AMIN'S UGANDA: WHAT NEXT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 21, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 September 197,
SUBJECT: Amin's Uganda: What Next?*
This paper is intended to provide some perspective on recent
events in Uganda, particularly in light of this week's unsuccess-
ful invasion from Tanzania, and to outline some of the problems
likely to come up in the next few months.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with appropriate offices in CIA, which are in agree-
ment with its principal judgments.
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SI?"CARI"'I,
1. When Idi Amin ousted President Obote in January 1971,
it caused at least a mild sigh of relief among Western countries
with an interest in Uganda. Obote had become increasingly diffi-
cult to deal with. He had nationalized most of the foreign-owned
companies in Uganda and appeared to be growing ever more radical
and anti-Western. Government finances had become pretty chaotic,
internal tribal tensions were severe, and the general outlook for
Uganda was not rosy.
2. Under Amin, Uganda has moved from the frying pan into
the fire. His coup was generally popular in Uganda -- especially
among the Baganda (the largest tribe, which had suffered under
Obote's rule) and among the resident Asians who had come to fear
Obote's intentions towards them. But the relatively bloodless
coup became a very bloody affair in the ensuing months as Amin
permitted tribal hostilities nearly free rein in the army. The
number of Lango and Acholi officers and enlisted men, who had
formed the backbone of the army under Obote, dropped by more than
half. Total army personnel grew from about 8,000 to around 12,000
within a matter of months, while about 4,000 army men were killed
or disappeared. Few experienced officers or NCOs Ere left, and
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the army is almost out of control. The once effective civil
service is demoralized by the sudden arrests and disappearance
of some of its leaders, the police have been reduced to impotence
by the disappearance (and probable death) of the top echelon.
The populace appears generally fearful and stunned, wondering
where disaster will strike next.
3. Since his coup, Amin has devoted most of his energies
to army affairs and to his peculiar brand of foreign policy. He
has made a number of trips (some on the spur of the moment) abroad --
.to England, and most of the Arab states -- and carried on noisy
feuds with several neighbor states. He has no patience with the
intricacies of government finance and no interest in matters economic.
The situation of the modern sector of the economy has gone from
bad to terrible in the past two years.
4. When he first came to power, Amin was avowedly pro-British --
grateful for the UK's early recognition of his regime -- and pro-
Israeli -- loud in his praise for their assistance to Uganda's military
establishment. Conversely, he was "anti-Communist" and very sympathetic
to the rebel cause in neighboring Sudan. In the past eight months,
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these positions have shifted 180 degrees. The Israelis were expelled
in March and Israel is now considered enemy number one; British mili-
tary advisors have just been expelled and the UK appears to have be-
come enemy number two. Some of his former "enemies" -- Sudan and the
Communist powers -- are now seen as "friends".
5. To Western eyes Amin appears at best erratic, anc;
possibly crazy. He has, for example, lectured Jordanian officers,
including the King, about allowing US B-52 bombers to cro.:;s Jordanian
airspace on the way to bomb North Vietnam. More recently he has
threatened to invade Rwanda? to make it
stop "harboring Israelis"; offered to take on the British army, air
force (and navy!) if necessary; and claims that the British, Israelis,
and "other Western nations" are plotting to assassinate him. Last
week he applauded Hitler's policy toward the Jews and suggested all
the Israelis in the Middle East be sent back to Engl:And.
6. There may, however, be some method in thi-~ madness. Amin
is ill-educated (primary school only) and unsophisticated in compari-
son with most African heads of state but he is shrewd and has long
been popular with his troops. He served under the British and rose
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fairly high in the enlisted ranks, as well as becoming Uganda's
top boxer. He seems to be something of a bully, enjoys public
appearances and speechmaking; and appears untroubled by violence
and disorder in government operations. He believes in direct
and simple solutions to problems; compromise and negotiation
do not appeal to him. He makes virtually all policy decisions
himself and many seem illogical or even paranoid. But practically
all his abrupt policy shifts have been preceded by warnings or
threats, and he has a keen appreciation of the usefulness of
scapegoats. He kicked the Israelis out last spring, for example,
after he had begun to make advances to the Arabs, and after the
Sudanese rebellion, in which Israel had helped the southern tribes
to which he claimed some kinship, had been calmed. He promptly
sought replacement aid and technicians from among new-found Arab
friends, without much success. Israeli plots and machinations
thereafter became the favorate scapegoat for many of Uganda's ills.
7. Amin's decision in early August to expel Uganda's Asians
appears directly related to the worsening economic situation.* Never
The extent of this order has changed several times since -- at
first it included all Asians, even citizens; it was later amended
to exempt some Asians with certain skills (like engineers and
teachers) and currently also exempts those who can prove, in
the face of arbitrary and shifting bureaucratic requirements,
their citizenship.
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mind that the Asians run virtually the whole of the modern economy,
and contribute the bulk of the doctors, lawyers, teachers, mechanics,
tradesmen, and entrepreneurs. The order for their expulsion was
generally popular among the Black Ugandans. Amin has repeatedly
accused the Asians of sabotaging the economy, milking it of profits,
making "life hard for the Africans. Moreover, his declaration that by
November, Black Ugandans will regain control of their economy and
finally achieve independence strikes a sympathetic nerve.
8. While the British grudgingly accepted responsibility for
most of Uganda's Asians (35,000 to 50,000 are probably either British
subjects or stateless; a few thousand have Indian or Pakistani papers;
possibly as many as 15,000 have clear Ugandan citizenship),* they first
sought to persuade Amin to cancel the expulsion order. It soon became
clear that there is little hope of that and the British in recent weeks
have sought an extension of the deadline. Amin remains adamant and, as
various pressures are applied -- by the British in the form of suspending
promised economic aid, by a few other nations such as Zambia, Tanzania,
and Canada who point out the inhumane and racist aspects of Amin's ex-
pulsion policy -- he is becoming even more stubborn and angry.
* Estimates of the total number of Asians in Uganda vary widely.
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9. In the past few weeks foreigners of many nationalities
have been subjected to humiliations by Amin's soldiers -- often
drunken, usually sullen and suspicious. American diplomatic
personnel trying to cross the border by car have been manhandled;
tourists subjected to rough baggage searches and confiscation, in
some cases, of valuables. Amin's orders to his hand-picked border
forces to shoot on sight any Israeli trying to cross the border;
his subsequent accusations of British plots and sabotage --
accompanied by observations as to what good targets white faces
would make for his troops -- have naturally alarmed most of the
foreign community in Uganda.
10. Amin has demonstrated a great tolerance for violence
and bloodshed and an exceptional ability to find someone to blame
for Uganda's troubles. So far, a relatively small number of Asians
(perhaps a hundred or so) and three Americans* have been killed.
It is clearly unrealistic to expect green or drunken troops, under
orders to shoot Israelis, to be able to distinguish between Israelis
Two Americans were killed by soldiers in July 1971 when they
went to investigate reports of a mutiny. This week a Peace
Corps Volunteer was shot at a roadblock.
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on the one hand and Dutchmen, Englishmen or Americans on the
other -- especially since Amin's speeches have begun lumping
"Europeans" (which in the local context means Whites) together
as "spies" and "plotters".
11. Clearly, the British -- numbering about 7,000 -- seem
to be the next focus for Amin's wrath. The military advisors
have already been ordered out (accused of plotting the assassina-
tion of Amin) and a number of prominent English civilians have either
left or been expelled. As British efforts to ensure an orderly
departure of many thousand Asians encounter the confusion and obstruc-
tion of the Ugandan bureaucracy, frictions are bound to get worse.
Amin has begun to accuse the UK of dragging its feet. He seems
perfectly capable of suddenly ordering the British to leave. Nor
would the fact that he needs their presence and help in removing the
Asians necessarily deter him.
12. The danger to Americans -- both private and official --
is clearly increasing. There are nearly 1,000 Americans in Uganda --
nearly 400 are officials or dependents of officials and the rest
are there in a private role -- mainly missionaries and teachers.
Most of the private citizens are outside the capital, in towns and
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villages. They are aware of the unruly and capricious behavior of
the army, keep their heads down, and mostly feel confident that the
inhabitants of their areas are friendly. Many of the officials,
especially Peace Corps and AID technicians, are posted outside the
capital.
13. Until recently, at least, Americans have been threatened
only by the general disorder and violence in which occasionally they
were inadvertently caught up -- drunken border guards, soldiers on
trains, urban crimes, disturbances near military installations, etc.
The roads are probably most dangerous since they are sporadically
patrolled by ar-;j units ordered to watch out for foreign spies and
suspicious characters. Given the prevailing disorder, additional
incidents affecting Americans are highly likely.
14. Tensions have increased greatly in the aftermath of the
abortive invasion from Tanzania by Ugandan exiles this week. The
army is still nervous and Amin is highly likely to order reprisals
against anyone suspected of sympathizing with the invaders. Internal
movement for civilians -- both native and foreign -- is almost certain
to become even more difficult and dangerous.
15. A second and far greater danger for Americans and other
foreigners lies in a potential policy shift, e.g., if Amin intensifies
-9-
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his xenophobic outlook in the wake of the invasion and begins to
worry about the whole Western presence. The chances of this
seem tied to how greatly his suspicions of British and other
foreign plotting against him are increased by recent events,
and on how the British behave in arranging the Asian exodus.
The outlook is not appealing.
16. If, under such circumstances, he turns on the British,
the Americans will probably be next in line. In Amin's view,
Americans and Israelis are closely aligned; in the past few months
he has accused Peace Corps personnel of spying and is convinced
that "Israeli-Americans" are plotting against Uganda. Moreover,
the US and UK are so linked, in his eyes, in NATO that their irterests
are very similar. Several months agu, he asked for and got a list of
all Americans in Uganda, by location and job. In the past few days
he has lumped all Westerners together when accusing them of trying to
do him in. There are reports that he is thinking of kicking us out.
17. Amin is quite capable of expelling Americans from his
country. So far, expulsions (of Israelis, Britons, and others) have
been peaceful. Also to the good, Ugandans have generally been friendly
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towards Europeans and disinclined towards violence against them.
But even if Amin decided foreigners could leave peaceably, his
lack of control over his soldiers -- combinea with general dis-
order -- could make it dangerous for the expellees. Nor is there
much that neighboring states or other powers could do to help.
18, It is not inevitable that events will follow such a
dismal course, or that the British and then the Americans will
be told to leave. But the odds seem to lie in this direction.
?'.)~ can we estimate how long the present dangerous situation will
last. Amin is making enemies, even in the army, at a rapid rate.
We cannot rule out an assassination. Coup plot rumors abound, but
we know of no potential leader or group capable of ousting Amin.
It is clear, however, that if he stays in power he will need many
scapegoats, and Americans constitute a tempting target.
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