ATTITUDES OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS TOWARD CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 13, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
D R A F T 13 February 1961
STAFF' MEMORANDUM 3.2-61 (Internal 0/NE Working Paper - CIE!
Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Attitudes of Other Latin American Governments toward
Cuba
1. Official opinion in Latin America has by now generally
crystallized against the Castro regime, and for the most part
Latin American governments are somewhat less fearful of
stirring up pro-Castro opposition at home than they were
initially.* How far individual governments might be prepared
to go in manifesting their opposition to Castro would depend
very heavily on circumstances.
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CIA
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2. In general, however, the 19 Latin members of the OAS
(with the obvious exclusion of Cuba) would appear to fall into
the following categories:
a. Eight (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua,,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela) are avowedly anti-
Castro and would welcome, if not throw their full weight
behind, collective measurop against him.
b. Five (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Haiti, and
Uruguay) are generally anti-Castro but in varying degrees
less militantly so; they would probably go along with
loss extreme OAS moves against Cuba.
c. Four (Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico)
now appear for domestic reasoria either unwilling or unable
to come out openly against Castro.
d. Two (Dominican Republic and Brazil) are special
cases. The Trujillo dictatorship is fundamentally opposed
to Castro acid Castroism, but in its present beleaguered
contition is erratic and unpredictable. Brazil's new
president has reserved his position on Crba.
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3. Attached is a summ,wry of the Y,reaent position of
each Latin American country.
ATTACHMENT
ATTITUDES OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS TOWARD CUBA
The First Ca!~Qmcmr.y
1. Colombia. President Lloras Camargo is convinced
that Castro must go, but he prefers that this be provoked by
OAS action and that the anti-Castro effort be supplemented by
measures to bring down Trujillo. He is under increasing
prossuro from the leading political parties, the press, business
people and others to break with Cuba unilaterally and soon.
2. The provisional government of El Salvador, in the
throes of reestablishing order after overthrowing a pro-Castro
junta, probably would be in favor of an OAS airing of the
l:'ba issue. In the meantime, there is a good chance that it
may break or sti~spond relations with Cuba.
3. Guatemala. The Ydigoras government, which broke
relations with Cuba last year, is aggressively anti-Castro.
It would participate in an OAS condemnation of Castro or stronger
measures.
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4. N& aragua is a determined opponent of Castro and the
Somoza go1r-.,rnmontIs relations with him are suspended. It
can be ca~+iited on to support almost any OAS solution on Cuba..
5. Panama has been hit hard by Castro activists and the
governmvc t there, under strongly pro-US leadership, is one of
Castro':,:; impl