NORTH VIETNAM'S FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700040050-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

 DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam's Food Supply Situation
C I A '*,--
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COPY
DD NOT D'S.ThOY
Secret
ER IM 72-167
December 1972
Copy UQ.,
App /,e,f
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NORTH VIETNAM'S 1700D SUPPLY SITUATION
Summary
1. Resumption of the bombing and escalation of military hostilities
had virtually no immediate effect on North Vietnam's agricultural economy
this year, and total production will probably be average or above. Because
of the lingering effects of the 1971 floods the spring crop in all likelihood
fell short of the previous year's record level; however, the autumn crop
should be a good one, perhaps even above average. Nevertheless, i Torth
Vietnam continues to be a long way from agricultural self-sufficiency, and,
before the spring 1973 harvest, food imports of some 500,000 metric tons
may be needed.
Background
2. Agriculture, the mainstay of North Vietnam's economy, employs
70% of the labor force and accounts for around 50% of national product.
Only 12% of North Vietnam's land area is cultivable, and three-fourths .;`
that is in the Red River delta. About 70% of cultivated acreage is in rice;
20% in secondary crops, mostly corn, sweet potatoes, and manioc; and 10%
in industrial and miscellaneous crops such as cotton, tobacco, sugar, and
oilseeds. The spring harvest, which depends heavily on irrigation, accounts
for about one-third of the yearly rice crop and for practically all other
crops. The larger rice crop is harvested in the autumn. Over the longer
term, the regime looks to the agricultural sector not only for self-sufficiency
in food but also as a source of labor and capital for furthering North
Vietnam's industrialization. For the present, agriculture provides only
85%-90% of national subsistence -food requirements.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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3. Food production increased during the first few years of
Communist rule and peaked at close to 3.9 million tons of milled rice and
rice equivalents' in 1959 (see the table). Average production declined to
a level roughly 10% below the 1959 record in 1960-65 and fell another
5 % by 1968. Imports of some 400,000-600,000 tons annually of rice,
wheat flour, and corn - almost entirely from the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the USSR - were needed merely to keep pace with population
growth. By 1969, however, rice production had begun to recover as a result
of increases in both acreage and yield. This recovery can be attributed in
part to the introduction of high-yield rice varieties. These strains accounted
for a rapidly growing share of the spring crop, from only 17% of planted
acreage in 1969 to about two-thirds in 1972.
Production of Food Crops in North Vietnam
Million Metric Tons
Year
Total
Ricca
Secondary
Cropsb
1959
3.9
3.5
0.4
1960
3.2
2.8
0.4
1961
3.7
3.1
0.6
1962
3.6
3.0
0.6
1963
3.5
2.9
0.6
1964
3.7
3.0
03
1965
3.8
3.1
0.7
1966
3.5
2.8
0.7
1967
3.6
2.8
0.8
1968
3.3
2.6
0.7
1969
3.4
2.7
0.7
1970
3.6
3.0
0.6
1971
3.0-3.1
2.4-2.5
C.6
1972
3.6
3.0
0.6
a. Milled or polished rice.
D. Corn, sweet potatoes, and manioc expressed in rice equivalents.
4. The mediocre performance of North Vietnamese agriculture
during the past decade has stemmed partly from adverse weather
conditions - generally unfavorable weather prevailed during seven of the,
last ten years and nullified a large part of North Vietnam's increased
investment in wat.r control facilities and mechanization as well as its
promotion of better agricultural management and technology. Significant
flooding occurred in 1968, 1969, and again last year. The destructive floods
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in the late summer of 1971 dealt agriculture a particularly severe setback.
About 35%-45% of the autumn rice crop was lost and total production
of milled rice for that year dropped to the range of 2.4 million to
2.5 million tons, the lowest since 1955.
5. The degrading effects of years of war have effectively halted
agricultural development since at least the mid-1960s. More specifically, the
war has forced concentration of efforts on cultivation of food crops at
the expense of industrial and export crops, fishing, and opening up of new
lands. Similarly, the war's competition for resources has limited
opportunities for increased mechanization, fertilizer usage, and irrigation
in agriculture. Although agricultural labor is under-utilized, the withdrawal
of men for military service and related support activities has led to a shortage
of trained cadre and the replacement of male labor with women and
children.
The Situation in 1972
Production
6. continued repair of the pervasive damage to water control
facilities caused by the 1971 floods was the most immediate problem
confronting North Vietnam as the spring rice growing season approached.
At the end of 1971, Premier Pham Van Dong had admitted disappointing
progress in rehabilitating the long stretches of cut irrigation canals, washed
out pumping stations, and silted drainage ditches. Moreover, the prolonged
inundation during the floods probably caused subtle undermining that did
not show until facilities were put to use on the spring crop.
7. Although North Vietnam probably experienced a reasonably good
spring rice crop, the government's claim of a crop equal that of 1971, which
has been estimated to be a record 1.3 million tons milled, is undoubtedly
overstated. In spite of about two-thirds of the crop being planted with
high-yield varieties, the residual effects of the flood damage to fields and
irrigation facilities and the heavy burdens placed on a peasantry charged
no. only with normal cultivation tasks but also with supplying most of
the manpower for flood repairs certainly limited output. Secondary crops,
most of which are harvested in the spring, were likely reduced by the same
factors. It is significant, however, that during the course of the spring season
there were no public warnings of impending crop difficulties or possible
food shortages, despite increased military activity and curtailed imports.
8. Unquestionably, the greatest concern after the spring harvest was
that the upcoming rainy season precipitation could lead to a repeat of the
disastrous 1971 floods with severe damage to the important autumn rice
crop. The North Vietnamese press stated explicitly in July that the dikes
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were completely repaired and could withstand a flood of last year's
magnitude. Apparently, however, Hanoi was still unsure of the quality of
repairs or US intentions and seized on events to launch a propaganda
campaign accusing the United States of deliberately bombing the country's
dike system. Allegations of damage to all types of water control facilities
grew in intensity as the rainy season progressed. At the end of July, Hanoi
claimed about 170 instances of cumulative dike damage, and this number
had grown to 206 by the end of August.*
9. The fear that US bombing of the dike system or poor quality
repairs would combine with rains to cause widespread flooding was not
borne out. Rainfall was only moderate, and river levels were well below
the heights reached during last year's floods. Minor flooding - to the extent
that paddy levies were intermittently submerged - was noted in several
areas of the delta, but this condition is an annual occurrence caused mainly
by localized rainfall and poor drainage. Available photography. indicates that
none of the flooding could be attributed to bomb damage.
10. The autumn harvest is now substantially completed and should
be good. There have been no indications that the bombing caused any labor
shortages. The non-agricultural manpower displaced by the bombing was
probably made available for agricultural work, in addition to transport,
communications, and bomb-da; iage repair. Field preparation, planting, and
transplanting took place on schedule, and few problems with insects and
disease developed. Alternatively, however, no pronouncements touted
greatly expanded planted area, higher than normal yields, or expectat. -s
of unusually high production. On the basis of analogy with past conditions,
indirect evidence, and judgment, this year's total food production -- both
spring and autumn harvests - appears comparable with that of 1970, a
year considered to be "normal" - that is, production will probably amount
to some 3.6 million tons of rice equivalents.
Food Availabilities
11. From all signs, food supply to the consumer has been a.' quate
this year. Rice available for food use from the spring harvest was apparently
sufficient for consumption up to the autumn harvest. The average grain
ration - 13.5 kilograms monthly - was unchanged, although at one point
the non-rice share of the ration was temporarily increased from 30% to
25X1 50%. Markets in general remained well stocked throughout the year.
I Ireported sporadic shortages of particular foods, but these
shortages were attributed to distribution problems rather than lack of
domestic stocks.
* Since the resumption of the bombing, photography has confirmed damage to water
25X1 control facilities in some 60 instances and repair of damage in at least 26 of these
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12. One solid reason for the satisfactory dk,t:ibution situation has
been a tightening of government control over harvested rice. The government
traditionally has maintained centralized state reserves and also has stored
at the cooperatives the food collected from them as the quota due to the
state. After the bombing resumed, Hanoi reacted quickly to funnel as much
rice as possible from the spring mop into government-controlled distribution
channels. In the cooperatives, adherence to individual ration levels was
stressed, and patriotic appeals urged that surpluses beyond the normal
production obligations be sold to the state. Debt collection in the form
of grains owed the government was stepped up and warnings were
continuously issued against excessive consumption, profiteering, or abuses
of the rationing system.
13. The amount of foodstuffs available from domestic supplies for
both consumption and stock maintenance has also been augmented through
very large imports this past: year, despite the US interdiction program. In
the six months or so prior to the mining, North Vietnam imported record
amounts of grain from the USSR and the PRC. Since the mining, a little
more than 100,000 tons of foodstuffs, mostly grains, may have been
delivered, using mainly road and rail routes from China. Some sea shipments
offloaded to lighters at anchorages along the North Vietnamese panhandle
were also in evidence.
Outlook
14. Agriculture has suffered no significant physical damage from the
bombing and, hence, will not require a period of reconstruction, as is the
prospect for other sectors of the economy. The most important immediate
requirement will be for food imports to carry over to the next harvest,
a requirement that, as in the past, is likely to be adequately filled by the
USSR and the PRC. Food availabilities from the autumn crop should be
sufficient for about five month's consumption; some 400,000-500,000 tons
of imports will be needed before the next spring harvest, but this amount
is not unusually large. If the current rate of imports continues through
the winter, the required level can be easily reached.
15. Attainment of Hanoi's long-term objective in achieving
self-sufficiency in food production will depend mainly on more intensive
cultivation of relatively fixed arable acreage. This, in turn, will require
further considerable investment in mechanization, fertilizer manufacture,
and water control facilities and, above all, a sustained period of good
weather. A return to more normal trade patterns in the future will provide
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an opportunity for greater imports of goods needed for agricultural
development. At the outset, these imports will likely consist of chemical
fertilizers, and possibly insecticides, that will be needed to maximize the
output of the high-yield rice strains which will certainly be a major part
of the 1973 spring crop. Domestic chemical fertilizer production has no
doubt declined since last May, and identified imports this year have been
running at about one-sixth of last year's level.
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