INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM IRAQ: OIL GIVES WIDER ECONOMIC OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050047-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: July 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Iraq: Oil Gives ider Economic Options
Secret
ER IM 73-50
July 1973
70
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July 1973
Iraq: Oil Gives Wider Economic Options
After more than a decade of sluggish growth, Iraq's economy appears to be entering
a period of prolonged expansion spurred by increased output of oil. One year after the
nationalization of much of the oil industry:
? Oil production has increased to 2 million barrels per day, the highest
output ever reached.
? Commitments for marketing the government's share of the oil have been
obtained through the mid-1970s.
? Investment in the oil industry has been guaranteed by Western and
Communist participating countries, notably France and the USSR.
? Foreign exchange reserves have climbed above the US $1 billion level.
Progress in agriculture, the other important economic sector, is slower. The current
economic plan (1971-75) calls for increases in agricultural output through investment in
irrigation and improved farming techniques. These programs, buttressed by considerable
foreign assistance, probably will yield appreciable gains in the near term, perhaps sufficient
to make Iraq an important exporter of grains.
As for foreign trade, increasing oil revenues will yield ample trade surpluses and will
provide the government with bider options in foreign economic relations. Thus the heavy
dependence on the USSR and other Communist countries for economic assistance probably
will be diluted by expanding commercial ties to non-Communist countries, particularly
France and Japan.
Note: Comments and queries regarding this memorandum are welcomed. They may be
directed to
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Background)
1. The radical military regimes in Iraq during the past decade and
a half have had little success in dcveiolpping the country's principal economic
resources - oil and agriculture. Weak governments have been unable to
provide continuity in economic policies. Moreover, the population is a
heterogeneous mixture of conflicting factions - the Sunni against the Shia
sects of Islam, a split intensified by the lower social and economic status
of the larger group, the Shias; the Muslims against tht better-educated and
Western-oriented Christian minority; the growing urban element against the
rural population; the Arabs against the Kurds, who make up 18% of the
population; and the Arabs against the smaller ethnic minorities, such as
the Turkomans and Assyrians.
2. Besides the domestic turmoil, continuous frictions in foreign
relations have served to stifle economic development. Iraq's strategic
position at the head of the Persian Gulf, contiguous with Iran, Turkey,
Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, has given the country's military
leaders ample reason to emphasize a military buildup at the expense of
economic development. Conflicts have abounded with Iran for its
encouragement of the Kurds, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over disputed
boundaries, and with Syria over transit rights for Iraqi people, goods, oil,
and water. Finally, the government and the foreign oil companies have
persistently been at loggerheads during thr past 12 years.
3. The economy of Iraq is dominated by oil and agriculture. Earnings
from oil provide the bulk of domestic development funds, 60% of
government revenues, 85% of foreign exchange earnings, and nearly
one-third of gross domestic; product (GDP). Agriculture contributes about
20% of GDP and provides employment for more than one-half of the labor
force.
4. Under the Baath regime, Iraqi economic policy has been directed
more by radical idealism or political expediency than by deliberate economic
planning. Economic units below the top have suffered in turn from the
government's inaction and from its confused intervention. In the early
1960s, private incentive was stifled when large private landholdings were
confiscated and all major industries were nationalized. Productivity in
agriculture fell, capital fled the country, and the stock of managerial
know-how declined. An expansion of the military forces from 75,000 to
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more than 100,000 men, together with outlays for expensive equipment,
added to Iraq's economic difficulties ;., the 1960s. The regime turned to
the USSR and other Communist countries for economic and military
assistance. From 1958 through 1972, Communist aid extended to Iraq
totaled $2.2 billion, of which slightly more than $1 billion was drawn.
Oil Production: Settlement of Longstanding Issues
5. Iraqi oil production has long been dominated by the international
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)2 and its affiliates - the Mosul Petroleum
Company (MPC) and Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC). In 1961 the Iraqi
government canceled concessions of the IPC and affiliates in areas not then
producing. The important North Rumaila field, which had been proved by
IPC but was not then operating, remained a subject of contention between
IPC and the Iraqi government from 1961 until early 1973. In 1964 the
government created a state-owned petroleum company, Iraq National Oil
Company (INOC), which from 1967 on proceeded to negotiate joint venture
agreements for oil exploration and production with the French state-owned
firm Enterprise des Recherches et d'Activites Petrolieres (ERAP) and
contract agreements with the USSR, Hungary, East Germany, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia. The North Rumaila field, being developed primarily with
Soviet and East European aid, came into production in April 1972.
6. In comparison with that of other Middle Eastern countries, the
expansion of Iraqi oil production and revenues lagged in the 1960s. Iraq's
share of Middle East production dropped from 18% to 8%. In 1971, IPC
pushed tip oil production (see Table 1) under pressure from Baghdad, which
saw other producing countries expanding output rapidly. However, IPC
reined in production in early 1972 on the economic grounds that northern
crude oil exported from the Mediterranean cost more than oil exported
from Persian Gulf ports - the result of separate, negotiated price
adjustments with the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean oil producers. After
months of unsuccessful negotiations between IPC and the government to
restore production to 1971 levels, the government nationalized the IPC
northern fields on 1 June 1972, leaving the Mosul Petroleum Company
and the Basrah Petroleum Company as the only remaining IPC affiliates
producing in Iraq. Iraqi oil production and exports fell by nearly 15% in
1972 (see Table 2).
7. Shortly after the nationalization, Iraq announced its intention to
compensate IPC for the takeover in 1961 and the June 1972
nationalization. A new series of negotiations began. These negotiations were
2. Parent companies of IPC and its affiliates are British Petroleum (BP), 23.75%; Royal Dutch
Shell, 23.75%; Compagnic Francaise des Petrolcs (CFP), 23.75%; Exxon Corp. and Mobil Oil Co.,
23.75%; and Participations and Explorations Corp. (Gulbenkian), 5%.
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Table 1
Iraq: Crude Oil Production
Thousand Barrels per Day
1960
955
1967 1,227
1961
990
1968 1,506
1962
995
1969 1,526
1963
1,160
1970 1,567
1964
1,255
1971 1,712
1965
1,315
1972 1,449
1966
1,389
Exports
Company
Average Average
Jon-Jun Jul-Dec
Total
Jan-Jun
Jul-Dec
Total
Total
1,476
1,423
1,449
1,360
1,296
1,328
IPC/MPC
811
16
414
1,3602
6352
9982
BPC
636
675
655
.
Government
29
732
380
Negl.
661
330
INOC (North
Rumaila)
117
70
43
Ncgl.
62
31
Iraq Company
for Oil
Operations
123
662
337
Negl.
599
299
1. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
2. Estimate.
3. One month only.
Table 2
Iraq: Crude Oil Production and Exports,1 1972
Thousand Barrels per Day
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largely suspended in the final quarter of 1972 while other Persian Gulf
states and the oil companies were discussing the issue of participation by
host governments in ownership and control of their oil production. During
this period the Iraqi government concluded agreements on marketing some
oil from the Kirkuk fields, agreements which relieved the government of
the financial strains that had built up since mid-1972.
8. The Iraqi government on one side and IPC and its affiliates on
the other finally agreed on all outstanding issues on 28 February 1973.
Under the settlement, IPC receives 15 million metric tons of crude oil at
the rate of 1 million tons a month (valued at $300 million to $350 million)
as compensation for all claims against the government, including claims
incident to the 1961 expropriation of the North Rumaila fields. IPC is
to pay the Iraqi government $350 million ($75 million in March 1973 and
the remainder in monthly installments proportional to oil deliveries) for
back taxes and claims that had accumulated because Iraq had not received
increases negotiuted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)3 during the 1960s. IPC also agreed to make its best endeavor to
substantially increase production from the BPC concessions, and ceded the
Mosul Petroleum Company holdings to Iraq.
9. By March 1973, Iraqi oil production had reached 2 million barrels
per day (b/d) of which nearly 1.2 million b/d were from the government's
Kirkuk fields, as sl'own in the following tabulation:
Thousand b/d
Kirkuk (and other
northern fields)
1,274
North Rumaila (and
other small fields)
108
Rumaila and Zubair (BPC)
648
Other
16
Iraq has had no difficulty in exporting its oil from the Kirkukand North
Rumaila fields. Western oil companies take the majority of Iraqi oil. CFP
has a 10-year contract to purchase nearly one-fourth of Kirkuk production;
Royal Dutch Shell is expected to reach agreements later in 1973 for major
oil purchases in 1974 and 1975. The USSR and Eastern Europe will take
about 194,000 b/d during 1973 in partial payment on economic and military
credits.
3. OPEC members are Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
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Favorable Prospects for the Oil Industry
10. With the nationalization issue settled, Iraq is pushing plans for
expanding the oil industry. Output probably will reach 3 million b/d in
1976 and could expand to 4 million b/d by 1980. Projects under way and
planned include (a) further participation by the USSR and Eastern Europe
in North Rumaila production, exploration, and development of other fields,
(b) further investment by BPC in the southern fields, and (c) further
development of existing fields, new exploration, and new pipelines by INOC.
11. Soviet assistance in the North Rumaila fields will bring the output
level up to 370,000 b/d by 1974, with an eventual output of up to
830,000 b/d on completion of the third stage of development. The USSR
is building a pipeline to connect the North Rumaila fields with a 30,000 b/d
refinery at Mosul, also being built with Soviet assistance. A pipeline is to
be built to connect with the 70,000 b/d refinery under construction at
Basrah with Czechoslovak aid. The two new refineries under construction
will nearly double the country's 1972 refining capacity.
12. BPC is to increase output of the Rumaila field to more than
1.6 million b/d by 1976. Investment by BPC in this future expansion could
run as high as $160 million over the next one and one-half years.
13. New exploration and exploitation have been assured by
agreements signed with the French firm ERAP and Brazil's Petrobras. The
latter signed a contract in August 1972 calling for exploration over the
next seven years. ERAP, joinirg recently with a Japanese consortium headed
by Sumitomo Trading Company, has agreed to undertake exploration and
expansion of fields at Abu Ghirab and Bozorgan Hill, as well as other areas,
through 1974. Initial production of these two new fields is to be at a rate
of 160,000 b/d and will be started as soon as the deepwater port near
Fao (see paragraph i4) has been completed. About two-thirds of the
production of these fields probably will go to Japan.
14. INOC has opened bidding for construction of a deepwater port
and oil terminal near Fao a~ Khor-al-Amaja, which will be capable of
handling 300,000-DWT tankers and is to cost around $120 million. The
deepwater terminal will be conned ;d with nearby producing fields by
pipelines that are under consideration by the ERAP-Japanese partnership.
Several other pipeline projects are under consideration, including a
north-south line from Hadithah to Fao, a second line through Syria to the
Mediterranean, and a $400 million line from Kirkuk to a Mediterranean
terminal at Iskendc - un in Turkey, for which a protocol has been signed
(see the Map).
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15. A petrochemical plant with a capacity of 120,000 tons to be
built in Basrah will use gas presently being flared in the southern oilfields.
Agriculture: Unrealized Potential
16. By Middle East standards, Iraq is well endowed with arable land
and water for irrigation. Present agricultural output, however, is far below
potential, yields having increased little if any since the 1958 revolution.
Production of many crops is at best equal to the levels of the 1950s, the
principal exception being the bumper wheat crop of 1972 (see Table 3).
Table 3
Iraq: Production of Major Crops
Thousand Metric Tons
1972
19S7
1961
1970
1971
Preliminary
Wheat
1,120
860
1,240
820
2,460
Barley
1,310
910
680
430
900
Rice
N.A.
70
180
310
320
Dates
N.A.
300
480
300
390
Iraq has become increasingly dependent on imported foodstuffs, and exports
of foodstuffs have never regained the pre-1958 levels. The production of
dates, Iraq's principal export crop, was lower in 1971 than the average
in the 1960s. In value terms, the net deficit on trade in agricultural products
increased from about $20 million in 1958 to more than $200 million in
1971, admittedly a dismal year for Iraqi agriculture. The deficit was
approximately $100 million in 1972. The bumper crops of wheat, barley,
and rice in 1972 suggest the extent to which production could be raised
if the adverse effects of fluctuations in weather could be reduced.
17. Principal constraints on agriculture have been the variability of
rainfall, particularly in the north; the inadequacy of water distribution and
control facilities; excessive salinity from improper drainage; and a shortage
of trained personnel needed to introduce new and improved farming
techniques. Institutional and administrative problems have persisted since
the 1958 revolution. Land redistribution after 1958, for example, quickly
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fell behind schedule because the government was slow in completing
irrigation canals, orppnizing rural education and health facilities, completing
surveys, and identifying suitable farmers. The establishment of cooperatives
in the 1960s faltered because of a shortage of facilities to train cooperative
managers. The government has long recognized the problems but has not
been able to overcome bureaucratic inertia. Experts from the West and from
Communist countries have submitted recommendations to overcome
problems in credit and marketing, seeds and fertilizers, salinity and drainage,
and extension services and rural education. The greatest need, however, is
the accumulation of indigenous skill and experience.
18. Following an austerity budget of $70 million in fiscal year (FY)
1972/73,4 about $200 million has been designated for agriculture in the
FY 1973/74 national budget. Projects that are in being or have been agreed
to include:
? An irrigation project northeast of Baghdad in the Diyala
basin financed jointly with the World Bank.
? New grain storage facilities that will add a total of about
770,000 tons to existing capacity, to be financed in part
by loans from the World Bank, the USSR, and East
Germany.
? Various irrigation projects and water treatment plants.
? A number of small projects to expand the cultivated area
and to raise yields through increased use of fertilizer.
19. Industrial production, excluding oil, increased in 1972 by about
7%, about the same as the average of the past several years. Plants coming
on stream in 1972 included a sulfur recovery plant, a fertilizer plant, a
glass factory, several textile manufacturing plants, and assembly plants for
automobiles, tractors, and agricultural machinery. Some slowdown in public
investment in industry probably occurred late in 1972 to judge from cuts
in the development budget and a reduction in the level of imports. In 1973,
industrial expansion probably has been resumed as a result of the increased
import program and the impetus from the forward movement in the oil
industry.
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20. The government restricts the development of basic industries, such
as the petroleum and related industries, to the public sector.The role of
the private sector is to develop production of light industries - such as
textiles, leather and plastic goods, and foodstuffs - construction materials,
and certain chemicals. To encourage private businesses, the government has
expedited the granting of business licenses, the importing of raw materials
and spare parts, and the expansion of industrial credit by the Iraqi Industrial
Banks Growth in bidustrial output is constrained by deficiencies common
to developing countries - inefficient marketing, transport, and storage; a
shortage of skilled laborers; poor management in public enterprises;
shortages of spare parts and raw materials; and low labor productivity and
rising labor costs.
Defense: Heavy Expenditures
21. The Iraqi military regime, which has been intensely antagonistic
toward Iran, has emphasized defense expenditures to the detriment of
economic development. About half of current expenditures are budgeted
for defense. The defense budget has jumped from $315 million in
FY 1971/72 to $640 million in FY 1973/74. Actual expenditures
probably will be far short of budget levels, reaching perhaps $500 million
in the new fiscal year. Iraq maintains an army of 90,000, an air force of
10,000, and a navy of 2,000 men. Its armed forces are twice as large as
Saudi Arabia's, but less than half of Iran's.
22. Iraq has obtained most of its military equipment from the USSR
and Czechoslovakia. Communist military deliveries from 1958-72 have
totaled $806 million, about 40% in the form of Soviet grants. Deliveries
during 1972 from the USSR were valued at about $80 million and included
equipment for the SA-3 missile system, T-62 tanks, guided missile patrol
boats, MIG-21 jet fighters, helicopters, and ground forces equipment.
Repayments on military debts to the USSR are small - $30 million to
$40 million a year. The total outstanding debt to the USSR on military
aid is less than $100 million.
Government Spending: Temporary Austerity
23. The drop in oil output and the nationalization of IPC facilities
in 1972 threatened a serious decline in revenues. The government reacted
by adopting widespread austerity measures, but the impact was small.
Planned expenditures were cut by nearly one-third to about $1.4 billion,
wifh ordinary expenditures being cut 20% and development expenditures
S. The Iraqi Industrial Bank was set up in 1946 to provide medium-term and long-term loans
to industrial enterprises and short-term loans for working capital. Its capital was increased by $8.5
million in 1971 to $34 million.
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50%. Non-military imports were reduced by 10?%o from the 1971 level.
Import restrictions primarily affected luxury imports. A good harvest
permitted reductions in food imports. imports of raw materials necessary
for industrial production were continued, and ongoing development projects
were not affected.
24. To fill the expected gap in oil revenues, the government issued
new revenue bonds, instituted compulsory savings, and appealed to other
Arab states for aid. Pledge.i of aid from members of the Organization of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)6 amounted to $130 million
by mid-1972. Nonetheless, only about $75 million was actually made
available during the year, and that took the form of short-term loans rather
than grants. Other foreign aid included French loans for 1 120 :pillion and
a $12 million loan from the World Bank for education projects. In the
end, the drop in oil revenues was not so drastic as had been anticipated..
and in any case oil revenues were soon to skyrocket.
25. The FY 1973/74 budget was expanded almost to the point of
extravagance because of the - ettlement with IPC. Spending was set at $2.3
billion, of which about 4011o is to be in the development budget. Of the
money allocated to public investment, 21% is to go for agriculture, 18%
for industry, 15% for construction and services, an,. 13% for transport and
communications. The remainder is to go for investment by the INOC and
other national companies and to meet unforeseen increases in the costs
of projects under way.
Bright Prospects for the Balance of Payments
26. Prospects for an improved balance-of-payments position have been
assured by the settlement with IPC. Annual oil revenues should exceed $2
billion in 1975 while imports probably will be around $1.8 billion. Iraq
experienced a small balance-of-payments deficit in 1970, the first since
1967. A small deficit probably occurred also in 1972. The size of the 1972
deficit was held down by the 10% cut in imports and increased drawings
on external loans.
27. Iraqi foreign exchange reserves have been mounting rapidly since
the end of 1971 -- from $600 million to more than $1 billion as of June
1973. The high level of reserves is due partly to the Iraqi requirement that
the stock of gold and hard currencies be at least 70% of the currency in
circulation. About 56% of the present level of Iraqi reserves thus are
committed. If oil earnings increased as estimated in this memorandum, Iraq
6. O EC members arc Abu Dhabi, Al,oria, Bahrain, Dubai, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
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1. Total on exports less repatriated company profits.
29. As for imports, machinery, transport equipment, and other
manufactured goods made up two-thirds of the total it 1972. The emphasis
on machinery and equipment imports has been increased in the FY 1973/74
import plan as development of transportation and industry are pushed. In
1972 the industrial countries of Western Et',rope supplied more than 40%
of Iraq's imports, the Communist countries le:; than 30%, and the United
States and the Arab countries only small amounts (see Table 4).
Western Commercial Interests in Iraq
30. The industrial non-Communist countries, particularly France and
Japan, are moving rapidly to expand economic relations with Iraq, primarily
to obtain oil supplies for the 1970s. Imports from major Westei n suppliers
in 1972 rose both by value and as a percent of total trade at the expense
of the Soviet Union. Japan's total trade with Iraq climbed from a low of
$16 million in 1968 to $42 million in 1972. France, Japan, and Brazil
are engaged in exploration in the oil sector, and Japan and France are
committed to finance capital expansion in the Iraqi oil industry. Prior to
the IPC settlement, France was the first Western nation to purchase Kirkuk
oil. Furthermore, France made loans to Iraq in 1972 to help offset the
financial impact of nationalization. In addition to participating in the oil
will be guaranteed a comfortable level of foreign exchange reserves over
the next several years. Growing expenditures for development and defense
probably will prevent extraordinarily large accumulations such as those
expected for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi in the remainder of
the decade.
Foreign Trade
28. Oil, of course, dominates Iraq's exports. Non-oil exports,
consisting largely of foodstuffs and cement going to other Arab states, are
small and have been growing at a slow rate, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Million US $
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Net receipts
from oil
exportsl
500
626
630
663
1,030
746
Exports (non.
oil)
62
72
74
76
77
77
Imports
511
483
531
614
737
793
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Iraq: Geographic Distribution
of Imports, .1972
West European countries
Of which:
United Kingdom
France
Italy
West Germany
East European countries
Of which:
Soviet Union
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Non-Communist Asian countries
Of which:
Japan
North American countries
Of which:
United States
Arab countries
China
Other
10
6
5
5
24
industry, Japan has offered a $95 million contract to expand an Iraqi
fertilizer plant at Basrah.
31. The embargo against US goods imposed after the Six-Day War
in 1967 has not been removed. However, Iraq still comes to the United
States for capital goods that cannot be purchased elsewhere. The decline
in the presence of US oil firms resulting from the nationalization of IPC
suggests that US sales of capital goods may decrease. The US oil companies'
share of the remaining BPC oil assets in Iraq is estimated at $25 million.
Future investment by BPC in Iraqi oilfie:ds, forecast at $160 million,
undoubtedly will be translated into some imports from the United States.
Communist Economic Involvement
32. Communist economic aid has been important to Iraq since the
revolution in 1958. The USSR has supplied project aid, tida6e credits, and
technicians to assist in Iraqi dev.topment. Soviet and East European
economic aid irawn by Iraq during 1959-72 totaled nearly $250 million.
Unused credits total three ::mcs this amount. The Soviets have helped
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Baghdad develop oil production at the North Rumaila oilfields, have assisted
in the construction of the Baghdad-Basrah railroad, have provided
agricultural assistance, and have supplied equipment for coin munications
facilities and several light industrial plants. Czechoslovakia has given credits
for in oil refinery at Basrah, which is nearly completed. Poland has provided
railroad tank cars and a sugar refinery. East Germany has extended credit
for i number of industrial and agricultural projects now under construction.
China has extended a $45 million line of credit, but none had been drawn
by Iraq by the middle of 1973.
33. The Communist countries also rallied to the siipport of Iraq at
the time of the IPC nationalization, allowing repayments on outstanding
debt to be made in oil. Outstanding debt to the Communist countries for
economic aid at the end of 1972 was $90 million, annual repayments being
about $18 million. In October 1972, Iraq requested observer status in
CEMA, which would tic Iraqi commerce even closer to that of the
Communists. No action on the request has been taken by CEMA, and the
Iraqis have not pressed the case.
34. Since the IPC settlement, government leaders have implied some
discontent with Iraq's close links with the Communists. Part of this is
window dressing to calm anti-Communist Arab states, which note that the
Iraqis are heavily dependent on they Communists for military training and
servicing of equipment. Part is real. For example, Iraq recently closed the
cultural centers in Baghdad operated by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
and East Germany. The government recently recalled abruptly all Iraqi
students studying in Moscow. The Iraqis also have announced that no further
barter deals will be made that tic Iraqi oil to development projects. The
large increases in oil revenues give Iraq a freedom of choice in making future
economic ties with the highly industrialized countries.
Approved For Release 2006/041s14-IDP85T00875R001700050047-4
 Approved For Release 2006/04/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050047-4
APPENDIX
Iraq: Selected Economic Indicators
GNP (current
prices)
Population
Million US S
Million
persons
1,580
7.6
1,780
7.8
1,960
8.1
2,100
8.4
2,130
8.6
2,330
8.9
2,460
9.2
2 080
9.4
1971
3,320
9.8
1972
(Prelim-
inasy)
3,800
10.1
Per capita
GNP
US S
210
230
240
250
250
260
270
320
340
380
Agricultural
proG ctinn
Wheat
Thousand
metric ton.
870
800
1,000
820
1,030
1,540
1,180
1,240
820
2,460
Barley
950
620
800
830
730
990
960
680
430
900
Rice
170
180
200
180
310
350
320
180
310
320
Dates
420
320
310
280
380
330
260
480
300
390
Livestock
Sheep
Thousand
head
10,820
10,500
11,040
11,850
11,548
11,771
11,994
13,099
12,470
12,720
Goats
2,220
2,080
1,845
1,800
1,877
1,821
1,766
2,301
1,661
1,612
Cattle
1,510
1,540
1,459
1,390
1,790
1,871
1,955
1,689
2,134
2,230
Crude oil
production
Thousand
barrels
per day
1,160
1,255
1,315
1,389
1,227
1,506
1,526
1,567
1,712
1,449
Foreig i trade
Receipts
from oil
exports
Million US S
3701
4001
4201
471
500
626
630
663
1,030
746
Non-oil
exports
57
52
61
73
62
72
74
76
77
77
Imports
380
456
S46
592
511
483
531
614
737
793
Balance
47
-44
-65
-48
51
215
173
125
370
30
Cr.
Approved For Release 2006/04/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001700050047-4