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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030097-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: June 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Q c. O,GO-r
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnamese Armor
Secret
ER IM 72-9 7
June` X19 7 2
Copy No. 81
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~~AI~.NING
This document contains information ailecting the naiional
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and ; 9 ~, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
onour t
Exdvdcd Irom ouiomatle
downgrnding and
Jeclmrif mlian
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMOR
Background
1. During the 1971 /72 dry season, Hanoi has deployed to South
Vietnam the largest concentration of armor committed to the war. 1 ~ The
usr, of tanks outside of North Vietnam prior to 1971 was limited to units
of battalion size or less. The first use of tanks by the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) in South Vietnam was in support of a ground assault against
Lang Vei, Quang Tri Province, in February 1968. Tanks were again used
against Ben Het in Kontum Province in March 1969.
2. During Operation Lam Son 7'.9 it southern Laos in the spring
of 1971, the NVA apparently committed at least one and possibly two
armor regiments, although only two battalions were specifically identified
in the fighting.
~ two armor regiments were destined for
South Vietnam (one to $-3 Front and one to COSVN) in early 1971. These
1. In addition to the armor used against South Vietnamese forces, the North
Vietnamese Army has used a fern tailcs in northern Laos primarily icy the Plauie des
Jarres area acid in the Laotian Panhandle against P.oyal Lao Government Forces. In
northern Laos the DArmor Battalion probably has no more than 15 tanks at the
present time..T,n the Laotian Panhandle, some .(8 tanks ai~e reported to be curren~iy
committed against friendly forces in the Bolovens Plateau area. These tanks may have
been left in sruihern Laos after Lam Son 719 by the DArmor Battalion, which
apparently returned to North Vietnam after the fighting to be refurbished. Currently,
*a,. - --
dry season to the B-3 Front. In addition to Laos, a large number of tank?sightings
have been made in Cambodia over the past few months, primarily- along the lines of
communication running south from Laos and in Kompong Cham Province, where
CUSVN's major units prepared for the current offensive. Recent evidence indicates that
Communist forces are training with tanks west of the Mekong near Kratie. The current
number of tanks in Laos and Cambodia is estimated to be at Ieast 50.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within CIA.
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two units were diverted, however, to fighting in Operation Lam Son 719,
after which they were further delayed from proceeding south by the rainy
season and possibly by mechanical difficulties. They finally deployed to
their origir_al destinations during the current dry season. In additie~~t, at
least two more armor regiments ave deployed
into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces of Military Region (MR; 1, and
it is possible that the remaining identified regiment h4a also
deployed there.
Organization
3. The North Vietnamese Armor Commend was formed in June 1955
in the Hanoi area and consisted of a headquarters and the
Armor Regiments, with a complement of about 3,500 men. Since then this
command has grown to at least five armor regiments or equivalents,
including the four currently known to be operating in South Vietnam. We
e;~timate the total strength of the Armor Command is about 10,000 men.
4. Little detailed information is available on the structure,, manning
levels, and activities of armor units in Noi i:t~ Vietnam. To date, only three
a~~mor regiments have been clearly identified
We have been unable
to detect the creation, structure, or activities of armoi units except from
pri;~oners and ralliers. According to one rallier, about 200 NVA cadre
underwent armor training in China and the YJSSR prior to the forii?ation
off an NVA armor capability, but there is scant evidence on the volume
of tank deliveries to North Vietnam.~2~
5. We are uncertain when the expansion of the Armor Command
was started, but a decisio,~ to build a sizable a~tmor capability probabl
was made some time after the offensives of 1 ?.58.
t is also clear that there was some
fiirther buildup in armor in 1971 after the losses sustained during Lam
Son 719.
6. In North Vietnam, an armor regiment generally has three
battalions with an authorized inventory of about 35 tanks per batt2lion.
The battalions that deployed to South Vietnam this dry season, however,
arrived with somewhat fewer than 35 tank, per battalion because c~.? losses
i;i transit resulting from terrain, maintenance difficulties, and air sF.~kes.
2. There is no information on either seaborne or overland delivery of tanks to North
Vietnam except from interrogation reports.
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indicate that each of the battalions of their units had
32 and 24 tanks, respectively. In addition, a prisoner
suggests that his battalion may have had as many as 40
tanks in December ~ 1971, prior to its infiltration. Because of losses incurred
en route, however, the unit arrived in South Vietnam in May with only
about 32 tanks.
Inventory
7. On the basis of order of battle information obtained since the
end of March 1572, we estimate that at the start of the current offensive
the NVA had more than SUO and possibly as many as 700 tanks.~4~ An
estimate made before most of the current information became available -
a~id now out of date -provides the only breakdown by type of tanks,
as follows:
Type of
Tank
Number
PT-76 90
- 100
T-34
130
- 145
T-54
190
- 215
T-63
30
8. Recently acquired information permits an expansion of this list.
.^.?.riat photography of T-63s near Dong Ha and in nort:~ern Laos s~~ggests
a substantial inventory of this vehicle, and a Chinese-made T-59 was
3. From the prisoner's general description of the type of tanks in his unit, three
of the 36 a.~e probably the ZSU-57-2 tracked vehicle, a twin 57-mm self-propelled
automatic antiaircraft gun carrier. Such vehicles were first identified in South Vietnam
by Forward Air Controllers in Kontum Province in April. Subsequently, aZSU-57-2
was captured at An Loc in Binh long Province.
4. This estimate includes tanks in units and stocks.
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captured in Quajtg Tri Province in April 1972.
reported that China supplied 3U T-63 and an unknown number of T-59
tanks to Nerth Vietnam a~ early as 1968.
_
however the raptured T-59
d~.rring 1970.
was produced
9. The NVA tanks currently being usEd in South Vietnam are awned
as follows:
Type of Tank Armament
PT-76 (Soviet amphibious) 76-mm gun
T-63 (Chinese amphibious) 8:~-mm gun
T-34 (Soviet) 85-mm gun
T-54 (soviet) 100-mm bun
T-5? (t;hinese) 100-mm gun
1972 Spring Offensive
10. The NVA initially deployed 320 to 400 tanks to South Vietnam
for the current offensive. The large scale use of armor during tale current
offensive reflects a Ni.=*h Vietnamese adaptation of arr:or tactics ?hat were
used successfully in Operation Lam Son 719 in early 197 i . In that
campaign, armor ~~vvs used to obtain increased firepower and a shock effect.
The enemy's use of tanks this dry season, however, has not been without
problems. NVA commanders have not consistently and effectively
coordinated infantry cover for their 'arks. Furthermore, Allied tactical air
support and the improved use of the M-72 antitank weapon by South
Vietnamese forces have tender: to reduce the effectiveness of NVA armor.
Finally, the NVA has had problems in getting all the armor to planned
areas of employment on a timely basis.
11. Testimony suggests that at least the .latter stages
of the expansion o t e Armor Command were poorly planned and
inadequate provision was made for training. One prisoner
stated that a number of troops in his battalion were
ma equate y trained and poorly motivated. He added that some
replacements received prior to infiltration were former deserters and .that
others were new recruits who had received only two months of basic
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infantry training. Of the some 3A officers in the unit, only about half had
received extensive tank training. In addition, there was a sliortag~ of
non-commissioned officers with armor training. 1!Iorcover, only 60 of the
approximately 175 men of his battalion ~~/ere classified as veteran
non-commissioned officers and soldiers with trai;7in~ in armor, but none
had evex had combat experience with an armored unit. These factors plus
the low level of morale of the troops seriously affecte9 the combat readiness
of the battalion at the time of its infiltrati~_,. A se.^,o,id pri~o;ier captured
indicated that no one from his unit, which
was involved in attacks on Fire Support Base (FSB) November, had ever
received field training in coordinating the movement of tanks with infantry
units.
Military Region 1
12. The North Vietnamese have deployed
DArmor Regiments to Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces during
the current offensive. These regiments, combined with a large amount of
artillery, have provided North Vietnamese ground forces in MR 1 with the
highest level of firepower ever attained by the NVA during the war. The
estimated to have originally deployed with a total
of some 165 to 200 tanks, including T-54s, T-59s, and T-63s, which are
being used in South Vietnam for the first time. In addition, there also
area .large i;umber of tanks in the A Shau area -probably around 25
tanks (a battalion-size group), although there, could be as many as 50 tanks
there. Although their subordination is unknown, these tanks are reportedly
to be used in support of the0 Civision, which is targeted against friendly
FSBs west of Hue City and against Hue City itself. Moreover, a small numr~er
of enemy tanks, including T-63s, also have been reported recently in Quang
Nam and Chiang Tin Provinces and ma;~ possibly be from the armor group
identified in A Shau.
13. The continued substantial presence of NVA tanks in MR 1 in
the face of heary losses (see paragraphs 18-20, below) suggests that
additional tanks have been deployed to the area during the offensive. We
as yet do .not know, however, whether these additional tanks are from the
Armor Regiment, w>,ich was being held in reserve in north Vietnam,
or from a replacement pool,.
Military Region 2
14. Since early 1969, NVA tanks have been used on a limited scale
in the B-3 Front area of MR 2 against remote FSBs. These tanks probably
belonged to the 0 Battalion of theDArtillery Regiment, which has
ar. estimated 10 to 15 tanks. This dry sea~oii, however, Hanoi appears to
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Sm, i Raap
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~" ; ~ Ne Tien l ~ n~ Xuyen.
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Ilc Duong Don~.~ ~r~.. ono 1 -K I ~' N 4j
1~ FUUUUaL ~~.IAN . ~~,. y
/1~ (Vietnam) RachGle Gen
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lop Pang
~ap9~ f.
MuongPhinO'
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~hUnirN ~ ~n~or c.
~rNOrvl: i
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~ .. ... 1.~ v Some 30 of these
arrived in ?he provin~;e as late as 5 May. In addition to NV,~ arrnor,
Communist forces have made considerable use in both Binh Lang and Tay
Ninh Prov?nces of friendly tanks and armored personn?i carriers, many of
which were captured during the ;teary fighting at Snoul, Carnbodia, in May
1971.
17. Irt the early stages of fighting in MR 3, enemy armor was quita
effective because of Sout}~ Vietnamese troops' fear of tanks and because
o? the adverse weather conditions, which prevented effective air support
of friendly forces. Since the South Vietnamese Army discovered that its
antitank weapons operate well against even the enemy's T-54, however, it
has been more successful in standing up 'to and destroying enemy armor.
Most enemy tank losses, however, have been attributable to massive Allied
air strikes.
5. Although one battalior. is believed to have been previously committed to southern
Laos since as early as 1969, it may have bren originally trained by or part of the
Regiment. The other battalion may be a relatively newer unit also trained by
the regiment.
6.. One armor `~attalion is reported to be ~:om theDAtmor Regirnent; however,
it may only have been trained by the regiment in North Vietnam for this offensi
and may not be ~n actual subordinate ba!taLon of the unit.
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18. As of 1 June, 421 enerny tanks are reported to have been
destroyed or cap~ured in South Vietnam since 30 March. Of this total,
some 265 (or 63%) occurred in MR 1, 49 in MR :?, avid 107 in MR 3.
Although enemy tank losses within South Vietnam unquestionably have
been heavy, these reported losses are almost certainly inflated -they exceed
the estimated initial deployment of tanks to South. Vietnam. The loss
figures, therefore, probably include some armored perso.~inel cazriers
;particularly in MR 3), some destroyed friendly tanks, and almost certainly
some duplication of NVt. tank "kills." It is not possible to make a firm
estim:~e ~ f actual tank losses, but analysis of the reporting of tank losses
that occurred during Operation Lam Son 71 S suggests that the actual
number of tanks destroyed or captured may be only about 60% of reported
losses, or on the order of 250.
19. A substantial %'.imber of tank crews also have been lost, and -
based on what little we know of its training proble:~rs - it is doubtful
that the NVA is in a position to replace all these crews. A recently captured
prisoner i;idicated
that his battalion suffered 200 casualties out of an n.i~inal strength of 450
mPn in its attack on South Vietnamese forces in Quang Tri Province in
late April. Moreover, some armor units aze apparently beina~ forned o;]
an, ad hoc basis from other types of NVt~ units in northern MR 1 because
of the considerable less of armor personnel. Prisoners recently captured
r,Par My ~hanh indicate that their unit -originally an infantry battalion -
was converted to an armor battalion after it infi}trated into South Vietnam
in order to provide replacements
20. The reported losses of NVA tanks in MR 1 exceed the estimated
number of enemy tanks originally deployed to that area. Although artual
losses probably are considerably below the level claimed, the extensive use
of tanks in the fighting in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces has resulted
in heavy losses, and additional NVA tanks have had to be brought inta
the area from North Vietnam since the original deployment. Despite the
faci that some armor replacements have been received, it is not believed
that the North Vietnamese have 'oeen able to make up all their tank losses.
21. Reported tank losses in 1V1R 2 have not been as large as those
fc: other areas but they are significant, given the number of tanks estimated
to have been committed to the area. Evidence suggests that the NVA may
have lost as many as 75% of the tanks brought into the highlands area
this dry season. Tank losses in MR 3 also are considerable relative to the
number believed to have been committedr from North Vietnam, reflecting
the Heavy fighting iri Binh Long Province. An unknown number of these
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losses, however, are tanks captured from the South Vietnamese by the
Communists either during the recent fighting or in Cambodia last year. Given
the level of enemy tank losses to date and the onset of the rainy season,
the capability of NVA armor in MRs 2 and 3 probably will be considerably
reduced over the next several months.
22. Over the past few years the Nort:~ Vietnamese have significantly
expanded their Armor Command. It to?aled at least five regi: gents or
equivalznts with an estimated 10,000 men and more than 500 and possibly
as many as 700 tanks at the start of the current offensive. About 55%
to 60% of Nor*h Vietnam's total tack inventory appears to have been
committed initially to support the current offensive in South Vietnam.
Hanoi deployed ai least foul regin'ients or equivalents with at least 320
and possibly as many as 400 tanks to South Vietnam, including the first
known use by the NVA of the Communist Chinese T-59 and T-63 tanks.
These figures c;~ initial tank deployments, however, do not reflect the entire
NVA commitment of armor against South Vietnamese forces -they do
not include replacements for losses, particularly in MR 1, or the use of
captured South Vietnamese tanks.
23. Despite the large amount of armor committed to the fighting,
poorly coordinated North Vietnamese infantry-tank tactics, countered by
Allied tactical air support, and the improved use of the hi-72 ar.~itank
weapon by South Vietnamese armed forces have blunted the effectiveness
of the *~ ~i r,'s armor. In addition, prisoners suggest that at least the latter
stages of the expansion of the Armor Command were poorly planked and
that inadequate provision was ,nade for training.
24. From 30 March through 1 June, 421 enemy armored vehicles
had been reported destroyed or captured in South Vietnam, of which some
t3% were in MR 1. Alttiougl~ the total ios~ figure almost certainly is
overstated, there is no question that enemy tank losses have: been heavy,
perhaps about 250. Moreover, a substantial number of tank crews also have
been lost and it is doubtful that the N!/A will be able to replace all these
crews. The high level of losses and continued use of zrmor in P.iR 1 strongly
suggest that additional NVA tanks ?have been brought into the area from
North `Jietnam during the fighting, either from reserve units or stocks. These
replacements, however, have not been sufficient to make up all of the losses.
In addition, the consideraWl~number of tank losses in MRs 2 and 3, coupled
with the onset of the ~ season, will mean a reduced capability in the
use of NVA armor in these azeas during the next three to four months.
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