THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP: TOWARD A NEW CONFIGURATION?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120025-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
The Soviet Leadership: Toward a New Configuration?
CIA
Secret
7 November 1972A
Copy No.
97
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 November 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Soviet Leadership: Toward a New Configuration?*
Unmistakably, the Soviet leadership is less collective
today than at any time since Khrushchev's overthrow in
October 1964. Brezhnev's personal role in Soviet politics
and policy is more evident than ever before. He is putting
his own imprint on the execution of Soviet policy and
probably on its formulation as well, though, necessarily,
we can be less sure of the second proposition than of the
first. In some sense, then, a "Brezhnev era" in the Soviet
leadership is in progress, though the term still needs to
be qualified.
This paper examines the scope of Brezhnev's personal
power as well as the factors which both limit it and enhance
it. It concludes that his authority might come under
challenge owing to recent reverses for Soviet policy, but
that, if it does, he is strongly placed to face down opposi-
tion. It is further concluded that the next year may be
critical in determining whether the trend towards a consolida-
tion of Brezhnev's personal power will continue or whether
the factors making for the preservation of "collectivity"
will again assert themselves. It also argues that, in any
case, the point has been reached when the present pattern of
personalities and politics in the top leadership must almost
certainly begin to shift.
* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National.
Estimates and discussed with other components of the CIA,
who are in general agreement with its judgments.
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1. In the course of Soviet history, collectivity and
personal rule have alternated as the dominant mode of leadership.
During the greater part of this period, however, in the flux of
Soviet politics, elements of both have been present. Pure collectivity
-- the equal sharing of power and authority by a number of men --
has never existed in the USSR.. There have also been important
differences between personal rulers in terms of the amount of power.
each had and the way he used it, as, for example, between Stalin and
Khrushchev. Between 1957 and 1964, Khrushchev was in a meaningful
sense a personal ruler. He was the prime initiator of policy and
he came close to controlling all the important levers of political
power, to the point where he could manipulate, override, by-pass or
simply ignore the rest of the oligarchy. But Stalin had succeeded
in establishing an almost absolute dictatorship. For a variety of
reasons, Khrushchev did not, and his failure to achieve unchallenged
supremacy ultimately cost him his position.
2. Brezhnev would also face risks in attempting the complete
destruction of collectivity. The collective arrangement has proven
to be more than a temporary alliance of convenience, exceeding
expectations both in terms of durability and serviceability. It
managed -- no doubt not without considerable strain, but stall
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without coming unstuck -- to carry the Soviet leadership through
some difficult policy choices (e.g., with respect.to the develop-
ment of Soviet strategic forces and the decision to enter SALT,
the Middle East, Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese problem). Under
this system of rule, the members of the leadership themselves and
the lower levels of the Party and government bureaucracies have
had more political, professional, and personal security than any
of them can remember. Under this system, also, none of the important
interest groups -- the Party apparatus, industrial management,
the military, etc. -- have been badly treated and each has had, to
one degree or another, the means to make itself felt in the decision-
making process. Nevertheless, the stresses of policy formui tion
and of internal politics have evidently together strengthened the
claims of unilateral authority and initiative, in the person of
Brezhnev, against those of committee rule.
Factors Which Have Limited Brezhnev 's Power
3. As chief of the Party, Brezhnev from the beginning had
a headstart toward predominance over his colleagues in the Politburo
(from 1952 to 1966, the Presidium). It might be considered
surprising that he has been so long in establishing his primacy.
Stalin and Khrushchev needed roughly six and four years, respectively,
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to do so. But the growth of Brezhnev's power has proceeded on the
whole steadily. and smoothly., Apart from what may have been-an
attempt to seize the Party leadership from him in 1965-1966 by
Aleksandr Shelepin, Brezhnev's position seems never to have been
seriously challenged, perhaps just because he made himself the
champion of collectivity. All the while, the power of his colleagues
in the Politburo relative to his own has gradually declined.
4. The slowness and persistence of Brezhnev's progress are
probably attributable largely to the underlying tension, still
unresolved, between the fear of strong leadership, on the one hand,
and the pressures for more dynamic leadership, on thp.other. The
painful experience of Khrushchev's arbitrariness and the even more
fearful memory of Stalin's autocracy were certainly powerful factors
in the formation of the collective and no doubt helped to hold it
together subsequently. In such circumstances, Brezhnev's position
in the Politburo must have owed.something to a capacity for
conciliation and compromise, as well, perhaps, to certain negative
considerations: his lack in the eyes of his colleagues of the kind
of personal qualities -- excessive ambitiousness, ruthlessness,
intellectual superiority which might have made him seem a
threat to them.
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5. It is also true.that, beyond these considerations, a
collective mode of leadership in many ways makes better organiza-
tional sense in Soviet conditions than control by a single,
immensely powerful leader would. Given the intense concentration
of political, economic, and social control and of decision-making
power at the top under the Soviet system and the growing complexity
of the policy issues posed, some division of function and authority --
largely absent when Stalin and Khrushchev were at the peak of their
powers -- may seem desirable, perhaps indispensable, to the Soviet
Party elite. At the same time, with the growth within the Soviet
bureaucracy of separate, occasionally overlapping and conflicting,
institutional interests, some mechanism for top level adjudication
between them has also become essential. The Politburo since
Khrushchev's time has, besides-setting the main lines of policy,
come to perform this additional function: it constitutes a clearing-
house through whose members the various functional (industrial,
agricultural, defense, security, etc.) and regional interests
receive a hearing at the highest level.
6. There have been other impediments which have prevented the
General Secretary from converting his natural advantages into clear-
cut domination. One of these is the ruling by the Party Central
Committee (to which the Politburo is nominally responsible), made
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soon after Khrushchev's.ouster, which prohibits the occupancy by
one man of the top posts in both the Party and government structures.
Another is the fact that the Party chief's powers in relation to the
other.members of the Politburo are not strictly defined: he must
to some extent make of the position what he can. He is, for
instance, evidently not entitled by right to the decisive word in
Politburo deliberations. Nor is his role in the formulation and
execution of'domestic or foreign policy precisely fixed. Brezhnev
seems to have chosen, or to have felt obliged, during the largest
part of his tenure in the Party post, not to throw his weight
around excessively. For some time he concentrated on those executive
responsibilities, e.g., internal Party management and relations with
the Communist states of Eastern Europe which were quite properly
his by virtue of his Party 9ffice. (An important exception is
defense policy, in which.Brezhnev has for some time had considerable
authority; another is the agricultural sphere, in which Brezhnev has
been prominently involved since he took over the top Party post,
despite the inherent hazards in this sphere.) He expanded his
field only bit by bit.
7. There is little to suggest that Brezhnev's colleagues
have taken serious alarm at any point at the growth of his power
or mounted a determined effort to cut him down to size. Whether
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by tacit agreement or-force of circumstance Brezhnev and his
colleagues seem, in fact, to . have. observed a certain mutual
restraint in their relationship with one another. On the one
hand,.other members of the Politburo have for the most part not
carried their political and policy differences with Brezhnev to the
point.of political confrontation. Some of them must, in fact, have
hitched themselves to his wagon, seeing advantage to themselves,
at least until now, in the consolidation of his power. For his
part, Brezhnev has riot resorted in blatant fashion to the classical
Soviet power plays: by packing the Central Committee, or by
engineering wholesale changes-An the Politburo itself. The turn-
over.in the Central Committees elected at the Party Congresses
in 1966 and 1971 wets below the rate at Congresses in the Khrushchev
and Stalin eras, well below that of some of the earlier Congresses.
Continuity in the Politburo has been considerable, even to the
extent that the three men with whom Brezhnev seems to have had his
most serious political and policy difficulties -- Shelepin, Voronov,
and Shelest -- as of now remain members, although they have been
deprived of other important posts. And, while a Brezhnev
"personality cult" has seemed to be sprouting from time to time in
recent years --? possibly planted in some cases by eager-to-please
underlings -- the full bloom has never emerged.
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Factors Enhancing Brezhnev's Power
8. As ageinst the many factors which have served as a
check on Brezhnev, he has, however, all along had much going for
him. As head of the Party in a Party-.state, his prestige is
inherently superior to that of his fellow leaders, and ultimately
the highest authority in the state is embodied in him. Although
Kosygin's post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers is commonly
equated to the Premiership outside the USSR, and Podgorny, as
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, is treated as the
titular President or Head of State, the powers associated with
these titles actually reside in the Politburo, of which Brezhnev
is in effect chairman. As such he is in a position to exercise
greater weight than his colleagues in every area of state policy.
Perhaps equally important, he has the right to organize the
Politburo's agenda and to manage its. proceedings. But there are
many who would consider these powers as.less significant in practical
political terms than those the General Secretary exercises as head
of the Party Secretariat, which is, among other things, responsible
for key appointments throughout the Party and government apparatuses
and for Party supervision of the military and security services.
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Party chiefs have of course always turned their patronage power to
personal advantage, and Brezhnev is no exception.*
9. With these advantages, judiciously and unobtrusively
employed, there was no reason why Brezhnev should not sooner or later
have begun to move out ahead, provided he succeeded in avoiding blame
for any egregious policy failures. In domestic affairs, he has
generally occupied what in Soviet terms is the middle ground with
regard to economic, social, and cultural policy. He has identified
himself, at least until recently, with the status quo, in some cases,
the status quo ante Khrushchev. Partly because of his Party position,
he has been a consistent advocate of ideological discipline.
(Brezhnev sponsored a revision of agricultural policy in 1965,
entailing mainly increased investment, but the initiative for the
more innovative reform of industrial management introduced later in
1965 was with Kosy gin.) In external policy, where the going got
rough for the USSR, Brezhnev fornd safety in numbers, as, for
example, in the Middle East in June 1967 and in Czechoslovakia in
July-August 1968. In the first instance, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
Podgorny each had some responsibility for dealing with the diffi-
culties created by the Arab-Israeli war. In the case of
Given the nature of their material, KremlinoZogists will,
however, naturally have various convictions as to what extent and
on whom Brezhnev has been able to confer this patronage.
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Czechoslovakia, though Brezhnev had been principally responsible for
dealing with the problem in the months leading up to the Soviet
invasion, at the point of decision virtually the entire Politburo
became directly and visibly involved. In both cases, care was
taken to secure the endorsement of the Central Committee for the
courses taken.
10. Nonetheless, the drift and indecisiveness which
characterized Soviet policy in many areas for the first five years
or so after Khrushchev became evident within the USSR as well as
outside. This must have created some sense of the inadequacies of
collective decision-making. This method had justified itself
during the post-Khrushchev period of political and policy consolida-
tion. But toward the end of 1969 this phase was about over: internal
economic and administrative dislocation had been corrected; the
Party apparatus had regained its paramount role in the bureaucratic
structure; the USSR had gained considerable confidence in its
strategic posture vis-a-vis the US; the turbulence in Eastern Europe
had largely subsided; and the moment of severest tension with the
Chinese had evidently passed. It is likely that at this juncture,
as a more active and innovative Soviet policy began to develop,
particularly in relations with the West, decision-making by consensus
became both more difficult and less convenient. In these circumstances,
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there was probably also increased need for an authoritative
figure to integrate, enunciate, and verify the main lines of
policy.
11. There has been considerable evidence during the last
three years that Brezhnev is now playing this part. He first
assumed a more prominent place in the promulgation of domestic
economic policy. Subsequently, he enlarged his direct involvement
in foreign affairs and is obviously no longer confined to dealings
with the Communist states. He has made a state visit to France. He
took sole charge of Willy Brandt's visit to the Crimea in September
1971. He played a central role at the Moscow Summit. And he has
evidently now assembled a personal staff of specialista- to support
him in this expanded activity in foreign affairs. Foreigners who
meet him generally find him self-confident and showing a good grasp
of the business at hand, which was not always the case in earlier
years.
12. In mid-1970, however, there were some signs of more than
the usual stress within the leadership and rumors in Moscow of
serious internal conflict. It may be that other leaders were
contesting Brezhnev's right to play a larger role and to set new
lines of policy and this resistance may have had something to do
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with the postpor,ement of the Party Congress scheduled for 1970. But,
if so, the difficulty was overcome. The 24th Party Congress, when
it did finally convene in the spring of 1971, confirmed Brezhnev's
pre-eminence; it witnessed the unveiling of what was officially
referred to as the Brezhnev Peace Program in foreign policy and a
domestic program which promised a new departure in economic policy:
a shift of priorities in favor of the Soviet consumer.
13. The sharing of public responsibility for the top-level
management of policy among Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, practiced
for some time, is now considerably less pronounced. Yet, the
processes involved in the formulation of Soviet policy, as opposed
to its implementation, are so thoroughly concealed that there can be
no assurance that Brezhnev has become the architect of policy to the
same extent as he has become its exponent. In fact, there seems to
be little that is original with Brezhnev in the main lines of the
policies now being followed. It is entirely probable, moreover,
that most of these would enjoy a preponderance of support at the
top echelon whether put forward by Brezhnev or not. The present
stress on ideological conformity and the prevailing conservatism
in domestic social and cultural policy (applied, however, without
the extreme repression of an earlier era) accord with the instincts
and needs of the Soviet bureaucratic establishment. Efforts which
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support the USSR's position of strategic parity with the US and
its superpower status generally and the maintenanc% of a firm line
toward China are policies which have the widest political backing
in the USSR. The detente line -- especially the.more flexible
approach to West Germany -- and the easing of relations with the US
seem to have caused some political strain. Shelest, for one,
evidently resisted this policy with some vigor. There was probably
also controversy over the projected change of emphasis in economic
policy. But to the extent that these policies, though they may
cause some offense to orthodox sensibilities, promise relief from
the threat of war and an amelioration of the standard of living,
they, too, no doubt enjoy wide popularity with important political
interests as well as with the Soviet public.
Dangers and Opportunities Arising from Brezhnev's New Role
14. Nonetheless, in his more forward position Brezhnev will
inevitably attract a larger share of the blame when setbacks occur.
The troubles now afflicting Soviet agriculture -- which could render
plans for an increase in the standard of living unrealizable for
some time to come and throw the entire current five-year economic
plan out of kilter -- are peculiarly his troubles because of his
close personal involvement with that area of policy. Brezhnev has
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also led the way on Soviet policy toward Germany -- and an adverse
turn for that policy, e.g., the failure of the SPD-FDP coalition
to hold office in West Germany in the November elections -- could
also undermine Brezhnev's political strength. Even in those cases
where Brezhnev's personal responsibility is less clear, as with the
expulsion of Soviet military personnel from Egypt, he is probably
vulnerable to criticism.
15. If Brezhnev's effective, usable power inside the political
structure has grown at anything like the same rate as his public
prestige and prominence, he ought to be able-to overcome these
embarrassments and others which may occur. What evidence there is
suggests that this is the case, but this kind of evidence is not
highly dependable. As long as Brezhnev has the authority to lead
but not to command absolute obedience -- as is now the case --
uncertainty about his position will persist. And Brezhnev may have
to continue to take care to insure that any contemplated moves have
substantial backing within the Politburo. One way to do this is,
where important issues are concerned,.to seek to discover where the
consensus lies and then stick fairly close to it. Another is to
alter the composition of the Politburo by addition, which has already
happened,* or by elimination, which could be about to happen.
* Four new full members and one candidate member were added to
the Politburo in 1971, and another candidate earlier this year,
bringing it to its greatest size in 12 years.
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Shelest, formerly Party chief in the Ukraine who-evidently
challenged the decision to proceed with the Summit in May -- and
as a result, lost his Ukrainian post but not his place in the
Politburo -- may have put his name near the top of the list of those
whose days on the Politburo are numbered. Other members who have
had their run-ins with Brezhnev and could be found expendable, if
Brezhnev should now decide that he needs greater security and has
enough momentum to obtain it, are Shelepin and Voronov.
16. Even without a shake-up, there will almost certainly be
a fair number of comings and goings in the Politburo in the next
few years. (If this turns out not to be the case, it will only be
because the status quo is being artificially maintained for cosmetic
purposes.) This will be due to the effects of age and failures of
health, a point which, though made often about the very old Soviet
leadership in recent years, is bound to come closer to being proven
as time goes on. The four men named full members of the Politburo
at the time of the Party Congress in 1971 had an average age (then)
of 55. Still, the average age of the Politburo as a whole is more
than 61 (for full members 62; for candidate members 60). Among
full members of the Politburo, Kosygin is 68 and from time to time
is reported to be tired and ailing; Podgorny is 69; Suslov is
nearly 70 and also reported to be in uncertain health; and Pelshe
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is 73. Mzhavanadze, who recently resigned as Party head of the
Georgian Republic at 70 has probably thereby lost his entitlement
to remain very long as a candidate member of the Politburo.
17. It would seem, therefore, that something is bound to give
and Brezhnev may have the opportunity in the near future to begin
the reconstruction of the Politburo according to his own preferences.
There would be a certain risk of upsetting the political equilibrium
in the process, but the gradual enhancement of Brezhnev's power and
responsibility may have reduced this risk: Kosygin's departure
from the Politburo would, for example, probably have a less
unsettling effect now than it would have had a few years ago, although
the choice of a successor would still not be easy. Brezhnev may
be strongly tempted to seize the opportunity to alter the composition
of the leading political organ, in order both to achieve greater
political security and to gain fuller control over the policy-
making mechanism. But the bar to Brezhnev's adding control of the
Council of Ministers to his Party post still stands and it remains
to be seen if he will try to circumvent this. There have been
rumors in Moscow of plans to name Brezhnev to the.chairmanship of
a kind of Council of State which would give him an alternative
authoritative government position.
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18. Thus, the present constellation of power and personalities
in the Politburo is not likely to remain as it is very much longer.
The clash of personal ambitions, policy conflicts, and the actuarial
laws seem to have begun to take their toll within.the leadership.
Some new blood -- not much yet, but some -- is being infused into the
top ranks. Long delayed, partly by design, the process of change
and renovation of the leadership once begun might very quickly gather
momentum. At the same time, Brezhnev has taken on greater responsi-
bility but seems to lack still the degree of prestige, authority,
or control of the levers of power which his predecessors had in one
way or another. He is therefore in a more exposed position
politically. He could, in these circumstances, try to wrap himself
again in the security of the group. It is likelier that the logic
of his situation will cause him to seek to enlarge his power further.
19. Total domination is, however, almost certainly beyond
Brezhnev's grasp, even if he were disposed to seek it. Any sign
that he was aiming at completely extinguishing collectivity would
inevitably arouse fears of the unpredictability and arbitrariness
which its end night portend. By ignoring n :ich attitudes Brezhnev
would place himself in danger of being overthrown by the same kind
of palace coup which ended Khrushchev's career. Awareness of this
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consideration on the part of Brezhnev himself seems likely to
continue to act as a check on his political ambitions. Where policy
itself is concerned, a Brezhnev possessed of greater power and self-
confidence may begin to take an even more vigorous lead in an attempt
to shape it more closely to his own design. In broad terms, the
design to which he now appears to be heavily committed is one which
calls for the continued pursuit of a detente line in foreign
policy linked to a steady growth of Soviet power,-and, at home,
progress in economic modernization but of such a guarded kind as
will not threaten to damage the existing political and social fabric.
Beyond Brezhnev
20. How long Brezhnev, nearing 66, can remain in power, no
matter what the form and dimensions of this power, can only be a
matter of guesswork. Though he is believed to have had trouble: with
his heart and other health problems, he might conceivably continue in
office for another five-ten years. But the actuarial odds would
favor a shorter rather than a longer term, and it would seem that
he and other leaders ought to be giving some thought to who might
replace him as General Secretary. Kirilenko has regularly in recent
years deputi:.ed for Brezhnev in his Party role, but Kirilenko is
himself 66 and would hardly be likely to be more than a transitional
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successor. Shcherbitsky (54), Kulakov (54), Katushev (45), who is
a Party Secretary, but not yet a member of the Politburo, and
Shelepin (54), as long as he remains in the picture, are other
potentials. Or some dark horse -- a less prominent individual,
possibly now serving in a provincial post --'might in time emerge
as the new Party chief.
21. The point is that the life of the post-Khrushchev
oligarchy is running out, but the succession to the important posts
is in no way assured. Especially is this so with respect to the
post of Party chief. Yet, it is still the case that in the Soviet
system power is concentrated at the top and it tends at the top to
flow into the hands of the General Secretary. It is one of the chief
flaws of this system, as has often been observed, that neither the
power, nor the limitations on the powers, of a post which is tanta-
mount to that of chief executive, have ever been statutorily defined.
There is, at the same time, no regularized procedure for filling the
post and throughout Soviet history succession to it has always
produced a period of political struggle and uncertainty in policy.
22. So little is known of the particular policy preferences
of the individuals who might compose a future leadership, much less
how they might behave if given greater responsibility, that an
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attempt to foresee what amalgam of policies would emerge under a
new alignment is bound to have small value. This would depend in
part on such unknowns as whether a changeover was precipitated by
failures of policy and which ones. Certainly, new men will devise
new tactics in future situations, but tactics will vary in any case
with changing circumstances. They may also bring new vigor to the
execution of policy. However, the notion that a new generation of
leaders -- not formed like the present men in the experiences of
the Stalinist era -- would tend to favor more liberal economic and
social policies, is, in the nature of things, an untested hypothesis.
It can even be supposed t-iat men who come to the top via provincial
Party posts will, at least initially, bring a narrower point of
view to bear.
23. No matter what their background, any new leaders, even
if they are so inclined, will find it difficult to overcome the
bureaucratic and institutional inhibitions to meaningful political
and social change or to significant alterations of the economic
structure. At the same time, in its conduct of foreign relations,
a reconstituted leadership might, like the post-Khrushchev leadership,
need a period of retrenchment and might pull back for a time from a
policy of more open dealings with the West. But these men would
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bZUKr;1,
also, more likely than not, come to see the USSR's interests as
being best served by "peaceful coexistence" with the US, detente
in Europe, and policies designed to check the growth of Chinese
power.
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