INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS SERIES SOUTH ASIA: A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF ILLICIT OPIUM FOR US MARKET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: June 25, 1972
• Content Type: IM

Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011 /01 /18
CIA-RDP85T00875R0017000
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/01/18:
CIA-RDP85T00875R0017000
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1 2~.
Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
International Narcotics Series
South Asia: A. Potential Source
of Illicit Opium for the US Market
Confidential
ER IM 72-105
28 June 1972
copy N2 587
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
E,dud,d Iron, auiommlc
dawngroding and
dndauifmiion
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 June 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SOUTH ASIA: A POTENTIAL SOURCE
OF ILLICIT OPIUM FOR THE US MARKET
Summary and Conclusions
1. Turkey, now the most important source of opium to be processed
into heroin for the US market, has prohibited all opium poppy cultivation
following the 1972 harvest. This development comes at a time when Iran
is increasing its domestic licit opium output to meet more fully the needs
of its large and growing addict population. Iran now has about 100,000
addicts and users in its registered addict program, but an estimated
additional 300,000 who remain outside the program must depend on illi"it
opium imports, which come mostly from South Asian poppy fields. As
Iran becomes self-sufficient, substantial quantities of illicit South Asian
opium could become available for distribution outside the region, and this
at roughly the same time that Western traffickers are apt to be seeking,
wi ether in South Asia or elsewhere, replacements for their Turkish supplies.
2. While tribal producers in Afghanistan and Pakistan undoubtedly
would be willing to sell to Western traffickers, they probably would not
actively seek a replacement market for opium by themselves. Nevertheless,
the potential for substantial diversions of opium westward exists, and the
estimated 100-300 tons currently being snuggled into Iran that could
become available exceeds the total amount of opium equivalent needed to
supply the US market. Laxities in law enforcement in South Asia would
offer a distinct advantage to international traffickers if they should decide
to tap the South Asian opium market.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
CONFIDENTIAL
The Scenario
3. A minimum of 2,500 metric tons of licit and illicit opium was
produced worldwide in 1971. Close to half was grown in India, Pakistan,
and Afghanistan, making South Asia the world's leading opium producing
region. About 25% of South Asia's total output is illicit - either diversions
from licensed poppy fields in India and Pakistan or illegal cultivation in
the remote tribal regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Illicit opium produced
in South Asia has thus not particularly interested major international
traffickers, because they have been able to obtain better-quality Turkish
opium. Moreover, the demand for South Asian opium in Iran was sufficient
to preclude South Asian producers from developing markets outside the
region. Consequently, no significant amounts of South Asian illicit opium
are known to have entered international trafficking channels westward, to
Europe or the United States.
4. South Asia's relative isolation from international opium trafficking
circles could change soon, however, because of recent developments in the
Middle East. Ankara has announced that all licit production will cease
following this year's poppy harvest. Turkey traditionally has been the most
important source of the opium processed into heroin for the US and the
smaller West European markets. Although estimates range considerably,
there appears to have been a significant drop in Turkish opium production
since 1967. The estimated 34-79 tons of illicit opium available for sale
in 1971 was only about 25% of the tonnage available in 1967, as shown
in the foliowing tabulation.
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Estimated Total
Production
Available to the
Illicit Market
240-350
150-260
225-300
100-175
135-250
8-123
120-220
60-160
180-225
34-79
The apparent squeeze on illicit production reflects the reduction in growing
area and increased government opium collection efforts. In 1967, only 90
2 CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
CONFIDENTIAL
tons of opium reportedly harvested from poppies planted on 20,600 hectares
of land was sold to government collectives. By 1971, however, despite a
drop to only 13,400 hectares, farmers turned over about 150 tons of opium
to the government.
5. Other factors probably have also contributed to the drop in illicit
output in Turkey. The government increased its efforts to monitor the
poppy crop, and between 1967 and 1971 the number of provinces with
legal opium production dropped from 21 to only seven. In addition,
increased export prices allowed the government to pay the farmers more.
Perhaps a more important factor has been an apparent decline in opium
smuggled to Iran. In 1969, Turkey reportedly supplied about half of Iran's
illicit opium imports. Intensified control and increased cooperation between
Turkey and Iran since then, however, has led to a dramatic decline in this
trade. The flow last year probably was no more than 30 tons, compared
with perhaps 120 tons in 1969.
6. The apparent drop in illicit imports from Turkey occurred as Iran
was instituting a registered addict program and resuming licit opium
production. Iran, as is the United States, is a narcotics victim country with
a large and growing addict and user population. In 1969, Tehran ended
a 14-year hiatus of domestic opium production because of its inability to
prevent illicit narcotics imports from neighboring countries and hence to
identify and eventually eliminate its large addict population. Although
precise figures on addiction are lacking, it is estimated that there were
upwards of 350,000 narcotics addicts and users in Iran at the outset of
1969. Virtually all of these addicts relied on between 120 and 360 tons
of illicit imports to meet their opium needs.
7. Since 1969, licit opium production in Iran has increased rapidly,
from 8 tons initially to 156 tons in 1971. The Shah has increased addict
registrations along with domestic production. At the outset of 1972 there
were about 90,000 addicts and users registered in the government programs,
triple the 1969 level. Even so, this represented less than 25% of the tota:
suspected addict and user population. This year, Iran anticipates a 217-ton
opium harvest and a 30,000 increase in the number of registrants. On the
basis of these trends in output and registration, it appears likely that Iran
will decide to continue expanding its present program to supply all or most
of its narcotics using population. Indeed, with licit domestic output rising
to more than 200 tons this year, Iran will have an opium surplus unless
greater numbers are added to the addict program. At present the
government's registration program essentially is restricted to those aged 60
years and older.
CONFIDENTIAL 3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
.CONFIDENTIAL
Impact on South Asian Producers
8. Resumption of licit production in Iran and expansion of the
registration program apparently has led to a drop in illicit imports. Estimated
imports in 1971 likely ranged between 100 and 300 tons - a slight drop
from 1969. While overall illicit demand for opium in Iran probably fell,
declines in illicit opium production in Turkey, accompanied by increased
security along its common border with Iran, probably has forced local
narcotics addicts and users to rely on South Asia f r most of their illicit
needs. Statistics on opium seizures along Iran's bu:ders suggests that a
dramatic shift in trafficking has taken place. In 1969, Iranian opium seizures
were divided about equally between its Afghan and Turkish borders. In
1970, however, only 5% of the total quantity seized was along the Turkish
border, with most of the remainder occurring in provinces adjacent to
Afghanistan. In Khorassan Province bordering on Afghanistan, for example,
seizures nearly doubled in 1970 from the previous year. Partial data on
seizures in 1971 and early 1972 suggest that most seizures continue to
occur along the Afghan border.
9. If seizures are indicative of trafficking patterns and if Iranian
consumption estimates are valid, then it appears that opium production
in Afghanistan and Pakistan may have risen sharply since 1969. The lack
of creditable information on land planted to poppy in illicit producing areas
precludes quantification of this increase. Nevertheless,
opium poppy cultivation indeed was on the rise in Afghanistan
in 1971. In 1969, Turkey probably was supplying about half of the average
of 240 tons of illicit opium imported into Iran, and Afghanistan plus
Pakistan were supplying a roughly equal amount. By 1971, however, Iran's
average illicit opium import requirement may have dropped to slightly less
than 200 tuns, with Turkey contributing about 30 tons or less, leaving
the remainder to be supplied by Afghanistan and akis; _n. This implies
an increase of as much as 40% in opium supplies from Afghanistan and
Pakistan in the two-year period.
10. An increase in bazaar prices for opium in Pakistan supports this
implication. In late 1971 tho bazaar price 'was about 420 rupees per
kilogram, almost uouble the price quoted for illicit opium in Islamabad's
1969 report to the United Nations. There was a similar price behavior in
the late 1950s' after Tehran abolished domestic production. This was
followed by a drop in price as local producers increased their opium output
to meet the demand.
11. As much as 360 tons of illicit opium may be currently produced
in South Asia's poppy fields, three-fourths u. it in the tribal regions of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most tribal opium is available for illicit export
4 CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
'CONFIDENTIAL
because domestic use is small - being confined largely to medical and
quasi-medical use in rural areas and to addicts in the cities. Opium usage
reportedly has increased somewhat in Afghanistan as rural peasants, lacking
adequate food supplies because of recent droughts, have resorted to chewing
opium guru to ease hunger pains. Almost all the illicit export traffic follows
land routes through Afghanistan to Iran, but some opium also may be moved
by sea from Pakistan or even India.
12. Indian opium traffickers, unlike their counterparts in Afgahnistan
and Pakistan, are not known to be involved in opium activities outside
their borders in any significant degree. The 100 tons or so produced illicitly
is aimed at domestic consumers
some opium, perhaps 5 tons or so, are smuggled to Ceylon from India
annually, and additional small amounts probably are smuggled into Pakistan.
Nevertheless, illicit consumption in India depends essentially on domestic
illicit production in the form of diversions from licit production and some
surreptitious cultivation in unauthorized areas. The withdrawal of Turkey
from the illicit world market could precipitate a more active interest in
Indian opium by international traffickers. The quality of Indian opium is
better than that produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in other
illicit producing areas. The Indians, however, pride themselves on their
extensive security and control system. The 100 tons of illicit opium that
may be produced currently in India represents about 10% of licit output.
It is unlikely that significantly larger amounts could be diverted without
official collusion.
P; ospects for South Asian Opium Diversions Westward
13. Whether or not substantial quantities of South Asian opium are
diverted to the United States and Western Europe will depend, in the final
analysis, on the Western traffickers. The traffickers' decision to seek new
sources outside Turkey hinges to some degree on the situation in Turkey.
They will still be able to draw on illicit output from the 1972 harvest
to meet their immediate needs. There is also the possibility that large illegal
stocks of opium gum and morphine base are stored in Turkey. The large
network of Turkish smugglers that collect, and in some cases, process and
smuggle the opium out of the country undoubtedly will continue to operate
until opium is no longer available. Beyond this, traffickers may also seek
to exploit or develop opium sources in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia,
and Latin America.
14. There are some factors, however, that might lead the traffickers
to seek illicit South Asian opium. Although South Asian opium is of lower
quality than opium produced in Turkey and India, the morphine content
of some illicit opium in Afghanistar, and Pakistan is as high as 10% and
CONFIDENTIAL s
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1
CONFIDENTIAL
certainly compares favoiably with that produced in Southeast Asia's
"Golden Triangle." In addition, substantially greater quantities of illicit
South Asia opium, upwards of 270 tons, could become available if Iranian
demand ends. In comparison, of the 700 tons or more of illicit opium
produced in Southeast Asia in 1971, 600 tons or so was consumed by
addicts and users in the region and only 100 tons probably was available
for distribution outside the region. The trafficking in Southeast Asia is
already well established, and Western traffickers, if they are not already
active in the region, probably would have to cooperate in terms of sharing
operations and profits with established interests. It is not certain that
Chinese traffickers currently in the business in Southeast Asia are willing
to share the trade. Laxities in law enforcement in Afghanistan and Pakistan
appear to offer a trafficker easier access to tribal producers than in Southeast
Asia, at least to the extent that penalties for narcotics violations are minimal.
In Afghanistan, for example, not a single Afghan has been arrested for opium
production or trafficking in the, past year. The few foreigners who have
been arrested for narcotics violations - use of narcotic drugs in the country
or trafficking in hashish - have been given minimal fines and allowed to
go on their way.
15. Finally, the existing hashish network in Afghanistan and Pakistan
could be used to send substantial quantities of opium westward. Hashish
trafficking in Afghanistan, for example, reportedly has become more
professional and sophisticated in recent years, and these distribution
channels could be used for illicit opium shipments fairly easily. Tourists
and other travelers carry or send contraband hashish to Europe and North
America when they leave the area, but most of the tonnage smuggled is
sent concealed in commercial cargoes by professionals - Afghans and
Pakistanis as well as Westerners.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030105-1