ITALIAN ELECTIONS IN MAY: WILL THEY HELP?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110046-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Italian Elections in May: Will They Help?
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
00 NOT DESTROY
Secret
3 March 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Italian Elections in May: Will They Help?*
1. A decade of center-left cooperation in Italy has
foundered on a formidable combination of political rivalries
and pressing domestic issues -- the latter including inflation
and a stagnant economy. The center-left parties were unable
to paper over their differences just one more time after the
bitter presidential election in December. As a consequence,
Italy now has a Christian Democratic minority caretaker govern-
ment, and unprecedented early national elections are scheduled
for this May. The Christian Democrats are certain to remain
This memorandum is narrowly focused on the pre-election,
political sces::a in Italy and some post-election possibilities.
Some of the more fundamental social, economic, and political
problems underlying the present difficulties are dealt
with in NIE 24-70: "Prospects for Italy", 12 November 1970.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Se timates and coordinated within CIA.
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the largest single party and presumably either will seek to
renew center-left cooperation or will try to devise a viable
alternative. Neither task will be easy. Indeed, the govern-
ment crisis may persist for some time, and satisfactory long-
term solutions to Italy's political problems may become more
elusive than ever.
THE PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL SCENE
2. When the center-left coalition was first organized,
it hoped to make a serious attack on Italy's social and economic
problems and thereby to undermine the political appeal of the
extreme left. Reality has not matched promise. The energies
of the center-left partners have been squandered on factional
infighting and the pursuit of personal power and advantage;
government crises have continu'd to be recurrent. Some of the
reform program has been enacted, some has not; of the reforms
enacted, some have not been implemented by the country's
creaking administrative machinery. On top of this, the growth
of GNP -- which averaged over five percent throughout the
1950s and 1960s -- has slowed and may not exceed one or two
percent this year. Meanwhile, there has `peen rising discontent
over the government's failure to come to grips with Italy's
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problems. Labor demonstrations and public violence have be-
come more frequent, and there have even been violent clashes
between left and right extremists. With elections scheduled
for the spring of 1973, politicians were clearly looking to
their prospects at that time in the light of current discon-
tent. It was their maneuvering which made the formation of a
new government impossible to achieve.*
Christian Democrats
3. Until late January, the Christian Democrats opposed
early elections. ThFy feared their party would lose seats to
the right no matter when elections were held, and they were
especially uneasy over Neo-fascist gains in last June's scattered
local elections. But the majority of Christian Democrats now
has come to believe that losses to the right can be minimized if
elections are held this year rather than next. Their reasoning
is influenced by their estimate that the economy is not
ikely to improve very much before the regular elections sched-
uled for 1973 -- not enough at any rate to increase their
chances at the polls.
The distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies just
before the dissolution of Parliament on 38 February appears
on page 10 of this memorandum.
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4. Other factors helped overcome the traditional Christian
Democratic reluctance to go to the polls early. Contracts for
over four million workers are up for renewal this fall. A repeat
of 1960's "hot Autumn" of prolonged strikes and labor violence
is not likely to occur, but moderate wage increases are expected
and will aggravate the inflationary problem. In addition, an
unfavorable demographic trend has been worrying the Christian
Democrats. The 1971 census figures, which are not Expected to
affect early elections, must eventually serve as the basis for
a redistribution of parliamentary seats among the electoral
districts. The figures apparently reflect shifts in population
since 1961, movement from rural areas to cities and from south
to north which could reduce Christian Democratic seats.
5. The most immediate Christian Democratic headache,
howevi.,^, involved a referendum on Italy's fifteen month-old
divorce law. In January, the constitutional court declared the
referendum legal. If held, the Christian Democrats would have
found themselves campaigning against divorce with the Neo-fascists
as their only political ally on this issue. With parliament
dissolved, the referendum has been postponed.
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6, Center and right-wing Christian Democrats, moreover,
have long been concerned over the efforts of their Socialist
coalition partners to establish a "new equilibrium", i.e.,
closer cooperation with the Communists. Some have felt that
the time had come to draw back from the center-left coalition
which included a Socialist Party moving in this direction. The
temporary alliance between Socialists and Communists in December's
presidential balloting -- and the ability of cente" and right
forces to overcome this alliance -- served only to strengthen
this conviction.
Social Democrats and Socialists
7. Both the Socialists and the Social Democrats view
early elections with mixed emotions. Former President Saragat,
who wants to preserve center-left cooperation and to lead his
party toward rapprochement with the Socialists, now seems to be
supported by a majority of Social Democrats. The party's strong
conservative minority, however, would shed few tears over the
demise of the four-party, center-left concept, although it does
wish to preserve the party's ties with the Christian Democrats.
The conservatives want no rapprochement with the Socialists, in
part because they think it would lead to a loss of votes from
right-leaning supporters. They recognize that Saragat's personal
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prestige may lure some voters away from the Socialists in the
coming elections, but both they and the left-leaning majority
fear the Neo-fascists may be the principal gainers in May.
8. The Socialists are still smarting from their defeat in
the presidential election. Their'alliance with the Communists
on that occasion was'part of their effort to stake out a position
as the natural intermediary between Communists and Christian
Democrats. They believe it will also help them to absorb a
major portion of the faltering Proletarian Socialist Party, thus
improving their parliamentary position. They admit some possible
losses to the Social Democrats from their own right, but they
think such losses will be more than offset by gains on their own
left. An increase in left-wing Socialist strength, however,
would pose new difficulties for reestablishment of four-party,
center-left government.
Republicans
9. Only the Republican members of the center-left coalition
have consistently favored early elections, believing that they
will make substantial gains. Their moralistic approach to politics
and their conservative economic policies have only limited voter
appeal in Italy. They are likely to improve their position
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somewhat at the expense of their former center-left partners
this spring, bL!t their hopes for sizeable gains are probably
illusory.
10. The Communists have really been in a dilemma. Perhaps
more than any other party, they wished to avoid the referendum
on divorce. They feared the referendum would cost them a portion
of their electoral base because many of their supporters are
Catholics who might leave the party fold on this issue and stay
away permanently. Early elections postpone that possibility for
at least a year and in any case until after the Communist parlia-
mentary delegation has been given a new lease on life. But
early elections also worry the Communists; they are concerned
over the Neo-fascist resurgence and fear it is still waxing.
Having embarked on a course of "responsible" opposition calculated
to lead to closer cooperation with the Christian Democrats, the
Communists would be seriously discomfited if Christian Democrats
edged to the right in an effort to prevent a slippage of their
conservative support to the Neo-fascists.
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The Right
11. The Liberals had hoped to avoid early elections and
thus at least postpone their own anticipated electoral losses
to the Neo-fascists. To this end, they pushed hard for a centrist
solution to the January government crisis, i.e., one involving
a Christian Democratic-Social Democratic government with out-
side Liberal support. (Such a government would have had only
a nine-seat majority in the 630-seat Chamber of Deputies -- too
small to last by Italian standards.) The Liberals hoped, of
course, that a year of a centrist government would improve
their chances in 1973 elections -- perhaps enough to make a
center coalition attractive to the Christian Democrats there-
after. But the narrowness of such a centrist majority had
doomed Liberal hopes from the start.
12. Though the Neo-fascists hold fewer seats in the
Chamber than the Liberals, they have far more vitality and
mass appeal. They look for substantial gains whether elections
are held this year or next. They are trying to capitalize on
the backlash to ineffectual government, labor demonstrations, and
mounting violence (to which they themselves have contributed).
In part, their hopes are based on last June's scattered local
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elections. We think that -- while these did represent a sub-
stantial gain in popular support -- they are not a very good
index to the future. Less than one quarter of the electorate
was involved, and the elections were primarily in the conser-
vative south, where certain special conditions were operative:
e.g., the traditionally strong Neo-fascist influence among
civil servants and retired military personnel in Rome, and the
resentment of Christian Democratic voters in Sicily over their
party's long-standing connection with the Mafia there. Apart
from Sicily, Neo-fascist gains were made almost entirely at
the expense of the fading Liberals and the near-defunct Monarchists.
And, although the Christian Democrats suffered an overall loss
of 4.2 percent of the total vote (when compared to the vote in
the same jurisdictions in 1970 local and regional elections),
their loss is reduced to less than 1 percent if Sicily is omitted
from the comparison.
THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION -- SOME POSSIBILITIES
13. Voting is a legal obligation in Italy -- though the
law is only haphazardly enforced -- and an average of over 92
percent of the electorate has voted in each of the five national
elections held since 1948. This traditionally heavy vote has
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also been remarkably stable; gains or losses by individual parties
have very rarely exceeded 4 percent, and shifts usually measure
no more than a percentage point or two. Even these small shifts
are closely studied and endlessly interpreted by Italian politicians,
however, and their impact on party policies and strategy is often
far greater than the figures would seem to warrant. Especially
in the highly factionalized Christian Democratic Party, implications
for future elections are bitterly debated, decisions are taken
concerning the composition of government coalitions, and support
for government programs is volunteered or withheld -- all on the
basis of the real or imagined trends discerned in minor changes
in the results of na-cional or local elections.
14. The distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies
before Parliament was dissolved is shown in the following table.
Party
No. of Seats
Total
Left:
Communists
177
Proletarian Socialists
22
Former Center-
Christian Democrats
265
left coalition
Socialists
62
partners:
Social Democrats
29
Republicans
9
Right:
Liberals
31
Neo-fascists
25
Monarchists
5
Other
5
6 30
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The analysis in the preceding paragraph suggests that, while the
shifts this sprint, may not be very great, they could make con-
siderable difference to the problem of government formation.
There could be some shift from the left to the former center-
left (Proletarian Socialist to Socialist) and some from the former
center-left to the right (Christian Democratic and Social Democratic
to Liberal and Neo-fascist). There probably will be some shift
within the right (Monarchist and Liberal to Neo-fascist). In
the analysis which follows we suggest what some of the possibilities
might be, using the distribution of seats outlined above as a
base and assuming some minor shifts.
Renewed Center-Left
15. Heavy Christian Democratic losses to the right in
May -- even of 25 seats -- would still leave a workable center-
left majority in the Chamber (about 340 seats, with 316 required
for a majority). If, as seems likely, Christian Democratic
losses are at least partially offset by Socialist gains, a new
four-party, center-left coalition would control only slightly few-
er seats than its predecessor. There are several factors,
however, that would work against renewal of four-party, center-
left cooperation. The Republicans have firmly opposed enactment
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of center-left reforms which violate their concept of fiscal
responsibility -- reforms which Socialists and left-wing Christian
Democrats consider a sine qua non to renewal of the coalition.
Christian Democratic center and right factions, moreover, would
interpret losses to the right as a rejection of the center-left
formula by the electorate. And gains by the Socialists on their
left wing would probably encourage them to make unacceptable
demands as their price for cooperation with their former center-
left partners.
lu. If, despite these limiting factors, a center-left coalition
government is re-formed after the elections -- or if a Christian
Democratic minority government depending on center-left support
should be formed -- the result most likely would be an intensifica-
tion of the trends of the past few years: government inaction,
recurrent crises, and still greater manifestations of popular
discontent than have occurred to date. Over time,this would lead
to a deepening of the political malaise in Italy.
Return to a Centrist Coalition
17. A return to the four-party centrist formula of the
1950s is possible on the basis of current parliamentary arithmetic.
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Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Republicans
now control a total of 334 seats. By Italian standards, however,
this is only a marginally workable majority. Among other things,
it would have trouble dealing with agitation for social and
economic reforms by forces on the left and by factions within
the coalition itself. A loss of even ten or fifteen seats to
the right after the elections, moreover, would reduce such a
centrist majority to the point where it could not hope to govern
effectively. It could lead to a series of government crises,
which in turn would lead to a search for some new arrangement.
New Center-Right
18. On the basis of current party holdings, a coalition
of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Monarchists
would control only 330 Chamber seats. A center-right coalition
excluding the Social Democrats but including the Neo-fascists
would control 326 seats. A rightward shift in May would not
make the formation of a center-right coalition any easier and
probably would make it more difficult. Neo-fascist gains would
make it impossible to form such a coalition without Neo-fascists,
and this would be virtually impossible for the Social Democrats
or the left-wing Christian iemocrats (about one third of the
party) to swallow. If such a coalition were formed, it would
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strongly provoke the left and could lead to a repetition of
the violence which drove the short-lived Tambroni government
from office in 1960 when it was tried.
Center-Left with Communist Support
19. A coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists
with external support from the extreme left is, of course, a
clear mathematical possibility. Christian Democrats and So-
ciali,sts already control a small, though probably unworkable,
majority in the Chamber (327 seats). Communist and Proletarian
Socialist support would increase that majority to 526. Assuming
some Christian Democratic loss to the right and some gain by the
Socialists from the left, a Socialist-Christian Democratic gov-
ernment might still be possible. This is the kind of situation
toward which some Socialists have been working. If the Com-
munists agreed to support such a coalition from without and
if the Christian Democrats could swallow this, Italian politics
would enter a new phase. If the Italian Communists are ever
to participate in Italian parliamentary government, it is likely
to come about by some such route as this.
20. An attempt to form this kind of government almost
certainly would not be made until the other possibilities described
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above had been explored and abandoned. And if tried, it would
not be easy. A leader would have to be found; unless it was
a Christian Democrat with national prestige -- Fanfani comes
to mind -- it could not be done, for the moderate Christian
Democrats would not go along. And there are many in Italy who
would do everything they could to prevent the Communists from
sharing in power. Even a solution which had Communist parlia-
mentary support without Cabinet participation could bring
rightists into the streets and start rumblings within the
military.
A CRISIS OF REGIME?
21. From the considerations outlined above, one can draw
the inference that the results of the May elections could make
the job of coalition formation even more difficult"than it is
now. None of the possibilities discussed is likely to provide a
consensus for the kind of government the country needs. The
"clarification" which Italian politicians often speak of could
be a clarification which promotes rather than eases crisis.
Perhaps after appraising the results and the possibilities,
Socialists, Social Democrats, and Christian Democrats (the
Republicans probably won't matter much) will conclude that the
safest and most sensible thing to do will be to reconstitute
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the center-left which hus governed Italy for the last ten years.
The Italians have shown a consistent capacity for patching some-
thing together at the last moment and for making it work, at
least for a while. But if they do not do so, Italy may be in
for a serious crisis of regime.
22. This crisis of regime could come about in several
ways. One would be through the formation of a center-right
government (including Neo-fascists) which precipitated agitation
and violence from the left. Another would be through the
formation of a center-left dependent upon Communist support
which precipitated agitation and violence from the right
(including she military). A third would be through the devel-
opment of political drift -- either because of inability to
form any government at all (thus prolonging the present care-
taker cabinet) or because any cabinet which could be formed
would have such a narrow and unstable majority that it could
not govern.
23. In the last case, somewhat reminiscent of the unsettled
period before the Colombo government was finally formed in 1970,
pressing problems would go unresolved. On that occasion there was
considerable unhappiness within the military establishment and
even some plotting on the madcap right. Prolonged political
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drift could start that all up again -- and even with more vigor,
given the greater self-confidence of the Neo-fascists.
24. A crisis of regime from whatever cause could result
in fundamental changes in Italy. A breakdown of the political
process might lead to a rational reexamination of that process
and the formation of a new moderate consensus capable of exert-
ing the political muscle to effect social, economic, and admin-
istrative reforms. But a crisis of regime which led to a left-
right confrontation on the streets would be an altogether
different thing. It is doubtful that the right could win; if
it did not, Italy's domestic balance would swing leftward and
over time that could produce major changes in foreign as well
as domestic policy.
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