SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001900020062-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: April 10, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

 Approved CIA-RD1285100875RO01 900 062-8
6 0
10 April 1974
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MEMORANDUM
Soviet and Chinese Aid to North Vietnam
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Military Aid
1. Military aid to North Vietnam from the USSR and the
PRC dropped sharply in 1973.' Although the sharp reduction
in photo-reconnaissance over North Vietnam -- our best and
most timely indicator of military imports -- has trade it diffi-
cult to estimate the value of these shipments, we believe
that Soviet military aid to North Vietnam in 1973 probably
amounted to or'iy about $150 million, less than half the 1972
-level of some $355 million and-the lowest amount since 1970.
Of this total, about two-thirds consisted of air defense
equipment.
2. Similarly, Chinese aid to North Vietnam probably also
decreased sharply, from about $215 million in 1972 to about
$100 million last year.
3. The following table shows estimated values of military
aid deliveries by the USSR and PRC since 1968.
3
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 ? u4.Xl Y...li.:'71
I
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
USSR 415 175 90 160 355
PRC 115 140 100 110 215
Total 530 315 190 270 570
Preliminary
1973*
1968-73
150
1,345
100
780
250
:,125
The composition of this aid also showed marked change last year.
In contrast to 1971-72, when North Vietnam received many new
weapons from the USSR, such as the SA-7 antiaircraft missile,
the AT-3 wire--guided missile and the 160-mm mortar, in prepara-
tion for the 1972 spring offensive, military aid since the
27 January 1973 ceasefire agreement has concentrated on
strengthening Hanoi's in-country air defenses and maintaining
existing stocks of military equipment. Except for the SA-3
missile system and several new types of radar, the Soviets
delivered no new weapons systems to North Vietnam during 1973.
There is indirect evidence, however, that North Vietnam's stocks
of SA-2 missiles were at least partly replenished during 1973..
North Vietnam also strengthened its air defenses with the
acquisition of two additional radars -- the FLAP WHEEL and
TALL KING -- probably received during 1973. Since the cease-
fire, there have bear. a few documented instances of Soviet
deliveries of ground forces equipment, suggesting that shipments
of these items from the Soviets have fallen off sharply since
1972.
4. Although no concrete evidence on the amount of military
aid North Vietnam will receive during 1974 is available,
deliveries probably will continue, but at a reduced level from
1973. During June 1973, North Vietnam signed a military and
economic aid agreement with China for 1974, and in October
signed an additional protocol for military aid. The protocol
probably delineated the specific details of the agreement worked
out in June. In contrast to China, the USSR signed only an
economic aid agreement with North Vietnam in July; no formal
military aid agreement was announced. We do not know why a
formal military aid pact was not publicly mentioned, although
it could be related to the Soviet concern for detente with the
US. Despite Moscow's apparent reluctance to sign an agreement,
the USSR did continue to ship military supplies to North Vietnam
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in 1973. The reduced level of shipments probably reflects
concern with US relations, but it also conforms to Hanoi's
lower require;:,ents. We have no way of judging which of these
two factors is the more important one.
Economic Aid
5. Economic aid of about $385 million from the USSR and
'China in 1973 supplied esse?itial commodities to North Vietnam
and probably provided reconstruction assistance roughly equal
to Hanoi's current needs. As in years prior to the mining of
the ports in 1972, the level of Communist economic assistance
in 1973 appeared to be closely related to Hanoi's requirements.
Although the value of Soviet assistance apparently fell below
even the depressed level of?1972, the decline probably resulted
from shipping restraints at Haiphong and the long lead times
necessary for damage surveys and reconstruction planning.
Chinese assistance rose sharply over earlier levels because
of North Vietnam's continuing heavy reliance on overland
transport for food, petroleum, and other goods. Estimated
aid, receipts
follows:
from the
two
major
1968
1969
1970
USSR
305
385
345
PRC
120
90
60
Total
425
475
405
suppliers since 1968 are as
Million US Dollars
1971
1972=
1973*
315
200
185
100
85
200
415
285
385
* Preliminary
6. Soviet and Chinese.support for North Vietnam has been
reaffirmed repeatedly since the ceasefire in aid agreements,
the travel of Communist technicians to North Vietnam, and
large-scale shipments of goods. Aid receipts in the first
quarter of 1974 continued last year's upward trend in food
deliveries from both suppliers and in capital goods imports
from the USSR. Future changes in the level of food imports
,will depend'on North Vietnam's own supply situation, but
capital goods imports are likely to rise for the next couple
of years -- barring a resumption of full-scale warfare.
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