblast, RSF$R, 1906) has been w member of the Presidium
since the spring of 1962. For six years an oblast First Secretary
and nos a member of the important party Bureau for the RSFSR, perhaps
as the supervisor fo.r industry, I{:~rilenlco has been a party member
since 1931 and a Cent:^al Committee member since 1956. His associ-
ation with Irhrushchev de.tes back to his service on the Southern Front
during the war and his long service as a party functionary in the
Ukraine, where he also served under Brezhnev.
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S-?L'-C-R-I'-~' /1NN~X
~. ICJ ri].er~lro bec,a:n~~ a cc~t.:;l~.c~atc mc;mber of t're Prer~idl.um in
~-957 at the time ;;~' t;he clcfartt ~:i' the n,nti-ic~.rty group, but waa
droppea from this p~aition in 151 i'or reasons whl.ch x~emr~in
obscure (par?ticulflrly rince r,e did not at ?thut time 1or~e his post
on the R~FSlt Lurewu). i'.~ bee~~vle a fu11 m~`~mLer the foll.owir.3 spring
when the Leningrader U.~~iridonov, presuzaably a Kozlov protege, was
dr~~ed fr. om the Presidium. The petr~l;y press sevrrrzl times listed
Itiril~enko out of the usual alphabetics,l order for the Presidium
(below hie cuatsina,ry opot) during the winter months, a possible
indication that during this period of ItY:rushc'rlev's difficulties
Kirilcnlco hZd also suffered a loss of statu?. Kirilenko, if not
a front-running candidate himself, would prob~~ixly support
Brezhnev to cucceed Khrushchev.
Y.ocygin
1. Aleksey N. Ksaygin ('u. LcninCrad 190I+) has served in high
office in both the party an3 goverz:nent since 1960. He has been
a member of the Central Csmtnittee since 1939 and became a candidate
member of its Presidium in 196 (though he lost tizis spot after
Stalin's death). Since he owes h3~ rise in the hierarchy chiefly
to his abilities as an economic administrator in the government
apparatus, and has never served as a full-tia~ member of the
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25X1
apparat, Kosygin does not fill. the qun,lificationa for the First
uecrete,ry;,hip. ~s a candidr-ate fir the premiership, however, ~
mF,y i.n fuct be the top contender.
2, I%osygin has been described as a "quiet, determined, able,
and coz~i'iclent ms,n." Ihsing a ti~isit to Greet Britain in 1955 he
favorably impressed observers with his knowledge and, r,~t times,
his wit. ile has also travelled to Ttz~1y and ArgAntiua.
~. Kosygin does not seem entirely to fill. the bi11 e.s a
Khrushchevian protege and he nvs,y indeed be on? of those v~mbers
of the Presidium who have at times opposed some of i;he First
Secretery's policies. His support would be eag?rl_y sought during
a succession crisis and might be won with a promise oi' the highest
government post.
1. A member of the Centrnl Committee since 1952, the Presidium
since 1961, rind the Bureau Pon the RSFSR since the same year,
Gennady =. Voronov apparently has served as a paxty co,reerist
principally in the field of agriculture. Borne in Kalinin in 1910,
he became an Oblast First Secretary in 1948 and served as such
(in Chita. Gblast~ until 1955 when he came to the, attention of
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Khrushchev as an expert in agricultural affairs; shortly there-
after he was made r3, dept~;cy minister of agriculture in the Soviet
government . Suboe~~,~aently, in 1957 he becarle First Secretary of
the prenburg ()b]aat in the Virgin Lands area, of the RSFSR and
wa,s given credit for three good harvest years. He way awarded in
1961 with candidate membership on the Prefidium and deputy chair-
manship of the RSFSR Bureau. A~: was made Chairman of the RSFSR
Council of Ministers in 1962, an appointment which need not have
represented a promotion.
2. It seems lilce:Ly that Voronov ones his political career
t^ affability, vigor, a talent for organization, his agricultural
experience, and luck (particularly during his service in the
Virgin Lands). Khrushchev probab]y has not considered him to be
one of the top policy-making officers of the party but as a high
level specialist in agricultural administr~Ction. Voronov is
reportedly a bitter personal rival of one of Khrushchev's favorites,
Kirilenko, and his career may have suffered somewhat as a result.
He may soon suffer even more if hF provided any support to Kozlov
during the winter months, a distinct possi~illty.
3. Though relra,tively young and with a good background in
administration and the apparat, Voronov is too junior to be a likely
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candidate for the I'irat uecretaryahip. lIia talent and auppart,
however, would be welcomed by the nth~r contenders. If he ploys
his cards rights he might be rewarded wits, a mayor position and
subsequently enter the 13ata as a top contender,
IV. ~H ~ ~ YOUNG CONICRS: I7EMICHCV, POLYANSKY, l1ND SITZ?;LEPIIJ
'.These three men are in key positions and are well known as
comers on the political scene. We have chosen them for these
reasons not necessarily because one or the other might someday
succeed to party leadership;
Unlike their contemporary, Ad~hubei, Izveatia
editor, bon vivant, and Khrushchev'a son-in-law these men seem
never to have demonstrated even a psesing fancy for modern art or
an inclination for banter with capitalist journalists. (Polyanstcy
however has been known to cross himse:Lf before eating a meal,
presumably out of respect for his olds orthodox mother). Thus
we find these men to be essentially humorless careerists, and though
they might not prove to be slavish u,~herents of Marxist dogma,
they nonetheless take their system seriously and probeblr cannot
comprehend an altexnetive (either personally or philosophically).
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25X1
-r-c-R-r-'.r. IINNi;x
Demichev
1. associated with the Moscow city party organization oincc
the end of the war, Rtr Demichev, (b. RSI'SR, 1918) joined the
party in 1939. Rising through the ranks of the apparnt in Moscow,
he becanx a secretary of the dblast committee in 1956, apparently
specializing in agitprop wor?s. In :19~ he was assigned to the
Council of Ministers of the USSR where he may have worked as a
special asai3tant to d{hrixshchev. In 1952 he was named First Secretary
of th.: Moscow Oblast, in 1959 was appointed, in addition, to the
d3ureau of the RSFSR, and in 1960 was appointed First Secretary o?
the Moscow City 2'arty Committee, a prized position within the
appe.rat. Finally,~.n 1961, he was raised to the Cl-SU Secretariat.
2. Demichev ie a protege of IChruchchev's and is on record
~s a viGo;.?ous a,nt1.-S~i;al~.ttiai, and ae a proponeni; of light ?.ndus~cry.
With an appropriate educational background, he is currently
serving as Chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for Light
eaa :,heroical Industries, an organ created by I{hrushchev in 1962.
3. One of the youngest members of the "hierarchy, Demichev
would plagr a role in the succession struggle. Not a Leningrader
or Ukrainian, completely identified with I{hrushchev and his policies,
Demichev might throw his support to Brezhnev.
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u--1! -C-R-r-T ANiVf'X
P~lyr~nalsv
1. Another of the up-and-coming generation of Soviet ps,rty
leaders, Thnitry S. polyanrsl.y, (b. Donbas region of the L~Icraine,
1917) hao been a full member ::? the Presidium since 1960. With
a baclcground in agriculture, Pol~.itust:y rose through the party
apparatus to become first Secrettcry of the Crimean Obl.a,st (1953-55~,
Ohreaburg Oblast (1955-57), and ICrasnodn,r ICxay (1957-SS). He
became a member of the Central Committee it: 1956 and in 1958
was named Chairman of the R~~.f'fIR Counci] of Ministers .
2. Despite his Ukrainian ba,ekground, Po]yanslc~~ has not been
too closely identified wits Khrushchev and, in fact, has at times
worlced with Kozlov. His appo:lntment as a deputy minister of the
USSR in 1962 seemed to be an a,nomoly and his political future may
be uncertain. He ha,s, hotneverf been described as energetic, intel.l!_i-
gent, and a ski11fu1 poli?ticir~n. He presumably has followed the
Khruohchev line, but his possible association with Kozlov and hie
narrow arty background suggest tha,L he ma,y be conserv~z-~ively inclined.
She lepln
1. ~'~ ia.st comer who owes his career almost entirely to his
patron, Khrushchev, Alelceandr N. Shelepin is currently a member
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3- .-C-R-r-T /1NNI'X
of the party Secretariat and is chairman of the Party-State Control
C~,asion, an organ of the Central Committee which could become
a ponrerftiil. and nationwide bane of political support. Born in 1918
in the R6FSR, he has been a member of the Party since 1940, served
in the Red Army during the war, and was head of the Komsomol from
1952 until 19j8. In 1958 he was appointed chief of the Central
Committee Section for Part~~ Organs, an important political post,
and seven months later, i.n Lecember, he was named Chairman of
the iC(~ .
2. Few young members of the top organs can claim a comparable
background and one ao neatly tailored to flzture advancement. His
experience in the iComsomol~ the Gnntral Committee apparatus, the
secret policy, and, current],y, the Secretariat, gives him awide-
ranging background in party politics and has provided him with an
opportunity to lay the gro~indwork for futuxe political maneuvering.
Personally, Scl?Lepin has been describer? as able, srticula.te, and
ambitious. If' he succeeds to a top post, he could be eatpected to
follow a generally Klarushchevian line, though th~:re is certainly
little in his background to su;,gest a "liberal" approach to policy.
3? IIe will almos+.. r_ertainly someday be a ma~-or actor in the
succession struggle. Of all the younger generation of party leaders
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25X1
he might b~: rated as the leading candidate far party leadership;
thiacould be confi Kmed by his eleva~~~n tv the Presidium during 1964.
'T'hough not a determinate, the role of regional associations
in Soviet palitics is by no means a minor one. The CPSU has
long been dominated at secand and third rank by fti~nctionaries with
backgrounds in the Ukraine, Leningrad, nr Mosco~+ itself (obvious]y,
the three principal loci of power within the USSR).
Stalin's moves agairm t the T~ningrad organization reflected his
awareness of such xegional structures and his concern that such
bases of power c~u].d be used against him. Khrushchev himself,
beginning in the spring of 1962, may have been moving to c,irb the
potter of the I,eningraders (e.g., Spiridonov, even Kazlov). Be
that ae it may, such considerations must enter into the calculationr~
of all aspirantis to the top position and will play a role in tY;e
next succession struggle.
1. Petr Y. Shelest (b. Kharkhov, Ukraine 1908) was suddenly
sad unexpectedly appointed First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist
Party in July of this near, succeeding N.V. Pvdgorny. In December 1963,
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~G7A'1 I I Lill I
Shelest was elevated to canc'.idc~,~te membership in the Presidium, a
concomitant oi' his rank in the Ukrainian party. A full member of
the CPS[7 Central Committee only since 1961 and a member of the
Ukrainian Secretariat only since August 1962, Sheleat has been a
member of the Party since 1928 and long served in various capacities
and areas as an administrator and engineer. I+'Y?om 1961 to 1962
he served as First Secretary of the Kiev Oblast.
2. His rapid 25X1
rise to eminence in the Ukrainian Party, however, testifies either
to real ability, political skill, or both. And since he is but
55 years old, he may become, as hea3 of the Ukrainian apparat, a
ma3or factor in the future succession struggle in the CPSU. We
doubt that he will become a mayor candidate for the top position,
but his support -- and thet of his Ukrainian colleagues -- will be
cultivated by other contenders. He would presumably be most likely
to throw his support to his farmer superior and benefactor, Podgorny.
VI. '1'W~D OUTSIDERS: THC MARSHAL AND ~ POET (MAL~ ~VSKY AND TVARDOVSI{Y~
Malinovsky is included here mainly because he is the senior
Soviet military leader, not because he is necessarily typical of
Soviet marshals. If he is still Minister of vefense after I{hrushchev's
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departu~~v, hawever, he will exercir~e considerable paver in his
awn right as tl'ie representative of the military. Tvr~xdavsky,
an the other. hand, will exercise very little powAr, other than as
a spokesman far interests which are essentially out of h~~mony
with those of the pwrty, and which might sameday be the object
ai efforts by the top conten?iers to buy off tb^ apposition.
Tvardavslcy's inclusian here is testimagy in itself to the fact
that the ?fliberal" trend in Soviet politics has as ~~et to find an
actfve political cha~tpian and represents as yet a very rtimaxphaus
(though incxeasingly impartant) tendency within the elite groupings.
M~,linavsky, Radion Y.
1. Rad:~n Y. Malinavsky (b. Odessa, 1898),wha served with
Khrushchev an the Sauthern front during, Warld War IT., is the leading
military man in the USSR; he has served as Minister of Defense
since 1957. Ee became a member of the Party in 1926 and was
elected to its Central Cammittee in lg>2.
2. Malinavsky has on aecasian appeared to be at adds with
his superior an ~rilitary matters such as the questian of the
proper balance of forces (graund vs. strategic strength), and
sometimes seems to re:~3.ect a more canservative political line as
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~..~a.
somewhat
well. l;t could be that Malinovslty, tho~zgh~independent concerning
matters of direct imterest, is retained by Iihrushchev primax~3ly
as a buffer between himself end the rest of the top military commsnd?25X1
I~. l~lmast certainlyy Iihrushchev has ma_"shals more to his
personal tasfie and policy inclinations (such as Biryuzov, C~jief
of the General. Staff and former commander of the rocket forces);
indeed Ms,linovsky may be replaced before 't4irushchev. TP not,
Malinovsky'~ support would be avidly sought during a succession
crisis and his views would swing considerable weight in the tcp
councils. He would not be himself of courses a candidate for
tre succession, but should he loin the winning side, he might be
rewarded with a post on the Presidium.
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Tvardovsl~,y, Alelcaandr T.
1. /1 leading Soviet intellectual, writer and poet, A].el~uandr
T. Tvardovsky (b. 1910) is a candidate member of the Central
Committee and has been a member of the party since 1940. He has
served as editor-in-chief of the influential literary journal,
Nom Mi.r (New World) since 1y58 (having previously occupied that
post from 1)~1 to 1958). He is also a member of the Board of
the USSR '~rh?itera Uc~.ion. He apparent]y is sometl;tng of a favorite
of Khrushchev's and, in an interview with a US correspondent in
the spring of 1963, heralded the end of the striden'L? campaign
against liberal writers. Tvardovsky is perhaps best kn~Wn in the
West for his "discovery" and first publication (in T1ovy Mir)
of the anti-Stalinist novella, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch.
Most recently, a long poem of his, "Vasili Terlcin in the Other World,"
also anti-Stalinist in character, was read to Khrushchev rand
subsequently printed in the government paper,(Izvestia, a move
as
which could be interpreted~Khrushchev's peraona7. sanction for the
resu~aption of anti-Stalinist literature.)
2. Tvardovslcy has never served in an official full-time
party capacity almost certainly has no political exmbitions of
his own, awes allegiance to the party and Khrushchev, but is,
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nonetheless, perhaps the h1.{;heat played liberal intellectual
within the party. liia ability to continue to wield considerable
literary influence testifies to his talent, courage, and political
acumen. Hia voice thus commands both respect and opposition.
3? As the spokesman for the new trend in Soviet literature,
he almost certainly can count on the support of similar-minded
writero, scientists, and other intellectuals, and, during the
succession struggle, would probably throw whatever weig.it he could
to the candidate with the most liberal inclinations. His support,
since it might also involve favorable publicity in tl~e ,~ournels,
might be sought by moderate leaders, though ofihers might shun it
as a possible kiss of death.
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