OUTLOOK FOR THE 1972 SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700040007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Outlook for the 1972 Soviet Grain Harvest
Odemiai
C
on
ER im 72-124
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
19
2
7
August
FILE COPS Copy No. 10 8
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
OUTLOOK FOR THE 1972 SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST
Introduction
1. This memorandum summarizes the development of the 1972
Soviet grain crop and offers a preliminary estimate of its size. The
implications of the harvest for the livestock program and Soviet imports
of grain are then explored.
2. Because of a combination of winterkill and drought, the
preliminary estimate of 1972 Soviet grain prospects is for a decline in. the
crop to about 135 million metric tons of usable grain, 13 million tons
less than the 1971 harvest. To stave off the consequences of this shortfall,
the USSR has already bought more than 20 million tons of grain from
the West for delivery in fiscal year (FY) 1973, up 12 million tons over
imports of the previous year.
3. Following the loss of one-third of its winter grain crop to a
January cold /ave, the USSR mounted a successful drive to replant spring
grains on the areas of winterkill and to extend the total area sown to grains.
Hopes of at least maintaining the harvest at the 1971 level of 148 minion
tons, however, were destroyed by insufficient soil moisture in some of the
major grain regions at the beginning and during the early part of the growing
season. High temperatures and untimely and heavy rains during the harvest
of early maturing grains contributed to a sharp decline in production in
the Ukraine; North Caucasus, and the Volga Basin.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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4. Even with the importation of 20 million tons of grain the Soviet
Union will be hard pressed to meet domestic needs and, at the same time,
to continue supplying its client states at the average level of recent years.
The surge in the use of grain as livestock feed in the campaign to alleviate
domestic meat shortages is expected to continue. Finally, because of
drawdown of wheat stocks for use as feed, carryover stocks of wheat suitable
for consumption as food are believed to be at a minimum.
Background
S. The USSR harvested 150 million tons of usable grain in 1970
and 14f; -11Non tons in 1971.(1) Although these were the two best crops
in Soviet history, they were not enough to support the livestock program
which has been so insistently advanced by Party Chairman Brezhnev and
other Soviet leaders. To fill the gap between domestic production and total
requirements for food, livestock feed, and exports to client states, the Soviet
Union has been purchasing large quantities of grain over the past fiscal
year. The USSR had apparently decided to seek additional supplies of grain
from the West on a long-term basis before a combination of severe cold
and sparse snow cover threatened the 1972 winter grain crop. By February
of this year the Soviet Union had arranged to buy 3.5 million tons of
grain from Canada for delivery in FY 1973. The commitment in May to
purchase $20G million of grain - about 3.5 million tons - from the United
States in.FY 1973 as part of the recently concluded 3-year grain sale seemed
to reflect a decision to ensure an adequate supply of livestock feed until
the USSR could boost its own grain output decisively.
6. In July and early August, however, after Soviet officials were in
a better position to appraise the 1972 grain crop, the USSR negotiated
further purchases of unprecedented quantities of grain from US companies.
These new contracts. taken together with additional orders for Canadian
and French grain, place total purchases for FY 1973 at more than
20 million tons (compared with 8 million tons in FY 1972) and will require
hard currency outlays - cash and credits - of more than $1.2 billion
(compared with $500 million in FY 1972). The Soviet decision to import
grain in this volume, reflects a serious shortfall in bread grain production
in 1972 and a continuation of the strong upward trend in the use of grain
as livestock feed, coupled with t minimum level of carryover stocks of
grain from previous harvests.
1. For a definition of usable grain, see Table 2.
(~ N j~EN^1~IA
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The Area Sown to Grains
7. In the fall of 1971, about 35 million hectares of winter grains
were sown, some 4.5 million hectares less than the average in the preceding
five years. These fall-sown grains - mostly winter wheat and rye - usually
supply more than 30% of all production. As the winter progressed, evidence
accumulated that the winter grains had suffered extensive winterkill. The
USSR's mid-year plan fulfillment report pinpoints the loss at nearly
one-third of the area planted in the fall, or 8 million hectares more than
last year's loss (see Figure 1). A good deal of the remaining winter grain
area, moreover, was substandard in terms of expected yields. To compensate
for the damage incurred by the winter grains, the USSR. seeded 11.3 million
hectarez more in spring grains than in 1971 (see Table 1) which, when
combined with losses of fall-sown crops, provided a net gain of 3.3 million
hectares in total grain acreage over 1971. Even with this expansion in total
acreage, however, the Soviet leadership knew that to prevent a drop in
grain production in 1972, yields in the spring grain areas would have to
be better than in 1970 or 1971, two of the best years on record. Given
average yields for spring and winter grains, it requires an increase of
1.5 hectares sown to spring grains to overcome the loss in production from
I hectare of winter grains.
8. In order to compensate in part for these differences in yields
between winter and spring grains, Soviet planners changed the composition
of spring sowings. Instead of attempting to increase the spring wheat area
to offset the losses of winter bread grains (wheat and rye), the USSR planted
more feed grains (barley, oats, and corn) which have higher yields than
spring wheat. The Soviet strategy in overcoming the losses of last winter
compared with the reactions to the comparable winterkill in 1969 indicates
how agricultural priorities have changed. In 1969 the spring wheat was
increased by about 4 million hectares; this year the increase was less than
a million hectares. The Soviet Union probably chose to emphasize the higher
yielding - but lower value - feed grains this year because the demands
of the livestock program for ever-increasing supplies of grain could not be
deferred for the sake of preventing a fall in the production of bread grains.
Crop-Development Through Early July(2)
9. In the European USSR, unusually warm weather accelerated the
spring sowing schedule by about two weeks, while in the important spring
grain areas of West Siberia and Kazakhstan (the "New Lands") seeding was
delayed somewhat but not past the usual planting period. The growing
2. The progress of the grain crop is described in greater detail in the Appendix.
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Table 1
USSR:
Comparison of Potential Grain Harvest Areas a/
Million Hectares
Winter Grains
Spring Grains
All Grains
Of Which:
Total
Total
RVe
Total
Wheat
Corn
Barley
Oats
_
1971
119.0
31.6
20.7 9.5
87.4
43.9
3.3
20.5
9.7
1972
122.3
23.6
14.7 8.1
98.7
44.8-
5.1
25.1
12.2
Net change
3.3
-8.0
-6.0 -1.4
11.3
0.9
1.8
4.6
2.5
a. Because the estimated area is given as of 1 July, it is net of winterkill
in the winter grain areas. The mid-year reports usually show a slightly larger
sown area than do the final statistical repo:-ts because about 1% to 2% of the
standing crop at mid-year is not harvested in late summer and early fall.
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History of Winterk@Il in the Soviet Union
Million
hoctaros
1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970
"Sown in the preceding fall for harvest in the given year.
"Also includes a fe.v million hectares of fall sown grains used as green
Area of Winter Grain Lost to Winterkill
% ?6
1955
8
1963
3.956
21
1964
.1957
8
1965
1958
6
1966
1959
8
1967
1961
8
1989
1962
8
1970
25
16
17
17
18
35
.20
Averaae 1955-60 12
Average 1961-65 15
Average 1966-70 22
1971 13
1972
Figure 1
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CONFIDENTIAL
season began badly from another standpoint, however. Much of the
European USSR had below-normal supplies of soil moisture. In Kazakhstan
and Siberia, soil moisture reserves were about the same as in the good crop
years of 1970 and 1971.
10. Weather conditions have foreclosed the prospects for average or
above-average grain yields in the major grain regions in the Ukraine, the
North Caucasus, and along the Volga. Rainfall has been below normal in
many regions and less than the average of 1970-71 in almost all of the
USSR's grain districts (see Figure 2). The shortfall was greatest in the winter
grain areas of the Ukraine and in the spring grain belt extending from the
west bank of the "olga through the western part of Kazakhstan. In the
eastern and southern regions of the Ukraine, the Lower and Middle Volga,
and the Northeast, Caucasus, soil moisture levels at the end of June were
below or close to the lowest levels reached during the past decade.
Meanwhile, highcr-than-normal temperatures were speeding the development
of the grain crop, particularly in the Ukraine and North Caucasus. In some
of these areas, extreme temperatures combined with a lack of rain prevented
the normal development of the grain kernels.
11. When harvesting began in early July, the USSR had to deal with
some special problems which threatened to reduce the crop. The warm
weather advanced the maturation of some of the spring grains - particularly
barley - to the extent that it ripened at the same time !As the winter grains
in many regions. The difficulties presented by the expansion of the usual
harvest area were compounded by the effects of a rash of heavy rains which
flattened and tangled the grain, making it hard to cut and increasing the
likelihood of larger than usual harvest losses.
Preliminary Estimate of the 1972 Grain Harvest
12. The 1972 grain crop can be projected on the basis of the sown
area and the analysis of the development of the crop since March. The
projection is stated in terms of usable grain: the differences between the
official Soviet measure of gross production and usable grain are shown in
Table 2. The estimate, of course, is preliminary since the final outcome
of the spring grain harvest will depend partly on the weather in August
and September.
13. Soviet winter grains production is tentatively estimated at 28
million tons, or 24 million tons less than the 1971 crop and 13 million
tons less than the 1966-70 average (see Table 3). On the basis of the rainfall
and temperature so far, yields of spri!ig grains should be down appreciably
in the Volga and Urals regions and off somewhat from last year's mark
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Table 2
Grain Production in the USSR a/
Million Metric Tons
Official Claims of Estimate of /
Gross Production Net Production b
AVERAGE, 1956-60 121 105
1961 131 110
1962 140 109
1963 108 92
1964 152 120
1965 121 100
AVERAGE, 1961-65 130 ' 106
1966 171 140
1967 148 122
1968 170 135
1969 162 128
1970 187 150
AVERAGE, 1966-70 168
135
1971 181 148
1972 (plan) 190 (forecast) 132-137
a. Inclu ing pulses.
b. Estimate of usable grain. Tlet usable grain is
estimated as the officially claimed gross output minus
excess moisture, unripe and damaged kernels, weed seeds
and other extraneous materials, post-harvest losses
incurred in loading and unloading grain, between the
grain harvesting combine and storage facilities, and
suspected biases in the official reporting of grain
production.
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Figure 2
Precipitation in Major Grain Growing Regions in May-June 1972
as Percent of Average May-June Precipitation in 1970-71*
Odessa
r)J\i
NORTH
. Krasnodar
>95%
-- Economic Region
Boundary
Q