COMMUNIST MILITARY AID DELIVERIES TO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050054-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2008/02/19: CIA-RDP85T00875R00170005~46 ,1X1C f S,Q~~~
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam
in 1972
CIA
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Secret
ER IM 73.57
August 1973
Copy No. 611
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COMMUNIST MILITARY AID DELIVERIES TO
NORTH VIETNAM IN 1972
1. Estimates of North Vietnam's military aid receiptsl show a sharp
jump in 1972, reflecting the massive deployment of weapons and extensive
losses attending Hanoi's spring offensive. Last year, deliveries probably
totaled about US $575 million, more than double the previous year's level
but still below the 1967 peak (see Table 1).
2. Most of the military supplies came from two traditional sources,
China and the USSR, and both countries stepped up deliveries in almost
every major category of combat materiel (see Table 2). Soviet assistance
was concentrated in air defense equipment but also included some of the
newer and more sophisticated ground forces hardware. As in the past, China
remained the dominant supplier of ground forces equipment, including
tanks, small arms, and other infantry weapons.
3. During the latter part of 1971 and early 1972, North Vietnam
received a number of new weapons that were deployed for the first time
in South Vietnam during the spring offensive. Among they-. were Soviet
and Chinese 130-mm field guns, Chinese 122-mm field guns (Type 60),
Soviet SA-7 (Grail) antiaircraft missiles, Soviet AT-3 (Sagger) wire-guided
antitank missiles, Soviet 160-mm mortars, Chinese 82-mm recoilless rifles,
and Chinese Type 68 automatic rifles - the most modern rifle in the Chinese
inventory. Specific details of various imported weapons systems are
presented in Tables 3 and 4.
4. Commitments from the Communist allies in 1972 reflected
continuing Soviet and Chinese support for Hanoi throughout the period
of intense combat activity, April-December. Hanoi had obtained
commitments from both Moscow and Peking in the fall of 1971 for military
and economic aid deliveries in 1972. Supplementary agreements covering
both military and economic aid were obtained from the USSR in December
1971. and from China in January 1972. Moscow sent Marshall Pavel Batitsky,
commander-in-chief of Soviet Air Defense Forces, in March, probably to
Note: Comments and queries regarding this memorandum, prepared jointly by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, are welcomed. They may be directed to
1. For a brief discussion of the nature and method of estimating military aid to North Vietnam,
we the Appendix.
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Communist Military Deliveries
to North Vietnam
Million 1970 US $
Totall
140
36S
610
830
530
31S
190
275
575
3,835
USSR
70
310
500
67S
415
175
90
160
355
2,750
China
70
55
110
155
115
140
100
110
215
1,070
Other
Ned.
Negl.
Negl.
Nogi.
Negi.
Negl.
Negl. .
5
5
15
1. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Soviet and Chinese Military Aid Deliveries
to North Vietnam, by Major Type of Equipment
1970
1971
1972
USSR
China
USSR
China
USSR
China
Total l
90
100
160
110
355
215
Air defense
equipment
10
8
65
6
132
29
Missiles
6
....
15
....
I U4
....
Ground forces
equipment
12
32
36
42
22
80
Ammunition
49
53
37
45
74
90
Naval craft
...
8
8
2
Other
13
8
8
7
15
12
2
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Chinese Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam
Quantity
Valael
(Units)
(Million 1970 US $)
1969
1970
1971
19722
1969
1970
1971
19722
Total3
....
....
....
....
140
100
110
215
Air defense equipment3
....
....
....
....
41
8
6
29
Antiaircraft artillery3
....
....
....
....
. 9
6
6
6
57-mm
35
40
30
20
2
3
2
2
37-mm
210
110
120
140
6
3
4
4
14.5-mm
120
40
60
10
1
Negl.
Negl.
Negl,
Radar
22
13
....
45
2
2
....
8
Jet fighter aircraft
32
....
....
17
30
....
....
15
Ammunition (metric tons)
9,000
13,000
11,000
22,000
37
53
45
90
Ground forces equipment3
....
....
....
....
60
32
42
80
Field artillery (75-mm
to 152-mm)
110
45
60
110
2
1
1
6
Armor3
....
....
....
....
3
4
11
40
T-59
15
25
50
200
2
3
7
28
T-62/63
15
15
30
120
1
1
3
11
Armored personnel
carriers
....
....
16
18
....
1
1
Mortars3
....
....
....
....
15
3
3
6
Rocket launchers3
....
....
....
....
Negl.
Negl.
1
Negl.
Small arms and other
infantry weapons3
....
....
....
....
40
24
26
28
Naval craft
....
....
8
4
8
2
Trucks
300
1,200
1,000
1,700
2
8
7
12
1. Where pouible,valuos are based on comparable US weapons and, alternatively, on Soviet foreign trade prices in 1970 US $.
Individual categories are rounded to the nearest $1 million; totals are rounded to the nearest $5 million. Because of rounding,
components may not add to the totals shown.
2. Preliminary estimates.
3. In categories that contain non-homogenous types of equipment, no quantitative totals were listed.
3
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Soviet Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam
Quantity
Valuel
(Units)
(Million 1.970 US $)
1969
1970
1971
19722
1969
1970
1971
19722
Total3
3
....
....
175
90
160
35S
Air defense equipment
Equipment for SA-2
....
....
....
103
10
65
132
firing battalions4
3
....
....
10
10
....
S9
59
Antiaircraft artillery
....
....
....
....
14
7
6
20
85-mm
10
5
55
1
Negl.
7
57-mm
65
40
20
25
4
3
2
2
37-mm
350
120
140
80
9
3.
4
2
14.5-mm
135
....
25
185
1
....
Negl.
2
23-mm
....
....
....
190
""
7
23-mm, self-propelled
....
quads
ZSU
,
....
....
8
....
1
Radar
35
19
5
20
6
3
Negl.
8
Jet fighter aircraft
55
....
....
30
83
....
45
Other aircraft
1
6
....
1
3
1-29 trainer
....
4
AN-24 transport
1
2
....
....
1
2
Replacement missiles
200
100
250
1,800
12
6
15
104
Ammunition (metric tons)
9,000
12,000
9,000
18,000
37
49
37
74
Ground.force equipment3
Field artillery (75-mm
....
....
....
....
10
12
36
22
to 152-mm)
3
40
30
25
110
1
1
1
6
Armor
....
....
4
7
32
14
T-54
15
45
190
65
2
6
26
9
PT-76
Armored personnel
40
20
55
15
2
1
4
1
carriers
15
....
45
115
Negl.
....
2
4
SU-76 assault guns
....
4
....
....
Negl.
JSU-122 assault guns
3
....
....
.
Negl
Mortars3
...
.
N
l
....
N
l
....
....
3
....
....
eg
.
eg
.
Negi.
Negl
Rocket launchers
Small arms and other
....
....
....
....
2
2
1
Negl.
infantry weapons3
....
....
....
....
3
2
2
2
Naval craft
15
4
3
Trucks and other vehicles
1,200
1,400
1,100
2,200
8
10
8
8
15
1. Where possible,values are based on comparable US weapons and, alternatively, on Soviet foreign trade prices in 19970 US S. In-
dividual categories are rounded to the nearest $1 million; totals are rounded to the nearest $5 million. Because of rounding, com-
ponents may not add to the totals shown.
2. Preliminary estimates.
3. In categories that contain nod-homogenous types of equipment, no quantitative totals were listed.
4. Equipment includes an estimated 50 missiles per battalion - 20 missiles on site, plus 30 held in strategic reserve.
4
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inspect North Vietnamese air defense.2 Shortly thereafter, Hanoi launched:
its attack on South Vietnam. The United States responded by resuming
the bombing over North Vietnam after a lapse of more than three years
and by mining North Vietnam's ports for the first time. The resulting cutoff
in seaborne imports forced North Vietnam to undertake a massive shift
to overland transport to maintain the flow of essential imports and military
supplies. Both Communist allies reaffirmed their support, as Peking signed
another supplementary military and economic aid agreement in June and
Moscow later reported that Soviet assistance had been increased following
the resumption of the bombing and the mining. The timing of events in
1972 and the unprecedented commitment of weaponry to the battlefield
suggest that large-scale military aid deliveries probably extended well back
into 1971.
Air Defense Equipment
5. Moscow and Peking provided substantial assistance to North
Vietnam's air defense during 1972 by increasing deliveries of fighter aircraft,
antiaircraft artillery, radar, and equipment for surface-to-air missile (SAM)
battalions. These deliveries were used effectively both to support the
offensive in South Vietnam and to bolster defenses against the intensive
bombing of North Vietnam. The following sections discuss imports of air
defense equipment, by major category.
Jet Fighter Aircraft
6. During 1972, North Vietnam received 17 MIG-19s from China
and 30 MIG-21J Fishbeds from the USSR, valued at $15 million and
$45 million, respectively. These were intended to help offset losses of some
90 aircraft during 1972 and were the first deliveries since 1969, when 87
jets were received. So far during 1973 there have been no new deliveries
of jet fighter aircraft, although 22 MIG-17s, already included in Hanoi's
inventory, were recently transferred back from China in an apparent attempt
to boost in-country air defenses further.
Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) and Associated Radar
7. US bombing during 1972 also caused a sharp increase in AAA
and radar deliveries to North Vietnam. About 700 AAA weapons were
delivered, including for the first time the Soviet self-propelled ZSU 23-mm
piece. These weapons were needed to replace losses sustained from the
2. There is some controversy over the actual purpose of Batitsky's visit. On the surface, timing
of the mission seemed to represent last-minute Soviet participation in Hanoi's military offensive.
A subsequent display of Soviet embarrassment over the episode, however, suggested that Batitsky
was not privy to Hanoi's military plans.
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bombing in North Vietnam and also to support the deployment of some
20 AAA regiments out-of-country. In addition to their normal armament,3
these units were also equipped with SA-7 missiles, which were responsible
for downing 54 known aircraft. Soviet deliveries of antiaircraft artillery and
radar for the year are estimated at $28 million, roughly double the Chinese
contribution for that category of equipment.
8. Imports of equipment for at least ten SA-2 battalions are also
estimated to have arrived in North Vietnam in 1972 from the USSR. Unlike
1971 deliveries, which augmented North Vietnam's SAM strength, imports
in 1972 were needed to replace losses and also to support the deployment
of several SAM regiments out-of-country. Ten SA-2 sites were destroyed
and possibly 12 more were damaged. Hanoi maintained its missile strength
at about 45-50 battalions throughout the year, however, enabling the North
Vietnamese. to provide missile defenses against air attack both for troops
in the field and for the major industrial centers of Hanoi and Haiphong.
9. Moscow remained the sole supplier of replacement SAMs in 1972.
Shipments from the USSR permitted the North Vietnamese to fire an
estimated 4,000 missiles at US aircraft during the course of the year. In
addition, some missiles must have been lost before firing at destroyed or
damaged SAM sites. Deliveries of replacement missiles during 1972 to
accommodate these uses are estimated at about 1,800, reflecting in part
an estimated drawdown in stocks and in part lags in delivery to North
Vietnam. The rate of missile firings during December probably was so
great - more than 1,100 during the bombing attacks on Hanoi and
Haiphong - as to preclude replacements by the end of the year.
10. Finally, SA-3 equipment from the Soviet Union was observed in
North Vietnam during January 1973, although this equipment may have
arrived in late 1972. Addition of this new weapons system to North
Vietnam's arsenal will further strengthen its air defenses. The SA-3 - which
will complement the SA-2 system -- significantly enhances Hanoi's
capability to attack low-flying aircraft with greater accuracy.
Ground Forces Equipment
11. The 1972 offensive marked a major shift in Communist fighting
tactics. For the first time in the war, North Vietnam supported major ground
3. Normal armament varies depending on the unit's mission. Many AAA regiments have a primary
mission of striking low-level aircraft. These regiments are equipped with 12.7-mm, 14.5-mm, and
37-mm weapons. All-purpose regiments are equipped with a full complement of weapons, including
heavier 57-mm, 55-mm, and 100-mm guns and- can strike low-, medium-, and high-altitude targets.
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force units with large numbers of tanks and heavy artillery, made possible
by record deliveries from its allies. Total deployments to South Vietnam
during 1972 and the first four months of 1973 amounted to some 1,100
tanks, substantially more than the number previously deployed during the
course of the entire war. Of the 1,100 deployed, about 500 were sent south
during the spring offensive, with total tank losses in the early months
estimated at about 400. Subsequently, at least another 600 tanks are
estimated to have been sent south during the 1972-73 dry season (including
about 350 after the January 1973 cease-fire), Presumably a minimum
strength of several hundred tanks was maintained in North Vietnam as a
contingency reserve and to train new troops in tank tactics.
12. Uncertainties concerning delivery dates and North Vietnam's
in-country inventory at the beginning of the offensive make a firm judgment
on tank imports for the year impossible. Hanoi probably reduced in-country
reserves to some extent in order to equip forces in the field with as much
firepower as possible, before the one-for-one replacement provision of the
cease-fire agreement became effective. For purposes of valuation, it is
estimated that at lease 725 tanks were imported during 1971-72.
Other Ground Forces Equipment
13. China remained by far the dominant source of small arms and
light infantry weapons and became Hanoi's largest supplier of armor in 1972.
Chinese-built equipment appearing for the first time in South Vietnam
included the T-63 amphibious tank (85-mm gun) and the T-59 tank
(100-mm gun), the M-1967 armored personnel carrier (APC), the 82-mm
recoilless rifle, and the Type 68 automatic rifle. China also supplied more
than 40 130-mm guns, more than 30 122-mm howitzers, and lesser numbers
of other large field artillery pieces.
14. The USSR also provided several types of armor and other
equipment, much of which was deployed in South Vietnam for the first
time in 1972. Among these items were more than 100 BTR-50 armored
personnel carriers and small numbers of ZSU-57-2 tracked vehicles .4 The
Soviet-supplied 160-mm mortar also made its initial appearance outside
North Vietnam. North Vietnam's field artillery capability was significantly
enhanced by receipt of more than 60 Soviet long-range 122-mm field guns
and about 25 130-mm guns, whose range and accuracy make them the
most effective field artillery used in Indochina. Another new weapon
initially deployed was the AT-3 (Sagger) wire-guided antitank missile from
the USSR.
4. These are self-propelled antiaircraft gun carriers designed to deploy with tanks to provide
protection against air strikes.
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Naval Craft
15. US air strikes and naval gunfire during 1972 inflicted heavy
damage to North Vietnam's naval assets. Pilots reported destroying hundreds
of waterborne logistics craft and also inflicting substantial damage to North
Vietnam's port facilities. In an effort to upgrade North Vietnam's naval
capability, the USSR delivered four Komar class guided missile patrol boats
in late 1972. The boats are normally equipped with two Styx antiship
missiles, each of which has a maximum range of 25 miles and which
constituted a serious threat to US Navy ships. The craft were attacked by
US Navy jets shortly after arriving in North Vietnamese waters; one was
reportedly destroyed and two damaged. In addition to Komar patrol boats,
four P-6 patrol boats were received in 1972 from China.
16. North Vietnam also imported thousands of metric tons of steel
barge plates (mainly from East European countries), a major portion of
which probably went to the repair or construction of waterborne logistics
craft. No attempt has been made to account for these costs in military
imports.
Trucks
17. As with most other categories of military hardware, estimates of
truck allocations entail a large margin of error. There is little hard evidence
to determine whether a truck is intended for military or civilian use, and
final, assignment becomes somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, total truck imports
probably are considerably greater than observed deliveries of 6,500 units.
China is known to have shipped at least 1,700
units, all in the second half of the year, while shipments from East European
countries amounted to about 800 units. In view of the Soviet plan for
truck deliveries and the lack of shipments from China for the first half
of the year, actual truck imports may have reached as high as 10,000 units,
of which an estimated 4,500 were assigned to military use. By way of
comparison, military truck imports were estimated at 2,100 in 1971 and
2,700 in 1970.
Outlook for 1973
18. Logic would suggest a continuation of military aid, but at a greatly
reduced level from the pace of deliveries that characterized the pre-cease-fire
period. With the cessation of US bombing, Hanoi's requirements for large
amounts of expensive SAM and AAA ordnance have been greatly reduced.
Furthermore, a general slackening of the fighting elsewhere in Indochina
has reduced other materiel requirements probably to one of the lowest levels
8
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of the war. On the other hand, North Vietnam's limited capability to
maintain or produce military equipment will necessitate some continuation
of foreign military assistance. As a case in point, the deliveries of SA-3
missiles detected just prior to the cease-fire will almost certainly require
Soviet participation for training and replacement parts if Hanoi is to make
full use of the equipment.
19. Since the cease-fire, there has been virtually no direct information
on military imports by North Vietnam except for a few reports on deliveries
of new trucks, helicopters, radars; and communications equipment.
However, the magnitude of North Vietnam's recently concluded logistical
effort to build up military stocks in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam
suggests that Hanoi is not hurting for military equipment. Traditionally,
such a high level of activity in the military logistics funnel has been
accompanied by a correspondingly high level of military imports from the
USSR and China, but there is no conclusive proof that such has been the
case. On the contrary, there has been a rash of reports,
that these imports have dropped sharply since the cease-fire.
20. Even so, Hanoi at least has obtained commitments for continued
assistance. As of July 1973, aid agreements for 1974 with China, Hungary,
Romania, and Poland all contained military aid pacts. Early in July, Moscow
agreed in principle to provide aid in 1974, and, although Soviet public
statements stress economic assistance, the USSR can be expected to reaffirm
military aid as a part of the final agreement.
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