THE PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE IN 1970 AND THE OUTLOOK FOR 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600040050-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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,,~a
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Perf6rmance Of soviet Agri~~~l~ure !n 1970
~ nd ~"he Outlook For 1971
~~ , ; ,
Da fddT DESTROY
Sacrst
ER IM 71 49
March 1971
Copy No. J~
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'W~iZNING
'I'bis document CUntn1115 InfUf[na11011 nllcctinl; the nntionnl
defense of the Unit(~d Stntcs, within the mcnnin~ of 'I'itlc
1K, sections 7J3 an(1 7~4, of the l-S Codc, as nmcnded.
lts transmission ur revelntiou of its coutcnts to or rr.-
ccil~t by t-n nnnuthnrixeci lx~rson is lrrohihitc(1 by law.
r oeour i
IGduJrJ Iron.. ouro TOrl,
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CEIJTI2AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1971
The Performance ~f Soviet A riculture
In An T e Out oo For
Introduction
Generally favorable growing and harvesting
conditions for crops boosted net Soviet agricultural
production in 1970 to a record level. The ending of
the 1966-70 plan period with a bumper harvest, in
contrast to the poor growing conditions in 1965,
artificially inflates improvements in agriculture
for the 1966-70 period as a whole. Thus Brezhnev
will go to the 24th Party Congress in March forti-
fied by a p3ausible image of the success in his
farm program.
Highlighting the 1970 agricultural performance
were the record outputs of grain, cotton, and meat
and an upswing in the site of livestock herds.
Despite the improved overall performance of the
fs:m sector during the past year, the increase in
output of quality foods was too small to permit a
marked improvement in the Soviet diet during the
1970/71 consumption yaar (1 July to 30 June). Even
at relatively high retail prices, supplies of meat
and some other quality foods available at retail
outlets are far short of satisfying the expanding
demands of Soviet consumers.
This memorandum (1) assesses the magnitude of
overall 1570 farm output and its princiFal compon-
ents -- crop and livestock production, (2) Qxamines
recent developments affecting the domestic supply
and consumption of meat in 1970 and the first half
of 1971, and (3) reports the probable level of
Soviet trade activity in grain products during the
1970/71 trade year.
Nota: This memorandum gas prepared by the Offioe
of Eeonomio Researoh.
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Overall Performance in 1970
1. Preliminazy estimates i~,zdicate that Soviet
farm output in 1970 increased by more than 11$
over the depressed 1969 level send surpassed the
previous record high attained ;Ln 1968 by 6~$.
The good performance in 1970 was highlighted by
an increase of more than 12$ i,fi crop production.
In comparison, livestock products grew less than
4~$ (see Table 1) .
2. The major increase iri total crops in 1970
reflected the results of record harvests of grain
and cotton and a recovery fxom depressed levels
of output in 1969 of sugar k>eets, fruit, vegetables,
and potatoes. Record yields of grain and cotton
were due in part to unusually favorable growing
and harvesting conditions r-nd in part to a boost
in the use of mineral fert:Llizers~ These same
factors indirectly led to an imprcved performance
in the livestock sector. A jump i?z the availabil-
ity of both feed grains sold other types of fodder
permitted a simultaneous gain in output of meat,
milk, eggs, and wool and a sizable increase in
herds. The overall value of livestock inventories
at the end of 1970 was at an alltime high.
Grain Production
3. The 1970 grain crop, estimated at 150 mil-
lion metric tons, the ].argent in Soviet history,
was 22 million tons above the mediocre harvest of
1969 and 10 million tons above the previous high
recorded in 1966. The, spurt in grain output in the
last year of the Eight;,h Five-Year Plan raised the
annual average level -of grain production in 1966-70
to 135 million tans, approximately the level pro-
mulgated under. the or,?iginal Brezhnev Program for
1966-70 ar.d 278 above; the average annual level
achieved in 1961-65.
4. On the average, weather and growing condi-
tions in the period 1966-70 were markedly better
than during the first half of the decade. During
1966-7~ there was a single year of exceptionally
favorable growing and harvesting conditions (1966),
another above average year (1970), one year of
more or.' lEBS Normal weather (1968) , and two subnor-
mal ye%ars (1967 and 1969). However, the earlier
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Table 1
USSR: Production of Major Crops, Livestock
Products, and Change in Herds
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Annual Rate of Growth
'
(Percent)
Total value a/
B.6
-1. 1
b.4
-4. 1
1,1. Z
Crops 15.0
1.1
7.3
-8.1
12.1
Livestock products 7.0
6.0
2.1
-1.8
4.3
Change in livestock
herds 2.7
-1.9
-1.6
1.1
7.0
Million Metric Tons
Grain
140
122
135
128
150
Potatoes
88
95
102
92
97
Sugar beets
74
87
94
71
78
Cottar~
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.7
6.9
Vegetables
17.9
20.5
19.0
18.7
20.3
Meat
9.4
10.1
10.2
9.9
10.4
Milk
71.4
75.1
77.4
76.6
77.9
Eggs (billion)
31.7
33.9
35.7
37.2
40.4
a. grzou tuna output oi? as s an ome oonaumptzon net
of uses of farm produota as axed and lives took feed. The
data for crops are based on production gross of uses of
grain and potatoQa for feed. In the indexes used to derive
the rates of 8ro~th, 19Be price ~sighte have been used in
aggregating the phbaioat output of Drops and animal products,
including ohangsa in inventories of livestock. Price r~si8hta
for 1969 hays been substituted for 1960 price heights, here-
tofore used tin oon-puting our index of Soviet agricultural
output .
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period included two years of exceptionally poor
growing conditions (1963 and 1965) not matched by
any year in the last half of the decade. In addi-
tion, 1961-65 did not include a year as favorable
as 1966.
5. As a result of the larger area of wheat and
rye harvested, the output of bread grains increased
relatively more in 1970 than did that of feed
grains. Therefore, supplies will be ample to meet
domes~~ic needs for high-quality bread supplies in
1971 and to fulfill current export commitments to
Eastern Europe and other client states.* In ad-
dition, the USSR will be in a position to enhance
its earnings of hard currency by a moderate expan-
sion of grain sales to Free World customers.
Finally, as the result of a somewhat larger supply
of grain for feeding, the regime will be able to
effect a boost in the output of meat and other
livestock products in the first half of 1971.
Factors Affecting the 1970 Grain Crop
6. The total area from which the USSR harveste~9
grain in 1970 is believed to have been slightly
below the 1967-69 average of about 122 million
hectares. In comparison with 1969, the acreage of
winter grains** harvested in 1970 increased by an
estimated 7 million hectares while spring grains***
declined by about 9 million hectares. This repre-
sents a shift to a more normal balance of acreage
between winter and spring grains, canceling a
change in the pattern that occurred in 1969. Be-
cause of unusually Heavy winterkill that year,
harvested acreage of the higher yielding winter
x T e term client state denotes a etose bilateral
political relationship. CZie nt states o f the USSR
ineZude the fo Z Zoning: the East European countries
(exctudiny Albania and YugosZavial, Cuba, North
Vietnam, North Korea, the United Arab RepubZie, and
Algeria.
x" These are grains eo-~n in thQ fall; minter
raheat, minter rye, and minter bartey are ineZudad.
FaZZ ao~n grains normaZty account for aomervhat morQ
than one-third of total grain output.
"*'~ Spri.ng seeded grains include spring reheat,
spring barley, oats, corn, buokrvheat, ms Ztet,
pulses, and rice.
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grains was reduced sharply and an additional 10
million hectares of spring grains were planted.
7. In 1970, less than optimum conditions for
the growth and development of winter grains occur-
red during portions of the crop year. Because
seeding was late and soil moisture supplies were
relatively low in the fall of 1969, the crop in
some areas failed to obtain the usual degree of
growth and development before the onset of winter.
Moreover, fall sown crops over widespread areas
suffered from prolonged cover of heavy snows and
ice in later winter. However, the effect on winter
grain yields was more than offset by the early ad-
vent of spring and above-normal levels of soil
moisture which provided a long period of develop-
ment under generally favorable conditions. Subse-
quently, excellent weather conditions during the
harvest in most of the winter wheat belt limited
losses to below-normal levels. The overall favor-
able growing and harvesting conditions, combined
with increased fertilizer, expanded use of improved
seed varieties, and improved cropping practises
resulted in a relatively large output of winter
grains.
8. Sowing of spring grains got off to an early
t~tar?t with excellent reserves of soil moisture.
Nearly all important spring grain areas received
a significantly above-normal accumulation of pre-
cipitation between the fall of 1968 and the aarly
stages of growth, and with few exceL~tions soil
moisture remained adequate during the season. The
most notable exceptions were in some southern areas
o~ the New Lands, where precipitation in mid-summer
tapered off to below the normal level, causing
crops to suffer from inadequate moisture, and in
the northern portion of the New Lands, where cool
rainy weather postponed ripening. As a result,
the bulk of the harvest in the latter area was
de??ayed into early autumn, which, as usual, was
marked by increased precipitation and the arrival
of snow. Adding to the harvest difficulties in
the New Lands was the excessive growth and lodging
of grain.* Thus, in contrast to the high quality
~ T e term lodging describes the oonditionR re-
sulting when stalks bY~~eak or bend and form a
flattened or tangled mass ~hioh is diffieuZt to
harvest.
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of grain harvested in the winter wheat belt, a
significant portion of the New Lan3s grain crop
may have suffered some deterioration of quality
before harvest and during storage. Despite these
problems, yields of most spring seeded grains
registered record high levels in 1970.
Production of Other Crops
9. After four years of stagnation, production
of cotton in 19 70 j umped by more than 16 8 above
the average attained in 1966-69. Since acreage
remained virtually unchanged, the record level of
output reflected a spurt in yields. The cotton
crop benefited from unusually favorable weather
from planting through the harvest, as well as a
record high application of fertilizer and better
irrigation practices.
10. The much larger output of cottonseed oil,
an important by-product of the cotton crop, will
partly offset a decline in output of vegetable oil
from the major oilseed crop, sunflowers. For the
second year in a row, both the yield and the
average oil content of sunflower seed declined.
The availability of sunflower oil from the 1970
crop may be as much as 158 below the record yield
of 1968 and 9$ below 1969. Growing conditions
during 1970 were characterized by a shortage of
soil moisture in late summer in some important
regions and by poor ripening and harvesting weather
in others.
il. The output of potatoes was the second
highest in Soviet history next to 1968. On the
other hang, the availability of beets for sugar
refining remained somewhat below the average for
1966-69 and 17$ below the record level attained
in 1968. Growing conditions were less than ideal
for root crops. Wet sad cool growing weather in
important potato-growing areas hampered plant
development and encouraged diseases while sugar
beet growth was restricted by a hot, dry period
in late July arld August .
12. Production of fruit and vegetables in-
creased significantly in 1970 with the output of
the latter approximately reaching the previous
high of 1967. The failure Hof fruit output to re-
gain the peztk output of 1968 reflected the
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continuing effect of widespread destruction of
fruit-bearing trees during the unusually severe
winter of 1968-69.
Livestock Production
13. In contrast to the 12$ increase in output
of crops, the production of major livestock prod-
ucts in 1970 increased at less than half that rate.
Nevertheless, output of meat, milk, and eggs did set
new records in 1970. Most importantly, after two
years of stagnation and decline, meat output rose
by 58 in 1970.
14. Official policy encouraged the expansion
of livestock herds in 1970 at the expense of
slaugrtering. Hence the increase in siza of herds
during 1970 (see Table 2) is more impressive than
the increase in livestock products. The 20$ in-
crease in hogs places inventories slightly below
the recora lEVel reached at the end of 1962. Total
cattle holdings are now a+: an 311time hig'~.
15. The livestock sector got off to a good
start in 1970. After two years of decline, overall
inventories of livestock at the k~eginning of the
year were up slightly, higr.lighted by a 14$ in-
crease in hogs. More important, there is evidence
that the regime had authorized the release of a
considerable quanfi?,ity of grain reserves frc+m
government-held stocks for feeding livestock.
These reserves, in conjunction with a somewhat
greater quantity of feed grain available from the
1969 crop, more than offset the lower supplies of
other concentrates such as oilseed cake and of
succulent feeds such as potatoes and silage. In
addition to the augmented carryover of feed from
1969, the early spring permitted a long pasturing
season. Finally, the same favorable growing con-
ditions that resulted in a record gzain yield led
to a higher production of h.ay, silage, and other
forage crops.
16. A major spurt in private holdings of hags
in both 1969 and 1970 -- up 28$ in two years --
apparently reflects a change ii: official policy
toward individual ownership. Ti~~ most important
factor in the slowdown and stagnation in output
of meat and other livestock products in the 1968-69
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USSR: Change in Livestock Herds
1961-65
Annual
Average 1966 1967 1968 1^ 969 1970
Annual Rafe of Growth of Val~1e
(Percen
Livestock inventories
Total r31ue 3.1 2.7 -1.9 -1.6 1.1 7.0
Socialized 3.4 3.0 -0.5 -0." 3.9 8.3
Private 2.3 2.1 -5.3 -3.; -6.0 3.2
Million Head~End of Year
Number of livestock
Cattle 87.0 97.1 97.2 95.7 95.2 99.1
Hogs 58.0 58.0. 50.9 49.0 56.1 67.2
Sheep and goats 139.3 141.0 144.0 146.1 135.8 143.2
period was the absolute decline in output of the
private sector. Faced with rising consumer demand
and the need to expend foreign currency an imports
of meat, the regime has recently decided to en-
courage private holdings of at least hogs by rais-
i;~g prices paid to producers and by accelerating
the sale of young pica and feed to individual
households. In February 1970, prices paid to
private producers of pork and poultry were increased
on the average by 35$. The government's purchase
price for an individually owned hog now exceeds
the equivalent state retail price (expressed in
live weight) by about 30$. In other vaords, the
private producer clearly has an incentive to sell
to the state and to satisfy his own personal demand
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for pork and pork products through purchases from
state retail outlets.
Recent Develo men+;s in the Su lv and Demand
or Meat
17. Although the Sot-iets claim that the meat
production target for the Eighth Five-Year Plan
(1966-70) was overfulfilled, retail supplies in
the last two years have fallen far short of demand.
Ev~.dence of the population's unsatisfied demand was
manifest in (1) lengthening queues in state stores,
where prices are fixed, (2) an increase in the number
of reports of complete absence of supplies of meat in
selected urban centers, and (3) rising prices in the
collective farm market (CrM), where prices rise and
fall according to demand and supply. TYie apparent dis-
parity between supply and demand reflects the
planners' underestimation of the soviet consumers?
des:~re to change more rapidly the composition of
his diet from starchlr staples (bread and potatoes)
i;o meat and other quality foods. In addition,
increases in money incomes beyond plan goals for
the period 1966-7U provided a further impetus to
demand.
1~. The slow growth of meat supplies since 1967
has beers accompanied by signs of unsatisfied demand
especially in 1969 and 1970. Beginning in mid-1969
there were sporadic reports of prolonged local
shortages. A strong upward trend in C~'M meat
prices for the country as a whole was suggested by
a 168 rise in Moscow markets between January 1969
an3 January 1870. Early in .197 the regime took
steps to augment domestic supplies of meat by
purchasing considerable quantities of meat from
major Frae World exporters.* Incomplete trade re-
turns for 1970 indicate that purchases for hard
currency came to at leapt 100,000 tons (aFprox-
imately $50 million).
19. The moderate improvement in meat supplies
in 1970 -- up 68 pPr capita -- failed to reduce
~ Between 1986 and 1868 the USSR 'was a net exporter
of meat, with oeZeeted client at,ztes ae the main
recipients. In 1969 and 1968, meat imports mare
Zees +han ~O,000 tons, with nearZ~ atl imports
originating from Eaat European client states.
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noticeably the market shortage. In the final
quarter of the year, Cb'M meat prices i.n riascow were
3$ above the corresponding period in 1969. More-
over, severe shortages and, frequently, total
absence of meat from state retail outlets in pro-
vincial cities continued to be reported throughout
the year. In two-thirds of the nearly 70 cities
~visitQd by diplomatic personnel in 1970 meat sup-
plies were either not available in state stor9s
or available in limited yuantities.*
20. Faced with a high level of u^satisfied
demand for meat, the regime has recenicly contracted
for further purchases from Free World suppliers.
Purchases of 80,000 tons far delivery in the first
half of 19 71 have been reported by reliable sources
with indications that total imports for the year
will exceed. those of 1970.
PrOBpects of Grain Trade
21. The record 1970 grain harvest will permit
the USSR to continue for the' fourth year in s~ic-
cession its traditional role as a net exporter of
grain. In addition to meeting its commitments to
Eastern Europe and to its ot:~er client states in
the current trade year, the USSR a.s in a position
to affect a moderate boost in exports to the Free
World. Net exports, which averaged nearly 4 mi~-
lion tons in 1967-68, jumpod to more than 6~S mil-
lion tons in 1969 but are estimated to have fallen
below 5 million tons in 1970. Purchases of grain
from Canada caused net exports to drop in 1970
even though ~~otal shipments probably continued
near the 1969 level (see Table 3) .
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USSR:
Exports,
I:~nports, and Net Trade in Total Grair. and Wheat a/
Thousand ASetric Tons
Annual Average
196C-63
1964-66
19~'---68
1969
1970 b/
1971 ~/
Exports
Total grain
7,402
4,228
6,493
8,076
7,600
9,500 to 10,500
Of which:
Wheat
5,108
2,579
5,473
6,803
N.A.
N.A.
Imports
Total grain
1,86"/
8,275
2,564
1,387
2,350
1,200
Of which:
Wheati
1,341
7,820
1,914
417
2,000
350
Net trade d/
Total grain
-5,535
+4,047
-3,929
-6,689
-4,750 -8,300 to -9,300
O~ which:
Wheat
-3,767
+5,241
-3,559
-6,386
N.A. N.A.
a. Inclu zng four (conz~erte into grain equZVa ants y using a 72~ estractzon ratel,
rice, and grouts.
b. Preliminary estimates.
c. Projected.
d. A plus sign denotes net impcrts; a minus sign, net exports.
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Soviet Grain Imports
22. Although the Soviet Uniun continues to
import some grain, it does so only as a convenient
way to supply its client states, its own remote
areas (such ae the Far East regions), and its own
preference for special types of grain. Although
1.8 million tons remains to be purchased under a
long-term agreement with Canada, the prime soucoe
of Soviet imports, purchases during the current
trade year probably will be limited to shipments
of 350,000 tons of Canadian flour (wheat equivalent)
to Cuba. Purchases from other sources will prob-
ably be limited to the usual small imports of rice
and corn.
Soviet Grain Exports
23. Moat of the USSR's grain exports go to its
client states (see Table 4). Although the figures
remain incomplete for 1970, it appears that ship-
ments to the East European clients may have declined
by 5$ to 10~ from tihe 4~ million tons exported in
1969. Poland has announced that the USSR will.
deliver a record 'million tons in 1971, or nearly
twicee as much as in 1970. Unconfirmed reports
indicate that Soviet shipments to Czechoslovakia
and East Germany, combined, will exceed the
deliveries in 1970. In addition, the adverad im-
pact of the 1970 floodo on grain production has
forced Romania to become a net importer during the
current trade yeare ReFortedly, Romania has re-
ceived a Soviet loan of 200,000 tons of? wheat,
possibly as ~ barter arrangement for corn (maize)
or as a wheat payment in-kind in the future. The
total East European demand for imports from all
sources for the current trade year is estimated at
ak?,out 8 million tons, more than 25t above the
relatively high level of 1969/70. The increased
demand reflects the need of the northern coun-
tries ??- Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland --
and Ron;ania for larger imports because of rising
domestic demand coupled with a large shortfall in
production.
24. Other major recipients of Soviet grain
exports are Cuba, Egypt, North Korea, and North
VieY.nam
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Tebla ~
UBgRt Exports of drain, by country
of D?stination
- - --
-
ThouAand Mletric Tons
Annual Average
...
_._.
1960-63
196
~-66
19~
151
Tatar
y,lG2
_
~
~1, ~'~B
8, IB3
~, p7$
East?rn Europa
I,S22 ~
2,915
3,7'32
4,431
Csachoslovakia
1,417
1,101
1,386
1,383
East Germany
1,814
1,131
1,222
1,Id8
Poland
783
3G8
97K
1,272
Hungary
262
131
189
28~
Bulgaria
99
78
--
--
Romania
26
133
--
--
United Arab Republic
--
67
819
301
Cubs 1
162
792
908
910
North Vi~atnam
12
G
28S
130
North Koran
112
73
178
1.71
Coaamunist China
13B
--
--
--
Other
2,iS6
315
711
1.813
tt. ~~'fd~~Il~1 ~"i~ ~~f3~11" ~Ll~?hZlo!'!;o~ ! r!!~3 ~' i'-4 r9 ci~:r2 s7 r1 ; cv, `Q l"p
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v ? ? ~' F' a -- .. ? r pi ~ -
~?. Pn/tl.~d ry,s AZb,~ne a o+sd ~:.;lrTa ~I~s+: a.
t't~to1' ~ret~ 3rni'~~ gtski'[top r'r~'i r..,!1ci ar*~~':~+~`.
A. Cube. ait~ast ~antir~l~v dppetat7~tat
on the UBEit for ialaart~d grain and fl+~vr.
v i 11 rr~c~e i ve a~hov t 1 tl~i i l ~ on tons ~ r- 19' 1 .
About onQ-half of chase rhipa~rits ate
expe+ctgd to origin~ata fst~as the #"'ro~ aosi+3
on Soviet acc~ountg l~rarring the rent to
shilpP~ 8it~rtly fttaA- the t~tSit.
b. t ??i ii prtbably i~ort vt
250.000 toxin of iiovi~c grain. ~ba~t the
ease level as in recee~t yoarr but sasrkedly
1 we r than tb4 1 si 111 on tons r+r A t~-~d i n i t ~ 7 .
s~ ~R ~:~r
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001600040050-2
 Approved For Release 2005/C~6f,2~~~1/#jRDP85T00875R001600040050-2
r. Shipment+~ to North Karen w! 11
probably be maintained at or slightly
above the 14 70 level ref 1 S0 , 000 to
700,000 tans.
d. North VintnaM'a need fear impe~rted
~Can~]gtuffg will +~ontinue at a relatively
high level through 1971, with shipments s~f
flvbr from the Soviet Union probably rea~h-
ing SS0,000 tong (grain equivalent) for the
year, only slightly lags than in 1Sr70.
25. to edditidn to the firt:~ commit.mentg of 7
million tong eatia-ated td be supplied by the UStilt,
the ~li.ent states t~utgide df Kagtern >uurop+~ will
need t+~ import over l million tone from other
gdurueg. The p~ggibility rep~aina that, given the
uncertainty c,f alternative supply arrangetaanta,
the JSSq may supply its client ge:ateg with amore
grain than called for in regular trade cc~ma+-ita-ents
and direst gales.
76. T?tal gales to the I~t'ee world during the
~:urrent trade year vi 11 probably b~ only mtiderst+~ly
ewe th~* high point r+ra~he8 in the last half of
the 14+~Oa -- 1. $ ai 11 ion tang in 1464. Srrvfet
~+xparta +~[ grain to free o~orld cauntrieta v+ere
relatively s>