SOVIET NEED FOR US AND WESTERN ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030165-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 165
• Publication Date: November 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Need For US And Western Electronics Technology
ER IM 70-154
November 1970
Copy No.. 71
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WARNING
This docurru'nt uonlains information a(feet ing the national
defense of the United Status, within the meaning; of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as ani raided.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an nnalllhori%1'd person is prohibited by law.
R Xl'111 /'MUN AUTOMATIC
Ir)u NUIIAI,No ANI,
Ill ~:I.AM %lP II,A TIUr,_____
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1970
Soviet Need For US And Western
Electronics Technology
Introduction
The capability to produce large numbers of
integrated circuits (ICs) has permitted the United
States and other nations of the Industrial West to
enter a stage of electronics technology that is
still essentially closed to the USSR and Eastern
Europe. The strategic and economic advantages of
ICs come from their ability to increase the relia-
bility and dramatically to lower the size, weight,
power consumption, and cost of complex electronics
equipment. Moreover, the reduction in total cir-
cuit length in computers equipped with ICs
materially increases computational speeds.
The mass production of the integrated circuit
is the most recent stage in the rapid advance of
US electronics component technology. The produc-
tion process for monolithic ICs embodies a refine-
ment of the planar and epitaxial growth techniques
developed originally for the production of silicon
planar epitaxial transistors. Silicon crystals
rather than those of germanium are used in this
process because of the possibility of forming in-
sulation layers of glass on the active silicon
surface by oxidation.
Today, ICs are extensively applied in the
United States in computer circuits, industrial
controls, avionics, communication equipment,
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Scientific
Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Research.
RF.C.R FT
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consumer entertainment products, and desk calcu-
lators. This technology made important contribu-
tions to the US moon landings. The still more
advanced instrumentation packages to be carried by
US space probes in the 1970s and 1980s will incor-
porate IC technology.
Mounting evidence indicates that the lag of
the USSR behind the United States in the technology
of integrated circuits production is at least five
years. The USSR seeks to reduce its lag in this
strategic industry by importing Western technology.
Manufacturers of electronics production equipment
in several, West European countries now have the
capability and appear willing to give technological
assistance to the USSR and Eastern Europe in the
field of IC production. Such assistance would re-
quire the unanimous consent of the other partivi-
pating countries in COCOM because IC technology
is currently under multi-lateral trade embargo.
It is expected that an "advanced state-of-the-art"
in IC production in the USSR and Eastern Europe
will be alleged increasingly by those participating
countries who wish to obtain exceptions to existing
COCOM regulations on IC technology.
This memorandum assembles the available evi-
dence and draws conclusions respecting the ability
of the USSR and Eastern Europe to produce inte-
grated circuits on an industrial scale. No state-
ment in this memorandum is intended to imply that
the USSR lacks the capability to produce limited
numbers of custom-made ICs of advanced design for
special military or space projects.
The Technological Garr) and Its Basis
1. The USSR and the East European countries
appear to lag at least five years behind the United
States in state-of-the-art in the large-scale
production and application of integrated circuits.
The lag is not primarily the result of failings
of Soviet science. It exists despite the fact
that Soviet scientists '.lave experimented for many
years with IC devices and with the technological
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processes required for IC production and undoubtedly
have the capability to produce limited numbers of
advanced devices. The USSR has also had available
US technical literature, which clearly outlines
the properties of IC devices and their potential
for advancing electronics technology.
2. The Soviet lag can probably be ascribed
largely to the Soviet incentive system. Soviet
plant managements are extremely reluctant to intro-
duce major innovations into a stable production
program because of the virtual certainty that out-
put (and thus bonuses) will be adversely affected,
at least in the short run. This built-in feature
of Soviet economic life has slowed the participa-
tion of the USSR in every new phase of the tech-
nological revolution in electronics during the
last 20 years. The lack of Western-developed
management and industrial organization techniques
has also contributed to the lag.
3. The substitution of transistors for vacuum
tubes appears to have been resisted in the USSR by
component producers and users alike. Knowledge
of the application of semiconductor devices seems
to have spread very slowly among rank and file
engineers. Designers of electronics equipment
continued to specify vacuum tubes which they
understood and trusted; users of electronics equip-
ment also preferred vacuum tubes for themv reli-
ability.
4. A strong military requirement for tran-
sistors did not develop in the USSR at the same
time that it did in the United States. The Soviet
ground forces standardized on field radios fitted
with vacuum tubes. Compact, man-carried radios
are fitted with subminiature tubes. Soviet mili-
tary aircraft were fitted with vacuum tube radio
gear long after Free World air foxces had shifted
to transistorized equipment. Silicon technology
for transistor production got its boost in the
Free World from the military requirement for de-
vices that would be more reliable under difficult
operating conditions than those made from germanium.
Because the Soviet military did not demand tran-
sistorized equipment, it provided little impetus
for the development; of silicon devices.
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5. The need for small, lightweight, lower
power electronic equipment for on-board guidance
of Minuteman ICBMs stimulated the development of
ICs in the United States in the early 1960s. The
feasibility and reliability of the technique was
established at that time. A parallel need for
integrated circuits, however, was not recognized
in the Soviet military/space program. The USSR
developed large boosters for ICBMs and space
probes, and, because of ample payload capacity
early in the program, the Soviet Union was not
forced to miniaturize electronics packages to the
same extent as the United States.
6. Little was done in the USSR toward estab-
lishing an industrial-scale capacity for ICs
until the priority need for large numbers of
high-speed computers emerged in the mid-1960s.
At that time, the Soviet Union found its elec-
tronics industries in a very unfat-.orable position
to undertake IC production. Large amounts of
high-purity monocrystalline silico.i were not
available. Little experience had been acquired
in producing semiconductors by the planar epi-
taxial process, and the high-volume production
equipment necessary for a rapid buildup of IC out-
put capacity had not been developed. Development
of semiconductor production in the USSR was almost
certainly retarded by COCOM embargo of both vital
raw materials and technology.
7. In the United States, computers probably
have been the most important influence leading to
high-volume production and low unit cost for ICs.
The average unit cost of integrated circuits pro-
duced in the United States dropped from $18.50 in
1964 to $1.29 in 1969. During this period, factory
sales increased from about $40 million to nearly
$500 million and from 2.2 million units to 252.9
million.*
* These figures do not include large numbers of
ICs which are incorporated into end items by the
component producing firm, and hence not reported
as IC sales.
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Soviet Progress in 2C Production
8. in 1965, ;alien the USSR belatedly recognized
the need to esteoi ish industrial-scale production
of ICs, it apparently did not have an adequate
capacity for supplying high-purity monocrystalline
silicon. This deficiency arose because the Soviet
Uni_-n was very slow in adopting silicon as a trans-
istor material. Although some silicon transistors
are produced in the USSR, and Soviet planar epitaxial
silicon transistors have been made since 1967,
almost all transistorized Soviet electronic products
contain only germani% transistors, a rather clear
indication that progress in applied silicon technology
continues to be slow. Delay in shifting from ger-
manium to silicon as the basic transistor material
is obviously a fundamental cause of the present
primitive state-of-the-art in Soviet IC production.
In contrast to the Sobiet experience, progress in
silicon technology in the United States was rapid.
Factory sales of silicon transistors increased from
275 million in 1965 to 935 million in 1969 while
factory sales of germanium transistors declined
from 334 million to 208 million in the same period.
9. It is sign ifiCant that silicon planar
epitaxial transistors first appeared in Soviet semi-
conductor catalogs only in 1967, seven years after
their annual sales in the United States had reached
$100 million. it was, coincidentally, in 1967 that
the Soviet Union first offered to export monocrystal-
line silicon. Although some samples were sold,
a major sales effort Was not mounted. The sub-
stantial purchases of monocrystalline silicon by
Hungary from Free World countries in 1969 and 1970
suggests that the USSR still is unable to export
significant amounts of adequate purity for IC use.
Raw materials of this type still remain COCOM
embargoed subject to an administrative note for
certain types.
10. Evidence has dppeared from time to time
that the Soviet IC production effort has long been
stalled in the prototype stage. In early 1966,
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the USSR was trying to develop a process for packag-
ing hybrid ICs in large transistor cans, a tech-
nique well established in the United States at
least three years earlier. At an electronic com-
ponents show in Paris in April 1969 and again at a
show in London in May 1969, the USSR exhibited
more than 200 types of ICs. The technical brochures
handed out at the shows indicated that, with few
exceptions, the Soviet ICs were typical of those in
production in the United States four years earlier.
Events subsequent to the shows suggest that the USSR
had exhibited prototype devices which it intended
eventually to produce on an industrial scale.
11. A Soviet representative at the Paris show
claimed that 150,000 ICs would be available for
export in 1969. Soviet trade officials rejected
all purchase orders throughout 1969, however, and
later announced that none of the USSR's ICs would
be available for export in 1970 because of strong
domestic needs.
12. In late 1969 a number of US scientists and
engineers visited Soviet semiconductor plants.
The most advanced production technology was seen
at the Svetlana plant in Leningrad. Svetlana is
the USSR's most important component plant. To-
gether with its branch plants it has been given the
status of a Main Administration under the Miniatry
of Electronics. Plant officials indicated that
Svetlana has the principal responsibility for
providing semiconductors for the Soviet computer
industry, and in 1970 the plant apparently is
attempting to establish industrial-scale production
of digital ICs for new models of computers. Sev-
eral US visitors were shown samples of ICs, but
none of the visitors was shown IC production facili-
ties. One US expert on semiconductors and ICs
reported that the ICs shown to him were laboratory
prototypes. Some idea of the level of unsolved
problems at Svetlana can be gained from the state-
ment of a plant official that the overall yield
of usable devices from the plant's production line
for silicon planar transistors was only 10% to
15%. This compares very unfavorably with current
yields of 80% in the United States. The principal
weak spots noted in production technology at Svetlana
were the low level of automation and the poor testing
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equipment (the USSR has been trying to procure
test equipment from the West). It seems likely
that efforts are under way to put ICS into pro-
duction at other component plants as well.
13. In June 1969, during an official reception
at the US Ambassador's residence in Moscow, an
official of the USSR's State Committee for Science
and Technology was asked by an officer of the US
Embassy when the USSR would produce "third-genera-
tion" computers. He replied, "When integrated
circuits become available." This statement is
particularly significant because the USSR has an-
nounced a RYAD third-generation computer, compatible
with the IBM 360 series, which currently is based
on ICs, although early models were not. In the
meantime, IBM has gone to a 370 series embodying a
more advanced type of integrated circuit -- the
LSI or large-scale integration development.*
14. Thus in 1970 the USSR is attempting to m-ve
ICs from production on an institute or laboratr..y
scale onto the industrial production line. The
production of major items of electronics equipment
incorporating ICs, and the quality and number of
items, will depend on the success of the'new Soviet
IC production facilities now being established.
* LSI depends for its successful implementation
on metal-insulator-semiconductor (MIS) technology.
This most recent development in microcircuitry
permits significant simplification in the produc-
tion process for microelectronic circuits. Should
the USSR decide to introduce this form of circuitry
widely, it could satisfy a large part of its needs
for microelectronic circuits. The USSR is aware
of MIS technology but so far has shown no inten-
tions of introducing it rapidly on an industrial
scale as it is attempting to do with monolithic
ICs. The substitution of MIS circuitry for ICs
would entail a considerable redesign of electronic
products which have been designed for monolithic
ICs. Moreover, a number of the difficult problems
associated with production of monolithic ICs are
also present in the production of MIS circuits.
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Production of Advanced Semiconductors
Lags Fn Eastern Europe
15. The East European countries have been slow
in developing advanced semiconductor production
technology. The slow pace of development may be
explained, in part, by a lack of cooperation among
the East European countries, and by the Soviet
failure (or inability) to honor its technical aid
commitments. In theory, the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA) directs cooperation in
semiconductor development and production through-
out Eastern Europe under the leadership of the USSR.
Under CEMA, the Academies of Science of the member
countries have working agreements for the exchange
of research results and production technology. In
practice, however, the exchange of information
between East European countries takes place only
when it is mutually desired. Moreover, Soviet
practices have discouraged rather than encouraged
cooperation. For example, the USSR not only has
failed to provide CEMA members with promised guid-
ance and technical assistance, but also has made
a practice of exploiting the best results obtained
by the other member countries and has assigned
such tasks to them as will benefit the Soviet semi-
conductor program.
16. Czechoslovakia and East Germany are the
only East European countries that have made tan-
gible progress in advanced semiconductor produc-
tion. Czechoslovakia has developed a small range
of linear and digital (monolithic) ICs which are
now being produced in small quantities. The East
Germans are producing miniaturized silicon planar
epitaxial transistors and have developed a variety
of linear and digital microcircuits using thin-
film passive and discrete active components.
However, despite the Czech and East German gains,
production on a commercial scale of advanced semi-
conductors (particularly monolithic ICs) in any
East European country probably will not be achieved
in the next few years without equipment and tech-
nology from the West.
Soviet and East European Strategy to Obtain
US Technology for IC Production
17. in recent years the USSR has become very
conscious that the "technology gap" between itself
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and the industrially advanced countries of the
Free World has probably been widening. In addi-
tion to a rather ineffective "scientific reform"
program, which is intended to speed up the intro-
duction of innovation in industrial production,
the USSR has mounted a campaign to obtain advanced
technology from the Free World. A major result of
the campaign is the conclusion of agreements with
the United Kingdom and France for scientific co-
operation and exchange of technological informa-
tion. Within these agreements the USSR will de-
velop strong pressures for the acquisition of
advanced technology that is not presently avail-
able to Communist countries, because of COCOM
controls. For example, the agreement on techno-
logical cooperation between the UK Ministry for
,'ethnology and the USSR State Committee for Science
and Technology calls for cooperation in the field
of numerical control and computer control of ma-
chine tools. Modern Free World numerical control
equipment typically'embodies integrated circuits.
Such cooperation by UK firms probably would re-
quire exceptions to COCOM regulations because the
more advanced forms of numerical control (contin-
uous path control) are embargoed. However, inte-
grated circuits embodied in non-embargoed equip-
ment can now move to the USSR and the East European
countries.
18. In 1968 the USSR plainly showed its in-
terest in obtaining massive Western assistance
for its lagging computer and semiconductor indus-
tries when it discussed an industrial and techni-
cal cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom
which would license the Soviet computer industry
to produce the ICL-4 series of computers (third-
generation computers, compatible with the IBM-360
series) together with the necessary components,
including integrated circuits. However, the
agreement was not consummated, and the USSR de-
veloped plans to produce the Soviet-designed RYAD
series of computers (also compatible with the IBM-
360 series) with participation. in the production
program by all the CEMA countries. The RYAD pro-
gram provides for Western participation also,
primarily in the'area of production of peripheral
equipment and provision of software.
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19. The RYAD program is lagging, and inadequate
production of ICs is a major reason for the lag.
This fact was reconfirmed in 1970 when senior of-
ficials of IBM visited the USSR at the request of
J.M. Gvishiani, Vice-Chairman of the State Commit-
tee for Science and Technology of the USSR. The
USSR was interested in receiving assistance from
IBM for its computer industry and proposed to pay
IBM in ICs, providing the firm would assist the
USSR in establishing a semiconductor facility.
IBM officials left the USSR with the judgment that
the Soviet Union lagged far behind the United
States in all stages of computer manufacturing.
20. The technology of semiconductor ICs is a
uniquely American development. The rapid spread
of this technology.t.o the major industrialized
nations of the Free World has been achieved largely
through license agreements and through subsidiaries
of TJS firms abroad. Although several Free World
countries are now making progress in developing
an indigenous IC capability, all these countries
continue to rely on US firms for some types of IC
production equipment.
21. Since the early 1960s the East European
countries have sought semiconductor production
technology in the West. In 1969, for the first
time in COCOM, approval to export equipment and
technology to Poland for the production of silicon
planar epitaxial transistors was granted in re-
sponse to a French request. Some items, useful
in such production, are now approved for export
to Eastern Europe on an ad hoc exceptions basis.
Romania has been seeking IC production technology
from British and US firms, and there are indica-
tions that Romania may have recently acquired
some US integrated circuit production equipment
through illegal transactions.
22. The continuing lag of the, Soviet and East
European countries in reaching commercial-scale
production of ICs and their mounting concern over
the consequences of further delays have made these
countries more active in seeking Western assistance.
This has created a very attractive potential market
for Free World countries -- so attractive, in fact,
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that despite the strategic importance of this
technology and its embargo status under COCOM,
several West European ccuntries are exerting
strong pressure in COCOM for permission to export
IC production technology to Eastern Europe. For
example, in June of this year, France submitted
an exceptions request to COCOM for the export of
11' production technology to Poland, and in July
the UK submitted a request to export part of a
small-scale IC production line to Hungary. Recently,
West Germany asked the United States for its reac-
ti,tn to a contemplated German request to export IC
technology to Poland.
23. Approval by COCOM of the French and British
requests would have important immediate as well as
long-run implications. Initially, it would almost
certainly lead to additional requests to export
such technology to Communist countries. It would
insure a reduction in the technology gap between
the Free World and the Communist countries in ad-
vanced semiconductor technology, particularly
since most of the contract proposals call for con-
tinually updating technology. Furthermore, once
the technology goes, most COCOM countries insist
there is no further case to maintain COCOM controls
on equipment in which the technology is embodied.
Most importantly, it would probably lead to sig-
nificant improvements in the quality of strategic
Communist items that are electronics intensive.
In short,,Free World export of IC technology to
the Communist countries would supply them with a
fundamental capability, the lack of which contrib-
utes to the Communist lag in important areas of
advanced electronics.
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Conclusions
24. The USSR is only beginning to e!3tablish
industrial-scale production of integrated circuits
and recognizes that it is far behind the United
States and other Free World countries in design
and production. This gap could widen unless the
USSR can get technological assistance from the
Free World, either directly or through Eastern
Europe.
25. The persistent efforts of the USSR to ob-
tain technical assistance in the production of
computers and integrated circuits from the Free
World reflects the Soviet belief that COCOM em-
bargoes of strategic goods can be broken down
through commercial pressures.
26. The technology the USSR seeks is available
in Western Europe. Much of the technology is of
US origin and still controlled by licenses granted
by US firms. If the USSR and East European Commu-
nist countries are successful in their current
drive to obtain IC technology from the West, along
with agreements to keep this technology up-to-date,
they will have solved one of their major strategic
and commercial problems.
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