CHILE ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: April 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011 /09/23 :
CIA RDP85TOO875RO01 70003
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/09/23:
CIA-RDP85T00875R0017000
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0 c T~
1110 - 11
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Chile. Allende's Economic Record
-CIA
D8CIJMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE CONY
DO NOT DESTROY
Secret
ER IM 72-70
April 1972
Copy No.
'7J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
E, Iuded from ouiommke
dnwngroling and
dedaftifcalinn
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CHILE: ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC RECORD
Introduction
1. In its first year and a half in power, the Allende government
successfully pursued its basic goals of rejuvenating a sluggish economy and
reducing the economic power of its opposition. But, its policies already
have entailed heavy costs in terms of economic dislocation and political
polarization. Postponing their full consequences until after the congressional
elections, scheduled for March 1973, will test even Allende's talents for
political maneuver and economic sleight-of-hand. This memorandum
presents an Overview of Allende's economic record to date and chronicles
recent developments affecting the expansion of state control over the
economy. It also comments on Chile's current relations with its major
foreign creditors, both Communist and non-Communist.
Discussion
Overview
2. At the end of 1971, Allende claimed success in his management
of the economy by pointing to an 8.5% jump in real gross domestic product
(GDP), a lower inflation rate than under the previous administration, and
the lowest unemployment rate in a decade (see Table 1). Reactivation of
the economy resulted largely from Allende's early bid for popular support
by sharply boosting the real wages of Chile's lower classes. Because of the
consumer buying spree that followed, manufacturing output increased by
about 12% in 1971. Increased government outlays for housing also brought
a 12% jump in construction activity. Both industries had ample unused
capacity on which to draw, and their increased production activity brought
about a decline in the unemployment rate in the Santiago area from 8.3%
to 3.8%.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
5r.U.Ki I
Percent Increase
Unemployment
-`!
in Santiago
Real Gross
Domestic
Product
OffiCial
Consumer
Price Index
(Percent of
Labor Force
at End of Year)
1965
5.0
25.9
4.8
1966
7.0
17.0
5.4
1967
2.3
21.9
6.4
1968
2.9
27.9
5.4
1969
3.3
29.3
5.4
1970
3.1
34.9
8.3
1971
8.5
22.1
3,8
3. Important primary industries, however, did not fare so well.
Despite unusually favorable weather during the main growing season,
agricultural output increased only slightly in 1971, and early indications
point to a drop of at least 10% this year. Moreover, total mining output
rose by about 6%, it, contrast with the large increases expected as a result
of the copper expansion program. Copper output in fact decii,ied at the
three large mines formerly operated by Anaconda and Kennecott (see Table
2).
1970
Change in
Shortfall in
Mine ,.-
Actual
Actual
Goal
Production
Meeting Goal
Million Pounds
Percent
Chuquicamata
580
551
740
-5.0
-25.5
El Teniente
390
325
560
-16.7
-42.0
El Salvador
205
187
220
-8.8
-15.0
Andina
13
118
134
New mine
-11.9
Exotica
4
78
204
New mine
-61.8
Total
1,192
1,259
1,858
6
-:52.2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
S.C,Vxrr 1
4. Although personal and government consumption grew 12% in real
terms in 1971, gross domestic investment fell at least 16%. An increase
in public investment only partly offset a drop by nearly 60% in private
investment outlays. The impact of this investment slump is even greater
than the statistics imply, because a substantial portion of increased public
outlays went into "social infrastructure projects" that at best would have
a beneficial effect on production capabilities only in the long term.
Threatened with imminent nationalization, businessmen refrained from
expanding their facilities even in those industries operating at or near full
capacity. By year's end, the combination of consumer boom and investment
slump was being reflected in increasingly widespread shortages in supply.
5. Allende's ability to cover domestic supply shortages through
imports came under increasing constraints as the year wore on. Net foreign
reserves, which stood at a record $378 million when he was elected,
plummeted to about $40 million by the end of 1971. Chile's foreign
exchange crunch derived both from inflated imports to meet spiraling
demand for food and other consumer goods and from a nearly 20% drop
in copper export earnings in 1971 due to lower world prices and production
difficulties in the nationalized mines. Moreover, because of the worsening
political and economic atmosphere, capital flows shifted from a large net
surplus in 1970 to a $100 million deficit in 1971. In the early months
of 1972, foreign reserves probably declined further despite the continued
unilateral moratorium on debt service payments, which since its inception
last November has saved Chile about $150 million, and despite the receipt
of at least $50 million in hard currency credits from the USSR.
6. The Allende government's highly inflationary policies throughout
its administration are now compounding Chile's economic problems. Public
sector wages were increased by more than 50% in 1971 and, as was to
be expected, average wages in private enterprise rose considerably more.
The steep acceleration in government spending, moreover, brought a record
budget deficit, and one-fourth of total public sector expenditures was
financed through inflationary borrowing from the domestic banking
system - in effect, by printing money. As a result, the money supply more
than doubled and rose from 13% to 20% as a share of GDP at current
prices. Despite these formidable pressures, the government was fairly
successful in holding the line on prices until October 1971, mainly because
many pe~~-I,le apparently were willing to hold larger cash balances as long
as the supply of goods seemed adequate. In the latter part of the year,
however, shortages of food, durable consumer goods, and industrial materials
became increasingly evident, and the pace of inflation accelerated markedly,
as shown in the following increases in the official consumer price index:
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
Percent
January-October 1971
1.5
(monthly
November
average)
1971
2.7
December
1971
2.8
January 19'12
3.7
February 1972
6.5
Moreover, with a growing number of products available only in the black
market or not Pt all, the official price index was even less representative
of actual inflation rates than it had been previously.
7. The task of controlling price rises is far more complicated now
than when Allende took office. Supplies are limited by declining agricultural
production, a leveling off in manufacturing output as capacity limits are
reached, and inadequate import capabilities. It is politically difficult,
however, to restrain demand through restrictions on wage increases and
government spending or through rationing. The administration's proposed
public wage increase for 1972 averages 35%, and labor unions in the private
sector again are using this hike as a floor for their wage bargaining. Although
Allende at least once has publicly stated that he will use a firm hand in
rationing consumer goods if need be, he indicated in a recent speech that
"Chile is not ready for that yet."
8. Under these circumstances, rapid inflation - which in effect
would restrict consumption by eroding nominal wage gains - may be the
most palatable option open. The government already has officially raised
prices of various basic foodstuffs this year by an average of 30% and is
in the process of upping rates on public services by a similar amount.
Because it is increasingly difficult for private enterprises to absorb additional
labor cost increases through productivity gains and a further profits squeeze,
the government is expected to permit price rises for some of their products
as well.
9. In an effort to avoid the most politically embarrassing kinds of
shortages, the government is sha.ply increasing food imports to offset the
marked deterioration already apparent in this year's agricultural production.
Wheat imports, which in 1971 represented almost 30% of total consumption,
are expected to rise by 40% to 700,000 metric tons this year. Because
of increasing agitation in the countryside associated with the government
agrarian reform effort and illegal land seizures, total wheat output in 1972
is now estimated at some 27% below last year's. Corn imports are likely
to jump almost 70% to 500,000 tons, and increased imports of rye, barley,
oats, and potatoes also are expected. In dealing with the continuing beef
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
shortage, the government has increased the number of "beefless days" to
more than 200 in 1972, but imports will still be required to fill the
remaining supply gap. As a result, net foreign exchange expenditures for
foodstuffs are expected to rise significantly above the all-time record of
$276 million set in 1971 (see the chart). Because shortages of cloth, drugs
and medicines, and other consumer goods are becoming increasingly
apparent, supplementary imports of this type may further burden foreign
exchange capabilities.
Chile
Net Imports of Foodstuffs
Million
US Dollars
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
10. Even though Santiago achieved most of its rescheduling goals at
the debt renegotiations completed in Paris on 19 April, the Allende
government still faces serious balance-of-payments problems over the next
year or so.* It almost certainly will not be able to fulfill import requirements
for both consumer and industrial goods, and shortfalls of either type carry
political costs. With the congressional elections less than z. year away,
Allende can be expected to continue to opt for appeasing the consumer
at the expense of needed investment, but he will also have to allot foreign
exchange for the imports of machinery and raw material required to avoid
a serious deterioration in output and employment levels. New foreign credit
offers, which so far the Allende government has found disappointing, will
be an important factor determining Chile's import capacity and thus its
ability to offset domestic supply shortfalls and contain inflationary
pressures.
Socialization of the Economy
11. As of September 1971, the state had ownership or control of
187 enterprises, of which 79 had been taken over by the Allende government
during its first year in office (see Tables 3 and 4). Since September, it
has expropriated, requisitioned, or intervened an additional 20-25
enterprises. The government also has drawn up a list of all corporations
whose capital plus reserves exceed $500,000; by the government's own
estimate, these 189 corporations account for 82% of the capital holdings
of the 1,987 companies incorporated in Chile. Many of them already are
government-owned, and those still in private hands are earmarked for
nationalization with few if any exceptions.
12. In a belated move to block Allende's efforts to place the state
in absolute control of Chile's economy, the opposition-controlled Congress
on 19 February approved a constitutional amendment sponsored by the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), defining the economic areas subject to
government ownership. The congressional bill broadly defines the activities
that the state can control directly, those that it can operate in partnership
with private enterprise, and those that the state cannot touch. Ten basic
industries or groups of industries are included in the first category:
large-scale copper mining; insurance; railways; air and water transport; mail
and telegraph services; power generation; production and distribution of
natural gas; extraction of petroleum, coal, and nitrates; the making of
weapons and armaments; and the production of steel, cement, iodine, and
heavy chemicals. Expropriation of enterprises in all other sectors would
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
Chile: Government.-Owned and Controlled Enterprises
as of September 1971
Mixed
Sector
Wholly
Government-
Owned
Majority
Government-
Owned
Minority
Government-
Owned
Government
Intervened
Total
Productive sector
41
i9
20
38
118
Agricultural
5
--
13
Copper
5
Other mining
2
7
--
15
Forestry
5
4
6
18
Industrial
11
4
32
67
Infrastructure
and service
sector
Energy 7
10
Communications 2
Transport 10
--
12
Housing 4
Commerce
Tourism
Financial sector
Banks
Real estate
Insurance
Total
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
Chile: Firms Coming Under Government
Ownership or Control During the First Year
of the Allende Administration
as of September 1971
Sector
Government-
Owned or
Mixed
Government
Intervened
Total
Productive sector
23
38
61
Agriculture
--
--
--
Mining
4
--
4
Copper
5
--
5
Industrial
14
38
52
Infrastructure
and service
sector
Energy
2
Communications
1
Transport
2
Financial sector
10
3
13
Banks
10
3
13
TctaZ
38
41
79
require congressional approval. A retroactive feature of the bill ma' i
government takeovers since October 1971 subject to such approva;.
13. After weeks of secret negotiations with the PDC, seeking a way
to avoid a direct confrontation with Congress, Allende in early April vetoed
the key portions of the PDC constitutional amendment and added clauses
that would significantly ease government takeover of the economy.
Administration forces contend that a two-thirds majority of Congress is
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
needed to override a presidential veto in this case, whereas opposition jurists
claim that only a simple majority is required. Allende wants to submit the
question to a five-member constitutional tribunal, which has supported the
government's position in its four decisions to date, while opposition
politizians maintain that a plebescite is the proper means of resolving the
issue.
14. Although Congress has unlimited time to deal with the veto
problem, any delay will benefit the Allende administration because it can
proceed freely with its expropriation plans in the interim. To counter further
government moves during this legislative impasse, business leaders are
attempting to persuade workers in firms marked for expropriation to seize
the property, thereby pre-empting government takeover or at the least
making such action politically difficult. Private sector leaders are also trying
to arouse rural workers by pointing out that the large farms expropriated
under the government's agrarian reform program are being turned into state
farms rather than divided into smaller tracts for peasant ownership. They
are attempting to instigate widespread seizures by agricultural workers of
government agrarian reform centers in southern Chile and, to this end, have
been collecting food, vehicles, and weapons. Serious organizational
difficulties apparently have delayed these actions, which had been scheduled
to begin shortly before the third UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) opened in Santiago on 13 April.
15. In the meantime, the Central Bank is considering a new credit
control measure that would substantially increase the government's control
over the economy. The proposal would limit most private firms to only
one account in one bank and require a quarterly financial report. The
government wants to liquidate outstanding non-banking credit instruments
that are not subject to its control, claiming that the measure is necessary
to "rationalize and make more democratic the credit system." By year's
end, the government controlled about 85% of all bank credit and 83% of
bank deposits. 'she government also has stiffened its control over foreign
travel through a new regulation requiring all ticket purchases for foreign
air travel to be made through state-controlled banks. In addition to adding
another bureaucratic link to the already complicated process of leaving the
country, the measures will have the effect of eliminating direct ticket sales
and credit extensions by travel agents and airlines.
Communist Assistance
16. Soviet, East European, and Chinese assistance clearly has been
growing and seems headed for farther expansion, despite continued
resistance against a shift to Communist equipment and technology by both
Chilean industry and the military. In late January 1972, an 11-man Soviet
economic delegation began a month-long stay in Chile "to firm up bilateral
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
agreements." The composition of the mission - specialists in planning,
finance, and balance of payments - and the length of its stay suggest the
possibility of an in-depth examination of Chi!e's acute economic problems,
perhaps accompanied by discussions of Soviet commitments in addition to
the $89 million in long-term project loans already extended. Thus far, the
Soviets have been cautious in offering the kinds of aid Alleride wants and
needs most; known hard currency credits to Chile now total only $50
million and the Soviets have made no offer as yet to help Chile meet its
current consumption requirements for food, other consumer goods,
petroleum, and the like. The USSR probably wants to tie any larger aid
commitment to assurances that Allende can put the Chilean economy in
order.
17. In late January 1972, Chile announced that China had offered
a $65 million credit, $13 million of which would be used to finance imports
of food and medicines this year and the remainder for small- and
medium-sized development projects. The credit is repayable in ten equal
annual installments beginning in 1981, and no interest will be charged. A
Chilean commercial mission left for China in late March to work out final
details on this loan.
18. Known long-term Communist economic assistance to Chile now
totals $256 million, of which nearly $200 million has been extended since
1 June 1971 (see Table 5). Except for the $13 million in Chinese food
and medical assistance, a $2.5 million earthquake relief grant from China,
and a reported Soviet offer to donate a $2.5 million prefabricated housing
plant, all of this assistance has been in the form of long-term project loans
to cover purchases of equipment and technical expertise from the donor
country. Until recently, virtually nothing had been drawn on these credits,
but the sale of 5,000 Soviet tractors now being delivered to Chile was
financed under the 1967 loan. Chile, however, probably is making full use
of the $50 million in short-term, hard currency credits thus far extended
by the USSR.
New Western Credits
19. The Allende government's credit rating has been badly damaged
by its temporary default on most of its foreign debt repayments, but Chile
is still obtaining a small amount of new Western financing.. Santiago is
currently negotiating a rescheduling of a substantial part of its existing
foreign debt and simultaneously trying to arrange new loans. The largest
thus far obtained is an $18 million export credit from Brazil to finance
the sale of 1,000 locally built Mercedes Benz buses. The Bank of Montreal
has offered a $10 million export credit line to the Chilean Nitrate Salas
Corporation in an attempt to attract ill,.e company's deposits that were
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
Chile: Known Long-Term Credits from Communist Countries
Million
Us $
Type
42 Industrial plants (port im-
provement, lubricants plant,
housing project, chemical
plants, agricultural assist-
ance, technical aid to
copper facilities)
46.8 a/ Machinery and equipment ($5
;uillion earmarked for road-
building equipment)
20 Mining equipment, health sup-
plies, possibly cargo crane
plant
Czechoslovakia April 1968
July 1971
Industrial plants (plants for
the manufacture of compres-
sors, motorcycle engines,
and power tools)
Machinery and equipment
Pharmaceuticals plant, copper
mining and transport equip-
ment
Sulphuric acid plant, agri-
cultural machinery and
transport equipment, pos-
sibly copper manufactures
plant
Poland
November 1971'
November 1971
10
Technical projects, partic-
ularly in the mining,
fishing, and metallurgical
sectors
Machinery and equipment
China
2.5
Earthquake relief (grant)
China
52
Small and medium-sized proj-
ects over the next four
years
Finance imports of food and
pharmaceutical products
a Expansion of $12.8 mt ion credit extended in 1967. The amount
has been adjusted for downpayments.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
transferred to Canada from New York banks in February to avoid
attachment by US courts. To protect its long-term market position in Chile,
the Gulf Oil Company is considering extending a $5 million line of credit,
repayable over five years. Various other small Western loans totaling some
$20 million to $25 million have been arranged in recent weeks, including
a $6 million credit from a Swedish heavy machinery firm and several other
credits from European, US, and South American private banks and firms.
Foreign Debt Renegotiation
20. In early February, Chilean officials signed an agreement with 36
US commercial banks, rescheduling about $245 million in debt, including
interest. The agreement provides for repayment of 5% of the principal in
1972 and 1973, 10% in 1974, 15% in 1975, 10% in June 1976, and 55%
in December 1976. If Chile is unable to meet this last "balloon" payment,
the proposal permits a substantial extension involving a 10% payment in
December 1976 and 15% annually for the next three years. The agre,mnent
requires Chile to pay less than half of the debts due to these banks during
the remainder of Allende's presidential term, scheduled to end in November
1976. The settlement probably reflects the banks' belief that a fairly
generous compromise was necessary in view of Chile's evident insolvency
and that the compromise was preferable to default.
21. In its presentation to the first Paris Club meeting during
2-4 February, Chile requested its major creditors to allow a moratorium
on $998 million in long-term debt service payments due between
9 November 1971 and 31 December 1974, followed by a ten-year deferred
payment s..'hedule. Chile's request to exclude from renegotiation debts
contracted after Allende's inauguration and those owed to other Latin
American countries was generally opposed because such exclusion would
involve discriminatory treatment of creditors. Representatives of the United
States, Canada, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Denma:ck, Spain, and Switzerland generally supported the
French suggestion that a moratorium of only one year be granted because
of the lack of longer range forecasts of Chile's balance of payments. US
attempts to link the copper compensation issue with debt renegotiation
received support from West Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands but were
opposed by France and Spain.
22. The second round of meetings during 16-17 February was
disappointing to the Chileans because of the relatively united stand by the
creditor nations in offering somewhat harder terms than anticipated. In
addition to cutting the requested moratorium period from three years to
one and the exemption of interest payments and a minor share of the
principal from rescheduling, the creditors also insisted on an International
Monetary Fund standby, which Chile rejected "for domestic and policy
12 SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0
SECRET
reasons." In lieu of an IMF standby agreement, Chile circulated i,i March
an alternative plan that in essence would be self-policing.
23. The third round of talks held during 29-30 March also was
inconclusive, despite strenuous Chilean efforts to obtain a favorable decision.
Chile was strongly backed by France, and to a lesser extent by Italy and
Spain, whereas US proposals were actively supported by the United
Kingdom, West Germany, Canada, and Denmark. The US proposal that a
"debt clause" be a precondition for rescheduling was generally upheld by
other creditors; such a clause would preclude discriminatory treatment of
any outstanding debts, including those deriving from copper nationalization.
During the meeting, the creditors softened their financial demands
somewhat, extending the moratorium to two years' duration. Although the
Paris Club members formally insisted on Chile's strengthening its alternative
plan if it is to replace an IMF standby program, most creditors appeared
willing to compromise on this issue. Despite vigorous Chilean objections,
final decisions on these and related matters were postponed until
17-19 April - after the opening of UNCTAD III.
24. A compromise agreement was finally reached by Chile and the
Paris Club on 19 April. It grants Chile two years' grace followed by a
six-year repayment period on 70% of principal and interest falling due during
the 14-month period from 1 November 1971 through 1972. Inclusion of
interest payments in the rescheduling process represents a concession to
Chile and significantly increases the debt relief involved during this period.
The creditors' decision not to reschedule at this time payments on debt
maturing after 1972 was a disappointment to Chile and was influenced by
the Allende government's refusal to arrange a standby agreement with the
IMF. Rescheduling of debt payments falling due in 1973 will be considered
late this year, at which time creditors will reassess the economic and
financial policies being pursued by Santiago. The creditors' position at that
time - and particularly that of the United States - will also be influenced
by Chile's scorecard on adhering to its formal acceptance of obligation to
repay its foreign debts on a non-discriminatory basis and its promise to
compensate adequately for expropriated foreign properties, both of which
were intc gral parts of the Paris agreement.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/23: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030070-0