STAFF MEMO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 7, 1961
• Content Type: NOTES

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 February 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM N0. 9-611 (Internal 0/NE Working Paper CIA
Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: The Widening Gulf Between African Radicals and the West
In Within the past several months, a major rift has
developed between Africa's most militantly nationalistic leaders
and the West. In addition to engendering serious complications
in the Congo situation, this rift has produced a schism of
serious proportions between moderate Africans willing to main-
tain a pro-Western orientation and the so-called radical
nationalists who are increasingly disposed to challenge Western
policies and practices in Africa: The decision taken by Guinea,
the UAR, and Morocco to withdraw their troops from the Congo,
their positions together with Meli and Ghana -- at the
January 3-7 Casablanca "summit" meeting, and their growing
dalliance with the Soviet Bloc., attest to the unhappiness of
the radicals with the prevailing Western posture in Africa.
Falling within the moderate category are such leaders as
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Prime Minister Balewa
of Nigeria and Shadrach Tutman of Liberia. Africans radicals
include Ghana's Nkrumah, Guinea!a Sekou Toure, and President
Nasser of the UAR.
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A further widening of the chasm between African radicals and
the West threatens to engender serious political difficulties
for the West, its moderate African supporters, and the UN,
whose effectiveness in the Congo already has been impaired by
existing differences.
2. In general, the leaders of nations such as Ghana,
Guinea, and Mali are disturbed by the prevailing process of
economic and political balkanization in Africa. They are also
fearful that the erstwhile European colonial powers will seek
to resurrect now spheres of influence as weak and deeply divided
African states acquire indopendcnt status, or will fashion neo-
colonial bonds in the form of economic dependence, military
alliances, and monopolization of advisory and technical positions
in those African states faced with serious shortages of skills,
resources, and capacity to govern effectively. The radicals
wish to end the exclusive connections imposed during the colonial
period and to diversify the sources upon which Africans must be
dependent for economic and technical aid. In addition, they
desire a predominant voice in what is said, discussed, or proposed
about Africa.
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3. The Congo crisis has providod a Focus for African fears
and has tended to reinforce radical African suspicions that the
colonial
/powers will:(a) relinquish its vestigial colonial influence only
grudgingly; (b) seek to exploit African weaknesses to their own
advantage; and (c) create "puppet" regimes which slavishly
pursue pro-Western policies inimical to African interests. The
US, which is regarded by radicals and moderates alike as a
financial and diplomatic supporter of the Mobutu clique, has been
the object of increasing criticism as well. The priority accorded
NATO interests by the US, its position on the recent Algeria and
colonial resolutions at the UN, and its tendency to view African
problems in the cold war context, also have made for African dis-
enchantment with the US. Some hope is expressed, however, that
the now administration will initiate an "agonizing reappraisal"
of US policies and practices in Africa,
4. As a result Africa's radicals are groping towards some
form of unified political action. Although they are seeking to
rally the support of other African leaders, they feel that
apposition to neo-colonialism should be organized around the
strongest and most militantly independent leadership in the area.
This leadership would act as a self-appointed executive committee
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in the name of the African community as a whole -- one which may
increasingly challenge the credentials of African statesmen
considered too Fro-Western.
5. The approach being taken by the radicals (with which the
UAR has strongly associated itself) was perhaps most clearly re-
vealed at the Casablanca conference of January 196]
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Although the conference concluded with an appeal for,
all African nations to join in the creation of a vaguely defined
NATO-typo organization to coordinate military, economic, and
military policies, the principal emphasis was rather on a series of
resolutions in which the conferees: (a) pledged themselves to a
policy of non-alignment; (b) opposed the maintenance of foreign
troops and bases on African territory; (c) called for the release
of Patrice Lumumba and his restoration to the Congo premiership;
and (d) renewed their threat to withdraw their troops from the
Congo. Resolutions also were adopted on Algeria, Mauritania, and
Israel which favored the special interests of the various con-
ference participants.
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6. Despite this momentary display of consensus, Africa's
"radicals" are themselves divided on a number of issues. Both
King Mohammed V of Morocco and President Modibo Keita of Mali
are essentially moderate loaders who feel impelled by domestic
radical forces to assume extreme postures, but probably are
privately reluctant to push too hard and too far on many foreign
policy issues of vital concern to the 'lest. Differences in social
philosophy and in personality separate these men from other African
leaders, especially those who seek preeminent positions as
acknowledged heads of a Pan-African movement. Disagreements also
obtain concerning Israel's proper role in Africa, recognition of
Mauritania as an independent state, and the formation of an all-
African Military Cottmand. Finally, basic consensus often is
absent on tactics to be adopted against Western neo-colonialism,
the timing of diplomatic initiatives, rind the extent to which
Soviet Ploo blandishments should be accepted.'
The obstacles which confront Pan-Africanists are reflected in
the difficulties facing the loose "union" of Ghana, Mali, and
Guinea. All three nations have separate currencies. Different
ethnic communities populate these countries. In addition, Ghana,
after fifty years of British colonial tutelage, employs English
as its official language, has inherited English Judicial,
educational, and governmental practices, and is a member of the
Commonwealth. Guinea and Mali have inherited French institutions
and administrative practices. The leaders of all three nations
are unwilling to sacrifice their power in a real union, disagree
on foreign policy initiatives, and are basically suspicio'73 of
one another's political ambitions. As a result, the Ghana-
Guinea-Mali "union" remains a paper amalgam.
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7. Desp to absence of real consensus among themselves,
Africa's radicals will continue to seek the means for Joint action
against Western neo-colonialism. Acting impulsively on a
defensive reflex basis these leaders will continue to give an
impression of extreme sensitivity and irrationality. Where
the West is concerned, the negative political instincts of these
states probably will provide additional impetus to declining
in
Aestern influence/ the area. Radical initiatives probably will
take such forms as: (a) demands for the early withdrawal of
Western military ,assets throughout Africa; (b) fiurther
retaliation against France on Algeria, the Sahara bomb tests,
and its policies in West Africa; and (c) frequent support for
Soviet Bloc initiatives before the UN and elsewhere which
are in harmony path African "aspirations".
8. The tendency of Africa's militant nationalists to
adopt extreme postures on area issues will pose serious
problems for the West, and particularly for the US. Under
the thre^.t of other Congo crises and further balkanization the
militant nationalists may intervene more blatantly in the domestic
affairs of their neighbors -.- e.g. Ghana in Togo, Guinea in
Liberia, the UAR in the Horn of Africa. Certainly moderate
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sta+,osmen, such as Houphouet-Aoigny of the Ivory Coast and
Prim? P4lnister Aolewa of Nig~~~iay will be placed andor sustained
pressure to alter their ex3.sting pro Western ori3ntations.
Tha Soviet Bloc, at the same time, can be expected to gain widening
entree into the continent and to find additional receptivity
for policies ~c~hich appear to cozncide with Africar requirements.
Concomitantly, the US probably will be challenged to make a
clear clistinction between its Western European socnrity needs
sand US African interests, as well as comp under further
radical attacks for its seeming tendency to support Africats
conservatilvo spokesmen rathex than the continentts militant
nationalist.
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