SOME THOUGHTS ON NATIONAL RIVALRIES AND INCREASING TENSIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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/ /fl? Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Some Thoughts on National Rivalries and Increasing Tensions
in South America
CIA
DOCUfiEiT SERVICES ~f11h~H
FILE COPY
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
25 August 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 August 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on National Rivalries and Increasing
Tensions in South America*
Much attention has been given, in recent NIEs and other
intelligence issuances, to the resurgence of nationalism in
South American countries and to its impact on relations with
the US; relatively little has been said about the implica-
tions for relationships among the South American countries
themselves; Here we explore the national rivalries and shift-
ing alliances on the continent from the second point of view,
emphasizing the changes now underway in the reg!onal balance.
Despite the increased tendency of many South American nations
to cooperate on certain matters of mutual benefit (such as
economic policies vis-a-vis the developed world), we foresee
a period of rising tensions in the area,
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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1. For a number cf reasons, the stresses and `rains in the
relations of South American countries with one anoth;=.r are likely
to increase. The slow and uneven economic development in the area
is frustrating to leaders strongly concerned with d+.;velopment as a
key national goal. The internal instability of some nations has
increased the tendency of their leaders to blame outside forces for
their troubles and to search for external scapegoats. There is dis-
agreement among South Americans over how far and and how fast the
LIS role in the area should be reduced. At the :.ame time, Brazil's
growing power and energetic policy are upsetting the traditional
balance of power. And historical grievances, !order disputes, tra-
ditional rivalries, cultural and ideological differences are still
important.
2. To many outsiders, the similarities among South American
countries seem more impressive than the di'rf'erences. The inhabi-
tants of these nations, however, are very !iiuch aware of the extreme
diversity in the region. Brazil's great &`.ze and its Afro-
Lusitanian heritage give it a unique position in South America.
The more Europeanized and Caucasian nations (Chile, Uruguay, and
Argentina) consider themselves far superior to
Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia. The feeling is reciprocated: most of
the nations to the north are scornful of the haughty, patronizing
-2-
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southerners whose boasts seem to run so far ahead of their achieve-
ments. This mutual antipathy does not prevent
a certain amount of
cooperation among countries, but it engenders patty quarrels and
makes small disagreements larger.
3. Differences in ideology and in the political organization
of the regimes have occasionally been important sources of friction
as well. For a number of years following the overthrow of the dic-
tator Perez Jimenez, the Venezuelan government would not recognize
military governments elsewhere in South Arica for fear of encourag-
ing the Venezuelan armed forces to take back pow-r. Military govern-
ments In one country tended to feel a certain k*inship with military
governments elsewhere, and to distrust civilian governments. The
current differences in institutional style -- civil versus military,
socialist versus capitalist, dictatorship versus democracy, and even
military-populist versus military-conservative -- have contributed
to renewed tensions. For example, the advent of Allende's adminis-
tration in Chile has worried a number of other governments. Allende,
in turn, was quite concerned when General Torres' leftist regime in
Bolivia was overthrown in 1971 by rightist officers supported by
Argentina and Brazil.
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4. Nonetheless, alliances have usually been fashioned for
reasons of geography rather than for cultural or ideological
reasons. Each South American country has always been suspicious
or fearful of its immediate neighbors and has looked to nations
farther off for political and military support. The traditional
rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, based on the desire of each
country to dominate the Southern Cone, has, until quite recently,
contributed to a rough balance of power. Brazil, which borders on
every South American country except Chile and Ecuador, has had
serious boundary disputes with each of its neighbors. Its tra-
ally has been Chile -- an ironic connection given the
mutJcil suspicions between the governments of the two countries
today. Peru and Bolivia have been hostile to Chile for over a
century, and border problems between Argentina and Chile have
flared up frequently. Argentina has had close, though paternal-
istic, ties with Peru ever since San Martin, an Argentine, helped
to liberate Peru in the 1820s. Although alliances have shifted
back and forth over the years, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia have
been allied most often, usually against Brazil and Chile.
5. The South American wars, mostly fought in the nineteen.h
century, are still evoked today by nationalistic elements. Irridentism,
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a heritage of most of these wars, remains a powerful sentiment.
Chile successfully waged war against both Peru and Bolivia, and
took away "sacred soil" from each one. Brazil and-Argentina have
fought over Uruguay and have been close to breaking relations on
other occasions. All three of these countries battled Paraguay
in a long and especially bloody conflict that wiped out almost
every adult Paraguayan male. In the 1930s, Paraguay had re-
covered enough to defeat Bolivia. In 1942 Peru used force to take
some territory from Ecuador and took advantage of US preoccupation
with World War II to retain it. Outside mediators, sometimes from
Europe, sometimes from the US, helped to settle certain of these
conflicts, but their efforts generally became effective only after
the military struggle had run most of its natural course.
6. The last three decades have been remarkably free of inter-
state violence, even though political disputes have been common.
In a sense, regional quarrels were submerged by the Cold War and
by the pervasiveness of US influence in South America, beginning
with World War II. South American leaders became accustomed to
taking it for granted that the Colossus of the North would play
an active role in maintaining regional stability.
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7. In the last few years, however, the mood has changed.
A conviction that the US role must and would be modified has be-
come widely accepted, along with a strong sentiment against in-
tervention by the US in South American disputes. Such leverage
as has accompanied US aid programs is clearly smaller than it
once was, and the threat to cut off aid much less effective as a
deterrent. Some Latin leaders have in fact come to doubt that
the US Government presently cares much about their continent, ex-
cept for US investments. Some even believe that the US has now
appointed Brazil as a guardian of Latin stability and a chief
defender against radical change. These various shifts in atti-
tude have on the one hand fosters.; increased cooperation on
certain economic issues involving confrontation with the US and
on the other more active diplomatic maneuvering among the nations
of South America.
8. Certainly the most dramatic development in the past
few years has been the awakening of Brazil.. A rare combination
in South America these days -- a booming economy and domestic
political stability -- has convinced Brazil's leaders that their
own house is in order and that they are ready to play a larger
role in Latin American a'nd world affairs. President Medici 's
visit to Washington in December 1971 helped to persuade the
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Brazilians and other Latin Americans that the US had indeed be-
stowed upon Brazil the mantle of leadership within the region.
The Brazilian government sees part of its mission as providing
assistance to countries which appear to be floundering politi-
cally or economically, particularly if they seem endangered by
Marxist radicals or other leftists.
9. Partly in consequence, Brazil has developed an exten-
sive aid program of its own. It is giving economic assistance to
12 Latin American countries and military assistance to several.
In Uruguay and Bolivia, this assistance includes counter-insurgency
support and training, because the Brazilians consider these govern-
ments especially insecure and vulnerable to radical subversion.
While pleased to have aid from Brazil, some of the recipients are
leery of the donor
For a 25X6
few, fears of Brazilian domination may already match in intensity
their fears of the US. And Argentina
has expanded its support to Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay
-- the "buffer" countries which have been an arena of competition
between the two giants of the Southern Cone for over a century.
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10. Aside from its impact on foreign relations, Brazil's
growing economic might is arousing considerable concern on eco-
nomic grounds. South America has become an increasingly important
market for Brazilian manufactured goods, but Brazil's new trading
partners can offer relatively little in return. The fact that
Brazil now sells far more products to Argentina than it buys helps
to explain why relations between the two nations are so touchy
these days. Uruguayan cattle ra;ichers find it more profitable
and efficient to smuggle their herds across the border to Brazil
than to sell them at Uruguayan prices. Uruguayan officials are
aware of the smuggling but are unable to put a stop to it, at
least partly because the Brazilian government refuses to get in-
volved.
11. Competition over natural resources is another factor
underlying regional tensions. The Argentines are furious over
Brazilian hydroelectric projects slated for rivers that eventu-
ally flow into Argentina. Both Brazil and Argentina look to the
"buffer" states for access to resources and potential markets.
At the same time, territorial disputes in the northern tier of
South America have taken on new importance because of the dis-
covery of natural resources along the borders and the prospect
that more will be found. Substantial petroleum deposits have,
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for example, been discovered in the area near the borders of
Peru and Ecuador. And Venezuela covets large, sparsely popu-
lated areas in Colombia and Guyana where oil in marketable
quantities may also be found.
12. In the last year or so, diplomatic activity in South
America has taken on a new excitement, Heads of State and their
foreign ministers are scurrying around -- asking themselves what
to do about the "Brazil problem", the "Chile problem", and what
they see as the new US role (political disengagement. tacit en-
couragement of an activist Brazil, and a nationalistic economic
policy). Occasionally these visits have worsened relations, e.g.,
President Lanusse's visits to Brazil in March 1972 which solved
none of the bilateral conflicts between the two nations and
actually added a few personal grievances. On the other hand,
Lanusse's talks with Chile's Allende were cordial and productive
enough to make the Brazilians uncomfortable,
Outlook and Implications
13. The combination of real and imagined threats will tend
to keep tensions in South America high. The tendency of some
governments to involve themselves in the internal affairs of
others is likely to become more pronounced.
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14. The general orientation of armed forces in the area
will remain of particular concern. Thus Argentine and Uruguayan
leaders will continue to be intimidated to some extent by the
formidable forces that Brazil maintains along its southern fron-
tier. Peruvian military leaders
will continue to organize their
armed forces on the assumption that one day Peru will have to
fight Chile again. The Peruvians are also nervous about the con-
struction of the Trans-Amazon highway in Brazil, because it repre-
sents an extension of Brazil's military as well as economic power
-- in effect a new threat upsetting the status quo.
15. Despite these fears, threats and pressure plays involv-
ing sabre-rattling, troop movements, and border skirmishes are
far more likely than large scale hostilities. Many national
leaders will view these as relatively safe methods of putting
pressure on their neighbors and, not incidentally, of distracting
attention from their own domestic problems. Even war is not entirely
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implausible, however, when one considers the growing competitic;
over natural resources, the assumption that the problems of some
others, and the incrcising military influence over governments,
Most South American countries are continuing programs to modern-
ize their armed forces. Partly this is a way to keep military
establishments satisfied; partly it represents insurance in case
one of the traditional rivalries or new grievances produce mili-
tary conflict. Some of the efforts at modernization will probably
proceed fast enough to give at least the appearance of an arms
race.
can become subversive threats to
16. A number of the continent's leaders will be maneuvering,
trying to create new alignments and relationships, primarily be-
cause of Brazil's growing power and changing role. Some nations
are likely to seek increased political, economic, and military
ties with Brazil as a form of protection against other countries.
The governments of Colombia and Guyana apparently believe that with
Brazil as a strong ally they would not be vulnerable to military
pressure from Venezuela. Other countries, however, are already
talking about setting up a kind of cordon sanitaire to contain
Brazil's new missionary spirit. There are indications that,
despite their ideological differences and mutual suspicions,
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Argentina is drawing closer to Chile in the wake of Brazil's
recent assertiveness. If so, this would be another sign that
balance of power concerns in the area still weigh heavily.
17. Brazilian officials are aware of these stirrings and
will, be trying to convince Brazil's neighbors of its benevolence.
Brazil
will be trying to play off one country against another while at
the same time exerting leadership and influence. But they prob-
ably cannot have it both ways. The more Brazil succeeds in
asserting itself, the more resistance it will arouse, Ironically
enough,
it is likely to find itself more and more the object of the kind
of animosity which the US has so long suffered as the Colossus
of the North.
18. Few of the various situations of stress and tension
likely to develop in Latin America will be susceptible to easy
or tidy solution. The OAS or the US might be able to prevent
armed confron;ations on occasion, but no outside intervention
is likely to solve the underlying problems or to will plaudits
for the mediator. In some cases, rival powers may both turn
to anti-US postures for domestic political reasons. Thus the
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pattern of future developments will not preclude cooperation
between South American rivals on these and other selected issues,
but it will inhibit broad efforts to promote genuine regional
unity.
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