(SANITIZED)THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010081-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 81
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Manpower Situation In South Vietnam
,D
TO
Secret
ER IM 71-129
July 1971.
Copy-N-o.
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WARNING
't'his document contains information alfecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 79.1, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Manpower Situation In South Vietnam
Background
1. As recently as June 1969 the prevailing
attitudes on manpower questions for South Vietnam
were that (a) military manpower requirements might
prove difficult to meet; and (b) some significant
dislocations to the civilian economy might attend
an increased mobilization effort by the GVN. In
retrospect, some of these earlier judgments appear
too pessimistic, for we have not seen clear evi-
dence of either prediction being fulfilled. Cur-
rently, there is generally an increasing confi-
dence in South Vietnam's ability to meet military
manpower requirements and an emerging concern for
local unemployment as US activities in South Viet-
nam are phased down. In addition, current estimates
of pressing social problems confronted by the GVN
invariably refer to the existence of an urban slum
population in which underemployment will be a con-
tinuing problem during the 1970s,
2. The apparent reversal in judgments on South
Vietnam's manpower position is explained for the
most part by imprecision of data, South Vietnam
has never been the subject of a complete national
census, and civilian labor force estimates have
been attempted only for 1960 and 1966, While we
are reasonably confident that the total population
is about 18 million, we are still largely ignorant
of the details of its structure and distribution.
We believe the population is growing at somewhat
over 2.5% although a figure as high as 3% would
still be in keeping with the circumstances. An
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Econ.o?"ic Research and coordinated within the
Directorate of Intelligence.
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overall participation rate on the order of 40% sug-
gests a labor force of about 7 million. On the
basis of limited official success by the GVN in
estimating the available number of draft-eligible
males, we believe that at present some 175,000-
225,000 young men each year reach the age. of 18 to
add to a pool of roughly 2/ million men in the prime
military age group of 18-39 years of age, This pool
represents somewhat less than 15% of the total popu-
lation of South Vietnam.
3. The most significant single change.in the
manpower situation has been increased GVN access to
labor resources in areas formerly dominated by the
Viet Congo An extension of a basic. Vietnamese
problem of longer standing has been the increasing
pressure on limited resources of skilled labor.
This problem has been met by the use of thousands
of foreign (US, South Korean, and Filipino) workers,
some moonlighting on the part.of military personnel,
and the increased employment of women in the civil
service and US-sector jobs. 1/ South Vietnam has
made ever-increasing use of women in other segments
of the civilian labor force as well. At.the same
time, increased pressures for labor mobilization
have resulted in a substantial increase. in the
employment of pre-draft-age youth. Finally, it
should be noted that one significant outcome of
the more effective use of labor resources has been
a major reduction in the traditional underemploy-
ment in the agricultural sector, as large numbers
of rural inhabitants have been called into the
armed forces or have moved to towns and cities, 2/
Survey of the Military Manpower Situation
Overall Manpower Requirements
4, Over the past. three years, the already-large
South Vietnamese military forces have grown substan-
tially. By the end of 1970 the regular and territorial
1. In 1970 it was estimated that over 40% of some
140,000 Vietnamese employed at the time by US
forces and contractors were women, many of whom
held skilled and semi-skilled jobs.
2. A best guess is that about 30%-40% of the pop u-
Zation is now in urban areas the size of district
towns or larger, compared to about 20% in the early
1960s.
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armed forces of the GVN numbered some 1,047,000,
compared with about 643,000 in 1967. In both years,
this force was augmented by roughly 150,000 para-
military personnel.
5. The maintenance of a force of this size
under existing combat conditions and desertion
losses requires an annual inflow of approximately
200,000 "new" men. 3/ Of these, the largest element
comes from the 175,U00-225,000 young men who reach
the age of 18 each year. Allowing for those not
physically fit for induction, this pool probably
provides at least 125,000 men to meet the annual
requirement. Although this represents a substan-
tial loss of healthy workers to the civilian economy,
this loss is offset somewhat by the young men's
gains in work discipline and labor skills in the
service and by occasional moonlighting by military
personnel. 4/
6. Another major source of "new" men is the
circular flow of deserters. Although soldiers may
desert their original units for a variety of rea-
sons, many of them subsequently reappear with other
units. Because of the difficulty of keeping track
of these men, we cannot be sure of their numbers.
Nevertheless, it seems very likely that they account
3. Total recruitment less additions to the GVN's
force level averaged about 230,000 from 1968 through
1970. This annual figure could be expected to fall
to around 200,000 with the continuation of recent
monthly declines in induction or slight reductions
in desertion rates. Although the figure 200,000
would be increased somewhat by further overall
force expansion, current plans do not provide for
any changes that would substantially affect the
discussion that follows.
4. Obviously, the VC recruit from South Vietnam's
manpower pool as well. In the Tet 1968 period when
the VC were able to produce a surge of new manpower
as many as 12,000 men a month were recruited. By
1970 recruitment dropped to probably not more than
3,000 a month. At present there is insufficient
information on which to base an estimate of VC re-
cruitment, but it is clear that VC recruitment has
declined further and is not currently at a level
sufficient to affect the analysis and conclusions
in this memorandum.
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for the remainder of annual recruitment (or perhaps
something on the order of 75,000-,1000000 of the
total),, Analysis of net desertions juxtaposed
against annual recruitment from the existing man-
power pool strongly indicates that something on
the order of 50%-75% of deserters reentered the
military pipeline either with their old or new
regular units or with the territorial forces.
7. Despite the limited data base, we are fairly
confident that the overall annual requirements of
200,000 new recruits can continue to be met without
significant economic dislocation,, This estimate,
however, does not preclude specific manpower prob-
lems at a local level or for particular force com-
ponents.
ional Force Ratios and Problems
8. Historically, the deployment of GVN military
units has been in large part determined by the local
availability of manpower and personnel links with
the population. This has facilitated the heavy
force deployment in Military Region (MR) 3 (in-
cluding Saigon), which has been the area of greatest
GVN control and heavy VC/NVA military pressure.
At the same time, strong local ties have had their
costs. Although the policy of recruiting territorial
forces for use within their own provinces is clearly
in keeping with the broader goal-of discouraging
Viet Cong penetration it tends to make the
occasional relocation in emergency circumstances
more difficult. Even the regular forces are af-
flicted by such problems as large-scale desertions
and significant declines in morale when units are
separated from their dependents and traditional
areas of responsibility,
9. GVN force/population ratios by military
region are shown in Table l,. Some of the factors
underlying these ratios are worthy of note,
a. The highest number of total GVN
military forces and the largest share
of regular ARVN units in the force struc-
ture have always been found in MR 3.
This is partly the result of GVN control,
of the large recruitment base of Saigon
and partly the result of the fact that
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GVN Military Forces in Relation to Population
Military Forces
Population
Military Forces
er
(Thousand)
(Thousand)
p
Thousand Population
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
101.8
163.7
3,230
3,269
31
50
Regular Forces
55.3
81.9
17
25
RF/PF a/
46.5
81.8
14
25
133.0
203.7
3,094
3,290
43
62
Regular Forces
58.8
84.9
19
26
RF/PF
74.2
118.8
24
36
231.6
371.1
4,985
5,602
46
66
Regular Forces
165.3
248.8
33
44
RF/PF
66.3
122.3
13
22
180.5
308.9
5,879
6,409
31
48
Regular Forces
63.0
97.8
11
15
RF/PF
117.5
211.1
20
33
South Vietnam
646.9
1,047.4
17,190 b/
18,570 b/
38
56
a. Regional and Popular Forces (South Vietnamese territorial forces).
b. Population data derived from the 1969 GVN Statistical Yearbook and an
assumed annual growth rate of 2.6%.
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both South Vietnam's command structure and
ARVN's reserve divisions have been located
in the Saigon area. Finally, heavy VC/NVA
pressure has in the past necessitated strong
regular forces in this politically important
region.
b. The ratios for MR 4 reflect past
GVN policy of emphasizing the development
and use of RF/PF units, The support of
regular ARVN units in this area has
traditionally been the lowest in Vietnam.
c. MR 2, which has consistently main-
tained Vietnam's highest ratio of territo-
rial forces to population, is exceeded in
the total forces/population ratio only by
MR 3.
d. MR 1, with a population almost
equal to that of MR 2, has recently main-
tained a smaller number of total GVN forces
per population than MRs 2 and 3. The assign-
ment of most US combat units to the northern
part of Vietnam-has enabled total Allied
forces to maintain a favorable balance to
enemy forces.
10. The problem of regional distribution becomes
more significant as the process of US withdrawal
proceeds. The area most affected by the removal of
US combat forces is MR 1, where from 40% to 60% of
US maneuver units have been located over the past
three years. The regional effect of the US reduc-
tion is indicated by Table 2, in which an index is
computed using December 1967 as a base period to
compare friendly versus enemy force balances by
Military Region. These data, however, are not meant
to suggest specific combat force deficits, but to
illustrate the effect on the main force ratio of
US force current reductions. There are a number
of reasons why both absolute and relative.main
force requirements by Military Region, would be
different than those suggested by Table 2. In
MR 3 the "deficit" shown may bean overstatement
because it does not take into account other factors
which have altered the military balance -- for ex-
ample, the disruption of the enemy's Cambodian
supply network certainly had an important effect
on the enemy's capabilities, but this would not be
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Dec Dec Dec Dec Redeployment) Dec 1970 Dec 1969
1967 1968 1969 1970 Jun 1972 Balance Balance
MR 1 100 99 119 184
U? MR 2 100 129 127 114
C) 1' 11 \ J = ~ . V V J J 1 G V C. 1/
MR 4 100 135 151 201
All SVN 100
South Vietnam: Index of Force Balance a/
= 100 Number of Effective ARVN
Battalions Needed to
Balance Following Regain Prior Balance,
US Withdrawal b/ by Military Region
(No RVNAF
108
100
158
201
37 13
9 17
22 (18 surplus d/)
0 (14 surplus- a/)
a. Re ates on 7y friendly maneuver forces to enemy main and oca combat and
combat-support forces.
b. Calculated with no US combat units and all other forces (including ROK
troops) constant with Dec 1970 deployment. The greatest decrease occurs in
MR 1, reflecting the fact of that region having the greatest share of US forces.
Conversely, MR 4 experiences no change, as no US combat forces are present in
the Delta.
c. Not including GVN Strategic Reserve forces.
d. Indicates that even following US withdrawal the ratio in these MRs would
be more favorable than that computed for Dec 1969.
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reflected in force ratios, Also, as a result of
the growth and development of RF/PF troops and the
decline of the Viet Cong Local Forces and Guerrillas,
South Vietnamese regulars should be able to cope with
NVA main force threats with something closer to
parity. Nonetheless,. the calculated "deficit" for
Military Region 1 of 37 battalions amount to some
25,000 men,
11. In re-achieving comparative main force
balance among regions, GVN options are limited to
combinations of the policies of local recruitment
and regional force upgrading, relocating in. the
north ARVN regular units from the southern military
regions, and deploying South Vietnam's Strategic
Reserve. Some aspects of these policies are out-
lined briefly below.
Local Recruiting and Upgrading
of Regional Forces
12. Comparison of GVN military forces to popu-
lation, by region (Table 1), indicates that MR 1
has a relatively low number of military personnel
per thousand population and suggests that the region
could contribute more to the GVN's military forces.
Specifically, if MR 1 matched -- by increased re-
cruitment -- the relation of forces per thousand
population of the highest area (MR 3), the addi-
tional manpower acquisition would be adequate to
replace all the present MR 1 regional forces so
these might be upgraded to par with regular ARVN
units. Such upgrading would be a lengthy process,
however, and even with an optimistic timetable
would not be completed in pace with US withdrawals.
Further, even this process would compensate for
only about one-half of US strength withdrawn,
Therefore, although future increases in recruitment
from the region seem possible, the compensation for
the reductions in Allied main forces by drawing
more heavily upon the local population must remain
a long-term solution,
Permanent Relocation of ARVN Regular Units
13. Table 2 indicates that the infusion of some-
what more than four regular ARVN divisions would be
necessary to maintain the balance of main forces
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that obtained in December 1970 in MR 1. A reloca-
tion of this magnitud