NIGERIA AND THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR BLACK AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000150009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 6, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
Nigeria and the Congo: Implications for Black Africa
Secret
6 November 1967
No. 9-67
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
6 November 1967
SPECIAL ME ORAND1JM No. 9-67
SUBJECT: Nigeria and the Congo: Implications for Black Africa
The bloody civil war in Nigeria and the racial and security
crises associated with the mercenary revolt in Congo (Kinshasa)
have caused some African and foreign observers to express fears
that comparable troubles are likely to be prevalent throughout
black Africa. Certainly these crises lay bare fundamental prob-
lems of tribal antagonisms and administrative and military dis-
abilities that are present nearly everywhere in black Africa.
In most states, however, these problems are not as intense as in
Nigeria and the Congo, and the threats to national unity and
order are not now as acute. Thus, though political instability
and economic malaise will continue to be widespread over the
next couple of years, we believe that fragmentation of states,
civil wars, and racial crises will be the exception rather than
the rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The crises of the past year indicate that Nigeria and
Congo (Kinshasa) are fumbling badly their attempts at nation
building. Like nearly all other newly independent African states,
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Nigeria and the Congo are "colonial creations:" their boundaries
were determined by political claims and military conquest, with
more ',onsideration given to administrative convenience and com-
mercial prospects than to lines of tribal demarcation. Preserva-
tion of national unity has proven particularly difficult for
Nigeria and the Congo because their populations are larger and
more diverse than those of other new black African states, and
because the political institutions and instruments of control
each inherited with independence were inadequate to cope with
the political and economic problems posed by their size and
diversity.
2. The sticking point in Nigeria nas been the incapacity
of the political syutem to accommodate the strongly-held tribal
identities of the population, or to reconcile the bitter antago-
nisms engendered by the growing contacts among the diverse tribal
and regional groupings within the country. Under colonial rule
and even after independence (1960), few Nigerlanz developed much
sense of national consciousness to replace or supplement the
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comfortable assurance of tribal membership. Indeed, increased
contacts among tribes in the rapidly expanding urban areas of
Nigeria generally reinforced tribal allegiances and intensified
tribal rivalries. Tribal identity, taken for granted in the
villages, took on greater meaning for the colonies of "foreign"
Ibos in northern Nigerian cities and of "foreign" Hausas in
Lagos. The uprooted strangers tended to live apart and to follow
their own customs and traditional beliefs. The generally better-
educated Ibos from Eastern Nigeria filled moat of the better jobs
in government and the public services and dominated commercial
life in much of the country. They displayed condescending atti-
tudes toward the more tradition bound Hausa-Fulani of the North,
and the more relaxed Yorubas of Western Nigeria.
3. The founding fathers, both British and African, fore-
seeing some of the obstacles barring the way to Nigerian unity,
The Briti+317, did not form a single administrative unit of present-
day Nigeria until 1914, and the outbreak of World War I delayed
any substantial development of a centralized administration
until the 1920's.
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fashioned a federation in which each of the three major tribal
groups could dominate a region which cmbraceri its own homeland
as well as those of lesser tribes. A major weakness in the
arrangement, however, was the parliamentary system of control of
the central government. By weight of numbers the Northerners
were virtually assured of a permanent majority at the center. Acs
the scope and importance of the central government increased, its
domination by the conservative Moslem North became intolerable to
the more modernized southerners. After efforts to loosen the
northern grip by constitutional meens failed, Ibo army officers
in early 1966 snuffed out the parliamentary system by assassinating
key Hausa-Fulani leaders, which led to the establishment of a mili-
tary regime. A second military coup, this one by northern officers
against the Ibo military chief, and a series of bloody massacres
of Ibos and other easterners living in the North set the stage for
the secession of the Eastern Region as the "Republic of Biafra,"
and for the subsequent civil war.
4. The massacres and the lack of remorse displayed by the
northerners convinced most Ibos that they could not live in e_ny
Nigerian state dominated by northerners. The civil war has, if
anything, intensified mutual animosities. In recent weeks as the
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tide of battle has turned againat them, many Ibos have come to
believe that the invading Federal forces are intent upon exter-
minating them, or reducing them to permanent subjugation. The
slaughter of civilians by Federal troops advancing through Ibo
settlements in the Mid-West and the East and the bellicose state-
ments of some Federal commanders give new substance to Ibo fears.
5. If, as now seems likely, the Federal forces continue to
prevail militarily, they will probably prevent a territorial
rupture of Nigeria, but the aggravation of tribal hatreds will
further complicate the task of nation building. It is difficult
to see how a bitterly resentful Tbo people, now hated more than
ever by the northerners, can be reabsorbed into a reconstructed
Nigeria. Furthermore, recent events have not provided much basis
for establishing tribal or political peace in non-Ibo parts of
Nigeria. The plan of the Federal Military Government for
establishing a strong central, government with 12 subordinate
states will be very difficult to implement, even if imposed by
military authority. Some of the proposed state boundaries cut
through tribal lands, and others bring together in narrow compass
traditionally antagonistic tribal groupings. After two years of
strife and political vacuum, the modern sector of the economy is
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in disarray, lawlessness has increased, and local officials are
unsure of their authority. Finally, there is no political leader
or group in sight which could gain the broad popular acceptance
necessary to carry out a political reconstruction, though various
tribal and regional spokesmen and some northern military command-
ers already are maneuvering to gain control of the postwar central
government.
6. The misfortunes, disabilities, and incapacities of the
Ccngo since independence (1960) make it the epitome of Africa's
difficulties. Other African states suffer similar troubles, but
not all at once, and usually not as acutely. Perhaps the major
obstacle to Congolese nationhood is the government's inability
to administer and provide security to a vast primitive state with
several widely dispersed centers of modern economic activity.
Lubumbashi and Bukavu are both some 900 miles from the capital,
with tenuous transportation and communication links. Heretofore,
most of what has passed for public administration and security,
to say nothing of modern activity in all other sectors, has been
provided by white expertise.
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7. Precident Mobutu's dilemma is that he feels imnelled to
demonstrate the Congro's independence and h1.s African nationalism
by pushing for greater Congolization; i.e., the elimination of
non-African administrators and advisors and the reduction of
foreign (mainly Belgian) economic interests. But each major step
in that direction places in bolder relief Congolese incapacity
for ruling (heir country, by further sapping governmental effi-
ciency, pub],.-.,,.c security, and economic viability. Mobutu's nian
to dismiss the white mercenaries in his army before the OAU chiefs
of state met in Kinshasa last September, backfired. The subsequent
mutiny revealed again not only the impotence of the Congolese
National Army, but its tendency in crises to destroy the public
security it is supposed to protect. Typically, Mobutu exacerbated
the breakdown in order by permitting a shrill anti-European
propaganda campaign.
8. Whatever the final outcome of the difficulties in the
eastern Congo resulting from the revolt of the mercenaries, or
of the recent incursion of mercenaries from Angola, the prolonged
disorders have accelerated the departure of Belgians and other
non-Africans from the country to a pace Mobutu probably had not
intended. Certainly Belgian public opinion now is weighted
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heavily against continued support for the Congo, and many Belgian
business interests in the Congo have either cut back or been
forced out. The Belgian government would probably prefer to
slash its aid program substantially, but is deterred mainly by
the fact that some 30,000 Belgian nationals in the Congo are in a
sense hostages. A considerable number of these are likely to
stick it out. In some cases the Congo is the only home they know
and prospects for equivalent emoluments in Belgium are dim. But
it is unlikely that Brussels will again provide much military or
juristic personnel, or permit its technical advisors to assume
posts outside of a few major cities. These gaps are not likely
to be filled as effectively by other foreign sources and inevitably
will cause a further decline in public services, especially in
the hinterland.
9. Particularly important to the Congo are the 1,000 or so
Belgian contract technicians who operate the copper industry of
Katanga. Most have no roots in the Congo, and each outburst of
anti-Belgian sentiment weakens their willingness to remain. If
many or most of them suddenly quit, replacement would be very
difficult, and mineral exports, the mainstay of Congolese public
revrenues, would decline or cease. This would not necessarily
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affect the bulk of the rural Congolese engaged in subsistence
farming, but would have a considerable impact on the c:Lvil service,
the security forces, and all who depend on state salaries. In
these circumstances, whether or not the Congo survives as a uni-
fied state, it would probably lose much of its remaining modern
character.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR BLACK AFRICA
10. As Nigeria's bloody struggle drags on, and as the Co;igo
gropes for relief from the racial and security problems associated
with its chronic revolts, what are the dangers of a spread of
similar crises throughout the continent, either as an immediate
spillover of violence from the current crisis, or as an eventual
development from like basic weaknesses?
11. It can hardly be denied that tribal frictions and
administrative incapacity are hampering nation building through-
out black Africa, or that political instability and economic
malaise will continue to be widespread. Yet we think the Nigeria
and Congo crises will not in the immediate future have profound
repercussions in other African countries, if only because the
populations of most states, including the troublesome elements,
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are too preoccupied with their own daily worries to pay much
attention to foreign developments. In most states, moreover,
the threats to national unity and order are not now as acute as
in Nigeria and the Congo: populations are smaller and cultural
diversity a lesser problem, tribal antipathies are less intense,
the white presence less irritating, and the hinterlands less
important economically. Thus, even over the next couple of
years, we think that fragmentation of states, civil wars, and
racial cr4.ses will be the exception rather than the rule in Africa.
12. In the final analysis, each African state will have to
cope in its own fashion with the fundamental problems laid bare
by the Nigerian and Congolese crises. At this stage in African
development, tribal affinities are paramount; nationalism can be
superimposed upon a tribal system, but cannot readily supplant or
suppress it. So far, most African rulers have proved fairly
adroit at balancing tribal influences, largely by bestowing bene-
fits proportionately among tribal claimants. This is not particu-
larly difficult in a state like Tanzania, where no single tribe
red:,-A"11 ,t:ns and where a charismatic leader commands allegiance
beyond his own tribal base. It is more difficult in Kenya, where
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Kikuyu political dominance is grudgingly accepted by the Luos and
others. Here the popular acceptance of Kenyatta as both Kikuyu
chief and national leader is the keystone of political stability.
It is also difficult in Cameroon, where the large, relatii ely
advanced Bamileke tribe is often at odds with the rational politi-
cal party and the centrai government and where traditional tribal
jealousies are easily aroused. President Ahidjo's firm hold on
power and his judicious application of rewards and punishments
maintains internal peace.
13. We cannot foresee whether the leaders of the new states
can continue to manipulate divergent tribal aspirations and
eventually weld them into national goals. Certainly, tribal
rivalries will slow progress in some cases and upset stability
in others. The passing from the scene of the aged Kenyatta, for
example, could precipitate a resurgence of tribal tensions which
would set back Kenya's political and economic progress, though,
even then, we think it 'unlikely that prolonged violence would
ensue.
14. The specter of tribal warfare at this time really haunts
only a few African states, i.e., those in which an important tribe
believes itself excluded from a reasonable share of the national
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benefits. President Obote of Uganda could face a serious internal
crisis if he is unable to win the cooperation for his newly-
imposed centralized government of the large and prosperous Baganda
tribe, the dominant element in the former federal system. Recent
actions by President Massamba-Debat of Congo (Brazzaville) favoring
his own Lari tribal brethren to the detriment of other important
tribes could bring on an internal conflict in that weak caricature
of a Communist state, in which tribal considerations still carry
greater weight than ideology. In Burundi, the Hutu majority may
eventually rise up against the Tutsi ruling class; or the Tutsis,
as in the past, may move to exterminate the Hutu leadership to
prevent such a rising
15. Elsewhere, insurgencies in Chad, Sudan, and Ethiopia
are variations of this theme. These rebellions have their roots
in ethnic, religious and historic antagonisms. The rebels --
Moslem nomadic ..ribes in ,'hadj. Christian and pagan negroes in
Sudan, and Moslems in the Eritrean province of Ethiopia -- resent
rule from a distant capital by an "alien" regime. Any meaningful
reconciliation of these long-standing disputes will require
greater leadership skills than now available, and new incentives
toward cooperation.
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B. Administrative Deficiencies and Racial Problems
16. Race relations throe`-;,out most of black Africa have
been surprisingly smooth since independence. Colonial rulers
generally retired ,from the scene gracefully, leaving a residue
of white doctors, engineers, teachers, and technical advisors,
whose services were needed and welcomed. What was not readily
apparent at independence was that persistent African deficiencies
in administrative and military skills meant that a considerable,
if not an increasing, number of expatriates would be required
for a long time. Both the African deficiencies and the admin-
istrative and security requirements were most obvious in the Congo.
In most of the other states the hinterland has less economic
importance and fewer security requirements, and could be safely
left to its own devices, while scarce indigenous administrative
talent and military force were concentrated in the capital.
17. Yet in nearly t ].l states, foreign experts continue to
play a key role in essential services and the modern sector of
the economy. Even Ghana, whose Africanization began early and
proceeded rapidly, relies upon 5S Peace Corps volunteers for
staffing its secondary schools. In Kenya and Northern Nigeria,
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whites hold half of the senior administrative positions in govern-
ment; while in most former French colonies the French continue to
monopolize education, medicine, finance, anl', commerce and to fill
key posts in civil administration and in the security forces.
18. Popular pressures for Africanization of jobs held by
non-Africans are universal but uneven, depending partly upon the
flow of students from foreign and domestic universities and tech-
nical schools, and partly upon the level of internal frustration
and envy of the white man's status. African rulers find it politi-
cally hazardous to ignore these pressures, but realize that to
capitulate to them could bring a drastic decline of efficiency or
security. In practice most leaders have been able to accommodate
domestic demands for jobs through gradual Africanization, without
seriously disrupting the functioning of the state and economy, as
has happened in the Congo.
19. Most African rulers have also been able thus far to
avoid the xenophobia of the Congo, partly because, unlike Mobutu,
they do not feel threatened by the white presence, or humiliated
by continued dependence upon white expertise. Zambia may prove
to be another exception. Antiwhite feelings are not far beneath
the surface and a large body of exFatriates hold the most essential
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jobs in the copper industry, the railroads, and other public
services, and retain some high administrative and military posts.
Moreover, if Zambia is to follow its national development plan,
an even greater number of whites will be required for professional
and technical jobs in the next few years. Yet pressures for
Africanization of jobs, regardless of qualifications, arc likely
to rise, as frustrations over Rhodesia and envy of the whites in
Zambia increase.
20. 'Similar pressures exist in East Africa against the large
Asian communities, which dominate retail trade and hold many
middle posts in the bureaucracy. Thus far national leaders
have been able to pace the rate of Africanization of positions
held by Asians and to avoid major racial conflicts, but only by
forcing more and more Asians to emigrate. This involves some
costs to the economy, as the Asians take their skills and capital
funds with them.
21. For black Africa as a whole, we cannot judge whether
the rate of training of Africans in the multiplicity of skills
required to manage even a modest twentieth century state and
economy will provide the necessary indigenous cadres before
pct:ular impatience manifests itself in xenophobic pressures.
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Indeed, the very process of modernization will generate new social.
tensions which judicious policies of Africanization alone will
not alleviate. Conditions which nourish political and economic
instability are certain to persist, and in some cacao, accompany-
ing racial tensions may make the presence of whites insecure.
Nonetheless, the white man will probably be welcomed in most of
Africa for a long time.
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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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