THE OUTLOOK FOR NIGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 26, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Outlook for Nigeria
Secret
26 January 1968
No. 2-68
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SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 2-68
SUBJECT: The Outlook for Nigeria*
26 January 1968
We believe that, no matter what the military outcome, the
protracted civil war and the political uphc?avals which preceded
it have already considerably damaged Nigeria's postwar prospects
for national development. It is difficult to see how a bitterly
resentful and widely hated Ibo people could be reabsorbed into
Nigeria's polity and society. Traditional tribal animosities cnd
political enmities among non-Ibos are likely to worsen. More-
over, we see no national leadership in sight, military or civilian,
which would be capable of assuaging intergroup antagonisms and
gaining the broad popular backing needed to carry out t:1e compli-
cated tasks of political, economic, and social reconstruction.
Hence, we estimate that political instability will plague Nigeria
for some considerable time to come, and that tribal and regional
strife will seriously threaten the country's unity.
Soviet influence in Nigeria, sparked by Moscow's willingness
to provide military equipment to the Federal forces, has increased
and is likely to persist after the war. The US and the UK have
suffered a diminution of influence, in part because the Federal
government has resented their declared noninvolvement in the civil
war. After the war, Nigeria is likely to follow a more nonaligned
and less pro-Western foreign policy than in the past, and the
competition for influence among foreign countries will probably
add one more disruptive factor to the Nigerian scene.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by
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1. Nigeria's prolonged civil strife is rooted in the fact
that increased contact among its diverse tribal and regional
groups intensified rather than diminished mutual antagonisms.
By the time of independence (1960), the generally better-educated
Ibos from Eastern Nigeria already dominated commerce and the
public services in much of the country. They displayed con-
descending attitudes toward the more tradition-bound Hausa-Fulani
of the North and the more relaxed Yorubas of Western Nigeria.
Most non-Ibos in turn developed considerable antipathy toward the
pushy, clannish Easterners, ranging from Yoruba resentment of
the Ibo superiority complex to the Hausa view of Ibos as "slave
material."
2. Nigeria's founding fathers, both British and African,
foreseeing some of the obstacles to national unity, fashioned a
federation in ,aich each of the three major tribal groups could
dominate a region which embraced its own homeland as well as
those of lesser tribes. The major weakness in the arrangement,
however, was that, by weight of numbers alone, the Northerners
were virtually assured of a permanent majority ?n the national
parliament. As the scope and importance of the central government
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increased, its domination by the conservative Moslem North became
intolerable to the more modernized Southerners. After efforts
to loosen the Northern grip by constitutional means failed, Ibo
army officers in early 1966 snuffed out the parliamentary system
by assassinating key Hausa-Fulani leaders, which led to the
establishment of a military regime, the Federal Military Govern-
ment (FMG). A second military coup, this one by Northern officers
against the Ibo head of the FMG, and a series of bloody massacres
of Ibos and other Easterners living in the North set the stage
for the secession last May of the Eastern Region as the "Republic
of Biafra," and for the subsequent civil war.
3. The massacres and the lack of remorse displayed by the
Northerners convinced the Ibos that they could not live in any
Nigerian state dominated by Northerners. The more recent slaughter
of civilians by Federal troops advancing through Ibo settlements
in the Mid-West and the East and the bellicose statements of some
Federal commanders give new substance to Ibo fears. Most Ibos now
believe that the invading Federal forces are intent upon extermi-
nating them or reducing them to permanent subjugation.
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4. Under these circumstances, the Ibo war effort is sustained
by the seeming lack of any alternative to continued resistance.
The battle performance of Biafran troops, though hardly brilliant,
has been adequate to keep the numerically superior and better
equipped Federal forces from penetrating deeply into the Ibo home-
land. Colonel Ojukwu, Biafran Chief of State, appears to enjoy
the support of the overwhelming majority of Ibos and his govern-
ment is accepted, or at least not openly opposed, by the minority
tribes under Biafran rule. A Federal blockade and seizure of key
Biafran coastal towns has brought Eastern exports of petroleum and
of palm oil, the traditional crop, to a halt and largely cut off
Biafra from the outside world. But there is as yet no indication
that the resultant economic pressures will soon force Ojukwu to
sue for peace. Though nutritional standards have declined, local
production assures an adequate supply of foodstuffs.
5. Meanwhile in Lagos, rising pressures against the govern-
ment of General Gowon call into question the ability of the FMG
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to sustain its war effort. Gowon has gained some stature merely
by surviving in office for a year and a half and by projecting
a much-needed image of dignity and honesty. But he has not won
the support of all military commanders, the more headstrong of
whom pay scant attention to orders from Lagos. Though well re-
garded by his fellow minority tribesmen of Northern Nigeria, who
make up the bulk of the army's rank and file, Gowon has done
little to attract popular support from Nigerians generally. So
far as we can determine, his government is neither effective nor
popular. His cabinet, the Federal Executive Council, is an
assemblage of opportunistic politicians, distinguished mainly
for their opposition to the former parliamentary regime. It
serves as a bridge of sorts between the military chiefs and the
civil service, but its members appear more interested in maneuver-
ing for political dominance in postwar Nigeria than in coping with
current problems.
6. Gowon is being pressed to speed the termination of the
war. Federal military commanders, dissatisfied with the rslow
pace of battle, are urging a bolder approach with less regard for
the possibilities of & negotiated peace, and with less attention
to the prevention of atrocities against Ibo civilians. The chiefs
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of the minority tribes of the North are calling for an early end
to the war, whether by victory or negotiation, alleging that
they are suffering by the absence of the men who have been re-
cruited into the army from their areas.
7. Furthermore, Nigeria's economy is beginning to show the
strains caused by the dislocations of the war. For one thing,
the cost of airms purchases abroad has contributed to a sharp drop
in foreign exchange holdings and a decline in no military imports.
Governmental revenues have fallen off since the virtual cessation
of petroleum production last summer, and the costs of supporting
a much larger army are straining the budget. The situation is by
no means desperate, but the coats are beginning to pinch and the
discomfort index will rise as the war continues.
8. Of no less importance to Gowon and a prime consideration
in assessing the RIG's ability to achieve a military victory is
the rumbling of rising tribal and political discord in a number
of different areas. The tensions among the Yorubas and between
the Yorubas and the government are particularly ominous. Old
political feuds and traditional clan rivalries are reviving,
together with a growing mutual distrust between Yoruba civilian
politicians generally and FMG military leaders. In addition, local
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feuds are developing among Northern tribes, e.g., between 'rive
and Hausas, and in the multitribol. Mid-West.
9. Gowon hopes to assuage ooze of the rastive tribal groups,
particularly the minorities in the North, by inaugurating a new
internal arrangement of twelve subordinate states with a strong
central government in place of the four formerly semi-autonomous
regions. He has proel.hned 31 March as statehood day. In our
view, all indications are that. the new arrangement, if carried
out as scheduled, would exacerbate rather than relieve tribal
tensions. Some new states will contain antagonistic tribes or
clans wb ah already are bickering over the location of state
capitals, control of patronage, and the division of regional
assets. Moreover, nearly all Northern states will face a short-
age of Qualified local talent to staff ministries and commissions.
Indeed, there are not even enough Northern civil servants to man
the present single regional government, let alone six new states.
Hance, many of the new states will either have to rely on educated
Yorubas or expatriates in considerable numbers or face a break-
down in local government. But resident Yorubas in widely scat-
tered Northern cities are increasingly resented by the local
populace as were the Ibos in the past. Some Yorubas have already
left the North for the safety of their homeland.
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10. Finally, such key matters as the formula for allocation
of federal revenues to the states and the degree of subordination
of the states to the FMG are still undecided. The state leaders
anticipate a much greater degree of autonomy than Gowon apparently
has in mind. Indeed, some look forward to 31 March as a kind of
independence day. At the ].east, the establishment of the state
system is likely to encourage existing centrifugal tendencies.
11. We cannot at this stage predict with any confidence
either the duration or the likely outcome of the war. We do not
rule out the prospect of a victory by Biafra; i.e., the making
good of its claim to independence. If the Biafrans succeed in
driving the Federal forces out of Eastern Nigeria, or if the
Federal forces withdraw from the struggle because of a crisis
within the FMG, Biafra would probabl* gain diplomatic recognition
from European states which have shown sympathy for their cause,
i.e., Portugal and France, and probably from some African states
as well. Its economic prospects would be fair to good, once its
petroleum production resumed. Bolstered by the successful. strug-
gle for independence, it could probably maintain a higher level of
political stability than normally prevails in West Africa.
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12. A Biafran victory would almost certainly worsen the
prospects for the rest of Nigeria. Much would depend on the cir-
cumstances of ending the war, the state of mind of Nigerian mili-
tary commanders, and the degree of discord among the tribal com-
ponents of the army and of the country. At the least there would
be considerable confusion, a venting of tensions among tri`aes and
factions, and some violence, which could lead to tribal warfare,
secessions, or a general break up into smaller component states.
13. On the other hand, a Federal military victory would not,
ensure a stable, unified Nigeria. Rather, it tco would be likely
to trigger a release of pent up antagonisms among non-loos. The
FMG, lacking any firm institutional framework or national consen-
sus, would have to rely mainly on the army and police to make its
wrz.t effective. The capabilities of the police are limited, and
their numbers too few for maintaining order over large areas. As
for the army,
troops have been
hastily mobilized and are largely untrained and undisciplined.
Its few competent officers would be too thinly spread to act ef-
fectively and in concert.
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14. There would also be a problem of demobilizing or re-
assigning much of the 60,000-man Federal army. Many of the new
recruits who came from the ranks of the unemployed or from menial
positions have high expectations of mustering out benefits, which
may not be fulfilled because of financial stringencies. The return
to civilian life of large numbers of disgruntled veterans, in the
unsettled conditions likely to prevail after the war, could lead
to a resurgence of the traditional practice of employment of bands
of armed thugs by local political bosses, or simply to more disorder.
15. In addition to the task of preserving some sort of unity
and order in non-Biafran Nigeria, the FMG would face the formida-
ble problem of dealing with the defeated Thos. It is difficult to
see how a bitterly resentful and widely hated Ibo people could be
reabsorbed into Nigerian polity and society. If the Feder&l army
is assigned the task of pacifying Iboland, there would almost
certainly be continued violence, if not massacres, which could
lead to a resurgence of Ibo resistr ce.
16. Some of these horrors might be avoided if an effective
political leader or group, civilian or military, were to appear
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on the sce~ie and win 'broad popular support. But we see no
promising person or organization on the horizon. The net effect
of two years of coups, assassinations, massacres, and civil war
has been to obliterate the institutions and relationships of the
old federal system, and to deplete the ;^ankb of capable military
officers and political leaders. Hence, we doubt that the fragile
i..slitical and administrative apparatus and mediocre leaders of the
FMG will be capable of dealing effecti-:rely with the complicated
tasks of political, social, and economic reconstruction. In sum,
we believe) whatever the outcome of the war, that political in-
stability will plague Nigeria for some considerable time to come
and that tribal and regional strife will seriously threaten the
country' s unity.
17. During the course of the war a considerable shift has
occurred in Nigeria's relations with x'oreiL,:l rowers. The most
conspicuous development is the rise of Soviet influence in Lagos,
largely sparked by Moscow's provision of military aircraft and
other arms to the FMG at a stage in the war when no other great
power was willing to do iao. The USSR has furnished over US $5 mil-
lion of military equipment aid s::?;oral score of technicians. In
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addition, it has renewed earlier offers of economic aid, particu-
larly for the rebuilding of roads and bridges after the war. In
the wake of Soviet involvement, the East European Communist
countries and the UAR have also contributed to the TMG's war effort.
18. The Soviets are moving quickly to exploit along customary
lines the advantages offered by their new acceptance in Lagos:
they are planning to add some 24 additional personnel to their
mission; they are breathing some life into hitherto dormant Soviet-
Nigerian friendship societies and forming new ones; they are also
lavishing attention on leftist trade unions, courting journalists
and broadcasters, and disseminating Soviet propaganda including
anti-US material. This ostentatious display has convinced a
good many Nigerians, including members of the educated elite,
that the Soviets are helping their efforts to preserve Nigerian
unity. Barring a major blunder, tr.e USSR ca- expect to develop
its influence further at very little cost or risk, at least so
long as the war lasts and probably for some time thereafter.
19. Recent Soviet successes in building influence stand out
the more starkly, in that prewar Ni-aria had been virtually a
Western preserve. The US since 1962 has extended over US $200 mil-
lion in aid. But most Nigerians, again including the educated
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elite, resent the US policy of noninvolvement in the civil war,
believing that our refusal to ship tams to the FMG either is based
on a pro-Biafran bias or rt.flects a lack of interestv, in preserving
a urified Nigeria. The UK also lost considerable influence early
in the war by taking a stand similar to that of the US. Subse-
quent arms sales to the FMG have only partially restored Lagoa'
confidence in UK intentions.
20. The US will continue to maintain some influence in
postwar Nigeria, if only because most Nigerians are aware of the
past willingness of the US to provide large amounts of economic
and other aid. The FMG is not without qualms about rising Soviet
influence and probably hopes that the US will furnish considerable
aid for reconstruction and for subsequent economic development.
Nonetheless, the postwar outlook iti for a Nigerian foreign policy
more nonaligned and less pro-Western than in the past. There will
probably be considerable comp`tition for influence between the
USSR and the Western powers, and this in itself is likely to inject
a further element of disharmony in Nigerian internal affairs.
21. Should Biafra make good its claim to independence, it
would probably maintain friendly relations with France and Portu-
gal
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Anti-Britirjn feeling, now at a high pitch, would certainly persist
for come time, and would make it difficult for Shell-BP and other
UK commercial interests to reestablish relations. A postwar Biafra
would soon look to Washington for a considerable amount of aid
and support, and its relations with the US would largely be deter-
mined by the response.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
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