TROUBLES AHEAD FOR ZAMBIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 8, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Troubles Ahead for Zambia
Secret
'8 June 1968
No. 14-68
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
18 June 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 14-68
SUBJECT: Troubles Ahead for Zambia*
Black-ruled Zambia, now in its fourth year of independence,
is beset by new internal tribal and political pressures, and
faces serious economic difficulties. Its foreign relations are
also disquieting. Zambian assistance to armed guerrillas seek-
ing to bring down the white minority regime in Rhodesia is
worsening its relations with the white governments in southern
Africa. Fearing retaliation, the Zambians are now urgently
seeking modern, sophisticated weapons which they believe will
deter an attack from the South. Lusaka is also preparing to
receive the first large contingent of Chinese Communist engineers,
who v111 plan the route of the Tan-Zara railway to Tanzania.
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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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1. Zambia, a country beset with internal political azd
economic troubles, io ill-equipped to play the role it has chosen
in the black challenge to white southern Africa. Zambia's modern
sector, dominated by the important copper industry's is a world
apart from the very primitive, isolated subsistence farmers who
make up the bulk of the populati.on. Deficiencies of skilled and
trained manpower are so great that the country depends, even more
than the Congo, on the hired services of a large number of whites.
There is still very little sense of national identity, and tribal
rivalries and suspicions dominate political life.
2. A further complication is Zambia's continued dependence
on Rhodesia, particularly for coal, power, and transportation.
Efforts to circumvent this dependence have cost Zambia dearly,
and have produced only marginal results,, A p?!pel.ine from Dar es
Salaam, now nearly completed, will alleviate Zambia's chronic
petrolrm shortage. But Zambian hopes for diverting trade from
Rhodesian routes to alternate lines are far from realization.
Rail lines through Angola and the Congo, the Great North Road to
Dar es Salaam, and an expensive air lift to Dar es Salaam, can
* Zambia is one of the three top producers among non-Communist
countries; the others are the US and Chile.
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handle only about half of the copper exports. The refA) goes via
Rhodesia Railways, which also still carry nearly 90 ,rrcent of
Zambia's imported goods other than fuel. The Chinese-r>, Communists
have undertaken to build a railroad from Zambia's .:opperbelt to
Dar es Salaam but this will probably take up to sev-ern years to
complete. Zambian coal., from newly opened mines, 'Ia of low
quality, and is usable in copper smelters only If mixed with
Rhodesian coal. In addition, Rhodesia controls '.,he giant Kariba
hydroelectric plant., which furnishes the bulk of Zambia's electric
power.
3. These harsh economic realities have not deterred Zambia
from a bellicose foreign policy., aimed primarily at encouraging
others to bring down the Smith regime.
4. In so doing., Zambia is running a higher risk of retali-
ation. Already the prime ministers of South Africa and Rhodesia
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have issued stern warnings, and the Portuguese, intentionally or
not, have dropped bombs on a Zambian village near the Angolan
border. Typically, the response from Lusaka was a bold reaffirma-
tion of its support for the liberation movements, and an appeal
to the UK, and the US, and others for. defensive armoraentc. We
doubt that Zambia is currently in danger of attack or even of
severe economic retaliation, but the Zambians feel exposed and
vulnerable and are seeking sophisticated weapons systems, e.g.,
British "Rapier" mobile missiles, with radar guidance, as well as
jet interceptor aircraft.
Kaunda and Co . rer
5. In this period of rising tensions, Zambia's two great
national assets, Kaunda and copper, which have carried the frail
state through previous crises, are in difficulties, Kenneth
Kaunda, Zambia's president since independence and head of the
ruling political party, is something of an anomaly among African
leaders. He prefers governing by cabinet consensus to autocratic
methods, and instead of charismatic appeals, lectures the populace
on the virtues of African Humanism, a vague political and economic
creed based on Christian precepts, which he sees as a substitute
for capitalism and, communism.
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6. Recently, Kaunda's political touch has been lest sure,
and the internal challenges more determined. The aggressive Demba
tribe, led by a forceful political figure, Simon Kapwepwe, has
enhanced its position in the government, upsetting the tribal
balance. Kapwepwe, now vice president, is not yet threatening
Kaunda's position, but his star is rising. Disgruntled tribal
repreb,*.;tatives are forming new cliques within the ruling party
and in resurgent minor parties, to the accompanying din of in-
creased ward-level violence. Kaunda has papered over some of
the rifts in his party, but has not restored harmony. Indeed,
factional feuding In a recent party conclave so upset him that he
resigned from the presidency, but was persuaded to return to office.
7. Meanwhile, the copper industry, which accounts for over
90 percent of Zambia's exports and about 65 percent of government
revenue, is slipping into serious trouble. High world copper
prices since independence have provided Zambia with a windfall,
much of which was squandered on schemes to avoid reliance on
Rhodesia. But with the settlement of the lengthy US copper
strike, world prices have plunged in the last few months from
70 cents a pound to as low as 45 cents, and are likely to level
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off at about 40 cents. New mines and production facilities are
being opened in the US and South America and tip?.:,re is little like-
lihood of a significant price increase over the next few years.
8. The economic and political impact in Zambia is likely
to be severe. Government revenues are already dropping sharply
with the fall of copper prices, and for the first time since
independence, Lusaka faces a budget &ficit. It can coast for
a year or so on its $120 million holdings in London, but the
deficits will mount, unless it curtails its spending drastically.
Zambia's ambitious $1.2 billion, four-year national development
program is likely to undergo major reductions. This will
mean fewer jobs, reduced social services, and inevitably, a rise
in urban discontent, which will exacerbate the current political
unrest. The copper companies will be unable to provide much help,
for they are already facing a severe cost-price squeeze. Because
of massive wage increases and rising fuel and transportation
costs, the unit cost of Zambian copper is the highest in the
world.
9. Moreover, 1:aunda has shown particularly bad timing in
initiating a new economic policy at th{.s critical point. In an
effort to bolster his prestige and head off pressures for greater
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Africanization of the economy, he has decided that the governme"t
will take controlling interest in some 25 leading non-copper
firms, and that the repatriation of profits by the two major
copper companies will be limited. The effect of this is to dis-
courage nei-r foreign investment in Zambia, particularly by the
copper companies. The copper producers are now considering
whether it is worthwhile to invest the additional funds in Zambia,
which would be necessary just to maintain the present level of
output, or take up options elsewhere which look to them more
attractive politically, e.g., copper and nickel deposits in
Botswana.
10. The interactions of economic stringencies, political
unrest, and triba:. tensions are threatening the internal stability
of Zambia. At the least, Kaunda will be in for some difficult
days. As popular discontent rises, there Will probably be a
tendency to blame the government, but some hostility will be
directed toward the copper companies, expatriate business men..
Asian traders, and outside powers, particularly the UK latent
antiwhite hostility, which is fairly close to the surface in
Zambia, could give an ugly cast to the kind of discontent likely
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to boil up. Kaunda would certainly try to prevent racial incidents.
At present he can count on a fairly effective police and army, led
by expatriates, to preserve order but their effectiveness will
decline as expatriate leaders are replaced by Zambians. If
Kaunda acts firmly he will probably be able to keep the internal
unrest within tolerable bounds. He is still the only national
figure who commands respect and allegiance from most Zambian
tribal groups.
11. Much hinges on Kaunda's willingness to stick it out in
the face of rising pressures. On the basis of his past perfor-
mances., and evidences of more recent emotional outbursts, we are
not very confider t on this score. If Kaunda leaves office for
any reason, a likely successor would be Vice President Kapwepwe,
a more radical figurc, who evokes strong feelings in Zambia both
pro and con. He would be deemed unacceptable by some of Zambia's
tribal groups, and his accession could touch off some nasty
tribal disorders. By necessity and inclination, Kapwepwe would
probably act in more authoritarian ways than does Kaunda, and
would no; shy away from antiwhite racist appeals, if these suited
his purposes.
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12. Whatever direction the internal course of events in
Zambia takes, its relations with southern Africa are not likely
to shift very far from the present path. Kapwepwe would be less
cautious than Kaunda in dealings with white regimes to the South,
and in support of the armed guerrillas in their forays into
Rhodesia and Angola. But we do not believe that the black
"liberators" will develop sufficient strength, determination, and
cohesion in thu next few years to pose a serious threat to any
white regime in southern Africa. However, the Smith regime and
the Portuguese in Angola will continue to be harassed and worried
by sporadic forays of Zambia-based insurgents.
13. We cannot be sure that the white regimes will continue
to resist the temptation to take a swipe at Zambia. This could
be done in subtle ways, e.g., the Portuguese might close the
Benguela Railroad for "repairs," or the Rhodesians might turn
off Kariba power to Zambia in order to "test the equipment."
Such measures would cause Lusaka at least to consider a temporary
restriction of guerrilla activities, but would not bring about
any fundamental change in Zambian commitments to "liberation."
If economic retaliation were accompanied by stern warnings to
Zambia, or if the whites were to raid a guerrilla camp in Zambia,
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Lusaka would respond with dramatic appeals for help to the UN,
the OAU, and to Western powers. Zambia would gain a great deal
of sympathy for its plight, but it is unlikely that any African
states, or any outside power, would become engaged militarily in
support of Zambia. The result would be a reinforced sense of
frustration, isolation, and bitterness in Zambia, and a tendency
to blame the US and the UK.
14. In the next few years it is almost inevitable that
Zambia, whether governed by the normally Weat'rard looking Kaunda,
or the more leftist Kapwepwe, will turn somewhat more to the
communist powers for support. The imminent arrival in Zambia of
several hundred Chinese railway experts to begin the engineering
survey, a preliminary stage in the construction of the Tan-Zam
railway, will probably enhance the prestige of the Chinl4c'
Communists among Zambians, and may eventually lead to an increase
of Chinese political influence in Lusaka. Indeed, some degree
of political influence may already exist, and may have accounted
for Zambia's vote against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
in the UN. But the Chinese will find Zambians a suspicious,
reserved people, who will not willingly aciiept much Chinese
tutelage.
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15. Zambia's leaders will be less likely to follow policies
favorable to the West in the next couple of years. The Influence
of Whitehall is fading fast, even though acme British advisory
personnel in the service of Zambia are still respected and heeded.
The refusal of the UK to provide funds which Zambia feels it is
entitled to, as compensation for joining the UK in sanctions
against Rhodesia, will further estrange Zambia from the British.
The US project of paving the Great North Road will not be completed
for some two years and thus will be of little immediate help to
Zambia. This project concerns the Tanzanian section of the road,
and is, therefore, unlikely to have much impact in Zambia, Some
Western interests, including perhaps the US investors in the
copper industry, are likely to suffer losses, but Zambia will
depend for a long time on Western markets for its copper? and
this will be a residual source of Western influence.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES :
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