THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ARMS RACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700070006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 1, 1974
• Content Type: IM

C I RI~ERr I Mr?4006 SECRETrNF -- THE MIDDLE
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No rorcfbn Dfssem
Intelligence Memorandum
~"he 1Vliddle E~.rt.? An Arms Rf~ce
?AgCZISV A~ , F1`;COIt~
Pi.r,~:y, ~,..
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Secret
ER IM 74-6
May 1974
COPY ~ ~ 2 3 1
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIOPI
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 015319
Exempt from general declasslflcatlon schodule
of E.O. 11654, exemption eatopory~
? 3B(1) (2), and (3)
Automatlcal~y doclasslflad one
Dato Impossible to Determine
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No ForelKn UL4sern
'I'IIC Middle East: An Arms Race
The Middle Eastl represents the most lucrative arms market in the less
developed world. Arms purchases by countries in the region jumped from an annual
average of US $1.1 billioh during 1967-69 to almost $5 billion in 1973 and appear
to be headed higher during the. next few years.
? Israel and the Arab countries bordering it accou;it for about 40%
of the arms sold.
? The Persian Gulf states purchased nearly 55%, with Iran alone
ordering almost $5.7 billion in military equipment during 1967-73.
T.~Trod out t s mcmoran um the term Middle Eastern countries comprises Israel, the Arab belligerents,
the Petsian Gulf countries (including Iran), and the North African countries (see Figure 1).
Note: Comments and queries regarding this memorandum are welcomed. They
may be directed to of the Office of Economic Research, Code 143,
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Although the arms purchases of some non-belligerent states appear to be far
in excess of their needs, the countries in the region believe that modern military
forces are vital to their survival. In addition, some states like Saudi Arabia and
Libya hw~ sought major weapons systems as an adjunct to those in the hands
of the belligerent Arabs. In sum, Middle Eastern demand for arms has been
generated by
? 'the longstanding Arab-Israeli animosity,
? [ranian-Arab competition to dominate the Persian Gulf,
? inter-Arab rivalries and conflicts, and
? normal arms modernization cycles.
About two-thirds of the arms sales to the area during 1967-73 (see Figure 2)
have moved from Western suppliers. The United States accounts for more than
'Nlllltary Sales and Deliveries to the !lAiddle East
6,000r--Total Solea and Dolivorlna
ier,ooo
Figure 2
secwrr
No fora/pn Oltr~m
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40`/0 of the total sales, and West European countries -largely the United Kingdom
and France -another 25%. Communist countries, ,primarily the USSR, arc the
source of the remainder.
The major arms suppliers are pushing the sale of military equipment in the
Middle East in an effort to further their own political and economic objectives.
In the past six months, two factors have emerged that virtua-ly guarantee increasing
availability of military hardware:
? the large and growing amount of money available to the oil-rich
Arab states which can be used to finance arms purchases and
? Western Europe's need for oil supplies and its desire to offset a
large balance-of-payments deficit, caused by the increase in oil prices.
The countries of the Middle East have received some of the most modern
and complex weapons systems available, including supersonic jet aircraft, surface-to-
surface and surface-to-;iir missile systems, sophisticated electronic acid
communications equipment, and advanced land armaments. They are now
negotiating the purchase of even more sophisticated systems.
? The oil-producing countries, with burgeoning revenues, will continue
to be the major recipients in the area, with Iran being the largest
purchaser.
? '1Che belligerent Arab states also will continue their arms buildup
with Syria contir-uing to receive the bulk of its arms from the Soviet
Union. Egypt, however, will accelerate its efforts to acnuire more
of its arms from Western sources, presumably financed by their
oil-rich allies.
? Israel's desire to maintain military superiority over its Arab neighbors
will lead to growing arms procurement abroad and increased
expenditures on its domestic arms industry.
? With the exception of Libya, North African arms purchases will
continue to be minor.
This memorandum analyzes and assesses arms sales to the Middle East since
1967 and makes some judgments about sales to the area in the coming several
years.
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The Belligerents
1. The longstanding Arab-Israeli animosity has provided and will provide
for years to come a central impetus for the arms buildap in the area.
? The lessons of the Arab-Israeli wars have reinforced the feelings on
both sides of the need to modernize and expand their armed forces.
? Israel views improvement of its military capability as vital to its
survival and its negotiating posture. Indeed, the Israelis have
attempted to manufacture the items that are deemed essential but
are not available from foreign suppliers.
? F'or their part, the Arab combatants have tried to recover their lost
territory by overcoming Israel's qualitative military superiority.
? To some degree, the Arab-Israeli dispute also has motivated Middle
East states further from the firing line to build up their armaments.
2. Israel and the Arab countries bordering it account for almost 40% of
the arms sold to the Middle East.2 Egypt and Syria alone account for more than
55% of the arms purchased by the belligerents, and Israel more than one-third,
as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Israel
Arms Sales to fire Belligerents
i
h
ddl
3. Almost 85% of the Isl?aeli arms purchases
n t
e Mi
e East
durin
1967-73
f
th
U
it
d St
3
1967-73
g
were
rom
e
n
e
ates.
The
rest were obtained from Western Europe, primarily
France and the United Kingdom.
Total 1
6,111
o
Aircraft and aircraft-associated
Israel
2,141
equipment have represented about
E~rypt
2,212
60% of Israel's purchases from the
Syria
1,257
United States and include 210 F-4
Jordan
429
Phantoms and 325 A-4 Skyhawks
Lebanon
72
(see Figure 3).4
1. Excluding the Sl billion in US arms o
Tel Aviv also purchased a variety of
sales during 1 July - 31 Becembcr 1973,
because all US data arc for fiscal years.
US missile systems, including the
2. For a discussion of the magnitude and direction of the arms flow to the area, see Appendix A.
3. For a discussion of the arms suppliers to the Middle Fast, sec Appendix B.
4. For a list of arms accords signed during 1967-73, see Appendix C.
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Sidcwindor and Sparrow air-to-air missiles, the Bullpup and Shrike
air-tasurface missiles, Walleye and Rockcye "smart" bombs, and the
Hawk surface-to-surface missile system.
Figure 3
A-4 Skyh~wk
4. DespitE fresh prospects for progress toward peace through negotiations,
Israel more than aver sees improvement of its military capability as vital to its
survival and its negotiating posture.
e The October War pointed out several deficiencies that Tel Aviv is
trying to correct and which will lead to arms purchases above the
pre-war level.
o Israel is particularly interested in obtaining additional armored
personnel carriers (APCs), medium tanks, artillery, antitank weapons,
and a large supply of ammunition.
~ The introduction of new weapons,,systems into Egypt or Syria, like
the MIG23 Flogger, would spark even more intensive efforts to
obtain advanced fighter and air defense equipment.
Egypt
5. Moscow has been the source of the great bulk of Cairo's arms purchases.
Since the 1967 War, Egyptian arms procurement has centered around one primary
objective -regaining the Sinai. Soviet refusal to supply advanced weapons systems
that might challenge Israel's technological superiority and its hold over the Sinai,
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however, led to Sadat's expulsion in 1972 of most Soviet military advisers and
technicians and all Sovict combat units stationed in Egypt. Although Sadat's actions
reduced the Sovict presence, it did not end the flow of Soviet arms.
? The T-62 medium tank (sec Figure 4) was provided in increasing
numbers, and the BMP combat infantry vehicle and SU-1'1 and SU-20
fighter bombers were introduced after the Soviet expulsion.
Figure 4
T-62 Medlurro Tank
? Contracts covering the supply of the Scud surface-to-surface missile
system and the MIG-23 Flogger swing-wing interceptor apparently
also were concluded.
? The Soviet resupply effort of October 1973 accelerated Egyptian
arms modernization as Egypt re-equipped, with armored equipment
and antitank weapons, those units hardest hit in the fighting.
6. Since the disengagement agreement on the Egyptian front, Sadat has felt
less of a need for dependence o;~ iiie Soviets and has moved closer to the West.
In mid-A~r~, i~iiowing a deterioration in relations between Moscow and Cairo,
the Soviets stopped arms deliveries and Sadat publicly announced a program to
diversify Egypt's sources of arms.
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? Despite the mutual antagonism, neitltcr Sadat nor the Soviets want
a total break in relations.
? Sadat needs Soviet arms and spare parts to maintain a credible
military posture to bri~ig about a final peace treaty.
o Moscow would like to protect its use of the port of Alexandria
and needs a viable relationship with Egypt during the Geneva peace
negotiations to check the ebb of its position in the Middle East.
? By June, Soviet-Etryptian relations, at least on the surface, were
beginning to improve, high-level Soviet-Egyptian meetings appeared
to be in the wind, and the resumption of Soviet arms deliveries
seems a possibility.
7. Sadat, however, will attempt to diversify his arms inventory by the
introduction of sophisticated Western weapons systems. Tlus will require a
long-range program during which time he will of necessity be primarily dependent
on Soviet weapons support.
? Cairo has sent arrr~s purchasing missions to Western Europe. and
expressed interest in obtaining Mirage and Jaguar aircraft, the Rapier
surface-to-air missile system, and a wide range of support equipment.
? Payments for Western weaponry will probably be guaranteed by the
oil .rich Arab states as was done with previous Western arms
purchases.
? Saudi Arabia, for example, purchased 30 Westland helicopters from
the United Kingdom last year for delivery to Egypt.
? Riyadh also ordered 38 Mirage III-E aircraft for possible transfer
to Egypt when needed.
? ~ibya appears to have arranged for a French sale of SS-11 anti-tank
missile equipment for Egypt.
Syria
8. Almost two-thirds of the $1.3 billion worth of arms Damascus contracted
for during 1967-73 were ordered after the spring of 1972, with most of the
agreements being concluded with the USSR and East European countries.
o In May 1972, Syria concluded an estimated $300 million arms
accord with Moscow which introduced a wide range of sophisticated
equipment, including SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (see Figure 5) and
FROG? rocket launchers into the Syrian inventory.
? Deliveries under the May accord were accelerated in the latter half
of the year after the Sovie*, expulsion from Egypt.
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9? Following the outbreak of the October War, Moscow replaced Syria's
war losses and further expanded and upgraded its armed forces.
? The SU-20 fighter bomber, additional surface-to-air missile
equipment, and possibly the Scud surface-to-surface missile system
were delivered, and the MIG-23 reportedly is on order.
? Damascus will continue to depend on Moscow and its East European
allies for virtually all of its military equipment.
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10. Jordan's arms purchases since the beginning of 1967 have been small,
and it has relied on the United States for most of its equipment.
? In 1971 the United States agreed to assist Jordan in a three-year
$125 million modernization program finan red with Foraign Military
Sales (FMS) credits and in addition provided $100 million as grant
aid.
? The subject of a follow-on program was scheduled for discussion
during King Husayn's March visit to Washington.
11. Beirut's arms purchases of some $72 million during 1967-73 were the
smallest of any of the countries bordering Israel.
Sav1~t SA-6 Surface-to-siR;r Mlsglle
.(Already In the Inventory of Syrea ~:!ld Egypt) a^cR^r
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? Lebanon obtained more than 90% of its arms from the West.
? Purchases from the Comr,-unist countries have been limited to
$3 million for artillery and some $3 million worth of ammunition
and explosives.
12. Local rivalries in the Gulf area have impelled various states to increase
their military forces. Most important of these has been Iran's military expansion
as the Shah has attempted to assume the role, until recently played by the British,
ref keeping order in the Gulf. The Iranian buildup far overshadows that of other
states in the area and has been a source of uneasiness among the traditional regimes
of the region.
? Saudi Arabia, which has its own pretensions to leadership of the
smaller Gulf states, does not want to see Iran greatly in~.rease its
military preponderance.
e The smaller states have shown healthy respect for Iranian power,
and this may in part account for Abu Dhabi's desire to acquire
sophisticated modern arms.
13. Other local conflicts have had less impact on the general level of
armaments in the area.
? Iraq has wanted arms to use against the Kurds who have demanded
autonomy, as well as for possible action against Israel.
? Kuwait wants to increase its military capability to discourage Iraqi
intrusions.
? Yemen (Aden) has provided low-level support to rebels in the
neighboring Dhofar province of Muscat, and its conflict with the
San'a regime also sputters along at a slow pace.
14. The Gulf states account for more than one-half of Middle East arms
purchases, with Iran by far the largest purchaser, as sho:vn in Table 2.
15. Iran bus become the largest purchaser of military equipment in the Middle
East and is using its large oil revenues to acquire the most modern arms. The
United States acoouiits for about two-tliirds of the Shah's total arms purchases.
? The recently concluded $600 million sale of 30 F-14 fighters (see
Figure 6) arned with the Phoenix air-to-air missile system is designed
to meet Iran's requirements fo: an air superiority fighter in the
late 1970x.
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Arma Sales to the Persian Gulf
1967-73
e Other recent purchases include
140 F-4 and F-5 jet fighters,
240 helicopters, and initial orders
for the Hawk surface-to-air missile
system and the Maverick air-to
Million US $ ground missile system.
Totall
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
United Arab Emirates
Yemen (Aden)
Kuwait
Oman
Yemen (San'a)
Qatar
Bahrain
8,460 Iran also has purchased some $1.3 billion
5,671 worth of military hardwaee from other Western
1,654 suppliers,
826
121 a The bulk of these purchases has
SG come from the United Kingdom,
53 including the Rapier air defense
42 missile system, almost 800 Chief-
29 tain tanks (see Figure 7) and 300
7 Scorpion tanks, a fleet of hover-
1 craft, and a destroyer.
1. Excluding tho S 1 billion in US urms
salon to Ira~~ and the S29 million to Saudi
Arabia during 1 July - 31 December
1973, because all US data aro for fiscal
years.
? Negotiations also are under way
with London fora cruiser con-
figured with a flight deck area cap-
able of landing helicopters and ver-
tical take-off and landing aircraft.
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Figuro 7
Chl~ttaln Tank
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? Purchases from other West European countries include French
missile patrol boats, Swiss antiaircraft guns, Italian helicopters,
Dutch transport aircraft, ar~d West Genman naval craft.
16. The USSR is Iran's third largest arms supplier and has sold Tehran almost
$600 million in military equipment. The Shah, although satisfied with Soviet anus,
has restricted purchases to such ground forces equipment as APCs, artillery and
antiaircraft guns, vehicles, and engineering equipment.
17. During 1967-73, Saudi Arabia purchased almost $1.7 billion in military
equipment largely from the United States and the United Kingdom, with about
70% of it acquired during 1972-73 alone. 'The Saudi air force has been the recipient
of most recent purchases, although there also has been a move to modernize the
ground and naval forces.
? Riyadh ordered 50 US F-5 jet filters (see Figure 8), 10 British
BAC-167 Strikemasters, and lu Italian AB-212 helicopters.
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Figure 8
~ F-5 Flglht?r
? In May 1973 a $625 million contract was concluded with a
consortium of British aircraft companies covering technical support
for the Saudi air force over the next five years.
? French tanks were purchased to replace the aging US tanks now
in their inventory.
e Negotiations are under way for the French HOT and MILAN
antitank missile systems.
? The Navy's expansion program for 1974-80 includes the acquisition
of 19 US ships, ranging from patrol frigates and minesweepers to
landing craft.
18. Baghdad, the catalyst of much of the instability in the Gulf area, depends
on Communist suppliers, primarily Moscow, for most of its weaponry.
e In late 1971 the USSR agreed to a comprehensive upgrading of Iraqi
military forces with the air force, the principal beneficiary, receiving
its first SU-2U fighter bombers;, MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters, and
TU-22 supersonic medium jet bombers, the first exported outside
the USSR (see Figure 9).
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F(purct 9
TU-22 Supersonic Medium Jet E>