WESTERN EUROPE THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Western Europe, the Israelis, and the Arabs
Secret
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 September 1971
SUBJECT: Western Europe, the Israelis, and the Arabs*
NOTE
This memorandum assesses official and public attitudes
within the principal West European countries toward the Arab-
Israeli situation and how these are likely to develop in the
future. A summary and discussion of general implications ap-
pears in paragraphs 33-35.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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1. In the two decades before 1967 Israel's image in
Western Europe had been generally that of a doughty, resolute
defender of its right to exist. Most West Europeans acknowl-
edged this right, and they and most of their governments had
backed the new nation at one time or another with material as
well as moral support. The rapid and decisive Israeli victory
in the Six Days War produced a wave of approval and admiration,
despite the commercial disruption caused by the closing of the
Suez Canal. Most Europeans believed that a settlement of the
Middle East problem was finally in sight.
2. For a time, it was not realized that Israel had won
only the third in a series of battles, leaving peace in the
area as elusive as ever. But the wave of sympathy for the Is-
raeli position crested in the summer and fall of 1967. It
has since receded in the face of Israel's unyielding position
on settlement terms, its apparent intention to retain at least
some of the conquered territory, including Jerusalem, and its
policy of "creating facts" by such moves as building permanent
facilities in the occupied areas.
3. Official and popular West European attitudes toward
the Arab-Israeli conflict are often far apart, the interaction
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between them accounting in large part for the ambiguity which
seems to characterize many aspects of Europe's approach to the
problem. But these attitudes are evolving in a way that may
subject the Israelis to increasingly significant West Euro-
pean pressures to come to a compromise settlement. An Israeli
failure to respond in some way to such pressures could compli-
cate the US role in the Middle East and even produce strains
in US-European relationships.
4. The decline in pro-Israeli sentiment in Western
Europe has caused uneasiness and even a bit of soul-searching
in Israel. Yet the.Israelis cannot.bring themselves to ac-
knowledge that their stance on.the territorial issue is pri-
marily responsible for that decline. Israeli leaders are
upset, inoreover, by charges that their "intransigence" has
led to an increase ire the Soviet presence in the Middle Ear,t.
The fact that greater Soviet involvement has not produced a
corresponding increase in European support for Israel as the
anti-Communist bastion in the area has both baffled and dis-
appointed them. BriFi.;ing statements on this issue by Israel;
cabinet ministers, such as Dayan and Al Ion, have done Israel's
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image more harm than good in European eyes, and qualified
disavowals by Prime Minister Meir and other official spokes-
men have failed to repair the damage.
5. The siege mentality which is so much a part of their
outlook today has led the Israelis to seek constant reaf-
firmations of support from those whom they consider to be
their friends and.to try to avoid censure by others not
avowedly.enemies. It.was, thus,.very.importa,it for. Israel to
forestall criticism by the traditionally pro-Israeli European
Socialist.parties last June when.the Socialist International
convened at Helsinki. The strenuous ei-forts put forth by
Mrs.-Meir at that time proved successful, and an almost audi-
ble sigh of relief was heard from the Israelis. There is dis-
may among them whenever Israel suffers even a.minor setback
in the United Nations, even though the Israelis, in practice,
igno%^e.adverse resolutions there and are generally contemp-
tuous of the world organization. And when former sympathizers
in Western Europe appear critical of or cool.toward Israel's
policies, the Israelis are hurt; for.they firmly believe that
Europe as a whole bears some responsibility for the sufferings
of the Jews.in World War II and owes Israel special obligations
as a result.
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The French government hoped,.
by getting.a consensus on various issues among the Six which
favored the Arabs, to reinforce their influence with the Arabs
and in Big Four talks on the Middle East. The Dutch attitude
during.the.talks, on the other hand,.has been described as
"150 pe'?ent" pro-Israeli, and the.positions of the others
varied between.the two extremes according.to the issues. The
subjects formally under examination by the Six were: free-
dom of navigation, demilitarized zones, Jerusalem, and the
Palestine refugees. While all six governments agreed that the
Israelis had.been far from forthcoming on a peace settlement,
there was considerable reluctance to take formal positions on
these issues despite strong French urging.
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9. West Europeans were favorably impressed by.President
Nasser's.public ac'nowledgement of Israel's right to exist and
his acceptance in 1970 of US initiatives for anegotiated set-
tlement. After Nasser's death, President Sadat further improved
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the Arab image ??- or at least that of Egypt -- in European.
eyes by appearing to focus Egyptian attention more on internal.
Egyptian affairs, and by his positive response to Ambassador
Jarring and to US attempts to mediate a settlement. King
Hussein of.Jordan also cooperated.. All this.was in striking
contrast to Israeli public comment and behavior on the issue
of a negotiated.scttlement, a contrast which served to dilute
European support for Israel.
10. Yet Arab efforts to win support.for?.their view- .
point in Western Europe have had mixed results. The unhappy
plight of the Arab refugees in the camps in Gaza.and on the West
Bank-has certainly attracted a good deal of sympathy and will,
doubtless, serve once again this month or next as a spring-
board for Arab denunciations of the Israeli position-before
the UN Secu ity Council and the General Assembly. But Euro-
pean.sympathy.for.the.refugees has generally not broadened
out to include the Arab states. Certainly the activities of
the fedayeen last year, especially those involving hijack-
ings of Western airliners and bombings in West European cities,
can only be described as a net loss to the Arab cause in terms
of public relations.
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11. ON the diplomatic front, virtually every Arab foreign
minister, as well as ?I.-he kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan,
have received- red carpet treatment in European. capitals over
the past several years. Almost all have visited Paris, much to
the disgruntlement of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban who.is
still hoping for an invitation to the City of Light. The Arabs
have also.hosted a number of West European statesmen during
this period. But they have been ineffectual in making their
case. However well-conceived and smoothly presented their
diplomatic initiatives have been, much of their impact has been
lost - usually.because of ill-timed terrorist acts or because
of inflammatory speeches by Arab leaders which have periodi-
cally echoed an unrelenting hostility toward Israel as a na-
tion, something which the West Europeans cannot approve. And
threats against European and American interests in the Arab
world.have only nourished the distrust already present in abun-
dance,
12. The statement recently made by Libyan Deputy Prime
Minister Jallud to his German hosts in Bonn to the effect
that the FRG "must choose between Israel and oil" obviously
does not reflect an appreciation of the German political im-
peratives which deny the West German government the choice
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of turning its back on Israel. Nor does it show a real
appreciation of realities in the Arab world. For, while oil
is undoubtedly itself an."imperative" which all West Euro-
pean.states.must.consider, the chances of concerted Arab
action to deny it to the European market are very slim,.and
the West Europeans -- if not the Libyans -- know it.
The Europeans
13. But the Europeans-are heavily . dependenton Arab oil.
They are both increasingly uneasy over the parlous situation
between Israel and the Arabs which poses.a continuous threat
to their petroleum-supply and.increasingly frustrated over their
own inability to ameliorate matters. Nevertheless, except for
France, the West European governments with any real stake in
the Middle East have been more than happy to let the US bear
responsibility for mediation efforts between the adversaries
and for guaranteeing Israel's continued existence. This has
permitted them to avoid uncomfortable domestic pressures and
to keep out of the direct line of fire of both sides in the
controversy.
14, France: A public opinion poll taken in France.in Septem-
ber 1967 showed 68 percent of all Frenchmen were "sympathetic to
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Israel", while only 6 percent indicated their sympathies lay
with.the Arabs. When the poll was repeated in March 1970, the
pro-Arab.figure remained the same, but the proportion favoring,
Israel.had dropped to 32 percent. The French case may be an
extreme example of Israel's fall from grace in European-eyes;
comparable polls are not available from other important West
European.countries. It does, however, illustrate,a decline in
sympathy for Israel since 1967 which is shared in other Euro-
pean states. It also demonstrates that -- at least with.the
French public -- this sympathy has not been transferred to the
Arab cause.
15. Official French support for the Israeli position
was,.of.course, sharply curtailed.after the Six Days War
which de Gaulle had advised against.and.which the.Israelis
had so.handily.won.thanks in large part,to the major weapons
they.had previously purchased from the French. De Gaulle's
basic concern was that an Israeli.victory.would definitively
polarize the area -- leaving the Arabs more.than ever depend-
ent upon the Soviets, the Israelis looking to the US as their
ultimate guarantor, and the French without clients or suitors
to satisfy their aspirations to a key role in the Middle East.
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16. In the event, de Gaulle's concern proved justified.
Official French policy then took on a definite pro-Arab cast
as de Gaulle, and Pompidou after him, sought to establish
France as the third . major.. influence in the Mediterranean.
During the Four Power talks on the Middle.East, the French po-
sition has been closest to that of the Soviets. Both have
favored the imposition of a peace settlement based on a strict
interpretation of UN Security Council -Resolution 242 of Nov-
ember 1967. France's aim in such an imposed settlement is, of
course, to insure its own position in future developments in the
area.. To this end, the French would be quite willing to take
part in peacekeeping activities. The French and Soviet posi-
tions would, most likely, be farther apart on.the questions of
territorial adjustments and the strength of an enforcement
mechanism -- with the French probably showing more flexibility
than the Soviets on boundary adjustments and calling for a
stronger security guarantee than Moscow is likely to favor.
17. The French government's pro-Arabism is not undiluted.
The still significant pro-Israeli sentiment in France is recog-
nized and, to some extent, shared by officials in Paris who
periodically reaffirm France's formal commitment to Israel's
right to a secure existence. France believes, however, that
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since the US will serve as the guarantor of Israel's survival
no matter what actions France may take for its own advantage,
it has room to pursue its Mediterranean vocation by cultivating
the Arabs.
Israel is
still France's major trading partner in the Middle East, ti,ade
between them having increased by more than 50 percent since
1967; and the French government continues to wink at a limited
sale of military supplies to Israel -- provided a profit can be
made and the transactions are handled discreetly enough so
that French interests in Arab countries are not threatened.
18. West Germany: Following the flurry of Israeli anxi-
ety over the EC political consultations, the West German-Israeli
"special relationship" was reconfirmed by Foreign Minister Scheel.
during his fence-mending (and precedent-setting) trip to Israel
in July. (At that time Scheel also indicated that the FRG's cur-
rent annual level of economic aid -- 140 million DM -- would pro-
bably be maintained.) The Israelis were further reassured by
the publication of a recent statement by Chancellor Brandt which
also reaf;;rmed the special relationship, indicated that the FRG.
would not be.influenced by Soviet views on the Middle East in the
course of its efforts to reach an understanding with Moscow, and
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pledged that Bonn's attempts to improve relations with the Arab
states would not be pursued to Israel's detriment.
19. Ironically, Israel has had less confidence in the
attitude of the Brandt government than it had in the long line
of Christian Democratic governments which preceded it. Brandt's
anti-Nazi credentials are impeccable, and he is an.honored fel-
low member of the Socialist International. But the Israelis have
feared that his support might be less stalwart because he does
not have the same need to prove his good will toward the Jews as,
for example, former Chancellor Kiesinger -- once a Nazi Party
member -- did.
20. While the West Germans may be inclined in coming years
to assert their own particular interests -- in regard to Israel
,is in other matters -- they do not think that it is to their
interest at this stage to rush into normalizing relations with
Arab countries which have recognized East Germany. Early this
year, Brandt told Prime Minister Heath that he saw little alter-.
native.to.maintaining the lowest possible profile in the Middle.
East -- a posture which will not, of course, prevent Bonn from
establishing mutually profitable, though.perhaps still unoffi-
cial, relations with as many Arab states as possible.
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leaving Palestine in 1948, the British have pursued a constantly
tacking course calculated to avoid total rupture with either the
Arabs or the-Israelis.. After their 1956 Suez venture, they set
about repairing relations with the Arabs and had achieved some
success by 1967. Britain's need for Arab oil, its own huge
oil investments in the area, and-the large Arab reserves held in
British banks made such repair work a vital necessity to the
21. UK: Since
stagnant British economy. In recent years, a
has characterized British actions there.
willingness to let the US lead.in Middle East initiatives
22. British opinion has for some time shown increasing
indifference toward the Arab-Israeli problem. Prime Minister
Heath has, moreover, turned Britain's overall foreign policy
in the direction of Europe; the combination should have and did
cause great concern to the Israelis. They could not help but
be impressed by their own lack of economic or other leverage with
the UK. The British have, in fact, tended.of late to favor the
French Middle East viewpoint when it did not directly contradict
that of the US. While their posture clearly reflects their view
of Britain's interests, this may be explained partly by a desire
not to antagonize France at this juncture because of the EC
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question. But there is still more public support for Israel in
Britain than for the Arabs. Furthermore, although official Lon-
don's long experience in dealing with the Arabs has given it an
understanding of and even considerable sympathy for Arab aspira-
tions, the British have little confidence in the Arabs' ability
to attain their goals through effective concerted action.
23. ItaZy: Because of its location, Italy is more sensi-
tive than the other major West European states to the dangerous
implications of L,-,a Arab-Israeli deadlock and the increased So-
viet presence in the Mediterranean. In addition to its feeling
of vulnerability, however, Italy harbors the conviction that its
location gives it the right to exercise its presenza in the area:
a presence which, after the chastening experience of World War II,
has been limited to commercial and cultural ties with Arab lit-
toral states. In 1967, then Foreign Minister Fanfani made an
abortive.attempt to foster Italy's presenza by advocating a high-
ly unpopular "equidistant" (but clearly pro-Arab) attitude dur-
ing the Middle East crisis. Since then, Italy has been trying to
consolidate its economic bridgeheads in the Maghreb and the Mid-
dle East while maintaining a mutually profitable commercial re-
lationship with Israel.
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24. The Italian National Petroleum and Gas Company,
which controls oil concessions in North Africa and the Middle
East, has made special efforts this year to recover lost eco-
nomic ground in Libya. And Italy's peripatetic Foreign Min-
ister Moro, who managed to allay anxieties in Israel during
his trip there in April,. has also made recent visits to
Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and.Algeria, and is planning
another Middle East swing in October during which he hopes to
firm up relations between Italy and Syria. In the interests of
keeping this delicate juggling act going,:the'I.talians have
tried to keep their distance from the potentially violent
reactions connected with the Arab-Israeli issue, and they want
very much to continue doing just that.
25. There is a significant reserve of sympathy among
Italians for the Israeli cause, little if any for that of the Arabs.
But there are also domestic pressures from.both the Communists and
various Italian economic interest groups for some pro-Arab
gestures; and the possibility of increasingly sharp criticism
of the Israeli position on Jerusalem by the Vatican cannot be ex-
cluded. Thus, while the Israelis now believe Italy to be a firm
friend and supporter, the constancy of Italian policy toward
the Arab-Israeli conflict is by no means assured.
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26. The Vatican: The Vatican's desire to see Jerusalem
become an internationally administered city is in direct con-
flict with Israel's determination to retain control there.
Israel and the Vaticcii have exchanged pointed words on this
subject in the past and may well do so again, despite recent
indications .that the two have agreed to discuss their differ-
ences quietly. Should this rift remain unhealed, Vatican
influence on governments of heavily Roman Catholic countries,
such as certain of those in Latin America, could contribute
to a further weakening of the Israeli position in the UN.
27. Benelux: Except for Dutch oil holdings, the Benelux
countries have few concrete interests at stake in the Middle
East, and their support for' Israel has run a relatively smooth
and steady course. Indeed, the Dutch government has been
Israel's staunchest West European defender despite their large
Middle East oil interests and the loss by emigration to Israel
of the major portion of the Dutch diamond cutting industry. Still,
Israeli immobilism on a peace settlement has caused both offi-
cial and public patience with Israel to wear thin in the Benelux
countries as it has elsewhere in Western Europe. But the
smaller EC countries have a certain amount of fellow-fdeling
for another small country, Israel, a phenomenon which tends to
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temper any resentment they may feel over Israeli recalcitrance
and to stiffen their resistance to French attempts to dominate
them and speak for them in world forums.
28. Scandinavia: Much the same can be said for the Scan-
dinavian countries which are even more removed from any direct
connection with, the Middle East. Their habit of
speaking out for themselves at length -- has been given full
rein in-recent years though they have not always been consistent
in supporting or condemning either side. On the whole, however,
public support for Israel is probably higher in Scandinavia than
anywhere else in Western Europe.
29. Spain: For a variety of practical reasons, Spain is
likely to continue showing extreme reluctance to be associated
with US actions in support of the Israelis. Spain, which does
not recognize Israel, has importa;r?~ oil and other commercial
ties with the Arab states, particularly with Egypt, Libya, and
Saudi Arabia. It seeks, wherever possible, to avoid fri'tion
with Morocco and Algeria over the Spanish territories in North
Africa. And, as Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo indicated last
February, it is quite content with a vote trade-off in the UN
which guarantees Spain fourteen reciprocal Arab votes in situ-
ations not directly involving vital Arab interests.
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30. Portugal: Unlike Snain, Portugal has consular `.,"a-
tions with Israel and has taken a formally neutral stance on the
Arab-Israeli conflict in the past -- primarily out of concern
for the Gulbenkian oil interests in Iraq. But government, busi-
ness, and military interests in Portugal resent Arab support for
national liberation movements in Africa. And they wish to main-
tain their good relationship with the US. As they have in the
past, therefore, the Portuguese are likely to continue their
quiet cooperation with US efforts in support of Israel -- pro-
vided the US remains discreet in its use of Portuguese facil-
ities.
31. Turkey: Turkey would `:e much relieved if the Arab-
Israeli conflict would just go away. For, while it lasts, the
Turks are tugged in one direction by their friendship with the
US and in the other by their strong desire to avoid. imbroglios
with their Arab neighbors. Turkey had deep misgivings over
the use of its facilities by the US for contingency air relief
operations in Jordan last September, and will probably be in-
creasingly reluctant to acquiesce to similar US requests in
the future.
32. Greece: Apart from the Orthodox Church, Greek in-
terests in the Arab world are considerably reduced from what
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they were in the 1950s. Moreover, Greece is interested in.
demonstrating its loyalty to the US. It has provided facili-
ties to the US in the past in connection with the Arab-
Israeli conflict: e.g., as a transit point for the delivery
of aircraft to Israel. And Vice Prime Minister Pattakos has
recently asserted that Greek help would probably again be
forthcoming should it be needed. Such assurances should not
be taken as firm Greek policy, but past performance indicates
that Greece would be the least reluctant of the NATO allies
to cooperate with the US in supporting Israel in the event
of renewed hostilities.
Some Implications
33. Apart from a general sense of isolation, the tan-
gible effects on Israel of the corrosion of its image may
not be great, particularly if Israel feels that US support
will continue and that there is sufficient pro-Israeli sym-
pathy in France and the UK to prevent either government from
pursuing anti-Israeli policies beyond a certain point. The
level of European approval which the Israelis enjoyed just
after the Six Days War was, afrter.all, abnormally high and
probably could not have been sustained in any event; Arab
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 rhetoric and the activities of the fedayeen since then have,
if anything, been counter-productive;.the Arabs have been un-
able to take effective, concerted action to bring pressure
on the West Europeans; and West Europe's criticism of the US
role in the Middle East should continue to be somewhat muted
because of its continuing concern over Soviet influence in
the Arab world and the Mediterranean.
34. But Europe's impatience with what is being increas-
ingly viewed as Israeli intransigence and Europe's anxiety
that this could help bring on a new upheaval could, in time,
cut further into the important unofficial support enjoyed by
the Israelis. And if the Middle East-impasse continues to
weaken West European emotional ccmmitment.to Israel, govern-
ments in France, Italy, and the UK may feel more inclined
actively to endorse Arab initiatives in such forums as the
UN -- even those-which may call for sanctions against the
Israelis. Further, a new outbreak of hostilities, unless
Israel appeared clearly innocent,. would increase concern in
Western Europe and stimulate stronger pressures for an im-
posed solution.
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35. Some NATO allies, in any event, are already showing
reluctance to.permit the US to use their facilities to support
any US military moves connected with the Arab-.Israeli problem.
Their hunger.for East-West detente can only. reinforce such re-
luctance. Continued US support for a persistently unyielding
Israel may become.a much greater irritant.in our dealings with
individual West European countries.and could reduce US leverage
in NATO and the UN.
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