COMMUNIST MILITARY AID DELIVERIES TO NORTH VIETNAM DURING 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030052-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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BUB
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Military Aid Deliveries To North Vietnam
During 1969
Secret
ER IM 70-52
April 1970
Copy No. 50
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting he national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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onour
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Communist Military Aid Deliveries
o North Vietnam During 1969
Introduction
1. During 1969, North Vietnam reduced the
value of imports of military equipment from Com-
munist countries, continuing a downward trend that
started with the partial bombing halt of early
1968. This memorandum presents estimates of the
values and types of military equipment and expend-
able munitions supplied by major donor countries.
2. There is virtually no direct information
on North Vietnam's military imports, most of which
are believed to come overland, by rail. 25X1
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The values cited in the text are in foreign 25X1
trade prices as reported in Soviet arms trade with
Free World countries. The estimates for the
? several types of equipment have varying confidence
levels; those fqr the laraer items such as aircr
and naval craft 25X1
are firmer estimates than those for small equipment
and ammunition. The total values must be considered
gross estimates of North Vietnam's military imports,
but they provide the best available indication of
the comparative levels of annual military imports
during the past five years.
Note: This memorandum was produced jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency.
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Military Deliveries During 1969
3. Deliveries of military equipment during
1969 were reduced considerably because of the total
bombing halt late in 1968 and the lower combat
levels that prevailed in South Vietnam during 1969.
Military aid deliveries included equipment for
improving air defense systems as well as munitions
to replace those expended in combat in South Vietnam
and Laos. Military deliveries in 1969 are estimated
to total about $225 million,* slightly more than
one-half the value imported in 1968. The 1969
military aid brings the cumulative value of Com-
munist deliveries of military equipment to North
Vietnam during 1954-69 to more than $2 billion,
as shown in Table 1.
4. The substantial drop in military aid
deliveries during 1969 resulted largely from
reduced imports of ammunition and missiles that
made up slightly more than one-third of the total
value in 1969, compared with three-quarters in
1967, as shown in the following tabulation.
Million US $
Ammunition and
missiles
110
240
490
260
80
Other military
equipment
160
215
160
130
145
The value of military deliveries during the bombing
years, particularly after initial inventories of
military weapons systems had been built up, was
* Values are given in Soviet foreign trade prices,
the list prices charged for military hardware and
ammunition by the USSR under its aid agreements
with non-Communist countries. These goods would
cost about 10% to 20% more if calculated at equiva-
lent US costa.
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heavily weighted toward replacement of ammunition
''sand surface-to-air missiles. Since the bombing
halt, the firing of SA-2 missiles and antiaircraft
ammunition in North Vietnam has dropped signifi-
cantly. Although North Vietnamese antiaircraft
defenses in Laos have been built up to counter the
stepped-up air war in that country, expenditures
of antiaircraft ammunition have been far below the
levels expended in North Vietnam during the
bombing.
5. The value of increased deliveries of jet
aircraft and of small arms in 1969 only partly
offset the reduced value of imports of ammunition
and missiles. Deliveries of MIG-21s by the USSR
and MIG-19s by China in 1969 increased thta inventory
of jet fighter aircraft to about 250* and improved
both the all-weather and the low-level intercept
capabilities of North Vietnam's air force. The
estimated value of imports of small arms and other
infantry weapons was nearly 40% greater than the
previous high annual level in 1966. Increased
deliveries of small arms, particularly the AK-47
assault rifle, are estimated to have been needed
to replace losses to Allied forces in South Vietnam
and Laos and to meet continuing resupply needs in
,:forth Vietnam. (Table 2 shows estimated quantities
and values of military aid deliveries during 1969,
by type of equipment.)
6. The USSR continued to be the major supplier
of military aid, but C-nmunist China is estimated
to have provided an increased share of all military
aid deliveries in 1969 -- almost one-half compared
with about one-fourth in the two preceding years --
mainly because of the emphasis on deliveries of
infantry weapons, many of which were supplied by
China (see Table 3,. The value of deliveries of
military equipment from North Korea and East Euro-
pean countries was estimated to be small. The
latter provided primarily small arms, grenade
launchers, and recoilless rifles as well as vehicles,
some of which undoubtedly were for military use.
On 1 January 1970, half of tho North Vietnamese
MIG jet inventory was deployed at bases in North
Vietnam and half was located at Yunnani Airfield
in southern China.
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Air Defense Equipment
7. An estimated 55 MIG-21 aircraft were
delivered by the USSR in 1969 and 10 MIG-19s were
delivered to airfields in North Vietnam by Communist
China. An additional 22 MIG-19s flown during 3,969
to Yunnani Airfield in southern China are believed
to have been transferred to North Vietnamese control
and are included as deliveries. These MIG-19s
are the most advanced fighter produced by China
and can out-perform the MIG-15s and 17s that pre-
viously served as North Vietnam's second-line
fighters. Moreover, the MIG-19 reportedly can
out-maneuver the faster MIG-21 at low altitudes,
making it particularly suited for defense against
low-flying reconnaissance aircraft. It is be-
lieved that many, or possibly all, of the MIG-21s
from the USSR were Fishbed F models, an advanced
version with enhanced all-weather and night inter-
ception capabilities.*
8. Imports of antiaircraft weapons and heavy
machine guns are estimated to he valued at $10 mil-
lion in 1969, an increase over 1968 but still con-
siderably below the levels in 1965-67, when North
Vietnam's antiaircraft defense system was being
developed. Most of these imports were replacements
for antiaircraft guns destroyed or captured in
Laos. About 1,000 antiaircraft weapons -- mostly
from North Vietnam -- have been deployed to Laos
dur' 4 .rg the 1968-69 and 1969-70 dry seasons,
according to a tes based on pilot reports of
threat areas.
more
than 220 37-mm antiaircraft weapons an heavy
machine guns were captured by friendly forces in
Northern Laos during August-October 1969. Imports
of radar and other electronic equipment related to
antiaircraft defenses in 1969 were valued at about
$6 million. Deliveries consisted primarily of
early warning equipment to supplement existing
units and to replace older Sets. No fire control
radars are known to have been deployed into Laos
in 1969.
* Although only 30 MIG-21 Fishbed F models have
been confirmed in the North Vietnamese inventory,
it is believed that the actual number may now be
twice this.
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Ground Forces Equipment
9. Imports of equipment for North Vietnamese
and other Communist ground forces during 1969 were
valued at more than $55 million, an increase of
two-thirds over the 1968 level. Deliveries of
field artillery and armored vehicles made up less
than 10% of the value of ground forces equipment
and are estimated to have been about the same as
in 1960. Imports of small arms and other infantry
weapons, including mortars and rockets, are esti-
mated to have increased in 1969 because of
increasing losses of weapons in combat areas and
the continuing requirements to re-equip forces in
North Vietnam. More than 71,000 individual and
crew-served weapons were reportedly lost during
1969 to Allied ground operations in South Vietnam
and to friendly forces in Northern Laos, about 15%
more than during 1968. Estimated normal attrition
would have required another 35,000 weapons, and
additional but uncounted losses were suffered from
air operations in Laos and South Vietnam. Something
in excess of 100,000 individual weapons are esti-
mated to have been required in North Vietnam to
equip new troops being infiltrated into South
Vietna'.m and to continue to re-equip existing in-
count7,-y units with the 7.62-mm family of modern
weapons. The modernization of Communist ground
forces weapons has been corroborated by weapons
captured in South Vietnam.*
Ammunition and Missiles
10. Ammunition imported during 1969 was valued
at nearly $75 million, compared with about $225 mil-
lion in 1968. Estimated expenditures and known
losses of ammunition to ground operations in South
Vietnam and Laos probably accounted for as much as
two-thirds of the estimated imports. In contrast,
only about 10% of estimated ammunition imports was
expended in out-of-country operations in 1968.
Actual firing of weapons in North Vietnam was
limited primarily to training and to reactions by
air defense units against US manned and unmanned
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reconnaissance aircraft. In-country expenditures,
together with unknown amounts lost to air operations
in South Vietnam and Laos, would have made up the
remaining one-third of imports.
11. North Vietnamese firings of surface-to-air
missiles during 1969 were at a greatly reduced
rate. According to pilot reports,
an estimated 200 missiles were fired in 1969, com-
pared with about 1,150 in 1968. Surface-to-air
missile units have not been introduced into Laos,
but increased deployment into the North Vietnamese
Panhandle had been started by December 1969. SAM
firings have been directed primarily at unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft, but since December missiles
have been fired also at B-52s operating against
targets in the Laos Panhandle close to the North
Vietnamese border.
Other Military Assistance
12. Negotiations with the USSR for three trans-
port aircraft ---two AN-24s and one IL-18 -- were
Hanoi may intend to renew civil air
service as the remainder of these aircraft are
received. Transport aircraft have been used ex-
clusively since 1965 for diplomatic travel and
military tactical and logistics missicns. Other
miscellaneous imports included a small number of
naval craft and a portion of the estimated 5,900
trucks imported in 15169 from the USSR, Communist
China, and the East European countries.
Conclusions
13. North Vietnam reduced m:~litaty aid imports
in 1969 for the second consecutive year; the esti-
mated value of military deliveries was about one-
half that of 1968.and one-third of the all-time
high reached in 1967. Imports of jet aircraft were
continvcd at a high level relative to previous
years. Increased amounts of small arms were im-
ported for use by Communist forces in South Vietnam
and Laos and for continuing the modernizing of
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The IL-18 was delivered in March 1970.
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weapons of in-country North Vietnamese ground
forces. Reduced firing of missiles and antiair-
craft artillery, however, permitted a significant
cutback in imports of these munitions. Imports
of artillery, armor, and naval craft are estimated
to have been no more than enough to maintain present
inventory levels.
14. The USSR and Communist China, the major
suppliers of military aid, provided more nearly
equal portions of the total value than in past
years. Soviet aid deliveries made up a little
more than half of the total value. Whereas the
USSR delivered a greater number of MIG jet aircraft,
Communist'China probably supplied most of the
ground forces weapons and at least as much ammuni-
tion as the USSR. East European Communist coun-
tries and North Korea made only small contributions
to the total direct military aid, as in past years.
15. North Vietnam's military impor,cs for 1970
undoubtedly were provided for in agreements signed
with the Communist donor countries during September-
November 1969. There has been no indication thus
far in 1970 of the continued imports of MIG air-
craft such as were observed in 1969, but it is
possible that equipment to build up and modernize
other weapons systems will be imported. If imports
are limited to the maintenance of current inven-
tories and the replacement of annual expenditures
of munitions both in and out of North Vietnam,
however, the value of military imports could again
be reduced in 1970.
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Table. 1
Estimated Communist Military Deliveries to North Vietnam a/
Million US $
1954-64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Total.
USSR 70 210 360 505 290 120 1,555
Communist
China 70 60 95 145 . 100 105. 575
Cn
Csi -Eastern 5 b/
Europe Negi. Negi. Negl. Negl. Negl Negl.
North
Korea 0 0 Negi. Negi. Negl. Negi. Negi.
Total 140 270 455 650 390 225 2,135 b/
a. The data refer exclusively to combat materiel; they exclude aid
designed for war-support purposes. Values are given in Soviet foreign
trade prices, the list prices charged for military hardware and ammunition
by the USSR under its aid agreements with non-Communist countries.
b. The cumulative value of deliveries from Eastern Europe during 1954-69
is estimated at.55 million.
Cl)
1
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