INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE CURRENT STATUS OF SOVIET OCEAN SHIPPING AND PLANS THROUGH 1975

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Current Status of Soviet Ocean Shipping
and Plans Through 1975
Confidential
ER IM 72-5
January 1972
Copy j0
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WARNING
This docu::,:?rtt rtmi.ti:rs informal ion alfc:ctiuu th,! natiOtial
tleft?us, ,tf the l r: tt cI States. within the tn.?a:,ing of '1?it)c?
IS, ..cctio I' i):: curl , I I, of tic. US code. as amended.
.Its tratr.n:k? iun or Irt?velatiun of its cor,tcItts to or rc-
t -e?iI)t i n? :ut un:it it It,~ri.:t?tI InTrsolI is hrnhihitt?cl by lair.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
January 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE CURRENT STATUS OF SOVIET OCEAN SHIPPING
AND PLANS THROUGH 1975
Introduction
1. During the last decade the USSR's merchant fleet more than
tripled in tonnage, growing somewhat faster than Soviet seaborne foreign
trade. In addition to carrying increased volumes of Soviet trade, including
heavy logistical suppo; t to Cuba, North Vietnam, and Egypt, the expanded
fleet has sharply stepped up its carriage of foreign cargo between non-Soviet
ports. Despite its impressive growth, the Soviet merchant fleet lacks certain
types of ships common to fleets of other leading maritime powers. This
memorandum assesses the receni growth, current status, and planned
expansion of the Soviet fleet through 1975, focusing on size, composition,
and deployment.
Fleet Expansion, 1966-70
2. By the end of 1970 the Soviet merchant fleet(s) had grown to
11.9 million deadweight tons (DWT), almost half again its size in 1965.
About 4.3 million DWT were delivered to the fleet during the 1966-70
Five-Year Plan, but this tonn:.ge was still 500,000 DWT below the plan
goal and 100,000 DWT below that of the previous five years. Deliveries
1. Including only vessels of 1.000 or more gross register tons (GRT) subordinate to
the Mir'stry of the Maritime Fleet; excluding ships of the Caspian Steamship Company
and river vessels of the Danube Steamship Company.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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peaked in 1964, when net additions exceeded 1.2 million DWT, fell off
slightly in 1965 and 1966, and have since averaged about 800,000 DWT
annually (see Table 1).
Table 1
Inventory as
of 31 December
Net Increase
in Tonnage a/.
Deliveries
During Year
Year
Number
Million
Dead-
weight
Tons
Million
Dead-
weight
Tons
Percent
Million
Dead-
weight
_ Tons
1959
590.
3.3
0.3
6
0.4
196n
650
3.9
0.6
18
0.6
1961
680
4.2
0.3
8
0.4
1962
19
740
4.8
0.6
14
0.7
63
1
820
5.7
0.9
19
0.9
964
1
900
6.9
1.2
21
1.3
965
990
8.0
1.1
16
1.2
1966
1
1,070
8.9
0.9
12
1.0
967
1
1,150
9.7
0.8
9
0.8
968
1
1,230
10.4
0.7
8
0.8
969
1, 320
11.2
0.8
7
0'.8
1970
1,400
11.9
0.7
7
0.8
a. Base on unrounded data.
3. Only about one-third of the new tonnage delivered during 1966-70
was built in Soviet shipyards. The two-thirds acquired abroad came chiefly
from Poland (1.1 million DWT), Yugoslavia (700,000 DWT), Finland
(500,000 DWT), and East Germany (500,000 DWT).
4. The failure to complete planned deliveries was attributed by the
Minister of the Maritime Fleet to budget constraints; a shortage of hard
currency probably was the principal reason. Negotiations' with Japan
beginning in 1966 for delivery of mo:?e than 300,?00 DWT by 1970 fell
through because of Soviet insistence on an extended eight-year payment
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Size and Growth
of the Soviet Merchant Fleet
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plan that was unacceptable to the Japanese.(2) . Subsequently, the USSR
made little effort to purchase tonnage from other hard currency sources.
5. Unlike other maritime nations that were augmenting their fleets
with giant tankers and bulk carriers, the USSR made little change in ship
sizes. The largest new Soviet tankers were of the 50,000-DWT Sofiya class
(see Figure 1). By contrast tankers as large as 370,000 DWT were being
Figure 1. The Soviet 50,000 - DWT Sofiya - Class Tanker Sofiya
added to fleets of other nations. A modest change did occur in the Soviet
dry cargo fleet with the addition of seven 23,000-DWT Zvenigorod-class
bulk carriers (see Figure 2); previously the largest dry cargo ships were
Figure 2. The Soviet 23,000 - DWT Zvenigorod - Class Bulk Dry Cargo Ship Zaporozh;ve
2. Contemplated purchases of merchant ships from Japan were part of a total package,
valued at US $260 million, that also included fish factory ships, dredges, and other
special-purpose craft.
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16,000 DWT. The new Zvenigorod class was dwarfed, however, by bulk
dry cargo ships in other fleets, some as large as 165,000 DWT. Soviet
preference for smaller ships is partly explained by the fact that few Soviet
ports can handle ships with drafts greater than 32 feet. A fully loaded
370,000-DWT tanker would have a draft of 87 feet.
6. The USSR also failed to keep pace in terms of speed. No
conventional cargo liners faster than 19 knots were added to the Soviet
fleet, whereas liners in the US and Japanese fleets, for example, were
operating as fast as 24 knots. Moreover, containerships with speeds of
up to 26 knots were being added to Western fleets, but the USSR was
neither building nor acquiring such ships.
7. During 1966-70 the Soviet merchant fleet did not improve its
standing among major maritime nations, some of whose fleets were; growing
faster than the Soviet fleet. At the end of 1970 it ranked seventh, a position
held since 1964, and accounted for almost 4% of world tonnag?, !see thn
accompanying tabulation).
a. Most ships flying the Liberian f tag are oWne
by Greek, US, and other foreign interests.
Million DWT
as of
31 December 1970
Percent of
World Total
1.
Liberia
61.0
18.7
2.
Japan
39.1
12.0
3.
United Kingdom
37.1
11.3
4.
Norway
32.4
9.9
5.
Greece
18.2
5.6
6.
United States
(active)
14.4
4.4
7.
USSR
11.9
3.6
Other
112.9
34.5
327.0
100.0
Fleet Performance Through 1970
8. Fleet output in tons-miles increased substantially faster than
capacity, rising by 69% from 210 billion ton-nautical miles in 1965 to 354
billion in 1970. At the same time, the volume of cargo carried rose from
119 million to 162 million metric tons, an increase of only 36%.
4
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Performance in 1 970 fell short of plan targets by 6% in ton-miles and by
13% in tons carried.
9. Although :ion-fulfillment on both counts reflected the slowdown
in deliveries to the fleet, the rerouting of shipping via the Cape of Good
Hope after the Suez Canal closed in mid-1967 was the most important
reason for the shortfall in tons carried. Round-trip sailing time from the
Black Sea to North Vietnam, increased from 40 to 72 days, and voyages
to other key Soviet trading partners east of Suez were similarly lengthened.
These reroutings forced the annual diversion of about 600,000 DWT of
additional Soviet shipping to handle trade east of Suez. The impact was
heaviest on the dry cargo fleet, which accounts for about two-thirds of
all Soviet tonnage using the Cape route.
10. Alt:tough the ton-mile performance in foreign trade has been
greater than in domestic tradc since 1956, the volume of cargo carried in
domestic trade was greater through 1965 because the voyages in that trade
are generally shorter. Since then foreign trade cargoes carried by Soviet
ships(3) have exceeded domestic cargoes (see the accompanying tabulation).
1965
1966
Class of
N
i
Million
Per-
Million
Per-
Million
Per-
av
gation
Tons
cent
Tons
ent
ons
c
T
cent
Domestic
61.8
52
63.2
48
71.7
44
Foreign
trade
57.5
48
68.0
52
90.3
56
Total
11 9. 3
100
131.2
100
162.0
100
11. The USSR has become relatively less dependent on foreign
shipping; in 1970 Soviet ships carried 54% of the USSR'c, seaborne foreign
trade, compared with 50% in 1965 (see the accompanying tabulation). This
achievement was close to the 1970 plan target of 56%.
3. Foreign trade cargoes carried by Soviet ships include exports and imports moving
through Soviet ports and shipments between foreign ports both on Soviet account and
for foreign shippers.
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19 6 5-
1970
Million
Tons
Per-
cent
Million Per-
_Tons cent
On Soviet ships
50
50
76
54
On foreign ships /
51
50
64
46
Total
100
140
100
a. Exporta account for the-
. a largest part by
far
of Soviet aeabcrne foreign trade.
Because a sub-
stantial portion of Soviet exports is sold f.-.b.,
most of the foreign tonnage is chartered by the
purchasers.
b. The Soviet foreign trade handbook reports
Soviet seaborne foreign trade in .1970 as 132.5
million tons. This volume has been adjusted
upwards in this memorandum to provide for aid
cargoes, mail, and other items not included in
Ministry of Foreign Trade statistics.
12. The volume of cargoes carried by Soviet ships for overseas clients
betweea foreign ports also increased, from 7.5 million tons in 1965 to about
14 million tons in 1970. Clients in the less developed countries accounted
for 40% of these cargoes, and clients in the Communist world and in the
Industrial West 30% each. Some of the cargoes and trade r,~utes involved
are as follows:
Destination
Sugar
Cuba
Western Europe
Coal
Poland, United Kingdom, and
Western Europe
Belgium
Crude oil
Romania and various Near
Eastern countries
Ores, jute, ano copra
India and Indonesia
Western Europe
Cotton
Egypt
Western Europe
Ores
Morocco, Algeria, and other
Poland and
African countries
Western Europe
Cotton and sulfur
Mexico
Western Europe
and Latin
America
Grain
Canada.
India and
Western Europe
General cargo
Japan
United States
and Canada
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Soviet '- -irgo Liner Services
13. In 1970, there were 33 Soviet international cargo liner services
(see the Appendix), and they handled almost seven million tons of cargo.
Eight of these lines carried substantial amounts of non-Soviet cargoes
between non-Soviet ports; there were only two such lines in 1965. New
services established during 1966-70 included lines linking Western Europe
with Australia and New Zealand, Japan with the West Coast of North
America, Japan with Southeast Asia and India, and Iranian ports on the
Caspian Sea with Western Europe. The number of Soviet international liner
services at the end of 1970 would have been even larger had the Suez
Canal closure and other factors not caused Moscow to modify or give up
some services functioning at the end of 1965. Services eliminated include
lines from the Black Sea to Burma and Ceylon and from Danube River
ports to the Red Sea.
14. On the lines to Australia and New Zealand, and on one established
earlier between the Mediterranean and eastern Canada, the Soviet steamship
companies are members of the freight conferences and adhere to their rates
and rules. However, the Soviet lines out of Japan, including one to the
US West Coast, operate outside the conference system. Like other
independent lines on these routes, the Soviets charge about 150 less than
the conferences.
15. In 1969, Soviet ships began trial voyages to US West Coast ports
that led to the inclusion of those ports in the USSR's service to western
Canada. These were the first calls by Soviet cargo ships at US ports since
the beginning of the Korean War. These calls -- 13 in 1970 -- have been
confined to the West Coast by the threat of International Longshoremen's
Association (ILA) boycotts in East Coast and Gulf ports. The ILA recently
agreed to lift this boycott for US grain shipments to the USSR.
16. By the end of 1970 a few Soviet international lines were carrying
small amounts of cargo in containers. Some were small Soviet railway
containers (5 tons and under), while others, leased from foreign shippers,
were 20- and 40-foot containers conforming to new international standards
and carried on the decks of conventional cargo ships. International routes
handling container traffic included Ilichevsk - Egypt, Black Sea ports -
Bulgaria, Baltic ports - United Kingdom, Baltic ports - East Germany, and
Far Eastern ports - Japan.
17. Seeking increased recognition as a maritime power and better
handling of its ships in foreign ports, the USSR, in 1967, began entering
into nondiscriminatory bilateral shipping agreements with such trading
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partners as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Spain.(4)
The USSR also set up joint shipping agencies with local nationals in Japan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Antwerp to handle the local business affairs
of Soviet ships and to solicit cargoes.
Goals for Shipping During 1971-75
18. The new 1971-75 Five-Year Plan suggests a further slowing in
the growth of the merchant fleet (see Table 2). The plan calls for an increase
to 16 million DWT by 1975. At that level the fleet probably would have
surpassed the US fleet and become the sixth largest in the world. By that
time, however, all other currently larger fleets, except the Greek fleet, are
likely to have tonnages at least twice the Soviet level. As a result, the Soviet
share of world tonnage probably will remain 4% at best.
19. To meet plan goals, deliveries will have to approach 4.5 million
DWT, 200,000 DWT more than the level achieved during 1966-70. Although
this would require annual deliveries of 900,000 DWT, well below the record
1.3 million DWT delivered in 1964, it is still greater than the yearly average
since 1966. In pursuing its goal, the USSR will rely both on local production
and foreign purchases.
20. The composition of ship deliveries will change significantly in the
next five years. After 1973 the fleet probably will acquire some
150,000-DWT Soviet-built Mir-class tankers with 56-foot drafts (see
Figure 3). To accommodate these ships, a "deep water port" with depths
~ t '?- , i^ 1 - s~i it c~ .:,.
Figure 3. Sketch of the Planned Soviet 150,000 - DW. T Tanker Mir
4. Nondiscriminatory agreements recognize the right of third party ships to carry cargo
'?.etween the signatory countries.
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Size and Performance of the Soviet Merchant Fleet
1960
1965
1970
1975 Plan
Fleet tonnage
Million deadweight tons
Total
3.9
8.0
11.9
16.0
Absolute increase
4.1
3.9
4.1
Percentage increase
105.5
49
34
Fleet performance
Billion ton-nautical miles
Total
71.0
209.9
353.8
495.3
Absolute increase
138.9
143.9
141.5
Pe
rcentage increase
196
69
40
Mi
llion metric tons carried
Total
75.9
119.3
162.0
204.9
Absolute increase
43.4
42.7
42.9
Percentage increase
Average length of haul
Nautical miles
Total 935 1,759 2,184 2,417
Absolute increase 824 425 233
Percentage increase
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up to 59 feet will be built on the Black Sea near Odessa. The Soviets
also may introduce a relatively large combined bulk ore and petroleum
carrier in the 120,000?DWT' class. This vc: 1 could be used for petroleum
exports from the Black Sea and for coal exports from Vrangel Bay in the
Far East, where a deep water port with a bulk cargo berth for ships of
this size is planned.
21. Although deliveries to the dry cargo fleet will continue to
emphasize vessels of 23,000 DWT and under with speeds of 19 knots and
less as in the preceding Five-Year Plan, a few 50,000-DWT bulk carriers
and one class of 23-knot cargo liners also will be added. The latter vessel -
the "SO-12S" - is a 15,000-DWT general-purpose dry cargo ship with a
steam turbine powerplant (see Figure 4). It is not clear whether this ship
also will be configured in a container-carrying variant.
Figure 4. Plans for the Proposed Soviet 23 - Knot, 15,000 - DWT "SO - 12S" - Class
Cargo Liner
22. Ac least four classes of dry cargo ships planned for delivery will
be full or part containerships. The first of these vessels, two units of the
East German-built Boltenhagen class - Fritsis Gaylis and Vasiliy Kucher -
were delivered in June 1971. Slightly under 1,000 DWT, they are full
containerships and can carry 40 standard 20-foot containers at 12 knots.
The Gaylis is in liner service between Riga and western UK ports; the Kucher
is on the joint Soviet-Bulgarian line between Ilichevsk and Varna on .he
Black Sea.
23. The lead ship of the first class of full containerships to be built
in the USSR - the Sestroretsk - is under construction at the Vyborg
Shipyard near Leningrad. Based on the design of a timber carrier built at
- 10 -
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the same yard, the vessel is 7,000 DWT and will carry 218 standard 20-foot
containers at 16 knots. Although larger containerships with capacities of
300 and 700 standard containers are also planned, no details are available.
Western shipowners are currently operating containerships as large as 29,000
DWT with space for as many as 1,000 standard 20-foot containers and
speeds up to 26 knots.
24. Planned increases in fleet performance during 1971-75 are very
close in absolute terms to achievements under the preceding Five-Year Plan
(Table 2). Cargo turnover is to grow 40% to 495 billion ton-miles by 1975;
cargo volume is to advance 26% to 205 million tons. Shipments in foreign
trade are scheduled to increase 37% to 124 million tons, with an even
sharper increase in shipments on behalf of non-Soviet clients.
25. Soviet plans to secure a larger volume of world commerce for
the merchant fleet were reflected in expansion of overseas liner cervices
in 1971. At least three were opened during the first seven months of the
year: a line l.etween Soviet Black Sea ports and southern France in April;
another between Malaysia, Western Europe, and the Black Sea in May; and
a third line linking Soviet Baltic ports, Western Europe, and the west coast
of South America in July. The only significant gap in the network of Soviet
cargo lines to the developing world is Central America, where the USSR's
trading partners in 1970 were Mexico and Costa Rica. Soviet ships already
call irregularly at Mexican ports, and it is likely, that liner service will be
extended to Mexico and perhaps to other countries in this region. Regular
service to US East Coast ports may also be initiated, now that prospects
have improved for ending the longstanding threat of a boycott by
longshoremen.
26. Along with the introduction of newly delivered containerships on
existing liner routes to Bulgaria and to the United Kingdom in 1971, liner
services from the Far East port of Nakhodka to Japan and from Leningrad
to London have been improved by the introduction of containerships that
are modified conventional dry cargo vessels. Containerships sailing between
the Soviet Far East and Japan carry not only goods in Soviet-Japanese trade
but also transit cargo in Japan's trade with Western Europe moving over
the Trans-Siberian land bridge. Carriage between Leningrad and London
involves both transit cargo between Japan and the United Kingdom and
commodities in Soviet-British trade. Previously, large containers built to
international standards have moved on these routes only on an experimental
basis as deck cargo on conventional freighters.
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Conclusions
27. During 1966-70 the Soviet merchant fleet increased in tonnage
almost 50% and by the end of 1970 totaled nearly 12 million DWT. With
about 4% of world merchant tonnage, the Soviet fleet ranks seventh, just
behind the US fleet. Although more than 65% of Soviet merchant ships
are less than ten years old, the fleet lacks the large tankers, bulk carriers,
and fast, modern cargo liners and containerships that are common to the
fleets of the other maritime powers. Thus the Soviets are transporting many
of their own cargoes inefficiently and are unable to compete in many areas
in the carriage of cargoes for foreign shippers.
28. The USSR intends to expand and modernize its fleet during
1971-75. Planned deliveries, only slightly higher than those during 1966-70,
aim at a fleet on the order of 16 million DWT and include modern
containerships, 150,000-DWT tanke~s, and 120,000-DWT combined bulk ore
and oil carriers. Other maritime fleets are likely to grow as fast as the
Soviet fleet, but the Soviet fleet probably will displace the US fleet from
sixth place by 1975. By that time it will still lag behind other leading
maritime powers in average size of vessels and in numbers of large tankers,
bulk carriers, and containerships.
29. The Soviet fleet will continue to be engaged overwhelmingly in
the carriage of Soviet cargoes, but Soviet maritime officials will seek to
improve the utilization of the fleet by finding foreign cargoes, particularly
for the return voyages of ships carrying Soviet exports. They will also
expand their liner services as a means of earning hard currency and
enhancing their maritime image throughout the world. To facilitate their
seaborne commerce, they will seek to add to the seven bilateral shipping
agreements they now have with non-Communist countries. They are
expected to continue their policy, followed in all except their earliest
shipping agreements (with India and Egypt), of nondiscrimination in the
allocation of cargoes. The Soviets also can be expected to set up additional
shipping agencies abroad, both unilaterally and jointly with foreign
nationals.
30. US seaborne trade, the world's largest, figures prominently in
Soviet plans for its merchant fleet. Calls by Soviet ships at US West Coast
ports almost certainly will increase sharply, and regular calls at US East
Coast and Gulf ports will materialize quickly if the threat of a
longshoremen's boycott is resolved. Not only will the Soviets attempt to
carry a substantial part of their. purchases of US grain in their own ships,
but they would also like to pick up tramp cargoes in US ports for Soviet
ships returning to Europe from Cuba. Shipping relations with the United
12 -
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States are sufficiently important that the USSR has expressed a desire for
a bilateral shipping agreement and has submitted to the US Government
a proposed draft similar in many ways to agreements signed with other
Western maritime powers.
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International Cargo Lines
Serve the Soviet merchant Fleet
30 September
Lines Operated Unilaterally
by Soviet Steamship Companies
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Sweden
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Norway and Denmark
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Finland - West Africa
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Cuba
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Europe - Malaysia a/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Europe - Australia b/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Europe - New Zealand b/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Western Europe - Eastern
Canada a/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Western Europe - West
Coast of South America c/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Netherlands, Belgium,
and West Germany
USSR (Black Sea) - Mediterranean - Eastern
Canada b/
USSR (Black Sea) - Cuba
USSR (Black Sea) - Southeast Asia (including
North Vietnam)
USSR (Black Sea) - Persian Gulf (Iraq)
USSR (Black Sea) - Near East (Mediterranean)
USSR (Black Sea) - Southern France c/
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Lines Operated Unilaterally
by Soviet bteamship Companies
USSR (Black Sea) - Italy
USSR (Black Sea) - Greece and Turkey
USSR (Black Sea) - East Africa - Red Sea
USSR (Black Sea) - Western Europe -
Malaysia 1
Iran (Caspian) - Baltic - North Sea (via
Volga-Baltic Waterway)
USSR (Lower Danube) - Near East
USSR (Lower Danube) - North Africa
USSR (Far East) - Japan - Western Canada
and the United States A/
USSR (Far East) - Japan - Southeast Asia -
India of
Nctionality
of
Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet
Foreign
and Foreign Steamship Companies
Participant
USSR (Baltic Sea) - East Germany
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Eastern Europe - Western
Europe - South America i/
USSR (Baltic Sea) - West Germany
West German
USSR (Baltic Sea; - Netherlands
Dutch
USSR (Baltic Sea) - Belgium
Belgian
USSR (Baltic Sea) - France
French
USSR (Baltic Sea) - United Kingdom (East
British
and West Coasts)
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030005-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030005-2
CONFIDENTIAL
Nationality of
Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet Foreign
and Foreign Steamship Companies Participant
USSR (Black Sea) - Bulgaria Bulgarian
USSR (Black Sea) - Egypt Egyptian
USSR (Black Sea) - India Indian
USSR (Far East) - Japan Japanese
a. An independent tine operating in competition with con-
ference tines on the same trade routes.
b. Conference line.
c. Lines introduced during the first nine months of 1971.
CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030005-2