THE PAK-AFGHAN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190037-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 13, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 November 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO, 69-61 (Internal ONE Working Papor -
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: The Pak-Afghan Problem
to Tho chronically troifoled relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan have boon in a particularly acute stage for the past
few months. Since the break in diplomatic relations between the
two countries in September, US official attention has been
focussed primarily on what might be called the international
aspects of the situation -- the problems posed by the cutting
off of the only satisfactory Free World transit route to
Afghanistan and by the consequent disruption of the US aid
program in Afghanistan,, the likelihood of increased Afghan
dependence on the USSR,, and the consequences for US r0.ations
with both Pakistan and Afghanistano It was these concerns
which largely prompted the US decision to send Ambassador
Merchant on a good will mission to the area. However, also
involved is a serious and more volatile local aspect of the
problem -- that posed by continuing friction along the border.
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The International Aspoc t
2. As refloctod in the difficulties encountered by
Jibasaador merchant on his good offices mission., it is clear
that neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan is now in a mood to move
toward a settlement of their difficultieso Doth sides arc still
.acutely sensitive to the matters of prestige and national honor
involved in the rupture of diplomatic relations and closure of
the border and of their consulates and trade agencies. In
addition, each sees its present course as part of a long-term
policy which still has a chance of scoring over its opponent.
Specifically, Kabul will cling as long as possible to the hope
that the I can be induced to bring pressure on Pakistan for
concessions; President Ayub of Pakistan probably believes that
he can continue for some I me at least to pursue his "hard"
policy toward Afghanistan without giving into US nudging or
suffering any serious consequences for not doing so.
3. Nevertheless, there is some hope that in six months
or so, as the lines of the recent confrontation become obscured.,
the attitudes, if not the basic positions, of both sVoos will
become somewhat more flexible, and negotiations and the exercise
of US influence may become more feasible. In addition., the
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danger that Afghanistan will in the meantime become greatly
more dependent on the USSR and thus significantly more subject
to Soviet pressures is probably less serious than is sometimoo
assumoa. At least so long as 'ho US makes a reasonable effort
to continue to provide countervailing support to /fghoni_stan, it
is likely that the present situation could dLag on for six
months to a year without a basic change in Afghaiistan's
position vis-a-vis the USSR, If the border remains closed,
some important US aid projects will have to be suspended and the
difficulties of planning future programs in support of the
country's Second Five Year Plan (1961-1966} will b-. increased,
However., other projects can be probably given greater emphasis
or redirected,, e.g., those which depend on personnel rather than
bulk imports. Some increase in imports from and through Iran
is possible. There is a good chance that in a few months it will
b possible to arrange a one-shot movement of material now
crapped in Pakistan -- provided such a movement is not tied
to a general settlement.
4. The USSR will naturally be working to take advantage of
Afghanistan's isolation. Moscow has long since offered to supply
all foreign aid (approximately $500 million) needed for the
Second Five Year Plan. New and favorable terms for use of the
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Soviet transit route are being arranged, Apart from these
items, however, the USSR has not moved with particu'Lor vigor
or directness to intervene in the situation. The 'i;h