SOVIET PRESSURE ON CENTO: A TENTATIVE EVALUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 15, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
15 September 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM 54-61 (Internal 0/NE Working Paper -
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Soviet Pressure on CENTO: A Tentative Evaluation
1. In recent weeks the USSR has sharply increased its
pressure on Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the Middle Eastern
members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)o In each
case, the pressure has been related to Soviet publication
of classified Baghdad Pact documents, presumably acquired
as a result of the 1958 revolution in Iraq. In Turkey, the
Soviets, disregarding objections from the Turkish Government,
have insisted on publicizing documents which charge the alliance
members with aggressive intentions.
2. The Soviet radio beamed at Iran has highlighted
alledgod Baghdad Pact plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR
and an "atomic death zone,' in Iran. Taking off from this, the
Soviet ambassador ir. Tehran and his associates have threatened
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to intervene under Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, unless Iran
loaves CENTO.* The Soviet pmss and radio have used a purported
Baghdad Pact document proposing the partition of Afghanistan
between Iran and Pakistan to acerbate already tense relations
between Afghanistan and Pakistan and to threaten the latter
with massive Soviet support for Afghanistan,
3. We believe that these threats should be considered
primarily as part of a general policy of bluster and intimidation
consequent on the Berlin crisis. Moscow probably finds them
useful both as diversionary efforts to distract the West from
Berlin and as devices aimed at breaking down the morale and will
to resist of the recipient countries. For the time being at
least, we believe the chances are against any major Soviet effort
deliberately to open Ha second front" against the West in this
area -- although the pressure here, as elsewhere on the periphery,
will probably be intensified and diversified further as the
Berlin crisis grows more tense.
*The Soviets have consistently asserted that certain provisions
of the treaty, initially designed to enable the USSR to take
action against any counterrevolutionary forces which might
establish themselves in Iran, gave them the right to intervene
against any "aggressive forces" in Iran.
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40 It mould probrbly bo unwise, however, to dismiss
Soviet throats against the CENTO countries as nothing more than
parts of a truculent Berlin policy. Tho Soviet Union has long
chafed over what it regards as US efforts to develop military
bases in this arua and by now has Omen up hope that any of
the present GENT? governments can be cajoled into dropping
their US ties. In the case of Turkey, protected by MO,
strongly anti-Russian by tradition, and fairly stably
governed, we doubt that the current pressure campaign is
designed to do more than generally raise tension. However,
Iran and Pakistan are more vulnerable.
5. In the case of Iran, Khrushchov appears never to have
forgiven tho Shah for initiating and then breaking off
negotiations for a non-aggression pact in 1959. While the
Tudeh (Iranian Communist) Party has relatively little internal
capability at the present time, Khrushchev has repeatedly
emphasized the instability of the present Iranian Government
and has made no secret of his expectations that it will fall
of its own weight in the not too distant future. He is also aware
of the possibilities for subversion offered by Iran's geographic
proximity to the USSR and the presence there of discontented
minorities, such as the Kurds and Azerbaijanis.
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6. No such opportunities for subversion exist in regard
to Pakistan. However, the tentative moves toward an improvuo.ont
in Soviet-Pakistani relations (Soviet assistance in oil
exploration and land desalinization) which took place earli)r
this year have been overshadowed by Ayub's visit to the US and
his outspoken statements in favor of the Western position on
Berlin. Pakistan's quarrel with Afghanistan is now at iti most
acute stageo With the Pakistani-Afghan border closed ant the
prospect of fighting between the two countries increasiLg, the
USSR will have a chance to make Afghanistan virtually /2,:mpletely
dependent on it; if this flghting actually breaks out nuch
of Pakistan's army and many of its resources could be tied down
in tutile guerrilla warfare.
7. In general, we do not think that the USSR by its own
actions will seek to provoke another confrontation with the
West over Iran or over the Pakistani-Afghan sitia/,%on. In
both cases, however, it will probably continue rif,crously to
fish in thP existing troubled waters; should a n ?i development
take place in either one of them which could be utilized to
Soviet advantage, the USSR might be prepared to take strong measures
to exploit it, regardles'i of the current state of the Berlin crisis.
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