OPPOSITION IN PORTUGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 8, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5106122:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD190D04.2
 Jl / Tf1/C/'c ,yL?21
Approved For Release 20 5/06/Vf22 DP85T00875R00 00/0190004-2
IL 1.
hl
CIA IN'i i-~:,"~ . U: ~,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 February 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 12.-61 (Internal 0/NE Working Paper - CIA
Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Opposition in Portugal
1. The strange odyssey of the Santa Maria, although a
personal fail- o for Japtain Galvao, did serve to focus world
strains within
atterrEion on/the embarrassed Portuguese dictatorship of Premier
Salazar, Stirred from its comfortable somnolence, the government
is demonstrating considerable anxiety lest oppositionists at home
and in the overseas provinces draw encouragement from the incident
and embark on a sustained campaign of open hostility -- no matter
what their views of Galvao, Delgado and Co. While neither the
regime, nor the 71-year-old Salazar, himself, appears in any real
immediate danger, it is unlikely that Portugal will once again
subside into usual political torpor until after the departure of
the dictator.
CIA IN
i~..;:.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
SECRET
CII\ INTERNAL u ONLY
2. Opposition in Portugal proper is not yet serious',
although there is grumbling among some high officials and within
the politically conscious elite over Salazar's reluctance to
invigorate the static Portuguese economy. A more general impression
that the premier's personal capabilities are no longer equal. to the
task of controlling and directing national affairs was strengthened
when he failed to take an active load in mapping policy to counter
X1
the damaging effects of the Santa Maria adventure.
25X1
3. The legislative elections scheduled for April will afford
the small and semi-clandestine opposition groups an early oppor-
tunity to test the extent of public disenchantment with Salazar at
home. In the likely event that the opposition is successful in
capturing some seates in the cortes -- now monopolized by Salazar's
political machine -- other prominent figures in the regime, dis-
couraged by the dictatorts uncertain leadership might use this
evidence of falling political fortunes as a pretext to persuade
CIA IN ITCH :,i?._ U:TL Olf"I'l
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL U '~:
him to resign. A successor government would probably be headed by
a military or government leader associated with the present regime.
Apart from possibly adopting more dynamic economic policies, it
would not be likely to basically change Portugal's political
orientation.
1&. Over the next few months the developing situation in the
Portuguese overseas territories will be critically important.
While the incumbent regime has tied its prestige to the retention
of its African "provinces" and to their development as primary
sources of national wealth and power, it has imposed a tight,
arbitrary rule on the areas and has in practice consistently
failed to meet settler expectations of much needed economic expan-
sion and foreign investment. Settler reactions to domination by
Lisbon are generally of three kinds: (1) Ssznple hostility to
Salazar and his government on the part of those whose loyalty to
Portugal remains steadfast, but who feel the "provinces" are being
overlooked by a far-away capitol. (2) Separatism, which has,
according to some reports, significant strength among Mozambique
settlers who are discontent with the assimilation policy and
attracted to some form of apartheid. (,(3) Scattered radical
opposition -- prepared to use any allies -- even African nation-
alists -- to discredit and eliminate the dictatorship and all its
3-
CIA ~
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22SE,2DP85T00875R002000190004-2
CIA INTERNAL USE opli_y
institutions. It was probably these latter elements that caused
the recent disturbances in Angola.
5. Finally, il, should bo noted that the overseas terri-
tories themselves a:o almost certain to be exposed to external
pressures over th,? next few years which could intensify the
political malais', within them. Portuguese Guinea is an inviting
target for Toura's nationalist propaganda and is apt to become
increasingly unsettled; the situation in northern Angola is
reportedly already troubled by Abako tribal agitation originating
recurrent
f. om kinsmen in the Congo; and Mozambique experiences/low level
native unrest, in part stimulated by outside agitators. The
Portuguese military establishment in these areas, although recently
enlarged; is probably spread too thin to cope with major disorders.
Although the scanty evidence available would indicate that the
Africans, themselves, are not as yet seriously infected with anti-
Portuguese sentiments., they will in time almost certainly be
stirred to hostile action against their white rulers in response
to some form of foreign pressure. A deteriorating situation in
the overseas provinces would probably quickly lead to the de-
parture of the Salazar government.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190004-2