POLAND UNDER GIEREK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Secret
MEMORANDUM
Pound Under Gierek
DOCUMENT
Do
Secret
5 November 1971
Copy. No.
81
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 November 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Poland Under Gierek*
The net, regime of Edward Gierek, which came to power
in the midst of the great turmoil of last winter, has
taken hold in Poland surprisingly well. It is ready,
in fact, to convene a Party Congress -- a major polit-
ical event in Poland -- early next month. Gierek,
somewhat in the manner of Hungary 's cautious innovator,
Kadar, would apparently like to set Poland off on a
new course -- toward a less oppressive political
atmosphere; improved living standards; a better deal
for the workers; more efficient, less bureaucratic, eco-
nomic programs; and some restoration of Polish na-
tional pride. But the people are 2restive and skeptical;
economic prospects are far from bright; and relations
with the USSR -- which is probably apprehensive about
Gierek 's intentions -- could prove to be increasingly
troublesome. Gierek thus has his work cut out for
him, and the way ahead looks rough and uncertain.
* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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5 November 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Poland Under Gierek
1. In less than a year, Poland has lived through major
urban riots, bordering on insurrection; has seen the fall of
a leadership which was once regarded as virtually irreplace-
able and which long enjoyed the special blessings of the USSR;
and has survived an interval of great political confusion and
uncertainty. Last winter and spring were, in fact, a time of
pervasive disarray, both at the top, where the reins of power
seemed to lie slackly in several hands, and among the workers,
some of whom seemed ready for a time to grasp these reins for
themselves.
2. The new leader of the Polish Party, Edward.Gierek,
can only be counted as an unusually artful and perhaps lucky
man. Gomulka's estate was in terrible shape, riddled with
debt and disorder and managed by a corps of functionaries
dominated by indolence, inertia, and incompetence. Gierek
had to find, first of all, some way to tide the country over,
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a quick way to placate seemingly implacable Poles, and then
some way to build popular confidence in the government. At
the same time he had to head off an economic crisis and to'
improve the lot of the consumer. And while this was unde rwo;y,
he had to fight to win clear ascendancy within top Party
councils and to gain firm control over the Party and govern--
ment bureaucracies, Moreover, he had to do all this withoat
in the process alarming the Russians, who are, understandably,
(a) sensitive about what goes on in Poland, (b) especially
so when a new man -- not necessarily their choice -- co!ros
to power, and (c) all the more so when the authority of the
Party is challenged and even overwhelmed, as it was along
the Baltic coast in December 1970.
3. Gierek has in most respects made a very strong start.
By January and February he had persuaded the SovietK; that it
was in their interest to support him with statement.:, of gaod
will and extensions of credit and hi:rd cash.4 By Nay he had
Following Gierel `;; initial visit to Moscow in eari,y dar,'1ary,
the Soviets promised t, increase d?liveries of grain and
cement. A month or so later, when Gierek was facing a second
round of strikes, the Kremlin agreed to lend Poland $100
million in hard currency for the purchase of food and con-
sumer goods in the West and to open a major line of credit --
estimated at over $1 billion -- to finance impc,'ts of grain,
gas, and petroleum products from the Bloc.
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apparently convinced the Polish people that there was a decent
chance that he would try to improve their material and political
well-being and that he meant it when he promised domestic "renewal"
and reform. And by the beginning of the summer -- when his
most -ormidable rival, Mieczyslaw Moczar, was removed from the
Secretariat -- it was clear to all that Gierek had become the
unquestioned (though certainly not yet all-powerful) boss of the
Party and of Poland itself.
4. Gierek, of course, had a number of things going for
him. As it turned e!;t, Gomulka -- ultraconservative, ascetic,
something of a recluse -- was not a difficult act to fellow;
to most Poles, almost anybody would have seemed an improvement.
In any case, Gierek's reputation, whether entirely deserved or
not, had preceded him to Warsaw. He was said to be tough but
human; decisive but prudent; a believing but non-doctrinaire
Communist. His record as Party chieftain in Katowice (Silesia
Poland's major industrial province) suggested to many that he
way an unusually able administrator and politician, a friend
of the workers, and even -- within limits -- a patriotic Pole.
He apparently got along well with the military establishment
(which sometimes plays an implicit political role, especially
during periods of tension), and, indeed, seemed to enjoy the
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respect of many and to be actively disliked by few. As was
observed some time ago, he seemed to be, in fact, "the one
man [in Poland] who could settle things down in the uncer-
tain aftermath of Gomulka's departure from the scene."*
5. But if Gierek has won most of the initial battles and
the renoi,ation of Poland is now underway, he is still far from
a decisive victory in a struggle which will surely persist
well into this decade. The Polish people are among the most
resolute, stubborn, and, in some circumstances, volatile in
Eastern Europe. They may admire Gierek, even like him, but
they do not yet owe him their loyalty, as they once owed it to
Gomulka for presumably saving them from the Russians. Nor do
they respect or trust the institution Gierek commands or care
for Gierek's comrades in Moscow. Before wholeheartedly signing
up for Gierek's cause, they will thus await tangible benefits,
mostly material, but also political -- including movement to-
ward a restoration of national pride.
6. And with or without popular support, Gierek must deal
with and through many old-line Party and government functionaries
ONE Staff' Memorandum No. 11-68: "Edward Gierek: .Poland's
Man for AZ Z Seasons", 20 February 1968, p.10.
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who are unhappy about him and apprehensive about his program.
He must also face a variety of special interest groups, which
will push in diverse and conflicting ways and probably with
renewed energy while the nation is in a state of flux. And
he still must contend with the Russians, at least some of
whom must be suspicious of both his methods and his ultimate
intentions. In any event, Poland's political and economic
problems are deep-seated and serious, and Gierek has not as
yet demonstrated a capacity to solve them in any fundamental
way. Gierek, for all his successes to date, thus remains in
a real sense on probation, and the way ahead is both rough
and uncertain.
7. Gierek did start off on the right foot. He stepped
into office last December in the midst of the country's most
severe crisis since 1956, and his initial moves were all the
proper cnes. He acted immediately and effectively to restore
order in the north and to assure calm elsewhere. Checking
whatever vengeful impulses he or others may have felt, he gave
much to the protesters without giving in. And though there
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were moments when state authority seemed in some areas to be
on the verge of tottering, Gierek's methods worked.
8. Gierek began by reversing the Gomulka regime's con-
demnation of the disorders, declaring them to have been the
expressions of legitimate working-class grievances. He blamed
the conditions which let to these grievances on his predecessor,
and promised to give the Polish people a new deal -- better
living standards, a more democratic style of leadership, and
a larger role in the formulation of policy. Specifically, he
raised incomes for the poorest Families, froze food prices for
two years, abandoned Gomulka's unpopular system of wage incen-
tives, and promised improvements in supplies of consumer goods,
food (especially meat), and housing. Later, as a consequence
of new Soviet credits, he was able to rescind the price increases
on food, fuel, and rent which had been announced by the Gomulka
regime and which had triggered the demonstrations in December.
Finally, turning to the problem of agricultural production, he
moved to win the confidence of the private peasants (who occupy
85 percent of Poland's arable land), raising certain procurement
prices and announcing that in January compulsory deliveries
will be abolished and th?.t tax laws will be revised to encourage
the expansion of private holdings.
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9. The Gierek regime unveiled its revised 1971-1975
economic plan in June. It is consumer oriented, thou,-,h not
overwhelmingly so, and its goals are ambitious. National Pro-
duct is to rise at an annual rate of 6.6 to 6.8 percent (com-
pared to roughly 6 percent from 1961 to 1970). Personal consump-
tion is to rise by at least as much, and social services are
to be greatly increased. The rate of increase in agricultural
production and in real wages is to double over the previous
five-year period. A high level of investment is to be main-
tained, with significant increases slated for industry (parti-
cularly light industry), housing, and agriculture. And foreign
trade is to grow more rapidly than was originally planned.
10. BY October, the regime could claim that prices had
been stabilized, that the supply of consumer goods had much
improved and that real wages would rise some 5 percent this
year. Though official pronouncements appear too optimistic,
there is little question that circumstances are better and
that the people, if not content, are at least willing to
give the new leadership the benefit of the doubt.
11. The regime's new style has not been confined to the
economy. The leadership is trying hard to convince the people
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that, quite unlike the Gomulka crowd, it wants to stay in touch
with the needs and aspirations of all the citizenry. Party and
government leaders have held innumerable meetings with workers
and other groups throughout the country, seeking to demonstrate
that there is now open and direct contact between the rulers
and the ruled. High-ranking officials respond on television
to questions submitted -- both in advance and while the program
is on the air -- by the listening audience. A new post of
government spokesman has been created to publicize and explain
the activities of the cabinet. The results of meetings of the
Politburo and Central Committee, now more frequent, are regularly
published. And the appearance of frank and mildly provocative
articles is now tolerated, and in some cases encouraged, in the
public press.
12. More important may be the regime's acceptance of the
concept -- tirst advanced by Kadar -- that "all who are not
against us are with us". Gierek has repeatedly expressed his
determination to eliminate discriminatory distinctions based
on an individual's class, political affiliation, or religious
beliefs. And he has moved to conciliate the Roman Catholic
Church, giving it title to its properties in former German
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territories, having his prime minister meet with Cardinal
kiyszynski (the first such Church-State "summit conference"
in eight years), and opening direct talks with the Vatican.
13. Gierek, again like Kadar, has also moved in modest ways
to give the general public a sense of greater participation in
the political process. He wishes the Sejm (parliament) to play
a larger and more visible role, plans to prod local governments
into greater activity, and wants the two non-Marxist political
pat-ties to demonstrate a small measure of independence. He also
wants the National unity Front (a conglomerate of various tame
political and social organizations) to rejuvenate itself and to
behave as if it were a real and representative force in Polish
life. Potentially more important, he has promised to take steps
to increase the role of workers in trade unions, the Party, and
the various mass organizations; has said that workers will be
given much more say-so in the decision: of management; and has
ordered the drafting Of a new labor code to protect and expand
worker's rights and benefits.
14. The Party itself has not been neglected. Gierek is
seeking, in fact, to divorce the Farty from day-to-day manage-
ment of poitical and economic affairs. He seems to believe
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that the Party should monitor and mobilize, persuade and pressure,
and formulate policy guidelines (drawing heavily on both Party
and non-Party expertise). But, without prejudice to the Party's
ultimate power to intervene, the practical implemention of
policy is to be left to the appropriate government and mass
organizations.
15. Gierek hopes at the same time to reinvigorate the
Party, partly by encouraging freer debate within its own councils
and by expanding the authority (and improving the morale) of its
lower echelons. He also hopes to strengthen it -- and, by no
means coincidentally, to consolidate his own position -- through
extensive pruning and shifts of key personnel. He has carried
out a considerable shake-up of the top leadership. Over half
of the 12-man Gomulka Politburo has been removed, and 11 of the
19 provincial Party First Secretaries who were in the scene in
December 1970 have been replaced. Several other Politburo hold-
overs may lose their jobs at the 6th Party Congress in December,
and a number of the remaining eight provincial holdovers may be
eased out before the end of the year. A substantial number of
lesser officials have also lost their jobs, and the newly recon-
stituted provincial and district Party executives recently
launched a quiet purge of the rank-and-file membership.
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Prospects
16. It is not yet possible to say with certainty whether
Gierek's programs and promises are heavy with solid content or
are simply a convincing cosmetic shell. The worker protests
last December frightened the Party leaders, demonstrated to
them that Gomulka's methods and attitudes were deficient and
dangerous, and persuaded most of them that the GomUlka regime
was no longer competent to rule. Changes in style were obviously
necessary, and it was clear that some means other than simple
coercion would be needed to head off a catastrophe. But it is
not easy to distinguish between the new regime's emergency tac-
tics and its Iona-range intentions. The Polish people themselves
find it difficult tc make the distinction. A skeptical witticism
is going the rounds in Warsaw: "Are there any differences be-
tween Gierek's Poland and Gomulka's Poland? None, but Gierek
is the only one who doesn't know it yet."
17. Although Gierek has unquestionably changed the political
climate of Poland, he has been living to a large extent on his
promises to the people and his credits from the Soviets. This
state of affairs obviously cannot continue indefinitely, and there
are those who predict that for the sake of these credits (and
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for the sake of his and the Party's authority) Gierek will be
willing to go back on many of his promises. This was pretty
much the route followed by Gomulka after his bright start in
1956, and it is true that there are already signs of some back-
sliding. Recurrent complaints indicate that, despite an exten-
sive shuffling of the trade union hierarchy and a lot of loud
self-criticism from the remaining union officials, little improve-
ment has been noted by workers at the factory level. The pace
of change in other areas -- e.g., in education, cultural affairs,
and youth activities -- has also been slow and uneven. Some
of the mire radical propos As which appeared in the wake of
Gomulka's dismissal -- such as specified limits on tenure in
high office -- have virtually disappeared from public discussion.
And a tougher and more orthodox l'Ine on a variety of issues --
Party and labor discipline, the limits of debate in the press,
and vigilance against foreign and domestic "anti-socialist
forces" -- has begun to emerge in official statements.
18. Still, the record suggests that Gierek's gruff populism
is not merely a pose. Indeed, the East European who most closely
resembles Gierek in terms of policies and intent, though not in
temperament, may be Janos Kadar. Both men apparent'y proceed
from a conviction that the first order of political business is
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to assure public order and the general leadership of the Party.
But they believe that it is then necessary to overcome popular
apathy and opposition and to draw the citizenry into a form of
active cooperation with the regime. This, in turn, prompts a
search for the means to boost individual economic incentives and
",iving standards in general and ways to give elements of the
population a meaningful stake and even a role in the conduct
of national and local affairs. It encourages an attitude of
official tolerance and precludes in most instances harsh offi-
cial repression. It also permits some freedom of expression in
private circles and a measure of candor in the media. And,
finally, in potentially the most delicate area of all, it allows
the appearance of some of the trappings and a hint of the sub-
stance of purely national pride ind purpose.
19. Gierek sought early on to demonstrate his concern for
Poland's great heritage. He approved the costly rebuilding
of the ancient royal castle in Warsaw, a prime symbol of the
nation's glorious past; encouraged the display of the Polish
national symbol, the white eagle; and substantially muted
ideological themes during national day celebrations in May.
More significantly, presumably at Gierek's behest, the Central
Committee of the Polish Party has declared itself on the issue
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of Polish patriotism in language which is both striking and
bold -- more so, in fact, than anything yet put fo-ward by
the Hungarian Party:
the noblest aspirations of all Poles revolve around
the strengthening of the international stature of the
Homeland. Concern for the nation's dignity, responsi-
bility for its destiny, the development of a sovereign
Poland, and the strength and welfare of the state re-
present the essence of contemporary patriotism.-4
20. Gierek probably conceives of himself as a loyal son of
Poland. He might indeed welcome a considerable loosening of
Poland's close ties to the Soviet Union, and, partly as a means
of accomplishing this, favor closer relations with the Western
states. Poland is in any case an ardent proponent of European
detente, and of a European security conference, perhaps for
political reasons vis-a-vis the USSR as for more obvious eco-
nomic reasons. But Gierek is by all accounts a flexible,
realistic, and ambitious man. He does not seem to share the
intense feelings of, say, a hard-boiled, anti-Soviet patriot
like Ceausescu or of a malleable, idealistic one like Imre
Nagy. It does not seem likely then that Gicrek would knowingly
endanger his country's future for the sake of its independence,
' From the GteideZines for the 6th Party Congress, adopted by
the Central Committee on 4 September 1971.
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in the manner of Ceausescu, or seriously risk his own political
future for much the same reason, in the manner of Nagy. It
may be, though, that once again some of his inspiration comes
from Kadar.
21. But whether Gierek can successfully apply the Kadar
approach to Poland and to Poland's relations with the USSR
is, of course, a principal question. In some ways, Gierek's
task should be the easier. Kadar started with almost nothing
in the way of domestic political resources and precious few
economic assets. But for Kadar, almost the only way open was
up. He had vigorous Soviet support -- both guns and butter --
and he dealt with a people who were ready to respond to small
favors. He was not, as it developed, a mere Quisling or a
Rakosi-like brute, and for this the Hungarians in due time
were grateful.
22. Gierek, on the other hand, may not find it so easy
to win the USSR's confidence or the public's gratitude. He
was not Moscow's handpicked man, nor did he replace someone
the Soviets considered a traitor. Moreover, since Polish re-
sources are not now in total disarray, Gierek may find it dif-
ficult to convince the Soviets that they must continue to
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provide generous assistance to the Polish economy indefinitely.
Finally, Soviet troops did not traumatize the Polish people by
shooting up the coastal cities in December: the Hungarians of
1956 were stunned and deprQssed; the Poles of today are alert
and expectant. In some ways, then, Gierek may find his job
tougher than Kadar's -- the Soviets more suspicious, his people
more impatient, and his economy harder to operate on.
23. Actually, of all Poland's problems, the ecp.omic
could in time prove the most intractable. Poland is a poor coun-
try. It was devastated by the war, exploited by the Russians,
exhausted by the Stalinists, and then mismanaged by the Gomul-
kaites. In terms of per capita income it ranks far behind all
its neighbors, including the USSR, is not so well off as Hungary,
and does only a very little bit better than Bulgaria.* The
Gomulka regime's approach to the economy was austere, bureaucratic,
inefficient and doctrinaire. Its concern for the welfare (and
the morale) of the workers was shockingly small, especially in
view of the Poznan riots of 1955 and Gomulka's own experiences
* Poland's 1970 per capita income war $1, 330; the USSR's near
$2,000; Czechoslovakia's and East Gemany's around $2,100;
Hungary's $1,450; Bulgaria's $1, 300; and Romania's -- t;te
lowest in Bloc Eastern Europe -- $1,140. (AZZ figures from
the NIS.)
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with public spontaneity in 1956. Real wages rose by an annual
average of only 1.7 percent during the 1960s, according to
official statistics. Bad harvests and bad management produced
major food shortages in 1970. And belated efforts to do some-
thing about these problems, including sagging rates of overall
annual growth, had only made matters worse.
24. So far, improvements in the economy under Gierek
probably owe at least as much to increases in imports and conces-
sions made possible by Bloc credits as to actual progress in
domestic economic performance. And future progress seems to
dapend heavily on more effective exploitation of existing re-
sources, i.e., on a sort of Khrushchevian effort to make use
of so-called hidden reserves (i.e., potential economic assets,
such as the ability of men to work harder and more efficiently,
the possibility of reducing wastage and increasing the produc-
tivity of investments, the prospect of improving agricultural
yields through better techniques, etc.). This is hardly the
surest way to advance economically, not because the resources
aren't there but because there are usually good (and complex)
reasons why they have remained hidden.
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25. Gierek's plans for economic reform remain vague.
He and his advisers apparently have not as ye' made up their
minds about structural changes, incentive systems, management
techniques, and the like. The regime, however, is full of
honorable and ambitious intentions, and there are signs that
it would like to borrow further from the Hungarian model,
which is itself a pallid but fairly effective imitation of
aspects of the Yugoslav experiment. Poland may thus be heading
toward a system which will permit some decentralization of
economic decision-making and will make some allowances for
the p'iay of market forces. In these circumstances, the Party
would continue to inak~- basic policy and prescribe general goals,
but presumably the economy, relieved of artificial restraints
and bureaucratic bumbling, would otherwise be free to take off
on its own.
26. But to meet its long-term economic objectives (some
specified, some only implied) the G?erek regime needs more than
honorable intentions and partial reform. It probably needs, in
effect, a turn of fate: an enthusiastic working force, enter-
prising farmers, efficient managers, imports of Western techno-
logy, Soviet aid and raw materials, good weather, and consummate
rood luck. But Polish workers are not German workers, Polish
peasants do not live in the future, and Polish managers do not
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have Harvard M.B.A.'s. Western technology, moreover, is expen-
sive and hard to apply, "oviet aid has strings attached, and
weather and luck belong to not always merciful gods.
27. Even if, somehow, all the targets of the new five-year
plan are met, the Gierek regime could still be in trouble. Its
long-term political future surely rests in large degree upon its
ability to provide palpable improvements in standards of living,
and here prospects are dubious. Existing goals for construction
and light industry, for example, seem inadequate to do much to
relieve the housing shortage or to improve the quality and quan-
tity of consumer goods. Further shifts in investment would be
beneficial but -- unless defense expenditures are reduced* --
might hurt other important sectors of the economy. A rising
level of exports to the West would help, but this would require
the production of finished goods which would be -- for the first
time -- competitive in a very tough market. Western investment
of the sort Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary are seeking and
Gierek says he would welcome -- would also be of some assistance,
Polish defense expenditures have been rising steadily and
significantly since 1965 in absolute terms and as a per-
centage of the total budget (over 9 percent in 1970) and
of GNP (about 4 1/2 percent in 1970).
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but it is very hard to obtain in substantial amounts; opportunities
for profit are limited, and the kind ofl terms usually imposed
by Communist governments are not likely to be very attractive.
It is easy to see why, even by Gierek's own calcula'.ions, signif-
icant basic improvements in Poland's economic situation cannot
be expected until sometime after 1975.
28. It thus may be that Gierek, whatever his intentions,
will face some very hard choices in the years ahead, of the sort
Kadar has so far been able to avoid. Shortfalls in the economy
would hurt Gierek with the workers -- who have already demon-
strated awesome reserves of power -- and with the people at
large. They would also hurt him within the arty, both among
the young and ambitious technocrats, who now give him their
conditional support, and the old-line hacks, who no doubt yearn
for the comforts of the past. Factionalism is, in any case,
no stranger to the Palish Party.
29. Gierek, like Gomulka before him, could thus find himself
losing both his popular base and his ability to count on his
colleagues to carry out his policies. In these circumstances,
with his cautious pragmatism no longer a sure guide, he might
be tempted to turn off in one of two diverging directions: toward
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policies of concession and innovation, designed to win public
loyalty and support and to provide radical solutions to eco-
nomic problems; or toward the politics of repression and reaction.
Whatever his choice, calculations of Soviet reactions would of
course be central to his decision.
30. The Soviets have so far been quite sensible about their
relations with Poland. They did not try to intervene to save
Gnmulka; they did not attempt to tell the Gierek regime how to
handle its problems with the workers; and they did not simply
sit around to see how the new regime would work out -- they pro-
vided immediate support. And so far, Moscow would seem to have
had little reason for complaint. Gierek must seem to have handled
the emergency with dash and competence, and he seems on the
whole to want to avoid any quarrels with the USSR. Still, the
Russians are especially sensitive about what goes on in Poland
and bear little love for the Poles. They n;ust have some
reservations about Gierek -- his style and his basic loyal-
ties. And above all, they must find worrisome the emerging
revival of Polish national pride.
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31. Current expressions of nativist sentiments in Poland may
only be a political device, intended by the regime mainly to
reassure or win over a doubtful citizenry. But the Russians
cannot be sure of this, and they are certainly well aware that
nationalism in Poland is traditionally anti-Russian, and has a
history of getting out of hand. They may, in fact, be much
less impressed with the Gierek regime's regular and ritualistic
protestations of fealty than with its fairly frequent appeals to
Polish patriotism. The Russians can complain about this --
perhaps already-have -- but the issue is delicate and cannot be
resolved by Moscow with a simple set of orders.
32. And there may be other, more general reasons why Moscow
might now be somewhat apprehensive about Poland's future position
in the Bloc. As demonstrated anew in 1968 in Czechoslovakia,
the USSR's hold on its East European allies still rests in the
last analysis on its military power. But this ultimate authority
does not of itself assure conformity because of the strong inhi-
bitions on its use. It may be that Poland could not get away
with a degree of independence comparable to that enjoyed by
Romania; Poland would seem a great deal more vital to Soviet
interests. But the urge to sovereignty is at least as strong
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in Poland as elsewhere, and its expression may be encouraged
in the period ahead by Soviet policies elsewhere in Europe.
33. The USSR's activities in Western Europe, especially
the cultivation of much improved relations with West Germaio
are likely in fact to encourage Polish interest in closer ties
to the West. They should at the same time reduce the amount of
leverage the USSR can exercise in Warsaw as the protector of
Poland's interests vis-a-vis West German "imperialism". More-
over, Poland's strategic importance to the USSR -- which has
helped in the past to convince the Poles that they should be
compliant -- could also work to Warsaw's advantage. Assuming
Russian reluctance to resort to force, the Poles have some bar-
gaining power; the Soviets might ft-:(' it prudent to appease the
Poles rather than to accept the penalties and uncertainties of
tension and hostility.
34. At the moment Gierek and hi friends seem to be less
interested in international problems than their predecessors.
"Socialist foreign policy", according to one expression of the
regime's view, "is expressed less in d':-.iomatic acts than in
the effectiveness of the solutions of internal problems". The
Party Guidelines, it is said, point out "the obvious fact that
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foreign policy is subordinated to internal policy". Perhaps the
Russians will interpret this peculiar formula -- which has not
been openly expressed anywhere else in the Bloc -- to mean only
that the Poles are so wrapped up in their own problems that
they cannot imagine making any troubles for the USSR abroad. i ut
interpreted literally, it means that Warsaw sees its relationship
with the USSR only in terms of what it can do for Poland. Even
a loose reading suggests that the Poles will be less than fervid
in their support of Soviet foreign policy goals, especially those
which demand tangi!-~''- polish contributions and which thus threaten
to impinge on internal Polish development.
35. In a more immediate sense, the Soviets must be dis-
turbed by the speed and extent of Gierek's campaign to rid the
Polish Party of old timers who were known quantities and who
were comfortable with the Soviet-Polish status quo. The
renovation of the top Polish leadership has gone much farther
than any other aspects of Gierek's program of renewal. To the
Soviets, this must appear incautious, even ominous. The
attlt!'des of the new men Gierek is putting into power are
probably not very clear, especially their attitudes toward the
Soviet Union.
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36. The Soviets may also be apprehensive about Gierek's
apparent lack of concern for ideology and uncertain about the
degree of his devotion to first (i.e., Soviet) principles.
Gierek is no Dubcek and certainly he is not promoting or likely
to tolerate an atmosphere in Warsaw comparable to the Prague
Spring. But much of the Gierek program emphasizes what has been
called "socialism with a human face", which some Russians pro-
bably suspect to be merely a euphemism for socialism with an
anti-Soviet face. And while the Soviets may not be at all alarmed
as yet by Gierek's economic plans and have so far tolerated
the Hungarian experiment, they have not themselves been willing
to try real reforms -- they feel, among other things, that the
Party must not let control of the economy slip from its hands,
.for the sake of the Party if not the economy.
37. The cumulati'v effect of all this -- the plans and
concepts and character of the new regime in Poland -- must arch
Stalinist eyebrows in Moscow and raise suspicions among the
orthodox everywhere. Where, the Russians must ask (remembering
Yugoslavia and still feeling the pain of Czechoslovakia) will
it all end? Which of Gierek's declarations will prove ulti-
mately to have been the least meaningful -- those dealing with
socialist internationalism and the leading role of the Party,
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or those emphasizing national patriotism and the rights of
all Poles? And what would it do to the remaining loyal states
or to the USSR itself if Poland -- by far the largest of the
USSR's client states in Eastern Europe -- began in earnest to
follow its own road to socialism?
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