THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030129-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 129
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
C74?7E/2
Tyr ~r - //9
Intelligence Memorandum
The Manpower Situation In South Vietnam
Secret
ER IM 71-129
July 1971
Copy No.
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WARNING
't'his doccuncnt contains information aIIeclint; the national
defense of, the United States, within the meaning of 'I'ithk
.18, sections '/93 and 79-1. of the US Code, as anicnded.
Its transmission or revclatiou of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an tntaulltori'cd Ix'rsolt is I>rohibili'd by law.
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SFf 11Z Fri"
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
The Manpower Situation In South Vietnam
Background
1. As recently as June 1969 the prevailing
attitudes on manpower questions for South Vietnam
were that (a) military manpower requirements might
prove difficult to meet; and (b) some significant
dislocations to the civilian economy might attend
an increased mobilization effort by the GVN. In
retrospect, some of these earlier judgments appear
too pessimistic, for we have not seen clear evi-
dence of either prediction being fulfilled. Cur-
rently, there is .generally an increasing confi-
dence in South Vietnam's ability to meet military
manpower requirements and an emerging concern for
local unemployment as US activities in South Viet-
nam are phased down. In addition, current estimates
of pressing social problems confronted by the GVN
invariably refer to the existence of an urban slum
population in which underemployment will be a con-
tinuing problem during the 1970s.
2. The apparent reversal in judgments on South
Vietnam's manpower position is explained for the
most part by imprecision of data., South Vietnam
has never been the subject of a complete national
census, and civilian labor force estimates have
been attempted only for 1960 and 1966, While we
are reasonably confident that the total population
is about 18 million, we are still largely ignorant
of the details of its structure and distribution.
We believe the population is growing at somewhat
over 2.5% although a figure as high as 3% would
still be in keeping with the circumstances. An
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the office
of i.vv~r~~rrr c Research and coordinated within the
DireCtOPUte of I.nteZZigence.
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25X1
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overall participation rate on the order of 40% sug-
gests a labor force of about 7 million. On the
basis of limited official success by the GVN in
estimating the available number of draft-eligible
males, we believe that at present some 175,000-
225,000 young men each year reach the age of 18 to
add to a pool of roughly 2/ million men in the prime
military age group of 18-39 years of age. This pool
represents somewhat less than 15% of the total popu-
lation of South Vietnam,,
3. The most significant single change in the
manpower situation has been increased GVN access to
labor resources in areas formerly dominated by the
Viet Cong. An extension of a basic Vietnamese
problem of longer standing has been the increasinq
pressure on limited resources of skilled labor.
This problem has been met by the use of thousands
of foreign (US, South Korean, and Filipino) workers,
some moonlighting on the part of military personnel,
and the increased employment of women in the civil
service and US-sector jobs. 1/ South Vietnam has
made ever-increasing use of women in other segments
of the civilian labor force as well. At the same
time, increased pressures for labor mobilization
have resulted in a substantial increase in the
employment of pre-draft-age youth. Finally, it
should be noted that one significant outcome of
the more effective use of labor resources has been
a major reduction in the traditional underemploy-
ment in the agricultural sector, as large numbers
of rural inhabitants have been called into the
armed forces or have moved to towns and cities.
Survey of the Military Manpower Situation
Overall Manpower Requirements
4. Over the past three years, the already-large
South Vietnamese military forces have grown substan-
tially. By the end of 1970 the regular and territorial
1. In 1970 it was estimated that over 40% of some
140,000 Vietnamese employed at the time by US
forces and contractors were women, many of whom
he Zd skilled and semi-skiZZed jobs.
2. A best guess is that about 30%-40% of the popu-
lation is now in urban areas the size of district
towns or larger, compared to about 20% in the early
1960s.
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armed forces of the GVN numbered some 1,047,000,
compared with about 643,000 in 1967. In both years,
this force was augmented by roughly 150,000 para-
military personnel,
5. The maintenance of a force of this size
under existing combat conditions and desertion
losses requires an annual inflow of approximately
200,000 "new" men. 3/ Of these, the largest element
comes from the 175,000-225,000 young men who reach
the age of 18 each year. Allowing for those not
physically fit for induction, this pool probably
provides at least 125,000 men to meet the annual
requirement. Although this represents a substan-
tial loss of healthy workers to the civilian economy,
this loss is offset somewhat by the young men's
gains in work discipline and labor skills in the
service and by occasional moonlighting by military
personnel. 1
6. Another major source of "new" men is the
circular flow of deserters. Although soldiers may
desert their original units for a variety of rea-
sons, many of them subsequently reappear with other
units. Because of the difficulty of keeping track
of these men, we cannot be sure of their numbers.
Nevertheless, it seems very likely that they account
3. Total recruitment less additions to the GVN's
force level averaged about 230,000 from 1968 through
1970. This annual figure could be expected to fall
to around 200,000 with the continuation of recent
monthly declines in induction or slight reductions
in desertion rates. Although the figure 200,000
would be increased somewhat by further overall
force expansion, current plans do not provide for
any changes that would substantially affect the
discussion that follows.
4. Obviously, the VC recruit from South Vietnam's
manpower pool as well. In the Tet 1968 period when
the VC were able to produce a surge of new manpower
as many as 12,000 men a month were recruited. By
1970 recruitment dropped to probably not more than
3,000 a month. At present there is insufficient
information on which to base an estimate of VC re-
cruitment, but it is clear that VC recruitment has
declined further and is not currently at a level
sufficient to affect the analysis and conclusions
in this memorandum.
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for the remainder of annual recruitment (or perhaps
something on the order of 75x000-100,000 of the
total), Analysis of net desertions juxtaposed
against annual recruitment from, the existing man-
power pool strongly indicates that something on
the order of 50%-75% of deserters reente;:ed the
military pipeline either with their old or new
regular units or with the territorial forces.
7. Despite the limited data base, we are fairly
confident that the overall annual requirements of
200,000 new recruits can continue to be met without
significant economic dislocation. This estimate,
however, does not preclude specific manpower prob-
lems at a local level or for particular force com-
ponents.
Regional Force Ratios and Problems
8. Historically, the deployment of GVN military
units has been in large part determined by the local
availability of manpower and personnel links with
the population. This has facilitated the heavy
force deployment in Military Region (MR) 3 (in-
cluding Saigon), which has been the area of greatest
GVN control and heavy VC/NVA military pressure,
At the same time, strong local ties have had their
costs. Although the policy of recruiting territorial
forces for use within their own provinces is clearly
in keeping with the broader goal of discouraging
Viet Cong penetration it tends to make the
occasional. relocation in emergency circumstances
more difficult. Even the regular forces are af-
flicted by such problems as large-scale desertions
and significant declines in morale when units are
separated from their dependents and traditional
areas of responsibility,
9. GVN force/population ratios by military
region are shown in Table 1. Some of the factors
underlying these ratios are worthy of note.
a. The highest number of total GVN
military forces and the largest share
of regular ARVN units in the force struc-
ture have always been found in MR 3.
This is partly the result of GVN control
of the large recruitment base of Saigon
and partly the result of the fact that
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GVN Military Forces in Relation to Population
Military Forces
Population
Military Forces per
(Thousand)
(Thousand)
Thousand Population
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
Jan 1968
Dec 1970
101.8
163.7
3,230
3,269
Regular Forces
55.3
81.9
17
25
RF/PF a/
46.5
81.8
14
25
133.0
203.7
3,094
3,290
43
62
Regular Forces
58.8
84.9
19
26
RF/PF
74.2
118.8
24
36
231.6
371.1
4,985
5,602
46
66
Regular Forces
165.3
248.8
33
44
RF/PF
66.3
122.3
13
22
180.5
308.9
5,879
6,409
Regular Forces
63.0
97.8
11
15
RF/PF
117.5
211.1
20
33
646.9
1,047.4
17,190 b/
18,570 b/
38
56
a. Regional and Popular Forces (South Vietnamese territorial forces).
b. Population data derived from the 1969 GVN Statistical Yearbook and an
assumed annual growth rate of 2.6%.
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both South Vietnam's command structure and
ARVN's reserve divisions have been located
in the Saigon area., Finally, heavy VC/NVA
pressure has in the past necessitated strong
regular forces in this politically important
region.
b. The ratios for MR 4 reflect past
GVN policy of emphasizing the development
and use of RF/PF units, The support of
regular ARVN units in this area has
traditionally been the lowest in Vietnam.
c. MR 2, which has consistently main-
tained Vietnam's highest ratio of territo-
rial forces to population, is exceeded in
the total forces/population ratio only by
MR 3.
d, MR 1, with a population almost
equal to that of MR 2, has recently main-
tained a smaller number of total GVN forces
per population than MRs 2 and 3., The assign-
ment of most US combat units to the northern
part of Vietnam has enabled total Allied
forces to maintain a favorable balance to
enemy forces.
10. The problem of regional distribution becomes
more significant as the process of US withdrawal
proceeds. The area most affected by the removal of
US combat forces is MR 1, where from 40% to 60% of
US maneuver units have been located over the past
three years. The regional effect of the US reduc-
tion is indicated by Table 2, in which an index is
computed using December 1967 as a base period to
compare friendly versus enemy force balances by
Military Region. These data, however, are not meant
to suggest specific combat force deficits, but to
illustrate the effect on the main force ratio of
US force current reductions, There are a number
of reasons why both ahsolute and relative main
force requirements by Military Region, would be
different than those suggested by Table 2. In
MR 3 the "deficit" shown may be an overstatement
because it does not take into account other factors
which have altered the military balance -- for ex-
ample, the disruption of the enemy's Cambodian
supply network certainly had an important effect
on the enemy's capabilities, but this would not be
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? 9 r
South Vietnam: Index of Force Balance a/
Number of Effective ARVN
Battalions Needed to
Balance Following Regain Prior Balance,
US Withdrawal b/ by Military Region
(No RVNAF
Dec Dec Dec Dec Redeployment) Dec 1970 Dec 1969
1967 1968 1969 1970 Jun 1972 Balance Balance
MR 1 100 99 119 184
MR 2 100 129 127 114
MR 3 c/ 100 95 126 217
MR 4 _ 100 135 151 201
108 37 13
100 9 17
158 22 (18 surplus d/)
201. 0 (14 surplus !/)
a. Relates only friendly maneuver forces to enemy ma?&/. and Local combat an
combat-support forces.
b. Calculated with no US combat units and all other forces (including ROK
troops) constant with Dec 1970 deployment. The greatest decrease occurs in
MR 1, reflecting the fact of that region having the greatest share of US forces.
Conversely, MR Q experiences no change, as no US combat forces are present in
the Delta.
C. Not including GVN Strategic Reserve forces.
d. Indicates that even following US withdrawal the ratio in these MRs would
be more favorable than that computed for Dec 1969.
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reflected in force ratios. Also, as a result of
the growth and development of RI'/PF troops and the
decline of the Viet Cong Local Forces and Guerrillas,
South Vietnamese regulars should be able to cope with
NVA main force threats with something closer to
parity. Nonetheless, the calculated "deficit" for
Military Region 1 of 37 battalions amount to some
25,000 men,
11. In re-achieving comparative main force
balance among regions, GVN options are limited to
combinations of the policies of local recruitment
and regional force upgrading, relocating in the
north ARVN regular units from the southern military
regions, and deploying South Vietnam's Strategic
Reserve. Some aspects of these policies are out-
lined briefly below.
Local Recruiting and Upgrading
of Regional Forces
12. Comparison of GVN military forces to popu-
lation, by region (Table 1), indicates that MR 1
has a relatively low number of military personnel
per thousand population and suggests that the region
could contribute more to the GVN's military forces.
Specifically, if MR 1 matched -- by increased re-
cruitment -- the relation of forces per thousand
population of the highest area (MR 3), the addi-
tional manpower acquisition would be adequate to
replace all the present MR 1 regional forces so
these might be upgraded to par with regular ARVN
units. Such upgrading would be a lengthy process,
however, and even with an optimistic timetable
would not be completed in pace with US withdrawals.
Further, even this process would compensate for
only about one-half of US strength withdrawn,
Therefore, although future increases in recruitment
from the region seem possible, the compensation for
the reductions in Allied main forces by drawing
more heavily upon the local population must remain
a long-term solution,
Permanent Relocation of ARVN Regular Units
13. Table 2 indicates that the infusion of some-
what more than four regular ARVN divisions would be
necessary to maintain the balance of main forces
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that obtained in December 1970 in MR 1. A reloca-
tion of this magnitude would probably entail un-
acceptable reductions in levels of morale and con-
sequential c',sertion from units in other Military
Regions that have long held a specific area of
operations. Both the experiences of moving the
25th ARVN Division from MR 2 to MR 3 and the ex-
tended operation of GVN units in Cambodia indicate
that serious reductions in effectiveness can result
from such relocation. Although some reduction of
relocation losses is possible by moving dependents
along with the military units, this measure has
been rare and is probably precluded in the future
because of the expense involved. Although we have
no adequate yardstick of relocation costs, we feel
it important to note that they can be minimized
only by troop redeployments of limited duration or
distance.
14. One particular redeployment configuration
suggeoted for mid-1972 has been sketched out in a
9 April draft by the Military Capabilities Panel
of the Vietnam Working Group. This configuration
(see Table 3) would still leave substantial reduc-
tions from the _r::cember 1970 balance in all but
MR 2. Moreover, were the Korean troops withdrawn,
the force balance in MR 2 would fall below the 1967
level.
Deployment of Strategic Reserves
15. Although traditionally based in MR 3, the
units comprising the GVN's strategic reserve could
compensate in part for the reduced force balance
in the northern provinces. These units can be used
more flexibly principally because they have been
conditioned to accept prolonged separation from
their initial locations, Although currently con-
sisting of 18 battalions of airborne arid marine
personnel, plans have been formulated for inclusion
in the reserve of an additional eight battalions.
With this addition, a new assignment of the marine
and airborne units would leave a potential reserve
intact. As a result, some periodic rotation between
the northern provinces and MR 3 of units making up
the reserve is concei-trable., The deployment in MR 1
of the total current reserve of 18 battalions would
not, however, represent force strength adequate to
fully compensate for the loss of US combat power.
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Table 3
Indexes of Force Balance Under Regional Redeployment Variants
December 1967 = 100
Redeployment Variants for June 1972 1
Korean Difference in Korean Difference in
December Troops Number of Troops Number of
1970 in Place Battalions L/ Withdrawn Battalions
MR 1 184 126 29 115 34
MR 2 114 126 8 surplus 90 17
MR 3 pl 217 133 33 1.13 33
MR 4 201 151 14 151 14
a. The calculated index figures correspond to the 1.1 mitZion man
RVNAF force deployment with no US combat troops.
b. Indicates the approximate number of ARVN battalions needed to
regain the December 1970 balances.
c. Not including 12 battalions of GVN Strategic Reserves.
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Furthermore, the balance in the remainder of the
country would still remain below December 1970 and
in MR 2 would actually decline to the 1967 level.
16. Although no one of the techniques outlined
above by itself solve the regional military problem,
some combinations could be designed to copa with a
substantial part of it. Specifically, the deploy-
ment of current strategic reserves in the northern
provinces could in part cover the slow process of
recruitment and upgrading of RF/PF forces in that
area. Concurrent with this, the gradual develop-
ment over time of other ARVN regulars into effec-
tive strategic reserve forces would offer a future
possibility of fully compensating for reduced Allied
combat strength. However, the regional balancing
of forces still remains substantially more complex
than the maintenance of countrywide military strength
at the authorized ceiling.
The Emerging Civilian Employment Problem
17. As a result of the US phasedown, there has
been a steady decline since mid-1969 in the number
of Vietnamese employed by US military and civilian
agencies and their contractors. Thus far, the
dismissals have caused no major difficulties. From
an all-time high of 160,000 in June 1969, US sector
employment fell to 128,000 at the end of 1970.
During 1971, another 22,000 or so are to be laid
off, and by mid-1972 the total is to be reduced to
about 80,000. The actual number of Vietnamese
workers affected by the US withdrawal, however,
certainly is much greater. In addition to the re-
ported employment figures, there are thousands more
who are employed privately by US civilian and mili-
tary personnel or whose jobs depend on the spending
of the Vietnamese who work for Americans.
18. So far, those laid off apparently have been
able to find new jobs easily. The armed forces
still are taking about 20,000 men a month. 5/ In
5. As noted previously, some workers laid off from
the US sector undoubtedly have been and will be in-
ducted into the armed forces. This process may
help relieve some of the pressure for military man-
power in MR 1. Other workers, including women and
unskilled mates over draft age, will be forced to
seek new jobs in areas where few currently are
available.
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addition, the fact that about two-thirds of the
Vietnamese working for the United States have some
manual or technical skill undoubtedly has eased
the transition?
19. As in the military manpower case, the
absence of an adjustment problem at the national
level does not preclude regional difficulties.
With continuing reductions in force, there may be
particular cause for concern in cities in MRs 1
and 2. The number of dismissals scheduled through
mid-1972 is greatest in MR 3, as shown in Table 4,
but the greatest impact will be felt in MRs 1 and 2
where a greater share of the urban labor force is
employed by or for Americans,, In Da Nang, for
example, US officials estimate that 40%-50% of the
city's wage earners either work directly for Ameri-
cans or for Vietnamese fixins servicing US activities.
Similar situations probably exist in Qui Nhon, Nha
Trang, and Cam Ranh. In order to ease local unem-
ployment problems, US officials have postponed
layoffs as long as possible. Earlier this year,
military agencies and contractors planned to dismiss
34,000 Vietnamese during 1971, but have since re-
duced the number to about 22,000.
20. For the longer term, planners have been
much more concerned about a possible, manpower sur-
plus than a shortage. Assuming that security does
not deteriorate and the size of the armed forces
remains relatively stable, there will be about a
million new entrants into the labor force during
the next five years or so in addition to those laid
off as a result of the US phasedown. If any demo-
bilization occurs, the number seeking employment
will correspondingly increase. The question, there-
fore, is whether the economy can grow fast enough
to absorb this additional manpower and still not
suffer a politically costly decline in per capita
incomes. Our research indicates that South Vietnam
could achieve these goals with a substantial in-
crease in agricultural yields and strong growth in
the non-agricultural sector. With some expansion
of cultivated area, advances in technology, in-
creased use of high-yielding rice seed and other
inputs, and increased diversification into other
crops after 1972, agriculture could absorb roughly
a million workers during the next five years..
Should employment opportunities develop in this
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f sh 1 %
Vietnamese Employed in US Sector
30 Jun
1969
31 Dec
1970
31 Mar
1971
30 Jun
1.972
Dismissals from
Dec 1970 to
Jun 1972
Total
160.0
127.8
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
By US civilian
agencies
6.0
6.5
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
By US military
agencies
154.0
121.3
115.7
79.6
41.7
MR 1
N.A.
23.5
21.7
14.5
9.0
MR 2
N.A.
32.6
31.2
22.4
10.2
MR 3
N.A.
54.6
52.6
37.0
17.6
MR 4
N.A.
10.6
10.2
5.7
4.9
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fashion, however, there would still remain the
problem of distributing the available manpower,
21. Although underemployment in urban areas
may be a problem in the 1970s because many workers
will be reluctant to return to the countryside,
a recent survey of residents in major cities indi
cates that about 10% of them would like to return
or move to rural areas when security is better.
A migration of such magnitude would probably relieve
any urban underemployment and along with the
natural increase in the present agricultural labor
force -- be sufficient to meet the requirements for
agricultural labor during the next few years.
22. There is no clear indication that the major
effort at enlarging the GVNVs military forces
following Tet in 1968 has caused serious dislocations
in the South Vietnamese economy. Indeed, focusing
solely on production, there has been substantial
economic recovery since then? In terms of the
regular and territorial forces, the South Vietnamese
appear to have no significant difficulty in meeting
their annual requirements for inductions to cover
combat losses and desertions, They should have no
basic difficulty in maintaining current force levels,
and a moderate increase should be possible.
23. A significant regional problem does exist
with respect to military manpower because of the
difficulty of making use of troops outside the
area in which they were recruited. The historical
distribution of GVN forces and the planned with-
drawal of US troops (who have made up an overall
force deficiency in MR 1) suggest that it will
be particularly difficult to sustain the current
friendly/enemy force balance in that region. Solu-
tions available over the next year or so are not
adequate to fully redress the balance.
24. Finally, despite the likelihood of some
local problems, the economy of South Vietnam is
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fully capable of growth -- primarily in the agri-
cultural sector -- at a rate adequate to absorb
additions to the manpower pool (including those
released by the US forces) between now and 1975.
It will be up to the South Vietnamese government
to create policies to spur labor movement out of
urban areas and into the agricultural sector to
support this growth.
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