VC/NVA COMBAT FORCES IN CAMBODIA SINCE THE DEPOSITION OF SIHANOUK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: May 5, 1998
• Content Type: IM

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Secret , a/o
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
VC/NVA Combat Forces in Cambodia
Since the Deposition of Sihanouk
Secret
March 1972
Copy No. 6 2
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1972
VC/NVA COMBAT FORCES IN CAMBODIA
SINCE THE DEPOSITION OF SIHANOUK
Introduction'
.
1. VC/NVA combat forces have been located on Cambodian territory
in varying degrees throughout most of the Vietnam War. Initially they were
confined to base areas along the border with South Vietnam and seldom
ventured further into Cambodia. After the deposition of Prince Sihanouk,
however, the VC/NVA began to move deeper into Cambodian territory,
rapidly occupying large areas of the countryside. To control this additional
territory and to cope with an expanded war, the VC/NVA force structure
was enlarged by infiltrating additional units and personnel from North
Vietnam and recruiting local Khmer into their units. This memorandum
describes the development, current strength, and disposition of the VC/NVA
regular combat forces in Cambodia, and offers some judgments on their
current capabilities.
2. A significant number of Khmer have been recruited into VC/NVA
units. These are not included in the VC/NVA combat force estimate
presented in this memorandum. For a discussion of Khmer combat forces
including the fillers in the VC/NVA forces, see ER IM 71-218, Khmer
Communist Combat Forces in Cambodia, November 1971,
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within CIA.
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Discussion
Evolution of VC/NVA Force Structure
3. At the time of the deposition of Prince Sihanouk - 18 March
1970 - an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 VC/NVA combat personnel in
Cambodia were deployed in base areas along the Cambodia-South Vietnam
border.(I) There, they enjoyed sanctuary for resupply, training, resting, and
refitting and conducted offensive operations against South Vietnam.
4. The entry of Cambodia into the war fundamentally altered the
strategic situation and required that the enemy make significant adjustments
in its force commitments. Within a few weeks, major elements of the
VC/NVA 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions moved westward from GVN Military
Region 3 into Cambodia, and by 29 April 1970 they had seized the
Cambodian towns of Krek, Mimot, and Snuol. On 30 April, US and South
Vietnamese forces launched operations across the Cambodia border, and
the remaining elements of the 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions deployed deeper
into Cambodia,(2) overrunning the countryside northeast of Phnom Penh.
At the same time, elements of the NVA 1st Division (redesignated the Phuoc
Long Front) deployed from GVN MR 4 into Cambodia, southeast of the
capital These deployments increased VC/NVA combat
strength in Cambodia to between 20,000 and 25,000 men.
5. North of Phnom Penh, the VC/NVA continued their push to the
west. Upon arriving at Siem Reap, the 275th Regiment of the VC 5th
Division apparently split to form the core of an additional regiment.
Subsequently, these new units were augmented both by locally recruited
Khmer and by personnel newly infiltrated from North Vietnam and
1. The number of troops in Cambodia before the deposition of Sihanouk fluctuated
widely depending on the annual campaigning cycle and the tactical situation in South
Vietnam. Administrative Service milts also were located in the Cambodian base areas
during this time, but they will not be covered in this memorandum.
2. Tha 69th Artillery Command, which supports these three divisions, also deployed
into Cambodia at this time. This unit was composed of the 96th and 208th Artillery
Regiments.
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7. By September 1970 the VC/NVA combat forces in Cambodia had
established standard areas of operation, which continue to the present. The
thus far in the current dry season, has now increased the VC/NVA force
structure in Cambodia to between 30,000 and 35,000 men, representing
an expansicm of about 15,000 men since the deposition of Sihanouk in
1970. During this same period, the Khmer Communist (KC) combat force
grew to between 15,000 and 30,000 men. Thus the total Communist combat
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force augmentation in Cambodia since early 1970 has been 30,000 to 45,000
personnel. While the KC combat forces are not as capable as those of the
VC/NVA, they do bring total Communist combat strength to between
45,000 and 65,000 men.
11. I I the bulk of the combat force is deployed
in Kompong Cham Province northeast of Phnom Penh and in Kompong
Speu Province east and south of the capital. The forces in both these
provinces pose the greatest threat to FANK units defending the capital,
and those in Kompong Cham pose the main threat to ARVN forces
defending South Vietnam's MR 3.
Current Combat Capability
dual organization gives the Vietnamese Communists the ability to use
regional forces to protect their supply routes without tying down the
offensive capability of the mobile strike force. Being primarily defensive,
the regional forces have limited their activities to population control,
harassment of FANK lines of communication, and attacks by fire against
FANK units moving into their areas of responsibility. Reports that these
regional regiments are understrength and lack sufficient arms and
ammunition may also account for their relatively light combat role.
13. The VC/NVA mobile strike forces are similar in strength and
character to VC/NVA main force units operating in northern South
Vietnam. The strike force battalions average about 300 men each and are
well equipped with modern small arms and crew- served weapons. At the
regimental and division level additional combat support units are available,
which increase the fire power of the mobile strike force battalions when
o eratin as a part of these larger formations.
14. The mobile strike force bati:alions are about the same strength
as the FANK battalions in the field. Unit for unit these mobile strike forces
are generally superior to FANK units because of their better training and
higher firepower. They are about half the size of ARVN units which operate
out of GVN MR 3, but any comparison with ARVN is obscured by the
presence of Allied air power.
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15. On the other hand, the VC/NVA regional forces are probably
less ca able than many of their FANK counterparts. These units contain
substantial numbers of locally recruited ethnic Khmer who are much less
motivated than recruits front North Vietnam. These units also lack most
of the combat support that ,he mobile strike forces enjoy. However, since
their mission is largely one of holding areas previously liberated by the
mobile strike forces, their requirement for combat support is somewhat
less.
The requirement of such a large part of the COSVN force structure
in Cambodia to perform rear area security missions has greatly relieved the
pressure on ARVN forces operating in southern South Vietnam. There have,
as yet, been no substantial enemy attacks either in the Saigon region or
in the important rice producing Delta since VC/NVA forces '.eft for
Cambodia in 1970.
Conclusions and Outlook
17. The VC/NVA combat force in Cambodia is presently stronger than
at any previous time during the Indochina conflict. The continuing
augmentation of the force structure by personnel infiltrated from North
Vietnam has kept the original VC/NVA units well up to strength while
providing much of the additional manpower for the creation of as many
as ten new regimental echelon formations. This force structure is probably
now capable of overrunning any given military objective in Cambodia.
However, an assault on the capital of Phnom Penh could, if FANK fought
well or ARVN intervened, cost the VC/NVA much of their current combat
force, and they would probably be unwilling to take that risk.
18. Prospects for continued growth of the VC/NVA force structure
in Cambodia are difficult to determine because it is not possible to predict
what kind of casualties will accompany the expected heavy fighting durin
the remainder of the current dry season.
oss rates and the number of personnel sent into South Vietnam remain
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about the same as last year, the VC/NVA force structure in Cambod.i could
expand at a moderate rate. The continued development of the KC force
structure will, in turn, enable the VC/NVA to take on more ambitious
offensive operations while the KC guard the rear areas. These operations
could include moves against the ARVN forces along the Cambodia-South
Vietnam border in preparation for a push into South Vietnam's MR 3 or
more comprehensive offensive action against key government-controlled
areas in Cambodia.
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