BOLSHEVIKS AND HEROES: THE USSR AND CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000150010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 21, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba
" Wily
L~Mia~ t~m~ ~~~ri
MY DEN~i"Y011
Secret
21 November 1967
No 0 10-67
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 November 1967
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM N0. 10-67
SUBJECT: Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba
INTRODUCTION
Brezhnev thinks that Castro is some kind of idiot, and
Castro probably isn't very fond of Brezhnev either. This is
still supposed to be a secret, but other symptoms of serious
strain in the Soviet-Cuban relationship have become publicly
conspicuous. The bonds which join them still seem to be much
stronger than the issues which divide them; nevrertheless, the
Soviets may now be close to losing their patience, and the
Castroites never had very much to begin with.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research.
GROUP 1
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Bolsheviks have always proceeded from the fact that
socialist revolution is not ... a conspiracy of a
group of heroes .... Experience shows that ...
manifestations of national insularity inevitably
weaken the positions of communists in the face of
the class enemy .... Marxists-Leninists have always
understood that socialism cannot be transplanted
from one country to the other by means of armed
force ....
-- Brezhnev, 3 November 1967
1. The mixed blessings of alliance with Castro's Cuba
have never been so dramatically demonstrated as during the
events surrounding the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations.
For one thing, the Cubans directly affronted the Soviets by
appointing a member of Castro's third team to head the Cuban
delegation to the Moscow festivities after the Soviets had
officially announced the planned attendance of Cuban president
Dorticos. For another, either because of Soviet insistence or
Havana's resistance, this worthy did not even deliver the customary
congratulatory address to his Soviet hosts. Next, the Cubans
compounded the insult by boycotting the traditional diplomatic
reception in Moscow presided over by Soviet chief of state
Podgorny. And finally, lest anyone miss the point, the Cubans
were the first to leave Moscow after the celebrations were over
(presumably racing the Rumanians to the airport for the honor).
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2. The Soviets for their part demonstrated little of the
restraint that has heretofore characterized the public handling
of their recalcitrant Caribbean ally. Just prior to the anniver.?,:ary
gathering in Moscow, Soviet publications carried obituaries of
Che Guevara, and also articles by two of Moscow's more obedient
Latin American communist party leaders, that seemed to cLaller,ole
the value of Castro's revolutionary philosophy and to convey
concerning Guevara's death -- more of a smug "we told you so"
than an expression of sympathy to the bereaved. In any case,,
the Soviets reacted to the Cubaa diplomatic snubs during thr::r
anniversary celebrations with a measure of acrimony. For example,
in his lengthy discourse on the achievements of the "Great
October," Brezhnev took an oblique but unmistakable swipe at
Castro's support of rebellions elsewhere in Latin Americo and
even at Castro's personalized and heroic style of revoli1tion
(see quotation above).
3. Clearly, a low point has been reached in the relationship
of the two communist partners. The question thus ari:;is as to
whether the divergencies that have been accumulating over the
past few years and have now broken more blatantly into the open
augur any fundamental change in Moscow's support of the Cuban regime.
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4. Although Castro himself has in the past alluded to
attempts by Moscow's supporters in Latin America to persuade the
Soviets to join the "economic blockade" of Cuba, apparently he
has long judged that Moscow could not afford to suspend or cur-
tail its economic assistance. In fact, Castro has evidently
felt so confident of the USSR's inability to abandon support of
Cuba that his spokesmen have in effect endorsed Albanian criticism
of Soviet assistance as a "yoke on the shoulders" of recipients,
thus demonstrating Cuba's ability to defy the hand that feeds it.
True, Castro has at times displayed some sensitivity to Soviet
views on one issue or another, but Moscow's official positions
are rarely an overriding consideration in his pursuit of causes
either at home or abroad. Indeed, the modest Cubans have
specifically criticized the USSR's management of its own affairs,
its interference in Cuban affairs, its handling of the Vietnam
war and the Middle East crisis, its aid to Latin American
governments, and its attitude toward revolutionary tactics in
the Third World.
5. A number of reports suggest that -- in the face of all
this -- the Soviet leaders are now prepared to get tough if
Castro does not mend his ways.
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6. This is not to say, of course, that the Soviets do not
see some advantages in their alliance with Cuba. Surely, they
are pleased to point to their sponsorship of a socialist "beacon"
in the Western Hemisphere, and they are well aware that Cuba
stands as a symbol of Soviet willingness and ability to provide
support even to remote allies. They recognize that their relation-
ship with Cuba serves as a reminder of the USSR's status as a
global power and as a propaganda device with which to taunt the
US. They are also happy at times with Castro's nuisance value
vic-a-vis the US.
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7. By now, however, the Soviets must be increasingly
impressed with the liabilities associated with their support of
_astro's Cuba. They are painfully aware that their economic aid
alone has cost them an average of roughly $300 million annually
since 1961 (a figure including drawn credits and grants as well
as the sugar purchase subsidy). They know that Cuba's importance
as a model for other fledgling nations has greatly diminished.
More important, they have found that Cuba does not afford them a
good foothold for incursions into other Latin American states.
Castro's alienation of a majority of Latin American communist
party leaders, his insistence on the need for revolutionary change
through violent tactics, and his refusal to cooperate with less
militant and non-communist forces of the left in Latin America
have created more difficulties than opportunities for Moscow.
8. The Soviets' relationship with Castro thus provides
them with a continuing demonstration that the burdens imposed by
commitments to small allies can exceed the benefits. But how to
disengage when the political and economic costs of a commitment
exceed the returns? Specifically, how could the Soviets pull
out of Cuba and look at the world or themselves in the morning?
It would be a confession of monumental failure -- the first and
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only socialist enterprise in the New World abandoned -- and it
would seriously damage Soviet prestige and be widely interpreted
as a victory of sorts for the United States.
9. It is true, however, that the Soviets have had some
considerable practical experience in these matters -- in
Yugoslavia, in China, and in Albania. A special set of circum-
stances governed Moscow's actions in each of these cases, but
there were some similarities in Soviet behavior. In each instance,
the Soviets sought through subversion or economi.c pressure or both
to bring the other party to heel. In each instance, of course,
the Soviets failed and then withdrew. Public disclosure of the
seriousness of the situation and an open exchange of insults
did not occur until the relationship had already passed the
point of no return. The Soviets, of course,insisted in each case
that their withdrawal had been compelled by the sins and crimes
of the other side. Finally, in each of these cases, the Soviets
were willing to withdraw even at the risk of great harm to their
national prestige and the unity of the communist movement at large.
10. Cuba is, of course, a special case and poses different
problems. Moreover, times have changed, Khrushchev no longer
reigns in Moscow, and the present Soviet leaders are surely more
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cautious than he. Then too, given his personal peculiarities
and enthusiasms, there can be no assurance that Castro's upset
will persist. Relations between Castro and the USSR almost
reached the name-calling stage after the Soviet withdrawal of
missiles from Cuba in 1962, but in May 1963 Castro journeyed to
the Soviet Union and there proclaimed that he had received a
"magnificent impression of Comrade Khrushchev .... without a
doubt one of the most brilliant intellects I have ever known."
Thus, Castro in 1967, having just snubbed the 50th anniversary
ceremonies, might conceivably travel to the USSR in 1968 and
put his fickle arms around Brezhnev. The Soviets for their
part could swallow their pride and accept the embrace. For that
matter, assuming no effort to make up, it is conceivable that
the Soviets and the Cubans could maintain their alliance in some
kind of repair for the indefinite future, even if their quarrels
should break completely into the open.
11. Given the strong motives of each side to maintain their
relationship, we do not believe that Soviet-Cuban difficulties
will come to a head in the near term or that Soviet-Cuban ill-will
is likely to lead to a break in relations comparable to, say, the
,3ino-Soviet split. But with each side apparently believing that
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the other cannot afford to become really obstreperous, either or
both could easily make a major miscalculation. The emotional
content of the quarrel, obviously intense on the part of the
Latins, now seems to have assumed considerable proportions on the
Russian side as well. The effects of this emotionalism cannot
be predicted, but symptoms of stress should be watched for. If
the quality of Sino-Soviet polemics is an indication, then it
would appear that, once exposed, Communist nerves Are as raw as
everybody, else's, maybe rawer.
12. If the Soviets should threaten to curtail their economic
support unless the Cubans behave themselves in Latin America --
and perhaps Kosygin dropped a hint of this when he visited
Havana last June -- Castro's reaction might be unrestrained.
The Soviets, in turn, might not be of a mind to humor any such
lack of restraint. Perhaps indeed, they have 1already entered
just such a process of moves and countermoves made in hurt and
rage. Perhaps in the end, if the Soviets really do get tough,
Castro might feel impelled to make important concessions. That,
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at any rate, would seem to be the way to survival. But a high
faith in his own skill and rectitude might blind Castro to the
costs and risks of defying the Soviets.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES :
25X1A
SHERMAN KEN2
Chairman
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