(SANITIZED)CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TANZANIA: A CASE STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010089-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
.,DIRECTORATE OF
INTE;:LIGENCE
Intell~~ence Memorandum
Chinese Communist Economic And Military Aid To Tanzania
A ~'dse Study
.~~
~~~ ~~
Secret
ER IM 71-137
July ].9 71
Cony: No .
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~VAIZNING
'].",vs document contains information affecting the national
~c?efense of the United States, within the meanuig of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Codc, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GHGUP 1
fe[ludrd from avsomalic
downgrading and
dr[Iasrl~ralion
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S~;C~K.h~T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
TO TANZANIA: A CASE STUDY
Introduction
1. Communist China has established itself as the principal foreign
presence in Tanzania during the past three years. The Chinese are now the
primary source of arms and training for Tanzania's military establishment,
and their $400 million commitment (half to Zambia) to undertake the
Tan-Zam Railroad has catapulted them to a position as Tanzania's most
important donor of foreign aid. Only Pakistan among the Third World
countries has received more Chinese economic aid.
2. The large commitment of the Chinese reflects their determination
to establish a position of paramount influence in Tanzania as a stepping
stone to other areas in Africa. Chinese success in Tanzania stems in large
part from their willingness to tailor their economic aid uncritically to
Tanzanian wants and to support the southern African liberation movements.
This memorandum analyzes the character of Chinese. aid to Tanzania and
evaluates its significance and impact.
Discussion
3. The efforts of the Chinese to develop and expand their influence
in the Third World during the past 15 years have been concentrated largely
on Africa. About half of China's $1.7 billion of economic aid to all less
developed countries has gone to Africa. The Chinese have put so much
Note: Thrs memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research and coordinated withi-t the Directorate of Intelligence.
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of their aid in Africa because they consider that continent to be the most
fertile area for pressing forward with their "struggle against colonialism and
imperialism" arrd for izndermviing Western and Soviet influence. Foreign
aid plays a critical role in their strategy because no other foreign policy
instrument could enable Pelting to establish the presence it feels it requires
to pursue its .objectives.
4. When the Chinese first launched their aid program in Africa, they
channeled their aid almost entirely to countries where Peking considered
the "revolutionary prospects" to be good. But the Chinese found few
countries which met this narrow criterion. During 1959-62, only some $68
million of economic aid was provided to Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.
In contrast, the Soviet Union extended credit to any country willing to
accept it and, by the end of 1962, had committed nearly $430 million
to African recipients. As more African countries al:tained independence and
as Sino-Soviet competition intensified, however, the level of Chinese
commitments jumped sharply. During the next two years the Chinese
extended nearly $210 million of economic aid to African countries, largely
to Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Mali, Somalia, and 'Tanzania.
5. As part of the concerted Chinese effort to cultivate the newly
emerging African countries, Premier Chou En-lai toured Africa from late
in December 1963 until early in February 1964. He hit hard on the themes
that China and Africa had mutual goals, that the West continued its colonial
hold over the continent, and that the USSR was ready to sell out Africa's
interests in order to achieve accommodation with the United States. Seeking
to discredit Soviet and Western aid programs and to underscore what Chou
claimed to be the unselfish motives governing Chinese aid, he put forward
the following eight principals guiding China's aid policy:
1. Aid is dispensed on the basis of equality and mutual
benefits;
2. The recipient's sovereignty is respected, and no
special privileges are sought;
3. Credits are provided interest free or at a low rate
of interest;
4. Chinese aid seeks to help the recipient become
self-relian?;
5. Projects selected will require less investment asicl yield
quick. returns;
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6. The best quality equipment will be providrd at
"international market prices";
7. In rendering technical assistance, the Chinese will
make certain that the personnel of the recipient country fully
master such techniques;
8. Chinese technicians will have the same standard of
living as their job counterparts in the recipient country.
6. By early 1965, African receptivity had begun to diminish in a
backlash of growing Chinese propaganda and subversive activities. Many
Africans, who thought they had accomplished their revolution, were
particularly incensed over Chou En-lai's repeated references to the "excellent
revolutionary prospects" in Africa. Several African countries either severed
diplomatic relations with China or expelled Chinese representatives for
aiding local dissident elements. The subsequent retrenchment in Chinese
aid activities was accompanied by a lowered level of Chinese effort abroad
stemming from the cultural revolution at home. Chinese economic aid
extensions during 1965-69 averaged only about $20 million annually, almost
half going to Guinea.
7. Communist China began to emerge from this self-imposed
diplomatic isolation in 1969 and, during 1970, stepped up its efforts to
repair the damage wrought to its international image. These efforts have
been particularly vigorous in Africa, where extensive diplomatic gestures
have been underscored with the signing of numerous economic aid and
commercial agreements. The Chinese extended more economic aid to the
Third World in 1970 than in any other single year, nearly two-thirds of
it to Africa. The $453 million committed to Africa in 1970 represented
about 55% of all Chinese aid extended to that continent since 1958. More
than $400 million was a,l allocation for the construction of the Tan-Zam
Railroad, the feasibility study and survey for which spannec9 the 1967-69
period. Although still concentrating their aid efforts on potentially
"progressive" countries, the Chinese. have shown an interest in expanding
relations with the more moderate African states.
Why Tanzania?
8. Among. the African countries, the Chinese have chc-sen to make
their biggest splash in Tanzania. They have established their strongest
presence there, and have steadily increased their investment .and their
involvement. Even during the years of their relative political disengagement
elsewhere, Chinese-Tanzanian economic relations continued to expanr~, and
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by the end of 1970 Peking had extended to Tanzania some $255 million
of economic aid and $12 million of military aid. The agreement to undertake
a survey of the Tan-Zam Railroad was signed in 1967.
9. The rapid expansion of the Chinese presence in the country has
been facilitated by Peking's willingness to associate itself closely with
Tanzanian President Nyerere's commitment to the liberation of
white-dominated southern Africa. Nyerere fears possible retaliation from
the south for harboring the liberation movements and may believe that
only the Chinese would be prepared to support him materially in any
confrontation with the countries in southern Africa. This consideration
probably has been crucial in Nyerere's decision to rely almost entirely on
Communist China for military assistance.
10. Nyerere's fears and aspirations thus tend to serve Chinese policies.
Moreover, an almost exclusive military aid position in Tanzania provides
China with access to all southern African insurgent groups based in that
country as well as to the Tanzanian military. The Chinese decision to
undertake the Tan-Zam Railroad illustrates Peking's willingness to take on
a project turned down by the West. It also provides a "showcase" to impress
other African countries with Chinese technical capabilities. Peking also
expects that the project will be viewed elsewhere in Africa as a further
effort to support the Zambian struggle to eliminate its dependence on
Rhodesian and Portuguese African transportation routes.
11. Peking may have an additional reason for developing close ties
with Tanzania. The Chinese are in the process of developing along-range
missile capability. In order to test-fire an ICBM to full-range, the Chinese
would find it advantageous to have monitoring facilities in the proximity
of the impact area. One of the test impact areas Peking almost certainly
is considering is the Indian Ocean off East Africa. Although a Chinese missile
instrumentation ship could operate without port stops, aland-based facility
in Tanzania would simplify the logistical problems. J
Magnitude of Chinese Economic Assistance
12. Chinese Communist economic aid extended to Tanzania since
early in 1964 totals $255 million (see the Table): These extensions account
for about 30% of Chinese economic aid to all African recipients and some
90% of total Communist commitments to Tanzania.
1. The US recently closed down a monitoring complex in Tanzania. While
the personnel and equipment have been removed, the vacated buildings
remain and offer a possible site for the Chinese.
2. The only other Communist countries to provide economic aid to
Tanzania are the Soviet Union (,8'20 million ii: 1966) and East Germany
($S.3 million in 1964 and $1.4 million in 1965).
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Table 1
Chinese Communist Economic Aid Extended to Tanzania
Million US $
Date
Value
Use
Terms
Feb 1964
0.5
Budgetary support.
Grant
Jun 1964
.14.0
Development projacts
Repayment in gooc:c or local
currency over ten years be-
ginning in 1980; no interest.
.
Jun 1964.
28.0
Development projects
Repayment in goods or local
~ ~
~ ~
currency over ten years be-
ginning in 1980; no interest.
cn
~
Jun 1964
3
0
Commodities and foreign
Grant
,~t7
~ ~ .
y
.
exchange
Jul 1964
0.6
Communications equipment
Grant
Dec 1964
0.2
Buses and tractors
Grant
Mar 1966
0.1
University-
Grant
Mar 1966
0.3
Agricultural settlements
Grant
Apr 1966
2.1
Joint shipping company
Repayment in goods or local
currency over ten years be-
ginning in 1977; no intEr~st.
Jun 1966
5.6
Foreign exchange
Repayment in goods or local
.currency over ten years Y,e-
ginning in 1871; no interest.
Jul 1970
200.6
Tan-Zam Railroad
Repayment in goods or local
currency over 30 years be-
ginning in 1983; no interest.
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13. Communist China is the only Communist country which has a
significant on-going economic aid program in Tanzania. Only about $1
million has been drawn on the $20 million of Soviet credits extended in
1966. Although the number of Soviet technicians in Tanzania increased
to about 125 in 1970, they were employed largely on geological survey
and teaching activities on the mainland, The few Soviet personnel in
Zanzibar were replaced by Chinese during the year. The East German
program, which was concentrated on Zanzibar, was terminated early in 1970
because of Zanzibari dissatisfaction with the program. Only about half of
East Germany's $6.7 million in aid had been used.
14. The Chinese extended their first assistance to Tanzania prior to
the union of the two states that now constitute the country. ~ In February
1964, immediately following a January coup which brought to power an
anti-Western regime in Zanzibar, the Chinese provided a $500,000 grant
for budgetary support to that new government. Despite the subsequent
union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964, the Chinese continued
to deal separately with the latter. J The Chinese extended a $14 million
development credit to Zanzibar in June of that year. Less than a month
later, Peking provided the mainland government with a $28 million credit
and a $3 million grant. The major Chinese commitment to Tanzania,
however, was made in 1970 when Peking extended a credit of more than
$400 million -divided equally between Tanzania and Zambia -for the
construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad. The 1,100-mile railroad, which had
been under study for more than three years, is the most spectacular Chinese
aid project and represents the largest Communist financial commitment for
a single aid project in the Thud World.
Character of Chinese Economic Aid
1 S. Chinese economic assistance to Tanzania, prior to the credit for
the Tan-Zam Railroad, was concentrated on small, quick yielding agricultural
and light industrial projects that were labor intensive, required a minimum
of imported capital goods, and made extensive use of local resources. Most
projects have been implemented rapidly. More than two-thirds of the
non-Tan-Zam project aid had been drawn and most of the balance obligated.
Drawings on this aid have averaged about $8 million annually since 1965.
3. Tanzania was created by a anion of the former British-administered
UN Trust Territory of Tangart~~ika and the former British protectorate of
Zanzibar. Tanganyika attairrecl its independence in December 1961 and
Zanzibar in December 1963. The two countries formed the United Republic
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar ir: April 1964, brst changed the name to the
United Republic of Tanzania in October 1964.
4. Zanzibar is, in fact, ,still largely. autonomous.
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The largest single project undertaken is the $15 million Ruvu State Farm.
This project, under construction since late 1966, consists of the development
of 7,500 acres of farmland in the Ruvu Valley, the construction of a
multi-purpose dam and water reservoir on the Ruvu Ri;~er, and the
establishment of a number of animal husbandry programs. Nearly $10
million was allocated for industry, of which $8 million went into the
construction of the Friendship Textile Mill. The mill, which began
operations less than 18 months after construction began, can employ 3,000
workers and ostensibly can meet all of Tanzania's cloth requirements (see
Figure 1). The Chinese also have provided about $10 million in foreign
exchange and $5 million in commodities to be sold locally to finance the
indigenous Tanzanian costs of Chinese development projects.
Chinese Financing of Local Costs
16. One of the advantages of Chinese economic aid is that their
programs often provide long-term financing to cover +he local costs of their
projects. The rate at wI-ich an aid recipient accumulates local funds to
'finance its share of a project often determines the pace of progress on
that project. The availability of such financing has contributed to the rapid
implementation of Chinese projects. The USSR, on the other hand, often
encounters serious delays on projects it undertakes in African countries
because it is unwilling to provide such aid. Moscow usually does not permit
its credits to be used to finance local costs and rarely provides goods to
be sold domestically to raise the local currency.
17. The Chinese generally have provided long-term financing for the
local costs of their projects in Tanzania. In addition to a direct commodity
and foreign exchange grant of $3 million in 1964, about $6.7 million of
the $42 million in project credits extended to Tanzania in 1964 was designed
to finance imports for sale locally to defray the cost of Tanzanian
participation in these projects. Perhaps half the credit for the Tan-Zam
Railroad will be used in this manner.
18. Until recently, Tanzania had little difficulty in selecting and
absorbing such Chinese imports. During 1970, however, accelerating
Tanzanian expenditures for the railroad dictated a need for a larger volume
of imports to finance the required local .revenue. The Tanzanians have
claimed that commodity imports during 1970 were unable to provide the
required local revenue because of high?import prices, poor quality of many
Chinese goods, uncertain shipping dates, and Chinese inability to guarantee
a steady flow of spare parts for some Tanzanian imports of equipment.
Although procurement of Chinese goods was below the required level during
1970, construction was reported to be ahead of schedule. The wage bill
alone was running at a $6 million annual rate. In order to kecli work moving,
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In Operation, February 1969
FIGURE 1. TANZANIA: FRIENDSHIP TEXTILE MILL
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the Chinese had to provide $2 million in hard currency to meet local cost
outlays in the third quarter.
Terms of. Chinese Aid
19. The repayment terms of Chinese aid to Tanzania are almost
unbeatable. Although only some $5 million has been grant aid in the
traditional sense, all credits are long term, extended without interest, and
are payable after grace periods of five to ten years ili goods or local currency.
The $42 million in development credits extended in 1964 are to be repaid
in ten years beginning in 1980. The Tan-Zam credit is to be repaid over
30 years beginning in 1983. In contrast, Soviet and East German credits
carry a 2.5% interest rate with repayment over 10-12 ye4~i~s, starting shortly
after the funds are drawn and usually with little or no grace period.
20. Because of the favorable repayment terms, servicing the Chiniese
debts is not likely to be burdensome. They should be self-liquidating because
of the extended grace periods allowed. Repayments are estimated at less
than $1 million anmially through 1979, will increase to about $5 million
in 1980, and will jump to $12 million by 1983. 'The latter figure is only
about 5% of the present level of Tanzania's total exports. Moreover, not
having to pay interest saves Tanzania substantial sums. The Egyptians, for
example, even with the comparatively low Soviet interest charges, will have
laid ou? some $70 million in interest by the time the $325 million of
Moscow's credits for the Aswan Dam are repaid.
Technical Assistance
21. It is characteristic of the Chinese to flood their aid projec?~ with
large numbers of their own personnel. The labor-intensive character of
Peking's aid has been a key factor in the rapid implemen~ation of Chinese
projects in Tanzania. Although many of the Chinese eventually employed
on the railroad presumably will be skilled technicians who will have to
be engaged in such difficult activities as tunneling and bridge building, they
presumably will be responsible for everything but the unskilled labor. Tate
extensive use of Chinese technicians avoids mane labor problems
encountered under Western and. Soviet programs which depend on local
workers to perform all but the highly skilled atiid professional jobs (see
Figure 2).
22. The number of Chinese employed in Tanzania has grown rapidly
as the pace of Peking's aid activities has accelerated. From about SO
technicians present in 1964, the number increased to nearly 350 in 1967,
to about 800 in 1968, and some 1,000 in 1969 as survey work progressed
on the Tan-Zam Railroad. With the start of construction in April 1970,
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FIGURE 2. CHINESE AND TANZANIANS BUILDING A BRIDGE FOR
THE TAN-ZAM RAILROAD, DECEMBER 1970
FIGURE 3. CHINESE COMMUNIST MEDICAL TEAMS IN TANZANIA
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tho number soared to more than 5,200 by the end of the year and to
9,000 by 'mid-1971. The number working on the railroad is expected to
climb to 13,000 for Tanzania and Zambia combined during the height of
construction in 1973-74. ~ There were some 330 additional technicians
ongaged in other development projects during 1970. Beyond these groups,
an estimated 160 medical personnel were employed in hospitals and clinics
throughoixt the country (see Figure 3). The joint shipping company had
ten Chinese in its Tanzanian operation.
23. The low cost to Tanzania of employing Chinese technicians is
particularly advantageous. Peking bears all foreign exchange costs, such as
transportation and salarir;s of Chinese technicians. This contrasts with the
Soviet and most Western aid programs, which require repayment of
equivalent foreign exchange costs by fhe recipient country for all ter;tnica!
services and associated costs. Tanzania is required to pay only the '%,~al
costs ~ to main!ain the technicians, and these are covered by the Chinese
credit. Moreover, Communist China requires that its technicians live at a
standard comparable to that of their local counterparts, thus minimizing
'local expenuitures.
Impact on Trade
24. Although Chinese-Tanzanian trade is still relatively small, it is
likely to expand rapidly along with Chinese aid activities. Trade between
the two countries, which totaled around $20 million in 1968 and 1969,
apparently jumped sharply in 1970. J This increase stems largely from
the upsurge in imports of material, equipment, and commodities associated
with the construction of the Tan-Zam Railroad. Tanzanian imports from
Cluna during the first five months of 1970 totaled about $11 million, more
than triple the imports for the comparable period of 1969. Tanzanian
exports to Communist China ($3.5 million) were running at double the
rate for the comparable five-month period of both year. At those levels,
the Chinese share of Tanzanian trade would increase almost 10% in 1970
and continue to grow over the next few years as work on the railroad
accelerates.
S. Because most of the early stages of construction are in Tm.zania, only
250 Chinese tech~ticians were in Zambia duri~tg 1970. As the crnnhasis shifts
to the Zambian end, the numbers there will jump sharply.
6. Local costs include board attd pocket money averaging about $SS a
month per man. Also presumably included ure medical care, insurance, and
local transportation and office facilities.
7. Chinese exports to Tanzania it: 1968 totaled about. $12 million and
Imports from that country nearly .8'8 million. Irt 1969 they each totaled
about ,8'11 million. Chinese trade accounted for about 4% of Tanzania's
total trade in both years.
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Economic Aid from the West
25. Despite the growing importance of the Chinese presence, annual
Western aid outlays have continued at a relatively high level. During
1961-69, official Western aid expenditures in Tanzania totaled nearly $365
million. ~ In recent years, Western outlays have averaged about $35 million
annually. Western aid, however, is diffuse and does not carry the political
impact of Chinese aid.
26. The .United Kingdom has spent some $165 million in Tanzania
since 1961 (about 45% of total Western t:id). I.+~n :on's aid gen~eralIy has
been used for a wide variety of small develoc~~j>nf projects anal to pay
the salaries of British expatriates working for the Tanzanian Government.
British aid, however, declined sharply after 1965, when Tanzania broke
relations with the United Kingdom over London's unwillingness to crush
Rhodesia's rebel government with military measures. Altliougli diplomatic
relations were resumed in 1968, no new British aid commitments have been
forthcoming. British disbursements prior to 1965 averaged about $30 million
annually, whereas in recent years they have totaled only about $4 million.
27. US aid expenditures reached a cumulative total of about $70
million at the end of fiscal year 1970. ~ They peaked at $13 million in
fiscal year 1966 but subsequently have been averaging less than $8 million
annually. While the largest share of this aid ($28 million) has consisted
of commodities under the Food for Peace program, about one-third ($22
million) has gone for the construction of a highway linking Zambia with
the Tanzanian Port of Dar es Salaam -the er~:ergency antecedent of the
Tan-Zam Railroad. Most of the remainder of US assistance has been spent
on agricultural and educational programs. International organizations have
spent nearly $40 million in Tanzania, much of it for mineral exploration,
educational and agricultural programs, and the development of electric
power and transportation facilities.
28. Several other Western donors that provided little or no aid prior
to 1965 have since made up some of the decline in British aid. Their outlays
in Tanzania have averaged about $ l :i million annually. The Nordic countries
of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have provided a total of $40
8. Tanzania also benefits from aid provided to the East African
Community (Kenya, Tang ~nia, and Uganda) by the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the World Bank.
9. The fiscal year ends on 30 June of the stated year.
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million; Italy and West Germany have spent nearly $50 million. Most of
these funds have gone for agricultural and educational development and
for the construction of transportation facilities and housing projects.
Canadian econorriic aid outlays have totaled about $10 million since 1964.
In 1970, however, the Canadians committed $14 million for agricultural,
forestry, and electrical power development. Subsequent Canadian
commitments are expected to continue high, at least through 1975.
Military Assistance
29. Tanzanian procurement of military equipment ;n recent years has
veer. confined largely to the Communist countries. Peking has provided some
$12 million, or about 80% of total Communist military assistance provided
since the beginning of 1964. Although the magnitude of Chinese military
iud is comparatively small, it is enabling Communist China to exert some
degree of influence thror~ghout Tanzania's military establis}unent. By the
end of 1970, the Tanzanian arme~9 forces wore being supplied primarily
by Communist China and being trained entirely by the Chinese. Initially,
Nyerere sought to avoid becoming dependent on any single source of
military aid. In ad4ition to the small quantities of arms left t-y the United
ICingdom, he accepted a small 4mount of grant arms aid from Communist
C:1.ina, purchased arms from Australia and the USSR, and brought in an
86-man Canadian contingent in 1964 to reorganize and train the Tanzanian
army. Meanwhile, Zanzibar's 3,000-man army was being trained and
equipped by both the USSR and China,
30. Chinese military influence in Tanzania developed gradually,
beginning with a grant of some $500,000 worth of small rrms early in
1964. Two arms agreements totaling $7 million were concluded in 1966,
followed by agreements of $1 million in 1967 and $4 mi-lion in 1968.
Under these accords the Chinese have delivered light tanks (see Figure 4),
patrol boats, landing craft, antiaircraft guns, and large quantities of small
arms and other military-related equipment. The Chinese also have
constructed an arms repair facility and a police training school. About $8
million o~' Chinese military aid has been provided as direct ,rants; the
remaining $4 million is to be repaid, without interest, beginning in 1983.
The length of the repayment period is not known.
31. Early in 1969, the Tanzanian government decided to unify its
armed forces and place the servicing of its military establishment largely
in the hands of the Chinese. Within a year, the Canadian and Soviet programs
were phased out and the number of Chinese advisers jumped from 220
in 1969 to 380 in 1970. The Tanzanian decision to accept Communist
China as the primary source of military aid presumably was prompted by
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FIGURE 4. CHINESE COMMUNIST T-S,~ MEDIUM TANKS IN
TANZANIA
a variety of factor. Tltc efficiencies stemming from standardization, the
sizable grant portion of Chinese assistance, and Moscow's foot-dragging on
the Tanzanian request for an expanded air force undoubtedly were
considerations. In addition, as Tanzania became ~morc deeply involved in
the African liberation struggle, Nyercre found it increasingly embarrassing
to have white, advisers in his defense command structure. In fact, for sci;ral
years the Canadians had been excl.ided from the guerrilla training camps
in Tanzania and had been told only the necessary minimum about Chinese
military aid activity.
32. The Chincsc moved rapidly into all aims of 't,~nzania's military
cstablisliment after the Western military aid programs were tcrrninatcd. More
than 200 advisers have been attached to infantry, artillery, logistic and
communications units of the Tanzanian PcoplcQ l~cfcnsc Force (TI'D>~) on
the mainland, and an additional 35 arc estimated to be on Zanzibar.
~Scvcnty-five
technicians arc presently supervising construction of a naval facility at Dar
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es Salaam comprising three clocking bcr~.hs for small vessels, a slipway, arrd
about 20 auxlliary buildings. Two borths and sovcral buildings were
cornplctcd ~~y rite end of 1970, and tlic crttirc project is due for complotion
early In 1972.
Conclusions
34. A large portion of the Cltincsc Communist effort to develop
influence in the Third World has been concentrated on Africa. About half
of the $1.7 billion of Clunesc CCOnOm1C aid since the mid-1950s has gone
to African countries. The major target in Afrtica has been Tanzania, where
the Chinese have bccvmc, the dominant foreign presence. Peking is now
Dar es Salaam's primary source of arms and economic aid. The Chincsc
have achieved this position because of their willingness to meet mucl. of
Tanzania's aid requests and to associate themselves openly with Nyercre's
commitment to liberate southern Afric;~ from white domination, i3y
materially supporting Nycrers's aspirations, the Chincsc hype to extend their
influence elsewhere in Africa.
35. Since c;trly in 19G4, the Chincsc have committed $255 million
of economic aid to T;utrania. These extensions account for some 30^!0 of
all Cltincsc cconornic commitments to Africa. t~nly Pakistan among the
Third World countries has received more Cltincsc aid. Peking's assistance
is Being used for a variety of agricultural and night industrial projects, but
its major ecammitment is the $400 million (half to Zambia) it has allocated
for the Tan-Zam Railroad. The terms of Chincsc aid to Tanzania arc
extremely favorable since their credits arc long term, do not carry interest
charges, ai7ow grace periods of five to ten years beforr~ repayment begins,
and permit repayment to be made in Tanzanian goods or local currency.
3t:~. As the pace of Chincsc aid activities has arceterated, the number
of Chincsc technicians employed in Tar,rania has jumped sharply. From
about 50 technicians pre~cnt in 19Ci4, the number rose to 1,000 in 19G9
and rocketed to 9,000 by rnid-1971 as constnrction on the railroad passed
the one-year mark. Tanzania thus accounts for about $0;~ of al! Chincsc
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technical personnel employed in Africa in mid-1971 and over 70% of f}lost,
present in all less developed countries.
37. Peking has provided Tanzania with some $12 million of military
aid ttnd is now that country's solo source of military equIpmcnt and training.
This aid is enabling tho Chinese to exert some dcgreo of influ~cnco
tlvoughout Tanzania's mllItary establislunent. By mid-1971, an estimated
500 Chineso military technicians were training the Tanzanian Peoples
Defense Fork and the newly authorized Peoples Militia. Nearly 350
Tanzanian naval and air force personnCl arc being trained in Communist
China.
38. Although the radical tenor of Tanzania's domestic and foreign
polIcics may permit Peking to continue to increase its Influer,~c in Dar
es Salaam, much of China's future influence will depend un the performance
of its aid program and developments in southern Africa. The Chinese arc
not likely in the next few years, to achieve a position where they can
manipulate Tanzanian polIcics. 'the continuing flow of aid, however,
eventually may create sufficient dependence to circumscribe Tanzania's
freedom of action. Additional Chinese economic and military aid is likely
to be forthcoming as aId projects arc completed and the military
establishment expands.
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