TITO'S TIME OF TROUBLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: November 17, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

719 i c. /SL
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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Tito's Time of Troubles
CIA
AO NOT DESTROY
MORI
review(s)
completed.
Secret
17 November 1972
Copy No.
1..09
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0LVitL' 1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 November 1972
SUBJECT: Tito's Time of Troubles
it is perhaps too soon to begin wringing hands, in
the manner of a recent commentary in The Economist
("Yugoslavia's liberalism is being thrown out of the window"),
but the news from Belgrade is in fact quite disquieting.
There are three principal concerns in the West and none of
them is entirely without foundation. The first is that the
recent wave of enforced resignations of high level political
figures, together with Tito 's emphasis on the need for a
return to authoritarian principles within the Communist
party, may herald a purge of Liberal, pro-Western leaders
and a turnabout in Yugoslavia's two-decade-old reformist
courree. The second is that the recent improvement in
Yugoslavia's relations with Moscow may presage Yugoslavia's
drift into the waiting arms of the USSR. And the third is
that Tito's current campaign to preserve federal unity may
have come too late and be too harsh; it may fail to revivify
the Communist party but succeed in enervating the nation.
Tito's Problems
1. The origins of the current ups3t in Yugoslavia can be
traced back to the crisis in Croatia of last December. That event
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates
and coordinated with OCI and the Clandestine Service, which are
in general agreement with its judgments.
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seems in retrospect to have constituted a watershed i" postwar
Yugoslav political history. It apparently ended what might be called
the era of federal optimism -- the phase of official., Titoist confi-
dence in the ability of the single federated state to survive the
various regional threats to its existence, even while the authority
of the central government and party was deliberate'y being reduced.
And it began a period of retrenchment,. intended it! the main to cut
back the powers of the constituent republics, to reassert the authority
of the central organs of the Communist party, and to do so while the
great national father figure, Tito, is still in command.
2. Tito has in fact been assailing "rotten liberalism" and
demanding party unity and discipline for the past ten months. But
outside of Croatia, where the problem has beer; met head on, many
have seemed reluctant to listen: there was rerhaps a feeling that
the old man didn't really mean what he was saying or lacked the will
and the power to implement his program. In any case, the leaders of
the Serbian party last month resisted Tito's efforts to have them
crack down on local non-conformists and ignored his insistence that
they accept the precepts of "democratic centralism". They resented
his effort to reimpose strong central authority over the affairs of
their hitherto largely autonomous (but cooperative) party and informed
Tito that they could not obey him. Perhaps Tito should have avoided
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pressing the issue to this point -- there is no evidence to suggest
that the Serbian leaders were the least bit anxious to engage him in
a test of strength. But once Tito was confronted with a direct
challenge to his authority he obviously felt he had no choice. And
so he seized the members of the Serbian Central Committee by the
scruff of the neck and somehow persuaded or forced them (we don't
know which) to vote their own leaders out of office.
3. Though there will be other terms used to describe what
is taking place, and though few if any of those forced to resign face
trial in a court of law, Tito has in fact instituted a purge and he
has done so for the usual reasons -- to rid the party of those who
would deny the right of the central leadership to enforce its will.
The purge at various levels of the state and party apparatuses in
Croatia consumed some 800 functionaries. The purge which began
early last month in Serbia has as yet to affect nearly so many, but
the process which started at the top has begun both to move down into
the ranks and to move out from this particular republic. Since the
beginning of October, twelve quite prominent figures from Serbia,
Macedonia, and Slovenia -- including five members of the large
national party Presidium -- have been forced to resign or have
resigned in protest. In the latter category was former foreign
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minister Koca Popovic, a Serbian who was an old friend and comrade-
in-arms of Tito himself.
4. Withal, there can be little doubt that Tito's intentions
are by his own standards honorable. Others will deplore his
methods, believe his actions high-handed, find his assumptions
questionable, and consider his timing a great deal less than perfect,
Those (like the editors of The Economist and probably not a few
Yugoslavs as well) who have looked forward to the uninterrupted
evolution of democracy in the Socialist Federated Republic of
Yugoslavia, will find Tito's current policies especially alarming,
even vaguely Stalinist. But his purpose is in a sense "pure:" and --
even were he too in favor of Western-style democracy, which of course
he is not -- Tito would remind his critics that to allow the nation-
alists of Croatia and Serbia to rule without restraint from the
center would simply make certain that there would ultimately be no
Yugoslavia in which the democratic process could unfold.
5. And Tito has much more to complain about than centrifugal
tendencies in the body politic. The Yugoslav economy is misbehaving
in a number of ways: inflation is running at about 15 percent or
more this year, in the manner, only worse, of a non-Socialist
We,,tern economy; foreign trade, in what is now practically a
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+:radition, is flowing much more in than out; some individual
enterprises are running up large deficits, others are spending
profits for frivolous purposes, rather than reinvesting them; the
backward southern republics are still backward and the prosperous
northerners still resent having to help them out; and the rate of
unemployment remains high, eased only by the large-scale emigration
of Yugoslav workers to other countries; especially West Germany.
Beyond all this, an old transgression, private entrepreneurism, which
has important ideological as well as economic and social overtones,
seems to be proliferating -- inter aZia, the new new class has been
speculating in real estate, amassing substantial wealth, hoarding
some of it in banks, and blowing the rest of it on fancy and con-
spicuous villas on the Dalmatian coast. Yet another problem, of
quite a different order, has also increasingly unsettled the regime
of late: the Ustashi (Croatian fascist) exiles have stepped up their
campaign of terror abroad and recently even moved it right into the
heart of Bosnia itself.*
In Perspective
6. Tito has been trying for two decades to fashion a new and
brighter philosophy of "socialism", partly because he came genuinely
See ONE Memorandum, "Yugoslavia -- the listashi and the Croatian
Se~eratiet Problem", 27 September 1972, CONFIDENTIAL.
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to detest the ideas and practices of Stalinism, partly.in order. to
give the Yugoslavs something else to believe in -- something that
would unify and inspire. To the extent that Titoist tenets have
worked -in Yugoslavia they have done so largely on the basis of
their nationalistic and utilitarian, not doctrinal, appeal. Compared
to Leninism and Maoism, for example, Titoism is pragmatic, uncertain,
lackluster -- hence commands no fanatics and arouses few frenzies
of dedication. (As a fount of ideological inspiration, Titoism has
provided greater nourishment elsewhere, especially in the Soviet-
dominated states of Eastern Europe.) In this sense, Titoist
Communism has failed to contribute substantially to the spirit of
Yugoslav unity.
7. Up to a point, nationalism represented an alternative
source of spiritual strength. It was a great force for federal
unity, so long as it was directed against hostile outside forces,
such as the USSR. But there is a large problem inherent in the
Titoist emphasis on nationalism: there are other kinds of nation-
alism -- Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, etc. -- which flourish in
Yugoslavia, and they are directed essentially against one another
and against Belgrade. And there are related problems associated
with Tito's brand of pragmatic socialism -- the lack of a sensa of
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shared purpose, a general unwillingness to make sacrifices for
the sake of a common cause.
8. The Titoist notion -- which underlay all the recent
constitutional reforms -- was that the way to deal with the forces
of nationalism and with regional urges for greater independence
was tj accommodate them. Emphasis in recent years was on
decentralization -- political, economic, ever. to some extent military.
It was thought, roughly speaking, that the restless intellectuals
could be won with liberal reforms and the republican nationalists
constrained with kindness. It was also thought that new and highly
elaborate federal structures -- e.g., the collective, 23-man State
Presidency which is drawn from all the regions and republics --
would serve to maintain central authority, even after Tito was gone.
But the events in Zagreb last year alerted Tito to serious weaknesses
in federal authority and to the fact that, in Croatia and perhaps
elsewhere, the general mood was changing; old animosities and fears --
of, for example, Serbian chauvinism -- had supplanted the Russian
menace as the fright of first order.
9. Developments in Croatia also reminded Tito that there is in
Yugoslavia an unhappy overlapping of the views of those who are
inclined to be pro-Western, liberal, and anti-Soviet,` and those who
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tend to be more or less militant regional and republican nationalists,,
Both elements in effect favor the weakening of the power of the party
and state at the federal level. The liberals wish to see the further
evolution of the pluralist society, the development in one form or
another of an essentially democratic socialist regime. They would
open the door to strong, at least tacitly anti-Communist influences
from the West. The nationalists (excluding the extremists, who
would cheerfully see the total dissolution of the Yugoslav state)
hold varying views about the desirability of democratic processes
but agree that the first order of business is the further strengthen-
ing of republican autonomy. To oversimplify, the liberals favor more
power for the people, the nationalists advocate more power for the
provinces. Tito, understandably, finds both points of view menacing:
the liberals would destroy "socialism", the nationalists would wreck
Yugoslavia. Tito feels then that he must move against both if his
and the party's authority are to endure.
10. Tito also feels that his problems -- though they were
most acute in Croatia -- are truly Yugoslav problems, that the
country-at-large (not just Croatia) and the party as a whole (not
just the Croatian) need a good, sound shaking. As was noted at the
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time of the Croatian events:*
While declaring that the fundamentals of the Yugoslav
system will be retained, he has nonetheless announced his
determination to find ways to prevent a recurrence [of the
Croatian affair]. He evidently feels (and rightly so) that
the Party, which he had counted on to behave as a unifying
national force, was especially remiss -- both in Zagreb
(where its leaders either failed to act or actually joined
the wrong side) and in Belgrade (where it seemed unable to
take decisive action). He may also be aware that his own
failure to provide active leadership in recent months was
in part responsible for the party's inertia. In any case,
Tito is now prepared to focus on the question of the
Party and its role in national life.
11. Specifically, Tito is trying to force the party to use
the power it already possesses in theory, though has not used in
recent practice, and to assume the responsibility for national
unity which it has over the years tended to ignore. He has denounced
the long-held notion and officially sanctioned article of faith
that the party can properly perform its duties as an instrument of
influence (playing only a "guiding role" in society) rather than as
a pre-eminent political force (exercising ultimate authority when-
ever and wherever necessary). Because he still believes that
doctrine can ultimately demolish the regional nationalisms, he has
emphasized that the party and the nation must heed and respect the
ONE Memorandaan, "The Crisis in Croatia", 5 January 1972, page 11,
CONFIDENTIAL.
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ideology of socialism. And thus, while still maintaining that the
system can to a degree be democratized and decentralized, he has
demanded that the party become the most powerful single institution
and the leading inspirational force in Yugoslav society, completely
free of the influences of provincial nationalism and bourgeois
liberalism.
The Russian Angle
12. This is about where the Russians come in. Tito's
increasingly black thoughts about pro-Western liberals please
Moscow for obvious reasons. His campaign against the nationalists
also pleases it, at least on the doctrinal level, and otherwise
causes it no particular pain.* And, in general, Tito's urgent back-
tracking on precisely those matters which have for so long been of
of public concern to the Soviets -- his toleration of dissent and his
devotion to decentralization -- must seem in Moscow to he a gratifying
spectacle. But the Russians have not, so far as we know, directly
interfered in any way. (Indirectly, though, they have emphatically
For good reasons of their own, the Russians do not care for dissi-
dent ethnic minorities nor overtly advocate the breakup of existing
unified states anywhere. Moreover, in the case of Yugoslavia, they
recognize that the militant nationalists are inclined to resist all
outside influences, including Soviet influences. But this is not
to say that the USSR would ignore a good opportunity to try to turn,
say, Croat or Serb separatism to its own advantage, circumstances
(say in the post-Tito era) permitting.
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endorsed Tito by encouraging closer relations and by agreeing to
provide substantial economic assistance.)
13. Moscow is of course aware that there are still "conservative"
Communists in Yugoslavia who would welcome a return to more orthodox
ideas and systems, and it would be happy to extend at least moral
support to such folk. But it knows full well that there is no longer
any pro-Russian faction in the Yugoslav party, no element which can
be counted on at this time consciously to advance Soviet interests
in Belgrade, the Balkans, or anywhere else. Moscow also knows
better than anyone else that the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement this
year is almost entirely the consequence of initiatives on the Soviet
side and not the result of any change of heart by Tito.* Tito has
been saying consistently since 1955 that he can get along with
Russia if only the Russians manage to behave themselves, i.e., do
not threaten Yugoslav independence and, secondarily, do not seek
to destroy the sovereignty (of whatever degree) of his East European
neighbors.
* In September 1971, following a period of severe strain in the
relationship, Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia, reconfirmed the validity
of the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations of 1955 and 1956 (which in
effect pledged the USSR to respect Yugoslav independence), and in
general signalled a conciliatory turn in Soviet policy. Since
then, the Russians have among other things extended at least $500
million (and perhaps much more) in new credits, and the Bulgarians
-- no doubt at Soviet behest -- have stopped their public agitation
of the highly sensitive issue of Macedonia.
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14. So much the better, of course, if the Russians, while
turning an amiable face to the Yugoslavs, are at the same time moving
to improve their relations with Western Europe and the United States.
(The Yugoslavs have enjoyed good relations with the West for years
and -- though Tito may campaign for a time against bourgeois Western
inroads -- Belgrade has no intention of sacrificing these relations
for the sake of closer ties with Moscow.) Finally, the Soviet leaders
seem to understand that their influence in Yugoslavia will be
severely limited so long as Tito reigns and that -- at least in the
near term -- efforts to enhance that influence necessarily must
follow the route which has become conventional in the Third World
rather than the path worn b, Big Brother in Eastern Europe.
Some Implications of the Current Trying Period
15. Put in these perspectives, neither Tito's purges of
officialdom nor his willingness to cooperate with the Soviets need
be found especiIly disturbing. It could be that the party does in
fact need to be shaken up if it is to become an effective force
for national unity. And it could be that better relations with the
USSR will ultimately redound to Yugoslavia's benefit, without in the
process compromising Belgrade's independence. Nevertheless, there
are worrisome aspects to the current round of dismissals of high
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level officials and disturbing implications and questions associated
with the general trend of Titoist policies.
16. First, the move against top people in Serbia threatens
to strip the party of a body of competent executives and to alienate
a substantial proportion of those functionaries who are otherwise
unaffected. Understandably, there does not now seem to be a large
residue of able leaders anxious to substitute for the disgraced first
team.* (The first first team in Serbia was purged some years ago after
the dismissal of the conservative superstar, Alexander Rankovic.)
17. Second, one is entitled to entertain some doubt that the
current wave of purges is being interpreted by the party faithful as
an "objective necessity", as, for example, the earlier purge of
Croatians seems to have been. No one has accused the ousted Serbians
of holding separatist views or of condoning the activities of those
who did: charges against them referred vaguely to "unhealthy" situa-
tions and failures to pursue the "class enemy". So what is all the
One of the two new men at the top in Serbia, for example,
apparently moved almost directly into his party post from his
previous position as a practicing (proletarian) locksmith. Tito
has explained that people of this sort may not be well-known to
the nation but are well-known to the "workers of Serbia". He
apparently feels that the question of competence is now subordinate
to the question of loyalty and that workers are more likely to
prove reliable in this regard than the members of the inteZZi-
gentsia they are replacing.
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commotion about? The Serbs may suspect that part of Tito's motive
here is simply to :Hake the disgruntled Croats a little less
unhappy. And there are probably others who see in all this the
signs of some sort of personal vendetta.
18. Third, there are overtones in these purges which suggest
to some that Tito means to turn the clock back to a much more
repressive period in Yugoslav history. Tito promised last month
that there would be no return to Stalinism but also condemned the
"euphoria of democratization" which he claimed began to develop in
the party in the early 1950s. Moreover, some of Tito's closest
companions are now ominously calling for severe curbs on the
independence of economic enterprises; for an end to the system of
direct election of members of the National Assembly; for a reduction
in the relative independence of the judiciary; and for a revision
of the criminal code so as to unsure the conviction of the "enemies
of socialism".
19. Finally, it is questionable that Tito in the time remain-
ing to him will be able to reassert the party's authority over the
other elements and forces which shape Yugoslav life and determine
the national destiny. In the confusion and enthusiasm accompanying
the introduction and development of Yugoslavia's decentralized system,
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the party has over time surrendered much of its power. This will be
difficult to restore. Some elements of the party seem to have lost
the habit of command. Many party officials seem to have other
interests and owe their first loyalties to other institutions or to
local constituencies. And many regional party organizations seem
to have been swept up in a rising tide of nationalism and blinded
by a growing pre-occupation with the economic self-interests of their
individual provinces and republics.
20. There is, moreover, a basic contradiction -- or quandary --
inherent in Tito's new approach. It is one thing to hold the army
in reserve as the final guarantor of federal integrity; this need
not directly affect the course of decentralization and so-called
self-management. It is quite another to demand that a single,
centralized, and authoritarian body, the party, actively participate
in and ultimately control the entire process. What could b9 the
meaning of a program of decentralization which is run firmly --
and without real statutory restraint -- from the center?
21. The question is, broadly put, can Yugoslavia somehow
strike a balance between the need for central authority and the
urge for pluralistic achievement? Can the system preserve its
unique identity as a ~;,,1 f-managing" socialist system if the theory
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and practice of self-management are assaulted by the man, Tito, who
practically invented both? The recently dismissed head of the
Serbian party, Marko Nikezic, has claimed that the basic achievement
of Yugoslavia's self-managing system is that political problems have
been solved by "general agreement". The greatest potential danger
to this marvelous achievement, he says, would be a trend toward a
concentration of power in the "professional political structure", i.e.,
the party and state apparats. Nikezic believes that Yugoslavia needs
"further democratization" at all levels of society, no, a return to
"centralism" and "direct exercise of power by the party". The party,
he feels (and so stated publicly in September) should try to
strengthen the trade unions and other mass organizations rather than
seek to draw more power to itself. Nikezic clearly fears, as no
doubt do many other Yugoslavs, that Tito's present remedies will
ultimately destroy what is truly worthwhile in the whole Yugoslav
experiment.
What of the Resolution?
22. in Belgrade also takes a dark view.
He believes that some of the prob'19ms "ugoslavia is facing -- economic
indiscipline, inefficiency, and corruption -- certainly demand some
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sort of "drastic action". But, in his view, Tito has unfortunately
"dramatized the situation to near crisis proportions" by calling for
a kind of Yugoslav cultural revolution.
The forces (mainly Yugoslav human nature) which
have resisted Tito's previous attempts at a general tighten-
ing up are very strong, but this time he seems to be
attacking with the urgency of a man who has not much time
left. If he continues, there is an obvious danger that
abuses and excesses will be attacked with much too blunt
instruments, destroying the energy and enterprise which
have been the mainsprings of Yugoslav development in recent
years and damaging, perhaps seriously, an economy now
propelled by forces which he does not begin to understand.
23. There are cogent reasons to entertain a less gloomy view.
ears
t
ith
t
w
no
standing -- may
have no intention of returning all power to the party and no desire
whatsoever to oversee even a diminutive cultural revolution. Tito
should know when to stop, even turn back, before the process of
disruption becomes irreversible. He is not, after all, a novice at
this sort of thing, nor would it be in character for him in a moment
of pique to abandon the fundamentals of the Yugoslav course:
innovative, pragmatic, and (relatively) humane socialism and
absolute national sovereignty. Tito certainly wishes these funda-
mentals to survive his own passing, and he has in effect designated
the party as his successor. Only the party, he feels, can carry
on -- preserve the Titoist treasury, guard Yugoslav independence,
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prevent federal disintegration. But, to carry on, the party must
be reinvigorated, made strong, and somehow given the kind of
charisma and authority that Tito himself has so long enjoyed.
24. The test will come of course after Tito goes. And it now
appears that the severity of the test will be greatly affected by the
timing of Tito's departure and by the, response of the party to Tito's
current round of pressures and purges. The recent crisis in the
party and the federal system, and the general political confusion
attending it, would no doubt greatly complicate the succession
problem if it should present itself soon. And even in the long run,
the party is not likely to become the kind of disciplined, dedicated,
unifying force Tito envisages. It can and probably will come to
play a somewhat more effective national role than it has in the
immediate past, but -- especially without Tito -- it will almost
certainly have to continue to accommodate itself to the pressures
of a pluralist society.
25. All things considered -- assuming in particular that Tito
is given time, another year or more -- our previous estimates would
still appear to be valid: Yugoslavia, as a single state, can outlast
Tito. Many of the fears, ideas, and forces which have helped to
bind the country together under Tito will persist even in his absence.
Fear of outside pressure and interference, particularly from the USSR,
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will endure, at least beneath the Surface. The Titoist heritage --
thirty or so years of Yugoslav survival in the face of war, cold
war, and adversity -- will no doubt remain a strong source of truly
national pride. The developing Yugoslav economy, with all its faults,
will continue to provide the citizenry, the politicians, and even
the regionalists with a heavy stake in federal survival. Finally,
the concern that the small individual successor states of the
Yugoslav union could not by themselves be prosperous or secure
will continue to persuade many Yugoslavs that the unified state,
in one form or another, must be preserved.
26. All this assumes, of course, that Tito's judgment has not
been impaired by age, that Tito is still in control of himself and
of the nation's political processes. We suppose, in other words,
that Tito's present approach is not irresponsible and eccentric or
worse, as some have lately suggested. But we should add that these
assumptions cannot now be made with absolute assurance: Tito is in
his 81st year, and there are -- perhaps inevitably -- stories that
he is declining mentally. There are also good reports to the
contrary. While it does not seem probable, it could be that his
faculties are deteriorating and if so, he could do a great deal of
damage before he dies or is removed from office.
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27. Presuming, however, that Tito remains a rational man,
and that his intentions are not so dire as his critics suspect,
the party and the people are likely over time to bend slowly to
his views, grudgingly and not all the way but far enough to ease
Tito's anxieties and to restore life to something akin to the not
entirely satisfactory or solvent norm. Yugoslavia will return to
its own variety of self-managed muddling through. And given half
a chance -- and reasonably good mental health -- Tito would
probably much rather spend the last years of his life acting like
a benevolent monarch than a dictator of the proletariat.
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Approved For Release 2007/08/05: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120028-2