NORTH VIETNAM'S CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE TO WAGE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: May 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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SECRET
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
NGA Review Completed
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam's Capability To Continue To Wage War
SECRET
ER IM 71-88
May 1971
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
14 May 1972
North Vietnam's Capability
To Continue To Wage War
Introduction
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to assess
North Vietnam's physical and material capabilities
to continue with the war. The analysis focuses
primarily on Hanoi's ability to continue to provide
the human and logistic resources needed to support
increased combat activity against Allied forces.
The parameters of the analysis are those provided
in our recent analyses of North Vietnam's strategic
options through 1972.
2. The manpower requirements range from the
100,000 infiltrators needed to support a continua-
tion of the war at the low level characteristic
of 1970 to the maximum requirement of 250,000-
300,000 needed to support a general offensive
throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia. The logistic
inputs to support the same strategies range from
66,000 tons annually for the low combat strategy
to an estimated 80,000-88,000 tons for the general
offensive strategy.
3. These parameters are used as an expression
of the maximum strains that might be put on Hanoi's
capabilities. It should be remembered that as US
forces withdraw, both the logistic and manpower
inputs needed for any of Hanoi's strategy options
will decline.
4. With the exception of its manpower, Hanoi
has few of the resources needed to support the
war. Consequently, the analysis also presents a
brief survey of the general economic situation in
North Vietnam and the role of North Vietnam's Com-
munist allies in providing military and economic aid.
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I. Impact of the War on North Vietnam's Manpower
5. During the past six years, Hanoi has had
to shoulder an increasingly heavy burden in its
manpower commitment to the war. To put this bur-
den into perspective, we have related Hanoi's
military manpower requirements to its reserves of
physically-fit manpower. The analysis then con-
siders the extent to which Hanoi's manpower re-
serves could continue to support its strategy
options.
Requirements Versus Reserves, 1965-70
6. Approximately 1 million North Vietnamese
men were inducted into military service during
1965-70, a result of both the substantial buildup
in the North Vietnamese armed forces and the heavy
casualties sustained during the war. The size of
the army was doubled in the period 1965-66 in
response to the massive increase in the US presence
in South Vietnam and the bombing of North Vietnam.
Continued heavy recruitment in 1967 and 1968 was
in preparation for, and to offset the casualties
resulting from, the major Communist offensives
during 1968. In 1969 the rate of induction dropped
sharply (see Table 1) as the Communists shifted to
Estimated Number of Men Inducted
into the North Vietnamese Army, by Year
1965
155
1966
260
1967
185
1968
215
1969
80
1970
200
(prelim-
inary)
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a protracted war strategy. In 1970 the induction
rate rose again following the ouster of Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia and the extension of the war
to the whole of Indochina, but it was probably
still below the peak level of the 1966-68 period.
As a result of these induction activities, North
Vietnam's civilian manpower reserve during 1965-70
declined by about one-third to one-half, depending
upon whether the reserve is defined as the 15-39
age group, from which draftees are known to have
been taken, or the more narrow 17-35 age ctroup,
which is apparently the "legal" draft age category.
The tabulation below illustrates the decline in
the manpower reserve during 1965-70:
Thousand Men 1
Year
15-39
17-35
1964
2,000
1,600
1965
1,900
1,400
1966
1,700
1,200
1967
1,600
1,100
1968
1,400
900
1969
1,400
900
1970
1,300
800
a. Physically fit males,
within the indicated age
groups, who are not in the
armed forces.
7. Although substantial drawdowns have been
made from North Vietnam's manpower reserves, the
remaining civilian pool is still quite large in
relation to the size of North Vietnam's armed
forces. In relative terms, Hanoi has managed to
sustain the war with a much smaller commitment of
manpower than has Saigon. As shown in the tabula-
tion below, Hanoi's armed forces at about 600,000
are equal to only one-fifth the total number of
males aged 18-39 in the population. This is less
than the 46% committed by South Vietnam at present
and selected other countries during World War II
and the Korean War.
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Million Men Percent
in the
Males Armed Armed
Country Month/Year 18-39 Forces Forces
United States Jul 45 24.7 12.1 49
United Kingdom Jun 45 8.3 4.7 57
Germany Jun 44 10.3 9.6 93
South Korea Dec 53 3.1 0.7 23
North Korea Dec 53 1.1 0.3 27
South Vietnam Dec 70 2.4 1.1 46
North Vietnam Dec 70 2.9 0.6 21
Future Manpower Requirements
8. The existing manpower reserve in North
Vietnam is adequate to support any of the strategy
options Hanoi might chocse through 1972. If durinrj
the remainder of 1971 and 1972 Hanoi should stay
with its protracted war strategy, its manpower
requirements could be met by holding inductions*
to 100,000 per year without any drawdown of its
reserves. If, however, Hanoi were to embark on
a course that would, as in 1968, require the com-
mitment of 250,000 to 300,000 inductees, the re-
serve would decline substantially, as shown below:
Reserves at Year End
Low Combat
Strategy a/
High Combat
Strategy /
Year
Entering
Reserve 2/
Leaving
Reserve d/
Age
15-39
Age
17-35
Age
15-39
Age
17-35
1971
162
67-68
1,300
800
1,100
600
1972
166
65-66
1,300
800
900
400
a. Supported by induction of 100,000 men.
b. Supported by induction of 300,000 men.
c. At age 15.
d. IncZ,uding those reaching age 40 and those leaving
the reserve through death of decline in physical fitness.
Inductions are equated in this analysis with
infiltration on the assumption that only nominal
changes would be made in the size of the armed
forces kept within North Vietnam.
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9. These calculations undoubtedly overstate
Hanoi's capabilities. There probably is a hard
core of physically fit males of draft age who
would not be subject to induction except in an
all-cut emergency, such as an invasion of North
Vietnam. This would include the most essential
people in the economy and some of the ethnic
minority group members unsuited for military
service because of language and cultural barriers.
Further downward adjustments might be made to
allow for the possibility that estimates of induc-
tion in 1965-70 might have been understated some-
what. These factors taken together would suggest
that if the regime opted for a high level of combat
and carried out such a strategy for a prolonged
period of time, the reserve of draftable men would
be very low by the end of 1972. However, it
should be borne in mind that even in this extreme
case, the regime would still have available for
induction in 1973 a new crop of approximately
130,000 17-year olds and an even larger number if
the pool were expanded to include youths below
the 17-year age limit.
10. In sum, North Vietnam's civilian manpower
pool could sustain indefinitely a continuation of
low-level zombat. A very high level of combat
would make inroads on the pool but would not de-
plete it through the period of this analysis.
Hanoi's View of Manpower Constraints
11. Hanoi, of course, must look to other con-
siderations than mere numbers in making any deci-
sion involving the commitment of its manpower.
North Vietnam has provided an enormous input of
manpower for the war in South Vietnam. During
the period 1965-70, losses are estimated to have
been on the order of 600,000 men. During the
same period, when the able-bodied pool of manpower
in the 15-39 age group should have grown by sev-
eral hundred thousand, it has been reduced from
1.9 million to 1.3 million. The civilian labor
force, estimated to have been about 9.4 million
in January 1965, grew to only 9.9 million in 1971.
Had there been no war, the labor force would have
grown to an estimated 10.6 million. The burden
of the loss fell almost entirely on the agricul-
tural labor force and was less than the number of
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men called to the colors only because of an abnor-
mal increase in the female labor force. The whole-
sale call-up of able-bodied men no doubt had a
qualitative as well as a quantitative effect on
the labor force. The diversion of manpower to
military service combined with the fact that the
economy has not yet recovered fully from the dis-
ruptions caused by bombing explain why gross
national product (GNP) in 1970 was only $1.4 bil-
lion, some $0.2 billion below the 1964 total. Had
there been no war, GNP could have been up by $0.5
billion to an estimated $2.1 billion by 1970, a
substantial portion of which would have been due
to the normal growth of the labor force.
12. By any standard these are losses which
must not be viewed lightly in Hanoi. The heavy
manpower losses sustained during the 1968 offen-
sives were a major factor in the decisions to
adopt the protracted warfare strategy of 1969-70.
Despite the past drain on manpower, there is no
convincing evidence that Hanoi has decided that
the manpower costs of the war are too high a
price. There is, in fact, evidence that North
Vietnam is willing to continue inputs at high
levels and if necessary to augment them. There
has been abundant evidence during the past year
of an acceleration in the recruitment and conscrip-
tion of soldiers, and several such "conscription"
drives have been carried out in recent months.
The regime has specifically reiterated the need
to build up "reserves" in support of the military
activity in the south. We cannot judge specifi-
cally what price Hanoi would be willing to pay
in manpower terms, but we doubt that it would be
as high as that paid in 1968.
13. The weakening of public morale as the
human costs of the war are increasingly brought
home to the people could also be a factor deter-
ring the regime's mobilization plans, but most
signs we observe point to the contrary.
14. While we have never been confident of our
ability to gauge with precision morale problems
in North Vietnam, there are definite periods in
which the regime manifests heightened concern
about such problems -- either by passing new
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security regulations or by devoting unusual propa-
ganda attention to issues that seriously affect
morale. The reports of captured prisoners infil-
trated from the North also help over time to identify
problem areas and issues. None of these barometers
has registered any significant change in the past
six months, and we, therefore, do no''. believe
morale considerations are a significant constraint
on Hanoi today. The morale problems that are
visible in North Vietnam reflect malaise and in-
difference rather than open defiance and circum-
vention. Such problems have been with the North
Vietnamese for years but have never reached the
level where they imposed a constraint on the
regime's ability to prosecute the war.
15. Even without the charisma of Ho Chi Minh
and in the face of new and unusual demands for
support of essentially foreign wars, the Hanoi
regime continues to demonstrate a remarkable
ability to get young men into the armed forces,
to keep its working population plugging away for
small material reward., and in general to extract
a whole host of sacrifices without giving much in
return. The post-Ho leadership is paying lip
service to the need for improvements in living
conditions, allowing the peasant to keep more of
his grain, giving the factory worker piece wages,
and in general looking the other way in the face
of most minor indiscretions and infractions of
law. To the outsider, the North Vietnamese people
seem reasonably content with what they get. There
are continuing reports of corruption, malingering,
draft dodging, and plain inefficiency throughout
the country, but the evidence suggests that the
severity of the problem is fairly constant and the
regime is prepared to tolerate this level.
North Vietnam's Military Training Capability
16. Perhaps the most direct limitation on
North Vietnam's ability to support the large man-
power commitment implied by the "general offensive"
strategy is the capability to train recruits.
North Vietnam conducts basic training for recruits
both in full-time training units and in regular
infantry units that are given a partial responsi-
bility for training. The extent to which the
latter units are used for basic training would
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depend on requirements during any given period,
but the use of these units gives flexibility to
the army's capacity for training. The three
regular training divisons and one training group
have an estimated capacity to train slightly more
than 25,000 recruits in one training cycle, or an
annual capacity to train over 100,000 recruits in
a three-month training cycle. The nine regular
infantry divisions and five regular independent
infantry regiments probably could train as many
as 140,000 recruits annually and still perform
their primary offensive or defensive mission.
In addition, most recruits destined for special-
ized units, such as artillery and antiaircraft
artillery, receive their basic training in these
specialized units. Thus the estimated upper limit
for providing basic training to new recruits would
be on the order of 250,000 annually. If Hanoi
were to opt for the general offensive strategy,
at least a year and possibly more would elapse
before all the troops necessary to support such
a strategy could be adequately trained for combat.
The apparently high rate of induction in 1970,
however, would indicate that North Vietnam may be
well along in its military training programs.
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II. The Rear Supply Base
17. A major and essential part of the supplies
with which the enemy has waged war in southern
Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia must come from
or through North Vietnam. The relatively modest
tonnages directly related to the war-making
capability of the enemy forces in these theaters
are estimated for the 1971-72 period at 66,000
tons annually for the low combat strategy and at
some 80,000-88,000 tons for the general offensive
strategy. Some of these supplies will be provided
by North Vietnamese industry and agriculture, but
much will come from North Vietnam's allies -- the
USSR and Communist China.
18. North Vietnam's capacity for the production
of war-making and war-supporting goods is small.
The ordnance branch of industry produces a limited
number of light infantry weapons, mortars, grenades,
and some ammunition, but no other types of military
hardware. From the
activities described in
open literature, i is evident that the ordnance
industry is primarily engaged in repair of weapons
and only nominally engaged in production. Domes-
tically produced war-supporting goods include food-
stuffs, materials for uniforms, and pharmaceuticals.
Repair shops of the machine building industry are
capable of maintaining all forms of transportation
used to carry men and supplies to the south, but
the country cannot produce the large quantities of
vehicles required by the war effort.
19. Thus North Vietnam is heavily dependent on
foreign aid from Communist countries. During
1965-70, imported foodstuffs accounted for as much
as 15% of annual food supplies; virtually all mili-
tary equipment had to be imported; and the lack of
resources or of domestic capability necessitated
imports of all the petroleum, vehicles, steel, and
most of the machinery that was needed. Reconstruc-
tion of bomb damage would be practically impossible
without foreign to:hnicians and imported industrial
equipment.
20. Except for manpower to fill military in-
duction requirements and to man the logistics pipe-
line, therefore, North Vietnam's economy contributed
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minor material resources to the war effort. A mini-
mum viability in the economy is mandatory, however,
to preserve order and stability in the country's
social structure, to sustain an adequate standard
of living for the populace, and to insure for the
regime a relative degree of independence in the
conduct of international affairs. In th4.s regard
the government's task is made easier by the simplicity
of the economy, which is predominantly agricultural
with a substantial small-scale industrial base and
the nucleus of a modern industrial sector.
Current Status of the Economy
21. In the two years since the bombing halt,
North Vietnam's economy has made modest overall
advances. Although output has not yet reached the
pre-bombing level, the economy is in a relatively
better position now to contribute its share to the
war in the south than it was two to three years ago.
By the end of 19 70 , output had recovered to about
85%-90% of pre-bombing levels in both industry and
agriculture in contrast to the low points of 65%
for industry in 1967 and 80% for agriculture in
1968. GNP increased by about 6% in the past year,
reaching an estimated $1.4 billion, or 90% of the
GNP in 1964 of $1.6 billion. At the current growth
rate, total output could reach pre-bombing levels
in two more years.
22. Hanoi has not made restoration of the economy
a first-priority item, reflecting both the concen-
tration on the war and, obliquely, the relative
unimportance of the domestic economy to North Viet-
nam's ability to continue waging war. The slow rate
of recovery may also be attributed to a combination of
factors such as the drain of trained manpower into
military service, failure to eliminate production
bottlenecks, the inefficiencies resulting from
dispersal of industry, and a reluctance to rebuild
without assurances that the bombing will not be
renewed.
Indus try
23. Recovery in industry continues to be hampered
by slow progress in repairing damage to modern plants,
particularly electric power stations. The gross
value of industrial output, however, reportedly
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increased by 5.5% in 1969 and about 6% in 1970,
bringing total industrial output to an estimated
85% of the 1964 level. Output of local industry,
which contributed about one-half the value of total
industrial output prior to the bombing, reportedly
increased during the past year by 4.3%. The decline
and subsequent partial recovery of production in
some of the modern industrial branches is shown in
Table 2.
Transportation
24. Steady improvement and expansion of trans-
portation facilities continued in 1970.* Enlarge-
ment of shipping berths- and new warehouses at the
port of Haiphong neared completion. A substantial
railroad realignmcnt project was finished on a
ten-mile section of the Done Dang-Hanoi line, near
the border with Communist China. In the Panhandle
of North Vietnam, construction continued on new
branches and extensions of the two petroleum pipe-
lines extending into Laos. In addition, a new
and larger pipeline system was begun in the northern
part of the country near Hon Gai. The type of
construction involved suggests that the system will
be a permanent oil transport medium, providing a
possible alternative to the current oil import
procedure at Haiphong.
Labor and Productivity
25. Efforts are being made to augment the labor
force in the face of continued manpower drains.
College and vocational students are required to en-
gage in production on a part-time basis, and a
conference was called in February 1971 to mobilize
more women for the labor force. In addition, until
troops are sent out of North Vietnam they are re-
quired to take part in construction, industrial
production, and agricultural harvests.
26. Much stress also was placed on reducing the
inefficiencies engendered by decentralization and
Further discussion of the buildup of logistic
facilities is presented in Section IV.
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Indicators of Industrial Output in North Vietnam
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Million Kilowatt Hours
Electric power
570
520
300
350
450
510
Thousand Metric Tons
Coal
4,000
3,600
2,500
2,800
2,800
2,900
Cement
660
665
200
120
250
330
Apatite
853
350
200
250
250
350
Chromitea ore
12
Negl.
Negl,
5
3
2
Iron ore
400
300
80
30
30
100
Pig iron
200
150
40
15
15
50
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lax management practices of the bombing years.
Criticism of low labor productivity began in
1968
and rose to a crescendo in 1970. The regime
is
trying to improve the situation by stimulating
labor and management to greater efforts. Wage
schedules are being reviewed to reflect skill and
effort more realistically. In industry and con-
struction, piecework wages have been instituted and
probably will spread rapidly. Plans also call for
a transfer of people from administrative duties
to production activity.
Agriculture
27. Agricultural output rose in 1970, with out-
put of milled ri.u estimated at 2.9 million tons,
about 7%-B% above output in 1969 and not far short
of the 3.0 million tons produced in 1965. Pro-
duction of subsidiary food crops is believed to
have paralleled the recovery in rice production.
The regime has been only marginally successful in
getting the peasants to resume cultivation of in-
dustrial crop acreage left fallow during the bomb-
ing years, but the regime in 1970 claimed increases
in acreage as well as yields of a number of crops
in this cats gory, including peanuts, sugar cane,
tobacco, and cotton.
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III. Support From North Vietnam's Allies
28. Imports from Communist countries, financed
primarily by credits and grants, have provided
critical support for North Vietnam's industrial
development program and for reconstruction of
bomb-damaged facilities, as well as for maintaining
minimum standards of living for the populace.
During 1955-64, Communist economic aid amounting
to $950 million financed about two-thirds of N_'rth
Vietnam's imports and provided the capital and goods
necessary for the development of North Vietnam's
modern induw;trial base (see Table 3). During 1965-
70, economic aid in excess of $2 billion financed
about 90% of North Vietnam's imports. In addition
to developmental aid, North Vietnam has had to rely
heavily on commodity assistance to offset shortfalls
in domestic output and to maintain an adequate level
of consumer welfare. Imports of foodstuffs soared
from less than 80,000 metric tons in 1966 to nearly
800,000 tons in 1968 when imports provided nearly
one-sixth of North Vietnam's total food supply.
Impor?cs of metals and metal products, machinery and
equipment, and' transportation equipment more than
tripled in quantity and rose even faster in value
during 1965-70.
War-Making Goods
29. Estimated deliveries of military aid in 1970
fell to $155 mi.Llion from $225 million in 1969,
continuing the downward trend frcm the 1967 peak
of $650 million. Communist China for the first time
became the predominant supplier of military aid as
deliveries from the USSR dropped even more precipi-
tously than deliveries from China. China provided
about $85 million of military aid in 1970, accounting
for about 55% of the total, while Soviet aid amounted
to about $70 million. The East European Commnunist
countries continued to supply only negligible amounts
of military aid. Military aid from China in 1970
was down to about 60% of the 1967 peak l'-'el of
$145 million, while Soviet military aid was less
than 15% of its 1967 peak level of $505 million.
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 Million US $
1954-64
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970 a/
Total
950
150
275
380
480
470
535
3,240
365
85
150
200
240
250
360
1,650
455
50
75
80
100
90
95
945
130
15
50
100
i4
130
80
645
155
2,290
70
210
360
505
290
120
70
1;625
70
60
95
145
100
105
85
660
Negl.
Neg1,,
Negl.,
Negl,,
Negl,
Negl.
Negl,
5
c/
1,090
420
730
1,030
870
695
690
5L530
435
295
510
705
530
370
430
3,27!;
525
110
170
225
200
195
180
1,605
130
15
50
100
140
130
80
650
a. Preliminary.
b. Military data show value at Soviet foreign trade prices of weapons, other
military equipment, and ammunition. They exclude aid for the construction of
military installations and defense-related facilities.
c. The cumulative value of deliveries from Eastern Europe.
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War-Supporting Goods
32. Deliveries of economic and military aid have
served to insure adequate stockpiles of essential
materials as well as to meet current requirements.
Although no precise quantification of North Vietnam's
reserves of essential economic or military goods
is available, there is a great deal of evidence to
support the general conclusion that stockpiles in
general are sufficient to satisfy requirements for
at least six months. Except for food and fertilizer,
Hanoi probably has ample supplies of economic goods.
For example, it appears likely that inventories of
trucks and other war-supporting material are main-
tained at levels sufficient to permit drawdowns to
meet any foreseeable contingencies. Petroleum
supplies are estimated t, be equivalent roughly to
three months' consinption.
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Outlook
33. Both Moscow and Peking have indicated their
willingness to continue deliveries of economic aid to
North Vietnam and to expand deliveries if necessary.
Agreements have been signed to provide economic, tech-
nical, and military assistance to North Vietnam through
1971 from all its major aid suppliers, and the Chinese
even signed a supplementary aid agreement with
North Vietnam following the South Vietnamese in-
cursion into Laos.
34. There is no doubt that Communist countries
are capable of supplying Hanoi with whatever it
needs to pursue the war at present levels or to
expand the fighting to the point where either man-
power or logistics constraints would come into play.
For example, China delivered 150,000 tons of grain
to North Vietnam in 1970, down 270,000 tons from
the 1968 level because of a slight recovery in North
Vietnam's production of rice and increased imports
of wheat flour from the USSR. if Peking were to
increase deliveries to the 1968 level, enough additional
food would be provided, other things being equal, to
offset the production that would be forgone by the with-
drawal of 200,000 men from the agricultural labor force
for military service.
35. While we know much less about the Soviet
and Chinese Communist military assistance activities
and plans than about their economic aid to North
Vietnam, it seems clear that, without question,
the Communist countries are capable of providing
North Vietnam through mid-1972 with the military
equipment needed to continue the war at present
levels or to expand the action to the point where
North Vietnamese manpower or logistics constraints
would become operati?re. The 1970 level of military
aid is less than 25% of the 1967 peak, and deliveries
could quickly be expanded to meet any likely in-
crease in the level of military activity. In the
event that either of North Vietnam's major allies
were to demur -- for poil'tical reasons -- from
meeting Hanoi's economic and military supply
needs for the type of war it is fighting in South
Vietnam, the other could easily go it alone.
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IV. North Vietnam's Logistical Base
36. During the past year and a half, the lass
of the Sihanoukville route as well as the active
air and ground challenges to the enemy's use of
the Laotian Panhandle have placed important ob-
stacles in the way of North Vietnam's support for
its troops in Cambodia and South Vietnam. However,
the lesson that the logistical history of the
Indochina war has taught is that the enemy has
been willing and able throughout to commit the
necessary resources to maintain a viable, flexible,
and sometimes redundant system through which to
channel supplies to the combat arenas in South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Throughout the Saar,
the Communists have worked continuously to build,
maintain, and expand a complex overland logistical
system capable of providing support to their forces
in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Even during
the US bombing campaign in 1965-68, the system
proved surprisingly durable: rapid repair and
reconstruction of bombed structures and the new
construction of other facilities enabled the enemy
to weather the destruction and to meet logistical
objectives. Since the bombing halt in the fall of
1968, the system has been improved so that at
present, war-supporting supplies -- most of which
are imported from other Communist countries -- are
moved quickly and efficiently to dispersed storage
areas throughout North Vietnam, particularly the
southern part of the country, which present few
lucrative targets for air attacks.
37. Improvements to the port of Haiphong now
allow berthing space for some 11 ships, and con-
gestion, once a major difficulty, has been virtually
eliminated. Since 1965 the railroad network has
been increased by nearly 15% to about 750 miles,
and the quality and quantity of rolling stock and
locomotives have been increased. The North Viet-
namese are now engaged in rebuilding the rail
tramway system that will extend from the Vinh area,
the terminus of the main rail network, some 58
miles to a rail-to-water transshipment point about
75 miles north of the DMZ.
38. The highway network was also extended during
and after the bombing. About 1,500 miles of new
roads added to the network since 1965 included at
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least six new or improved border connections to
Communist China and two new connections to southern
Laos. The import of trucks annually
since 1967 has been generally adequate to maintain
the total truck inventory despite the heavy losses
in North Vietnam and Laos,
39. North Vietnam's inland water network has
also been expanded and improved, and hundreds of
steel-hulled barges, LCMs, and self-propelled fuel
urges have been imported. North Vietnam's fleet
of coastal vessels has also become a most important
mode of moving supplies directly from Haiphong to
the southern river ports at Vinh, Quang Khe, and
Dong Hoi.
40. As mentioned earlier, the North Vietnamese
have constructed and continually improved a petro-
leum pipeline network. The main north-south system,
first observed in 1968, extenca.s from Vinh through
Mu Gia Pass into southern Laos. This system was
recently linked within North Vietnam to a second
system which extends from the river port at Quang
Khe in a southwesterly direction into Laos west of
the DMZ. The pipeline system frees a substantial
number of trucks that would otherwise be needed to
move petroleum into Laos and considerably reduces
the vulnerability of moving petroleum to bombing
* North Vietnam currently maintains an extensive
truck park within its borders. However, precise
quantification of the total inventory icult
owing to the un-
certainties a ou truck Losses resulting from
bombing, Nevertheless, photography indicates
clearly that the Communists have sufficient vehicles
to maintain the war effort, and there is every rea-
son to believe that North Vietnam's allies will
continue to provide a steady flow of vehicles to
maintain the truck park.
Recent photography has identified some 40 dis-
persed active storage and maintenance facilities
containing some 6,800 cargo trucks. Other recent
photography over Hanoi and Haiphong revealed about
3,600 trucks in these two cities. Thus the 40
facilities and the two cities alone contain some
10,400 trucks. On the basis of this evidence, we
estimate that the total inventory could be on the
order of 15,000-20,000 trucks.
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and adverse weather. The system has an estimated
length oi: more than 250 miles and a theoretical
throughput capacity of up to 2,000 tons per day.
This capacity exceeds total nationwide consumption
and is far in excess of present needs in the area.
41. The substantial effort made by the Commu-
nists during the past decade to maintain and im-
prove their North Vietnam logistics base has been
largely successful. Even during the bombing cam-
paign, the rear base functioned effectively to
sup;,ly forces in Laos and South Vietnam. The sys-
tem is flexible and elaborate with considerable
built-in redundancy, and its capacity far exceeds
current use. Through 1972 it will continue to be
upgraded and focused on support of out-of-country
c,nmbat forces. With sustained imports of military
and transport equipment from other Communist coun-
tries, the system should continue to be successful
in moving supplies southward,
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Conclusions
42. Assuming a determination on its; part to
ovrsist with the war in Indochina, North Vietnam's
capability to do so depends heavily on sustaining
a flow of men and supplies to the military fronts
in Indochina. In addition to providing overall
.. Lf;adership, Hanoi's principal contributions to the
ww-ir have been its inputs of trained military man-
power and the organization and maintenance of a
viable logistic system. The military supplies and
war-supporting goods needed to carry on the war are
provided almost exclusively by the USSR and
Communist China.
43. In terms of either human or material inputs
the burdens imposed on Hanoi over the past six
years have been manageable and, for the most part,
acceptable costs. Moreover, the resources available
to North Vietnam for continuing with the war are
clearly adequate to support any of the strategic
options that Hanoi's Jeadership might choose to
follow through 1972.
44. North Vietnam's manpower resources continue
to be adequate and could support a considerable
military expansion. At the present time, there
are from 800,000 to 1.3 million physically fit men
in the civilian reserves, depending on whether the
age span of the pool is defined as ranging from
17 to 35 or from 15 to 39. The military induction
necessary for the enemy to continue to support the
low levels of fighting in the south characteristic
of 1970 would result in no drawdown of this pool.
The considerably larger induction necessary to
support a general offensive in South Vietnam and
Cambodia would cause the civilian reserve to drop
by some 200,000 by the end of 1971 and by a similar
amount by the end of 1972 if the high rate of in-
duction were maintained throughout the next year.
A possible limitation on Hanoi's choice of a high
combat strategy during the next year or so might be
the problems inherent in the annual recruitment
and training of the 250,000-300,000 troops which
would be required. However, the apparently high
rate of induction in 1970 -- on the order of 200,000
men -- would indicate that North Vietnam may be well
along in its military training program.
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45. Although Hanoi has the raw capability to
make an annual commitment of as much as 300,000
personnel over the next two years at least, other
factors may dampen enthusiasm for such an undertaking.
These include the fact that at least 600,000 North
Vietnamese have already been killed in this war.
In addition, an offensive strategy requiring the
commitment of as many as 300,000 men would un-
doubtedly involve heavy casualties. We cannot
judge specifically what price Hanoi would be willing
to pay in manpower terms, but we doubt that it would
be willing to undertake a sustained offensive
throughciit South Vietnam and Cambodia that cost as
much as the 1968 offensives.
46. North Vietnam provides only a small part
of the military and war-supporting goods needed to
carry on the war -- and some of the necessary food,
uniforms, and medicines. North Vietnam's economy,
partially recovered from the bombing years, is fully
capable of continuing this limited level of support
without difficulty.
47. The major part of the supplies with which
the enemy has waged war in Indochina has come from
the USSR End Communist China. These countries should
find little difficulty i"1 continuing ?-- or even in-
creasing -- such military and economic assistance
related to the war. .ring 1965-70, North Vietnam's
allies provided economic, aid in excess of $2 billion
and military aid of a sii;.ilar order of magnitude.
Estimated economic aid for 1970 of $535 million is
about 14% above the 1969 luvel, and, while it repre-
sents a record high, it in no significant way taxes
the economic capabilities of the donor countries.
Military aid for 1970 -- $155 million -- is only
about one-fourth of the record high for such
assistance provided.
48. Finally,, the successful implementation of
Hanoi's strategies will, in the future, as in the
past, depend upon the enemy's ability to move
supplies to the military fronts. While the enemy
faces more complex logistical problems now than
at any time in the past several years, it seems
likely that the system, both in North Vietnam and
in the Laotian Panhandle, can continue to support
the requirements of the battlefields.
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