NIGERIA: HOW THE CIVIL WAR MAY END

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 3, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5107112:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD170D02.6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000~1,70002-
~ecre
Nu !vn?i?i~>> Disse~m
SPECIAL
M~MOR1~.I~DUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAI. ESTIMATES
Nigeria: How the Civil War Ma~~ End
Secret
N o. 2-69
3 February '! 969
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6 ~?.? -
~~~
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEI~?7
3 February 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 2-6g
SUBJECT : Nigeria : Ho~~r the Civil Mar May End3~
SUMMARY
B~,afra's prospects, which reached a low point last
autumn, have improved. If the airlift of arms and food
from abroad continues near the pre;~ent level, then Biafra's
chances of obtaining independence or a wide measure of
autonorn~y will increase. The military stalemate is generating
war-weariness and ne~~rfrictions in the Federal area of
Nigeria. Another coup attempt, led either by Hawkish
northern officers or by t?~ar-weary Yorubas, may be in the
offing. Such an attempt, t?rhether or not immediately
successful, would probably lead to the break-up oi' the
remaining Nigerian Federation and so hamper the ~rar effort
as to give Biafra victoxy by default.
*This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated wi+,h the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic
Research.
GROUP 1
Excluded f. om auto*eatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgr~ul.t~ag anc~
NO FOREIGN DISSL2~4 declassification
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO NORrrrrT 1~ISSEM
1. The 19-month old Nigerian civil war has thus far
enabled the Federal A?ilitary Government (FMG) to paper over the
underlying frictions in federal Nigeria and to postpone some
difficult problems. Still unresolved are the fundamental
issues of state versus federal authority and the distribution
of power among the contending tribes. But as the conflict
drags on w~t,th no end in sight, war-taeariness and tribal
frictions are beginning to surface. Moreover, the economic
impact of tY~e civil war is ,just beginning to be felt by urban
and other tax-paying Nigerians and by the deficit-ridden state
governments which depend on large subsidies from Lagos.
2. General Gowon's government .teems threatened from two
sides. The hawks -- mostly northern army officers -- feel he
has deferred too much to world opinion and pressurFS from the
governments of Llestern nations on behalf of the suffering
civilians in Biafra and thereby enabled reeling Biafrans to
regain their balance. These hawks urge a more ruthless policy
to win the war quickly. Tk-e doves -- Yoruba, politicians and
probably some officers from western Nigeria -- resent bearing
what they feel is a disproportionate share of the war coats
and have never been keen on forcing Biafra to submit. N-any,
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DI'.~,SEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E~C-P.-E-T
NO FOREIGN .OI3SEM
perhaps moat, Yorubas now see thc: wa^ oc ~xnwinnable. Moreover,
the Yorubas have always resented northern domin~~ion oi'' the
Federal gover.nmenf:, r,~re uneasy about their subordinate status,
s.nd probab],y find the notion of an independent '~oruba c~tate
increasingly attractive.
Ricts in the Western S~~ete
Discontent is most evident in the Western State where
the situation is highly reminiscent of the months immediately
preceding the January 1966 coup that led even'i;ually to the
civil war. The Yoruba-?run regime in the Western State is
notoriously corrupt, inefficient, and daily becoming more
unpopular. Taxes have gone up and the federal subsidy to the
state government has declined. Now as :!n the earlier crisis,
many Yoruba feel they are not receiving their fair share of
benefits, especially since the Western State's rocoa provides
a large share of Federal revenue while the cocoa farmer gets
relatively little. Anti-tax riots and political assassinations,
often incited by the political outs and their hired thugs, have
occurred with increasing frequency since last November. The
toll of deaths -- well over l00 -- and property damages is
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/1~w~C~j4~~P~$5T00875R002000170002-6
NO I'OREIGN DISSEM
moun.~t?.ina, and army units have been called in to aid the local
p~o~.~.~ee in quelling disorders. Neither the state nor the
i'~c'~~:~ral military government has shown e.nrv inclination +,o get
at acre roots of the trouble nor have they devised effective
mc~ywaures for stopping the disorders.
1E. The situation in the west is almost certain to get
~r~orse if the war draQa on. Yoruba impatience is likely to
grow, and with :it, riots and killings. 5umc western leaders
are already openl;,~ accusing the FMS'., particularly the military
commanders (most of whom are non-Yoruba) of prolonging the war
in order to increase their personal prot'ita~ There is ample
evidence that many officers, including field commanders, are
enriching themselves. More ot+vious to the bulk oi' the Yorubr;s
are the various extortions practiced by tha aYvly in tre Western
State. Soldiers statio~~ed i.n the west, deserters anal men posing
as ar~}r officers are increasingly preying on the merchants,
holding up travellers at road blocks, and fleecing the populs.tion
in general.
5-~E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
IJO F01'tL"IGN DISGEM
Discontent E.lsetirhere
5. Although the other new states are cux?rcntly more
peaceful than the Western State, they are experieneint~ much
tribal dissension as they attempt to set up and run their new
adminiat?rations. In some non-natives are being Pushed nut of
office, even where natives with the reclu9.red skills are lacking.
Where indigenous tribal groaps are contesting for office, the
losers are angrily calling for new states of their own.
Energies are largely absorbe=a :y these cor.,tests and :ew are
in a position either to sronsor a coup or to help iti crushing
one .
6. The foricer ruling no:cthern e.ristocracy is by no means
rFCOnciled to the breakup of the ald feudal regime that until
recently ran the north and, in effect, the whole country. They
can be expected to resist further diminution of their influence.
The minority tribes, particularly those from the north, are the
core of the Federal army and strong supporters of the new state
system as a bulwark against an aristocratic resurgence.
A1thoLgh these t:ew ata~es are desperately short of funds and
feel neglected by the FMG, we doubt that they will trouble
Gowon, at least so long as the war goes on.
-5-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
u-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGYI DTSSEM
7? Biafrans are the only group in black Africa to have
fought for their independence and the process appears to have
forged a kind of national cohesion unigue in that area. Morale
remains high despite shortages and sizeable human and material
losses. Between ,T'u~ly 1967 and September 1968, Biafra was
reduced to less than one-fourth its original size. It now
covers about 7,000 square miles and conta:~.ns 6-7 million
people, nearly Yialf of whom are refugees. They have shown
extraordinary inventiveness in the face of blockade, war, and
territorial losses. They remain well organized and capable of
producing a wide variety of essential goods despite the loss
of their main refinery, power plants, and manufacturing centers.
The ordinary Ibo, both civilian and military, is convinced he
is fighting for his life and Colonel O julcwtt has come to
symbolize the Ibo spirit of resistance. Tdhile there may be
some disagreements among influential Biafrans, Colonel Ojukwufs
important leadership role does not appear seriously threatened.
Should he die in office, Biafra would probably fight on.
-6-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DIS5EM
has at times been short, it has never run out and we doubt
that it will so long as France actively supporta Biafra's drive
for autonomy.
g. The well-publicized plight of the refugees and other
helpless civilians has garnered much sympathy abroad and
considerable assistance. ThE food situation has improved since
last aut;um: as ~~he main crops were harvested and the airlift
of relief s~xpplies increased. The most critical current
shortage is of protein, particularly for the hundreds of
thousands in refugee camps or without access to the land.
The International Red Cross airiirt alone had been feeding
S-E-C-h-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/125 C~~.;F~PI,8~,T00875R002000170002-6
NO FOREIGN DTSSEM
more than 800,000 until it was stopped by the government of
Equatorial Guinea in early January. Although otk~er airlifts
from the Portuguese island of Ss,o Tome and from L3.breville in
Gabon continue, the plight of those dependent on the Red Cross
is likely to worsen rapidly in the next few weeks unless the
Red Cross finds ways to resume its efforts. Moreover, locally
grown staples will become even scarcer soon because, even in
normal times, this area had to import food in the spring
months and it now must support a greatly enlarged population.
Biafra, however, probably would accept a higher rate of death
from starvation before surrendering.
10. Under present conditions, it appears unlikely that
Biafra will be defeated militari]y. It would require the with-
drataal of French support, or more direst foreign intervention
on behalf of the Federal forces, or a drastic deterioration
in Biafra's food supplies -- none of which seem probable.
.If French support should be increased, as is possible, then
Biafra would stand a fair chance of successfully counter-
attacking.
-8-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSENT
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RD~8~5T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
11. ?he FMG employs a number of foreign pilots and is
getting all the arms it needs from the UK, USSR, and elsewhere.
It lacks the will, the logistical skills, and the effective
discipline and leadership necessexy to win. ~dlile the Biafran
soldier is convinced he is fighting for his life, the Federal
soldier is told to fight for the unity of a country he can
barely conceive of. He probably joined the army not for love
of country or ever. because he hated the Ibo, but because the
pay is not bad and he can show off among the civilians. His
division commanders run their own campaigns pretty much as they
see fit. Each lobbies with the central government :der materiel
and personnel. Troop discipline, especially in the two northern-
led divisions, seems to depend largely on tribal ties and on
conditions at the front. Mutinies and inter-tribal clashes
among the troops have already broken out on a few occasions
and successful Biafran counter-attacks could lead to even more
serious disarray in the federal army.
12. The war has been stalemated since la~~t September when
Biafra's arms supplies increased significantly. Even if the
next Federal offensive, scheduled for some time between FEbruary
-9-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
and March, should capture Biafra' s one i-rorlcing airfield less
than 12 miles inside ?the lines, another airstrip is in readiness.
Federal planes have tried but failed to bomb the airfield out of
commission or otherwise interdj.ct the 10 to 20 planes that no~~r
land in Biafra on the average night. Moreover, the FMG is
unable or unwilling to attack the relief aircraft that fly at
the same times and over much the same routes as the arms planes.
Nevertheless, the airlift remains highly vulnerable to more
aggressive tactics and improved ordnance.
The Outlook
13. While we cannot predict with confidence which of
several courses events in Nigeria will take, the signs pc'~`.-lt
to a further disintegration of Nigerian unity. The war is
likely to drag on for months without much cl2ange. So long as
it does, unrest in the Western State is likely to deepen,
leading the Yorubas to press for some settlement which would
allow Biafra a large measure of autonomy at least. They would
then probably demand the same status for themselves. If the
Yorubas despair of achieving such an end, they will be
increasingly tempted to try to change the government or to
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DTSSEM
opt out of the federation. In either event, the F'MG would
probably resist such an attempt with force and would find
it difficult to sustain the war with Biafra.
14. As time goes on, the hawkish elements are lilceiy to
be more tempted to oust the present leaders and try more
ruthless methods to end the war. They now blame outside
interference for the failure to defeat Biafra. Pub'.ic sentiment,
especially in the north, is turning strongly anti-Western.
Prance, the US, the Red Cross and other charitable institutions,
even the UK at times, are seen as the enemies of Nigerian unity.
Calls for expulsion of missionar?h s and Peace Corps personnel,
for breaking diplomatic relations with Prance, even for
expropriating foreign-owned firms are mounting. So long as
Biafra bets food and arms from outside and the stalemate
continues, t.1is anger and frustration is likely to grow and
could easily turn against General Gowon for being too soft.
15. A northern coup seems somewhat more likely than a
Yoruba ccup, because it would probably be organized by military
leaders trho stand in no awe of their colleague, General Gowon.
Should such a coup succeed, the new rulers would probably be
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
-I;-C-R-E-T
NO FOREI~3N DTSSEM
determin~ad to push for ~, military victory and would be much
'less concernecl about international public opinion. ~I~tiey would
probably expel the Red Cross from the territory under Federal
control, and have far less hesitation about trying to shoot
down relief planes. Successful attaclcs on these planes would
in turn probably arouse still greater sympathy for the starving
civilians and induce many Western governments to Lrtake still
stronger representations on behalf of relief efforts. The
Nigerian government t~rould almost certainly interpret this as
gross interference in Nigeria's internal affairs and might
allow its anger to be taken out on Westerners and Western
interests in the country.
lh. Moreover, a nerr government run by predominant],y
northern hawks would be ever, less acceptable to the Yorubas
than the present relatively moderate and ineffectual regime.
Yorubaland might final7,y despair of ever getting a fair share
and attempt to secede. At that point, tribal frictions in
the army could well erupt into mutinies or widespread fighting.
The men and arms necessary to subdue ever a badly organized
Yoruba uprising L:ould have to come largely from the best
S-E-C-R-E-T
~~10 FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: C~7IA-RpDP85T00875R002000170002-6
S-E"C"a\- Ti"'1
NO FOREIGN DIS3EM
northern troops on the Biafran front. In tI-e resulting
confusion, it would be very difficult fer ;;he Ff9G to maintain
a r~emblance of national unity. J3iafra would probably win by
default and other states, particularly in the faZ^ north would
probabl,~,~ go their own way.
17. T,f General Gowon's government manages to remaa.n in
power, rising discontent at the cost of the war is lilcely to
make a negotiated settlement more att',ractive as the stalemate
continues. We doubt that Gowon could begin xcal negotiations
without the approval of the hawks. If he made concessions at
a sacs ::onference, he would be likely to be in real tr:~uble
with them. Biafra's strategy, on the other hand, is to hang
on in hopes that internal pressures will eventually force the
FMG to give up and allow it either a wide measure of autonomy
or complete independence. And the odds seem to be changing
in Biafra's favor.
18. l^Jhether the fighting is eniied by negotiations, by
a coup or an uprising, or degenerates into guerilla warfare,
the result will probably lead to either a loose confederation
of semi-independent states or the formation of three or more
lg
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 ? Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
-1;-C-It-l-T
NO FORITCN DT33EM
completel,}r inc1cpendent countries. Tn either event, the USSR
as the moat active supporter of the present', I~MC~ policy would
lose some influence. The ~deot could probably live with moat
if not all of the resulttn~ states who would seelc a considerable
amount: of post-war assistance. An independent; IIirzfra~ ~~lcatcrn
state, and oven aevcrc~l northern otatea would be at leo,at as
viable as most 41e~t African countries.
- 14 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
IQO FOREIGN DISSEM
25X1A
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
 ~C ~1;~ D
I.vr 1.
t Il,1(i '...ti ~~
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6
Q\Imin
It ! ail II I
I ,~ ~1 I ~~ I I
NIGERIA
--- - ~
W I :: '~; 'T' F: 11 N ~ ~
Ibminn0 _ . i
f_J
nouNnAnr nuolrsrNrAnoN IA a G'UI`NEA
Nf)f Nrl:i B9 n1111Y AU 111 f11111w11VP 1 ~ Yap.)
IItO ?.1 1 1 ~ n n nnin ?.
':7A71 111111 NIM HY
O ?"?nll 1'n I~Il nl
nlnrtrn mnlvt+nuY
Approved For Release 2005/07/12 :CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170002-6