A COMPARISON OF THE US AND SOVIET ECONOMIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050056-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
A Comparison of the US and Soviet Economies
C I A
BRNCU
DO
NOTLSD
a0
Confidential
ER IM 73-59
Septe;mber 1973
Copy
N2 177
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A Comparison of the US and Soviet Economics
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
Overall Economy
The USSR., with a gross national product (GNP) of about US $610
billion, has the world's second largest economy, somewhat more than half
that of the United States. It has consistently grown faster than the US
economy, although Soviet growth slowed after 1960, as fc!ows:
Average Annual
Rate of Growth
(Percent)
USSR 1
US
1951.60
6.3
3.2
1961-65
5.0
4.3
1966-70
5.6
3.2
1971-72
2.9
4.6
In absolute terms, however, the gap between the US and Soviet economies
has increased in recent years (Figure 1).
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
BILLION 1972 US $
Note: Comments rnd queries regarding this memorandum are welcomed. They may be directed
to
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Growth of Soviet GNP was about 2% in 1972, the lowest annual rate in
almost 10 years, as fans output declined by about 7%. Unexpected setbacks
in industry also contributed to the poor overall performance in 1972.
Uses of Output
Soviet leaders have always given priority to defense needs and to
providing for rapid industrial growth. The USSR allocates much more of its
GNP to investment than does the United States, but the some proportion to
defense (Figure 2). The Soviet consumer, in contrast, receives a smaller share
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, BY END USE, 1972
323 BILLION
'368 RUBLES
1,155 BILLION
1972 DOLLARS
of national output than does his US counterpart, and his per capita
consumption is only one-third that of the average US citizen. This
quantitative comparison, moreover, does not measure the very great
differences in the quality and variety of diets, clothing, and consumer
durables in the two countries.
National Policy Expenditures
Important aspects of Soviet economic policy are illustrated by compari-
son of a group of strategic components of GNP that may be termed national
policy expenditures (Figure 3). Industrial investment and expenditures on
education and civilian research and development reflect the emphasis on
economic growth; defense and foreign aid expenditures reflect foreign policy
priorities.
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FIGURE 3
NATIONAL POLICY EXPENDITURES, 1972
BILLION 1972 US $
INDUSTRIAL
INVESTMENT
Taken as a whole, Soviet national policy expenditures (measured in
dollars) are not far below those of the United States. The Soviets have long
regarded education as an important element in the economic growth process.
The large investment in industrial plant and equipment indicates the
strenuous Soviet effort to catch up with US industry. The USSR spends
heavily on advanced education and on research and development and
frequently achieves impressive results in research. Nevertheless, an inflexible
management system and inadequate incentives unduly delay the develop-
ment and introduction of innovations.
Defense Spending
The burden of maintaining and adding to military capability can be
viewed in a number of ways, including the share of total machinery output
going to defense uses; the demands of the defense sector on specific metals,
mater :Qs, or products; or the degree to which skilled manpower is diverted
from civilian to military uses. The most comprehensive measure of
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FIGURE 4
DEFENSE AS A PERCENT OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT*
USSR
US 12
1955 60 70 72
'Measured in 1968. ublos for the USSR and 1972
dollars for the US. The use of dollar estimates of
Soviet GNP in measuring the defense share of GNP
would be incorrect because the high costs of de-
fense goods (relative to non-defense goods) in the
US are imputed to the relatively large output of
Soviet defense gcods.
"burden," however, is the
share of total defense spending
in GNP. Burden in this sense is
properly measured only in a
country's own currency-
rubles for the USSR and dol-
lars for the United States (Fig-
ure 4). The rapid growth of
Soviet GNP since 1955 (more
than 5% annually) relative to
the average annual growth in
defense spending of 3% has led
to a steady decline in the
Soviet use of national output
for defense.
Industrial Output
During most of the post-
war period, industrial produc-
tion grew faster in the USSR
than in the United States. As a
result, production in Soviet industry now stands at about two-thirds that of
the United States.
Soviet industrial growth was especially rapid in the 1950s-about 10% a
year-but slowed to about 7% a year in the 1960s (Figure 5). The decline has
continued in 1971 and 1972. Industrial production increased by 6% in 1971
and 5% in 1972. Part of the explanation for the slump in 1971-72 was the
poor performance of Soviet agriculture, which drew men from industry to
aH in the harvest and slowed deliveries of agricultural commodities to
industrial processors. More important for the future, however, were failures
to meet deadlines for introducing new productive capacity and inefficient
use of existing capacity, which caused Soviet leaders to take a hard look at
their capital investment program. The setbacks in industry in 1971 and 1972
led Soviet planners to revise downward industrial output goals for 1973.
A hallmark of Soviet economic development has been the priority
expansion of the producers' goods sector, a policy that has begun to be
relaxed only in the last few years. A comparison of the o-.itput of the two
countries' producers' goods industries shows how much progress the USSR
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INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
INDEX: 1060 =100
225,
251L1
1950
has made (Figure 6). The USSR now outproduces the United States in
cement, but remains far behind in production of goods such as electronics
and computers, which play a critical role in modern technology. Large-scale
production of Soviet automobiles is just beginning.
Although the volume of Soviet output in large, the USSR, outside of its
military-space sector, lags behind the West in the quality of the output of
most heavy industries. Metalcutting machine tool production, which was five
times US production in 1972 in terms of number of units, consists largely of
standard types. The Soviets have had to turn to the West to get a number of
crucial components for their several motor vehicle plants now under
construction. They have only recently begun limited production of
tldrd-generation computers based on integrated circuits.
There are exceptions, however. Soviet .,.,ods of some kinds have equaled
the best in Western designs. These include hydroelectric generating equip-
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FIGURE 6
OUTPUT OF PRODUCERS' GOODS, 1972
USSR AS A PERCENT Or US
ELECTRIC L;
ELECTRONICS
COMPUTERS
TRUCKS
AND BUSES
AUTOMOBILES
CRUDE OIL
NATURAL GAS
ELECTRIC POWER
ment, high-voltage transmission equipment, electroslag remelting furnaces,
and some kinds of radios and cameras.
Primary Energy Consumption
Bosh the United States and the USSR are well supplied with the primary
sources of energy-coal, oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power. Production
continues to rise in both countries in response to escalating demands, but
more rapidly in the USSR. Newly discovered resources (especially in the
USSR) and incrcised imports (particularly for the United States) have
prevented major shortages thus far. This trend is likely to persist.
The pattern of energy consumption differs greatly in the two countries.
About 39% of Soviet energy comes from coal, compared with 19% in the
United States, and the Soviet shares of oil and gas are correspondingly much
smaller (Figure 7). However, the Soviet consumption pattern is shifting
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PRIMARY ENERGY
1960
NUCLEAR 11 HYDRO
CONSUMPTION
PERCENT
RESERVES,1972
USSR AS A PERCENT OF US
HYDRO
COAL
OIL
NATURAL GAS
USSR
HYDRO
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rapidly from coal to oil and gas, following the path of the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan.
Both countries are self-sufficient in coal, although the USSR produced
much more than the United States in 1972. Soviet industry is, however,
increasingly forced to exploit low-grade deposits far removed from major
consumption centers. The United States and the USSR are the world's
leading crude oil producers. Each country has about 5% of total proved
world reserves, but potential reserves may be more abundant in the USSR.
Although US production of natural gas was almost three times Soviet output
in 1972, potential reserves are much larger hi the USSR. Nuclear power will
continue to play only a minor role in the overall energy balance of both
countries for the next several years.
A significant factor in the growth of the Soviet economy has been the
country's extensive deposits of generally high-quality ores and metals. Many
of these deposits, however, are found in the country's northern and eastern
regions where exploration and developmental expenditures as well as
transportation costs to major consumption areas are extremely high. Until
recently the USSR has postponed these expenses by exploiting reserves
located in more accessible areas, but these deposits are being depleted and
consequently reliance is increasing on development of the more distant
sources.
In 1972, Soviet production of platinum-group metals, manganese, nickel,
and iron ore far exceeded US output. As for chrome ore and industrial
diamonds, the USSR produced significant proportions of total world output
while the United States produced neither of these items. US production of
copper and phosphates exceeded that of the USSR in 1972, but primarily as
a result of lower Soviet demand. The USSR is well endowed in both of these
resources (Figure 8).
Soviet steel output surpasses that of the United States, but the quality of
output lags behind that of the West. Most of the steel produced by the USSR
consists of the simpler, less specialized varieties. As a result, the Soviets have
been unable to produce the large-diameter pipe needed to develop their
distant oil and gas fields.
Currently the United States imports large amounts of Soviet chrome ore
and platinum-group metals and lesser but significant amounts of diamonds
and nickel. Copper and manganese may join this list over time as US demand
outstrips domestic supply or alternative sources for imports become less
attractive.
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FIGURE 8
OUTPUT OF METALS AND MINERALS, 1972
US AS A PERCENT OF USSR
COPPER
STEEL
ALUMINUM
IRON ORE
NICKEL
BAUXITE
PHOSPHATE ROCK
As in a number of other industrial areas, the USSR is looking to the West
for the technology and a ;uiF,ment to develop the country's mineral
resources. Currently, the Soviets are seeking Western aid in developing their
raw materials sector through joint ventures involving self-liquidating credit-
that is, credit to be repaid out of the product of the joint venture.
Of all sectors of the US and Soviet economies, agriculture offers the
greatest contrast in terms of organization and efficiency. Successive Soviet
leaders have had, recurring difficulties in assuring an adequate food supply
for a growing population. While the USSR has been expanding sown acreage
in an effort to increase production, the United States until the early 1970s
had been reducing the area under cultivation and struggling with farm
surpluses.
In some respects, US and Soviet agriculture are similar. Both countries
have very large expanses of farmland relative to their populations. Despite
the USSR's much larger total area, the amount of arable land in the two
countries is roughly equal, as only 11% of the USSR's huge land mass is
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suitable for farming. Most of the farmland of both countries lies in the north
temperate zone. The USSR, however, is less favorably situated because of its
more northerly location and because much of its grain acreage receives
marginal rainfall. The USSR has no cropland corresponding to the most
productive farm regions of the United States: the combination of fertile soil,
adequate moisture, and long growing seasons found in the US corn belt is
lacking in the USSR, where low temperature and overly moist lands prevail
in the north and aridity characterizes the south.
Institutional differences are vast. The collectivization of agriculture in
the USSR has resulted in the division of farm organization into two
sectors-the socialized sector, which consists of state and collective farms
and which accounts for two-thirds of agricultural production; and the private
sector, which consists of small private garden plots that account for the
remainder of total farm output.
Soviet agricultural output was about 70% of the US level in 1960. Since
that time the dollar value of Soviet output has increased by about 35% and
now stands at about three-fourths of US production (Figure 9). However,
NET AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION
BREAD GRAINS"
FEED GRAINS"
POTATOES
FRUITS
MEAT'"
FIGURE 9
VALUE OF OUTPUT OF SELECTED
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS*, 1972
601
'Value of production of crops and livestock for human use In average 1957-59
dollars. The dollar value of the USSR's output reflects the geometric mean
of alternative comparisons of US and USSR production computed In 1068 ruble
prices and 1957.50 dollar prices.
"Based on production In million meiric tons.
"'Based on marketed or slaughtered cattle, sheep, poultry, and other meat
animals, adjusted for changes in herd sizes.
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Soviet farm output is still dominated by bread grains and potatoes-the
USSR norma'.y produces about twice as much wheat as the United States
but only 7% as much corn-while output of higher quality foods, particularly
meat and fruits, lags far behind that of the United States and is patently
inadequate to satisfy the growing demand-- of the Soviet consumer.
Although Soviet farm output has increased and diets have improved
somewhat, the additions to agricultural rroduction in recent years resulting
from the larger flows o new plant, equipment, and soil additives have been
below expectations. Thus the USSR has recently imported large quantities of
grain, sugar, and some butter from the West and has scheduled further
Imports of bread grains and feed grains for fiscal year 1974.
The USSR employs a farm labor force more than eight times the size of
that in the United States on three-fourths more cultivated land (Figure 10).
LABOR
LAND'
LIVESTOCK"
NEW FIXED
INVESTMENT
FERTILIZER
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
IN AGRICULTURE, 1971
'Acreage sown to annual and perennial crops,
"Beginning -Of-year Inventories.
523
But in the USSR, one farm worker feeds seven while in the United States he
feeds 47. The USSR maintains more than one-fourth of its labor force in
agriculture, by far the largest share among industrialized nations; the United
States employes only 5% of its labor force in agriculture.
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Despite heavy capital in-
vestment-19% of total invest-
FIGURE 11 ment in the USSR versus 4%
INVENTORIES in the United States-the with-
OF AGRICULTURAL drawal of manpo.ver from
EQUIPMENT, 1972 Soviet farms is relatively slow,
ULSR AS A PERCENT OF US and mechanization of the agri-
cultural sector lags far behind
TRACTORS 46 the US level. Deliveries of
equipment to agriculture are
large but erratic and have not
TRUCKS 42 always coincided with needs.
Thus, although inventories
GRAIN have increased substantially
CO 68
MBINES since the 1950s, Soviet farms
still have only about 45% as
many tractors and trucks as
US farms and 90% as many combines (Figure 11). Moreover, efficient
utilization of Sov' t mechanized equipment is hampered by the poor state of
repair work.
A major cause cf inefficiency in Soviet agriculture is the collective farm
system. Soviet farmers and their families work their private plots intensively
and are not given adequate incentives to produce efficiently on the collective
land.
In 1972 the average Soviet citizen consumed about one-third of the
goods and services consumed by his US counterpart, but this comparison
fails to reflect fully the inferior quality, assortment, and styling of Soviet
clothes and durables; the chronic shortages; or the long queues at retail
stoles (Figure 12).
Except for sewing machines, Soviet consumers enjoy only a fraction of
the durables owned by their US counterparts (Figure 13). In the last two
years, production at the new Tol'yatti plant has brought about large
increases in passenger car output. This has reduced the waiting period for a
new car from 6 years to 2-3 years. Shorter delays exist for the best-quality
refrigerators and furniture. Many durables-automatic washers, dryers, and
freezers-are not manufactured or sold in the USSR. On the other hand,
both color and black-and-white television sets, radio-phonographs, transistor
radios, and tape recorders are available off the sales floor. The poor quality
of the color in Soviet television sets, their high price, and the few hours of
color programming per week hove turned Soviet consumers away from this
product.
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PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION, 1972
USSR AS A PERCENT OF US
PERSONAL
SERVICES
DURABLE
GOODS
SOFT GOODS
FOOD
TOTAL
CONSUMPTION
Housing conditions in the USSR are one of the major causes of popular
discontent. The Soviets have built urban housing at a very rapid rate during
the last decade, but, because of the large growth of urban population, the
number of square meters of space per person increased from only 6 in 1960
to about 7.8 in 1972. Housing space per capita for the total population in
the USSR, however, is still only one-third that in the United States. A
substantial percentage of the urban apartments share bathrooms and
kitchens, and a considerable number of communal dwelling units exist.
However, increasingly larger numbers of urban families are obtaining
apartments with their own bath and kitchen facilities.
Soviet consumers receive enough to cat in terms of dally calories, but
their diet is heavily weighted with starches and deficient in meat, vegetables,
and fruit (Figure 14). Although per capita consumption of meat has
increased by one-fourth since 1965, the average Soviet citizen still cats about
40% as much meat as that consumed by his ULO counterpart (Figure 15).
However, the Brezhnev regime is clearly committed to expanded meat
production to a;leviatc the worst sho?tages.
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FIGURE 13
STOCK OF CONSUMER DURABLES, 1972
UNITS PER 100 PEOPLE
WASHING
MACHINES
RADIOS
TELEVISION SETS
AUTOMOBILES
VACUUM
CLEANERS
SEWING
MACHINES
AVERAGE DIETS, 1972
COMPOSITION OF DIETS
GRAIN
PRODUCTS
AND
POTATOES
--MEAT AND FISH --------
VEGETABLES.
FATS AND OILS
14
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rlaunc is
PER CAPITA MEAT CONSUMPTION
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1972
USSR
POLAND
HUN.1At1Y
EAST GERMANY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
WEST GERMANY
The Soviet population is 19% larger than the US population, but the
total labor force of the USSR exceeds that of the United States by 44%, a
ratio which has been diminishing gradually since 1955 (Figure 16). A basic
factor accounting for the larger hare of employed persons in the USSR is
the greater use of women workers. In 1972, one worker in two in the USSR
was a woman, while in the United States the ratio was roughly one out of
three.
The sharpest difference in structure between the US and the Soviet labor
force is in agriculture, where Soviet employment now reaches a leve'' eight
times that of the United States in 1972. By contrast, only one-third o; the
US labor force is employed in services, whereas icss than one-fifth are so
employed in the USSR (Figure 17). However, the SovLt service sector is
growing rapidly as a proportion of the nonagricultural labor for,,'-from 22%
in 1960 to 27% in 1972.
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TOTAL LABOR FORCE
Commerce (that is, rethil trade, banking, insurance, and real estate), like
services, is only now emerging from an embryonic stage in the Soviet Union.
These activities employ one-fourth of the US labor force and only 7% of the
Soviet force. The United States has fewer men under arms than the
USSR-2.4 million in the United States, compared with 3.3 million in the
USSR. In both countries, about one-fourth of the work force is employed in
industry, while construction takes 4% and 8%, of the labor force and
transportation-communications 5% and 8%, respectively, in the United
States and the I JSS-'~..
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rinUtuz 17
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
BY SECTOR, 1972
AGRICULTURE
INDUSTRY
CONSTRUCTION
COMMERCE
SERVICES
TRANSPORTATION
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
Sovi(' growth in the past has been fueled by large and increasing outlays
on investment (Fig-ire 18). In 1972 the share of GNP allocated to capital
formation was about 34%, compared with P,8% in the United States. In spite
of this high sate of investment. re!ative labor productivity in the two
countries his been about the same since 1955 (Figure 19). Labor
productivity in Soviet industry was almost 40% (f the US level in both 1955
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TOTAL INVESTMENT'
AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1955 60 65 70 72
?lnveatm.nl Include, expenditures tot nilw plant wtJ equipment, capita l r.padr, and R&D.
and 1972. The marked Soviet advantage over the United States in the rate of
growth of industrial output reflects a more rapid increase in enrployment,
not in productivity. Similarly, growth in agricultural productivity has barely
matched US performance, and agricultural labor is only about 10% as
productive in the USSR as in the United States in spite of a decade of much
larger investments in Soviet agk?iculturc.
The consistently poor performance in productivity stems from the many
managerial problems of a centralized and bureaucratic socialism. Rewards
and pressures ara directed toward increasing output, while the introduction
of new technology involves risks of failure. In addition, the armed forces
preempt the larger share of research and development (R&D) funds and get
the best scientific talent (Figure 20). Civi!ian R&D currently receives about
40% of total R&D outlays in the USSR against 60% in the United States.
Moreover, three-fourths of the funds allocated to all R&D in the USSR go
for basic and applied research rather than to translating research into the
dcv.-lopment of new processes and products. In contrast, the United States
spends three-fifths of its total allocation to R&D on developing new
processes and products.
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FIaufI 19
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY"
USSR AS A PERCENT OF US
37
11 10
'Computed using not Industrial and agricultural
output and the average annual number of
workers employed In each sector.
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EXPENDITURES FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AND SPACE
1 1 1
CIVIL SPACE
I I I I
85
MILITARY R&D
(INCLUDING SPACE)
CML SPACE
L ll I I I I I I I I i 10
70 72 1980 65 70 72
CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURES
1960-72
BILLION 1972 US $
The USSR is less dependent on foreign trade than is the United States. In
1972, imports were about 3% of Soviet GNP and about 5% of US GNP.
Soviet foreign trade is less than one-third that of the United States. Soviet
exports totaled $15.4 billion in 1972, compared with US exports of $49.2
billion, while Soviet imports were a 16.1 billion, compared with US imports
of $55.6 billion (Figure 21).
A;most two-thirds of Soviet foreign trade is with Communist countries,
particularly the East European countries, while about one-fifth of total trade
is with industrialized Western countries and the balance is with less
developed countries. (Figure 22).
MILITARY R&D
(INCLUDING SPACE)
~
-
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EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
BY MAJOR COMMODITIES, 1972
BILLION 1972 US $
OTHER
MANUFACTURED
GOODS
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EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY MAJOR AREA, 1972
a COMMUNIST COV' TRIES
E DEVELOPED WESTERN
COUNTRIES
LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
EXPORTS
US USSR
IMPORTS
US USSR
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USSR US
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1972
Gross National Product (billion 1972 US 3) 248.0 329.7 433.8 573.8 590.9 610.6 t 1,155.2
Population, mid-year (million persons) 100.2 214.3 230.0 242.8 245.1 247.5 208.8
Per capita Gross National Product (1972 US 3) 1 ,270 1 ,640 1,880 2,360 2,440 2,4701 5,5S0
Industrial production index (1960100) 67.3 100.0 138.7 189.6 201.0 211.0 r 172.7
Not agricultural production index (1000 0100) 80.5 100.0 115.0 144.4 144.0 134.7 r 124.4
Broad grains (million metric tons) 03.6 59.8 02.7 00.5 01.0 76.3
Feed grains (million metric tone 82.2
38.1 32.5 35.8 57.5 54.6 55.8 181.2
Potatoes (million metric tons) 71.8 84.4 88.7 00.8 92.7 78,3 13.4
.'!eat 9 (million metric tons) 5.8 8.7 10.0 12.3 12.2 13.0
Total labor force (including the armed forces) a 16.8
(million persons) 105.2 110.0 117.0 124.2 120.0 128.1 89.0
Non-agricultural8 (million persons) 55.3 64.0 75.5 86.7 80.1 92.1 78.2
Agricultural3 (million persons) 49.9 46.0 42.3 37.5 30.9 36.0 4.4
Total investment index (1060 v 100) 58.7 100.0 141,0 190.0 214.6 228.4 156.24
Per capita consumption index (1960 =100) 82.9 100.0 11119 143.2 148.0 150.5 142.3
Crude oil (million metric tons) 71 147 242 349 377 304 467
Natural gas (billion cubic motors) 9 45 128 108 212 221 648
Electric power (billion kilowatt-hours) 170 292 507 741 800 858 11908
Petroleum products (million metric tons) 01 114 174 252 266 285 544
Coal (million metric tons) 300 490 545 577 592 004 535
Primary energy production (million metric tone
of coal cquival%nt) 435 603 042 1 ,218 1 ,291 1 ,323 2,183
Crude steel (m:!aon metric tons) 45.3 tiS.3 01.0 115.9 120.9 126.0 120.8
Cement (millioii metric tons) 22.5 45.5 72.4 95.2 100.3 104.3 75.0
Aluminum (thousand metric tons) 430 630 1,000 1,720 1,760 1,870 3,744
Bauxite (thousand metric tot s) 2,700 3,110 4,860 5,000 5,000 5,000 1,930
Copper, refined (thousand metric tons) 377 490 772 1,100 1,100 1,250 2,010
Chromito (million metric tons) 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 0
Manganese ore (million metric tons) 4.7 5.0 7.6 6.8 0.8 7.5 0
Iron ore (million metric tons) 71.9 105.9 153.4 195.5 203.0 208.0 77.1
Nickel, refined (thousand metric tons) 40 72 100 137 151 I50 14
Phosphate rocks (million metric tons) N.A. 5.8 11.5 18.0 19.9 21.0 38.51
Automobiles (thousand units) 107.8 138.8 201.2 344.2 529.( 730.1 8,824
Trucks, including buses (thousand units) 337.5 384.8 415.1 571.9 613.7 648.7 2,447
Electric generators (thousand kilowatts) 4,526 7,915 14,390 10,578 13,354 13,700 44,109
Machine tools, metalcutting (thousand units) 117.1 155.9 186.1 202.3 206.0 210.0 41.6
Instruments (million rubles, 1067 prices) 208 820 1,440 3,079 3,400 4 100 Computers, digital (units) N.A.
0
60 280 470 800 1,000 1 ,300 24.000
Refrigerators (thousand units) 151 529 1,075 4,140 4,557 5,030 6.3156
Washing machines (thousand units) 87 805 3,430 5,143 4,052 3,002 5, t07 0
Radios (thousand units) 3,549 4,105 5,160 7,815 8,794 8,842 21,311
Television sets (thousand units) 495 1,726 3,655 6,682 5,814 5,968 13,507
Vacuum cleaners (thousand units) 131 501 800 1,509 1,718 2,168 8.337 s
Sewing machines (thousand units) 1,611 3,006 800 1,400 1,408 1 ,439 N. A.
Gold production (thousand troy ounces) 2,970 3.500 5,000 6,600 6,960 8,200 1,450
Imports (million US 8) 3,061 5,628 8,058 11,732 12,480 16,097 55,555
Exports (million US 8) 3,427 5,5114 8.175 12,800 13,806 15,409 40,208
I Preliminary.
T Carcass weight, bone in, includes beef, veal, mutton-lamb, goat, pork, poultry, and edible offals, but excludes lard.
3 Adjusted annual average.
4 New fixed investmear
5 Estimated.
6 Factory sales.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2006/04/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050056-4