AGRICULTURE IN NORTH VIETNAM: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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-- I . / Vu i..1.r ? . ? - -
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Agriculture In North Vietnam: Performance And Prospects -
ER IM 70-49
April 1970
Copy No. 45
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WARNING
.This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Agriculture In North Vietnam:
Performance And Prospects
Introduction
This memorandum evaluates the effects of war-
induced priorities and US bombing on North Viet-
nam's agriculture and the prospects for agricul-
tural development in the next few years. Practically
no statistics on North Vietnamese agriculture have
been published by the Hanoi regime for several years
and eyewitness reporting by Westerners has been
sparse, particularly since the initiation of US
bombing in 1965. Thus the following discussion is
based largely on statements in official publica-
tions,F
statistics which are several years old.
and on extrapolations from
Background
1. Agriculture is the mainstay of North Viet-
nam's economy, as in other countries of Southeast
Asia. The great: majority of the North Vietnamese
people are farmers who barely scratch out an exist-
ence through the production of rice and other basic
foodstuffs. North Vietnam has never been self-
sufficient in food production, unlike South Vietnam
which has had frequent exportable surpluses.
Cultivation techniques are crude and labor inten-
sive, using little power machinery. Fertilizer is
mainly human, animal, and green, rather than
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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chemical. horth Vietnam's agriculture is unique
in Southeast Asia in two respects, the well-
developed water control system and the centralized
control through cooperativization.
2. North Vietnam's elaborate water control
system helps to prevent flooding during the summer
rainy season and stores water for use during the
winter dry season, enabling North Vietnam to grow
two wet rice crops a year in much of the Red River
delta. Much of the country's terrain is too rugged
for cultivation, and North Vietnam's 0.12 hectare*
of arable land per capita in 1964 was among the
lowest in Southeast Asia. However, counting the
arable land that is double cropped, there was in
1964 about 0.19 hectare of crop land per capita,
still slightly below the 0.20 hectare per capita
in South Vietnam. Approximately 73% of North Viet-
nam's crop land, including double-cropped areas,
is devoted to rice production, compared with about
85% in South Vietnam. Of the approximately 1.1 mil-
lion hectares of double-cropped land, more than
three-fourths produces two rice crops; the remainder
produces one rice crop and another food crop.
3. Unlike the other countries in Southeast
Asia, North Vietnam since 1954 has been under the
rigid control of a Communist regime which has
attempted to industrialize the economy and to
socialize agriculture. Under French rule, agricul-
ture consisted of large plantations growing rice
and industrial crops and many small private farm
plots devoted primarily to subsistence farming.
With the ouster of the French in 1954, the new
Communist government instituted agricultural re-
form which first involved breaking up the large
land holdings and distributing small parcels to
the landless peasants. A few of the estates were
retained by the central government and formed into
state farms to function primarily as model farms
and experimental stations. Through cajolery and
stark economic necessity, individual farmers were
enticed to pool their labor, farm animals, imple-
ments, and land in a cooperative effort with their
neighbors.
4. Until 1959, cooperativization progressed
slowly, but during the next two years the coopera-
tivization drive was accelerated. By the end of
* A hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres.
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1960, the regime claimed that 86% of all farm
families had joined cooperatives, and more than
41,000 cooperatives had been formed. By the time
the bombing program was initiated in Febr:,ary 1965,
about 88% of all farm families had joined coopera-
tives, according to regime statements.
5. To encourage the formation of cooperatives,
the regime reserved about 5% of cooperative land
for the private use of cooperative embers to grow
food crops and to engage in animal husbandry to
supplement income earned from the collective. The
private plot from the start played an important
role in the output of subsidiary food crops and
the raising of livestock and as a source of farm
income, a role which became increasingly important
during the bombing years.
6. In the pre-bombing years the Communist
regime made some modest attempts to increase agri-
cultural investment. With foreign aid, two large
phosphatic fertilizer plants were constructed in
the early 1960s to process the huge deposits of
domestic apatite. These two plants achieved an
annual output of about 120,000 tons of phosphatic
fertilizer -- primarily superphosphate -- all of
which was used domestically. In addition, a nitrog-
enous fertilizer plant designed to produce about
150,000 tons of ammonium nitrate per year from the
country's coal deposits was bearing completion with
Chinese Communist aid when the bombing program
started. The plant was never put into operation.
The regime also imported small quantities of farm
machinery and equipment, but most of the imported
machinery was for use on the state farms. The
plentiful supply of labor in agriculture and the
lack of employment opportunities elsewhere in the
economy apparently militated against a large invest-
ment in labor saving devices.
Pre-War Output
7. Agricultural output in North Vietnam in-
creased under Communist rule through 1964. However,
the amount of credit that the regime can take for
the increase is open to question. Weather was un-
doubtedly an important factor. Furthermore, output
in the early 1950s had been depressed because of
the disruptions caused by the longstanding war with
the French, and some increase in output was likely
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under more peaceful conditions no matter what form
of government was in control.
8. Production of milled rice* increased from
1.7 million tons in 1954 to 3.5 million, tons in
1959 -- a record year for North Vietnam. During
1960-64, rice production stagnated between 2.8 mil-
lion and 3.2 million tons. In South Vietnam, rice
output lagged behind that in the North in the late
1950s but exceeded it during the 1960s except for
1961, suggesting that the formation of cooperatives
in North Vietnam together with the regime's
emphasis on industry in the five-year plan may
have adversely affected rice output. Output of
milled rice in North and South Vietnam for the
years 1954-64 is shown below:
Million Metric Tons
Year
North
Vietnam
South a/
Vietnam -
1954
1.7
1.7
1955
2.4
1.9
1956
2.8
2.3
1957
2.6
2.1
1958
3.1
2.8
1959
3.5
3.4
1960
2.8
3.3
1961
3.2
3.1
1962
3.0
3.5
1963
2.9
3.6
1964
2.9
3.5
a. For the sake of com-
parison, a 67% extraction
rate is used for both North
and South Vietnam, although
the extraction rate used
for official South Viet-
namese statistical re-
porting is 60%.
Milled rice is the edible portion of the paddy
rice and is extracted from the paddy at an esti-
mated 67% rate.
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9. The output of subsidiary food crops --
such as corn, sweet potatoes, manioc, and beans --
increased during the period 1955-63, according to
regime statistics. Many of these crops are con-
sumed directly on the farm. Therefore, much of
the growth may simply reflect more accurate record
keeping that would have resulted from the coopera-
tivization of farms.
10. The output of some industrial crops --
peanuts, soybeans, sugarcane, tobacco, cotton, jute,
hemp, tea, and coffee -- also reportedly increased
during the period 1955-63. Most industrial crops
require mechanical processing facilities; therefore,
the regime's emphasis on industrialization during
the early development years probably contributed
to this favorable growth.
Output Since 1965
11. All indications are that rice output de-
clined during 1966-68 although no meaningful output
data were released by the regime during these
years. A substantial portion of the male farm
labor force was diverted from agricultural pro-
duction tasks to military service, and all workers
suffered periodic interruptions from frequent air
raids. At times, farmers were obliged to work in
the fields only at night. Inadequate attention
was devoted to the maintenance of vital water
control and irrigation facilities. The weather
was unfavorable, particularly in 1968 when floods
and tropical storms seriously affected the tenth-
month rice crop. Indirect evidence also points
to declining output. The regime-controlled press
has been silent on the actual levels of agricul-
tural output since 1965, but has made frequent
reference to bad weather and to US bombing of
water control facilities to excuse shortcomings.
Imports of foodstuffs grew significantly during
these years. Rice output in South Vietnam also
suffered a decline during 1965-68, although it
was not as steep as in the North, and the recovery
of output in the South in 1969 exceeded the slight
improvement estimated for the North.
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12. Estimates of North Vietnamese rice produc-
tion for the war years have been derived from a
study of the weather reports and regime claims
regarding the progress of transplanting and har-
vesting. The estimates for milled rice in both
North and South Vietnam for 1965-69 are shown
below:
Million Metric Tons
Year
North
Vietnam
South
Vietnam
1965
3.0
3.2
1966
2.8
2.9
1967
2.7
3.1
1968
2.5
2.9
1969
2.7
3.4
Manpower
13. By far the most significant factor de-
pressing agricultural output during the war has
been the diversion since 1965 of possibly as many
as 600,000 men from the agricultural labor force --
some 20% of the total males in agriculture. This
total includes some 540,000 men mobilized from the
countryside into military service and about 60,000
diverted from agriculture to repairing bomb damage
and to work in transport. As a whole, while the
marginal productivity of farm laborers in North
Vietnam is quite low, the individuals diverted
were primarily able-bodied young males whose con-
tributions to output would have been higher than
average. Likewise, there is evidence that diver-
sions included managerial cadres as well as the
common farm worker.
14. The regime attempted to bring larger numbers
of women into agriculture to replace the diverted
males. The proportion of women in the total agri-
cultural labor force was increased from 62% in
1965 to 67% in 1,968 and 71% by 1970. Nevertheless,
the total farm labor force excluding those engaged
in fishing dropped from an estimated 6.7 million
at the beginning of 1965 to 6.5 million by early
1968. Such a decrease contrasts with the pre-
bombing growth in the agricultural labor force of
about 100,000 a year.
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15. The availability of fertilizer was not a
serious limiting factor during the bombing. Most
of North Vietnam's fertilizer inputs have been
natural organic materials such as animal rianure,
night soil, green manure, compost, and aquatic
plants. These products are generally produced
where they are consumed. On the other hand, the
disruptions to transportation undoubtedly affected
the timely distribution of imported chemical fer-
tilizer.
16. North Vietnam has ample domestic sources
of phosphate in the form of apatite which is mined
primarily in Lao Cai but also found in smaller,
lower quality deposits throughout the country.
Sufficient quantities of phosphate ore were mined --
albeit intermittently -- to feed the country's two
phosphate fertilizer plants during the bombing.
Moreover, the expedient of using raw apatite on
agricultural land, although not as efficient as
using the more soluble processed phosphate fer-
tilizers, undoubtedly was adopted to an increasing
degree partly offsetting any decline in the avail-
ability of processed phosphates.
17. The main fertilizer nutrient imported by
North Vietnam has been nitrogen. Before the
bombing, North Vietnam imported an average of
about 150,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer, pri-
marily ammonium sulphate. The Bac Giang nitrogenous
fertilizer plant, with a planned capacity of
150,000 tons of ammonium nitrate a year, was close
to production status when the US bombing inter-
rupted completion of the facility. Nitrogenous
fertilizer imports continued, however, and the
amount available was apparertly no lower than
before the bombing. Imports of small quantities
of chemical pocassic fertilizer for application
to certain industrial crops have also continued
uninterrupted.
Regime Controls
18. The demands of the war weakened the regime's
control over agriculture, stimulating private pro-
duction and to some oo:xtent lessening the drop in
food output. Regime statistics show a continued
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gradual growth of farm families on cooperatives
during the bombing years, increasing from about
88% in 1965 to 95% at the beginning of 1969. How-
ever, while these gains were being recorded, it
appears that within many cooperatives a breakdown
of the cooperative concept and a reversion to
private initiative occurred. This was largely the
result of reduced central control resulting from
the wartime distractions and the diversion of
managerial cadres to the war effort.
19. Families within the cooperatives were left
pretty much to follow their own routines, and there
was a marked increase in private farming. Some
managers and members of cooperatives rented out the
cooperative land and materials in clear violation
of regulations. Since traditionally the main
products of the private plots were root crops,
leafy vegetables, and livestock, it is highly
likely that the opportunities to engage in private
agricultural activities tended to depress the out-
put of rice, particularly of the rice that would
normally be procured by the central government,
and tended to maintain output of non-rice subsidiary
foodstuffs.
20. It was not until 1968, after bombing of
the northern part of the country had ceased, that
the regime was able to turn its attention to the
loosening of the cooperative system. In June 1968,
Party First Secretary Le Duan called for a
strengtbaening of the "collective economy" and
stricter guidance of private farming. Five months
later the Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National Assembly, Truong Chinh, criticized
strongly the practice of treating cooperative land
as though it were privately held.
21. An indication of the types of abuses and
the seriousness of the situation was revealed in
the statute on cooperatives promulgated in May
1969 by the National Assembly Standing Committee.
Among other things the statute pointed out that
property of the agricultural cooperatives such as
ricefields, cattle, agricultural tools, and so
forth, are public property and must be "protected,
closely managed, and properly used." The coopera-
tive members were admonished not to misappropriate
the ricefields and other property of the coopera-
tives. The cooperative managers were warned not
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to cede or sell the ricefields or other property
of the cooperative without the acquiescence of
cooperative members.
22. The new statute established no new rules
or policies, and to date there have been no signs
of a crackdown by the regime to expedite enforce-
ment of policies that had been ignored or subverted
to wartime demands during the bombing. The culti-
vation of private plots has been allowed to con-
tinue, as these were the source of about 40% of the
income of cooperative members, about 90% of all
hogs, and most of the country's leafy vegetables
and food crops.
Food Consumption and Imports Since 1965
Consumption
23. North Vietnamese rationing of basic food-
stuffs has not been altered because of the war.
The rationing system, initiated in 1954, continued
to allocate grain and root crops to adults on the
basis of the type of labor performed and to children
according to age. There is no evidence that the
ration associated with a particular occupation or
age has been reduced since 1965. The grain ration
for adults ranges from 13.5 kilograms per month for
sedentary workers to 24 kilograms for heavy workers
and soldiers. Children up to age 15 received from
4 to 13 kilograms a month. The minimum per capita
grain ration for adults in North Vietnam of approxi-
mately one-sixth of a ton a year provides only
about 1,600 calories a day, four-fifths of the
caloric intake considered essential for adequate
health. The additional caloric needs are satisfied
from purchases of rice on the free market and from
other non-grain rationed foodstuffs -- including
Nuoc Mam (a highly favored fermented fish sauce),
pork, chicken, fish, cooking oil, and sugar -- and
from unrationed fruits and vegetables.
24. Because of the transfer of adults into
more physically demanding occupations to satisfy
wartime manpower demands, the average per capita
grain consumption probably increased during the
last five years. This increase together with
population growth resulted in an increase in
national food requirements during the war period.
Under normal conditions the population of North
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Vietnam would have grown at an estimated rate of
400,000 per year, or an annual increase of about
2.3%. The population did not grow normally during
1965-69, however,, as North Vietnam dispatched to
South Vietnam large numbers of men and suffered
abnormally high death rates because of the war.
Effective in-country annual average population
growth probably was close to 1.5%. A total of
about 500,000 men were lost because of the war
during 1965-69, and the normal increase in grain
requirements was reduced, as shown in the
following tabulation:
Thousand Metric Tons
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Additional food
requirements:
Normal population
growth
70
140
210
280
350
Casualties
7
18
39
80
114
Net increase
63
122
171
200
236
25. The estimated increase in food requirements
resulting from military mobilization is shown
below*:
Year
Thousand
Metric Tons
Year
Thousand
Metric Tons
1965
5
1968
31
1966
24
1969
29
1967
25
* For both the military and the civilian mobiliza-
tion, it was assumed that food rations were in-
creased from minimum to maximum in adult levels.
More realistically this assumption allows for:
(a) an increase from average to maximum rations
for those (mainly males) who were actual Zy mobi-
lized; and (b) an increase from minimum to average
rations for those (mainly females) who took over
the tasks formerly performed by those who had been
mobilized.
10
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26. Increased food requirements resulting from
the mobilization of an estimated 200,000 civilians
for heavy labor that included repair of bomb damage
and transport work such as driving and repairing
trucks and loading and unloading cargo can be esti-
mated similarly, assuming that the numbers of
additional heavy workers averaged 100,000 in 1965,
200,000 in the years 1966 through 1968, and then
dropped back to 100,000 in 1969. Increased civilian
food requirements would have been as shown in the
following tabulation:
Year
Thousand
Metric Tons
Year
Thousand
Metric Tons
1965
13
1968
25
1966
25
1969
13
1967
25
27. By drawing together the estimated changes
in consumption requirements resulting from popula-
tion growth and war-induced mobilization, the
following rough estimate of increased food require-
ments can be computed.
Thousand Metric Tons
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Changes
ments r
from:
in require-
esulting
Population growth
63
122
171
200
236
Mobilization
18
49
50
56
42
Total
81
171
221
256
278
Food Imports
28. The combination of reduced domestic output
and increased domestic requirements resulted in a
sharp increase in food imports during the bombing
years. In 1964, identified seaborne imports of
foodstuffs amounted to 162,000 tons. Imports
of foodstuffs in 1965 dropped because the bombing
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had not yet affected agriculture, and rice output
during the year was a respectable 3.0 million tons.
Food deliveries continued low until late 1966,
when the trend was sharply reversed. in 1968,
North Vietnam imported 790,000 tons of foodstuffs,
an estimated one-sixth of its total caloric con-
sumption (see the chart). Food imports dropped
FOOC AVAILABILITY
IN NORTH VIETNAM
slightly in 1969, reflecting the slight improve-
ment in agricultural output after the cessation of
the bombing. Most of the increase in food de-
liveries to North Vietnam during 1967-69 consisted
of Soviet wheat flour and corn and Chinese rice.
29. The greatly increased imports enabled North
Vietnam for all practical purposes to offset the
reduction in domestic output and to cover increased
domestic requirements every year since 1965, except
perhaps for the substantial deficit in 1966, as
shown in the following tabulation:
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Thousand Metric Tons a~
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Reduction (increase]
a.n output over 1964
(130]
70
200
340
200
Increase in domestic
requirements
80
170
220
260
280
Total increase [de-
crease] in external
requirements
[50]
240
420
590
480
Increase [decrease]
in observed food
imports over 1964
[40]
(80]
300
630
600
Deficit (surplus]
(10]
320
120
[40]
[120]
a. Data have been rounded to the nearest -yen
thousand. Because of rounding, components may not
add to the totals shown.
30. In spite of the apparent large deficit in
1966, there is no evidence that food became un-
usually scarce during the year. A possible ex-
planation for this anomaly is that rice production
in 1966 was higher than estimated, but this is not
likely, because of the bombing and the fact that
weather conditions were not unusually favorable.
A more likely explanation is that the country's
food stocks were sufficient to cover much of the
deficit in 1966. Most of the output of the tenth-
month crop is consumed during the first half of
the following calendar year. Thus the good rice
harvest in 1965 would have provided the country
with good carryover stocks at the beginning of
1966. The fact that food imports began to increase
rapidly late in 1966 suggests that in about the
middle of 1966 a disappointing fifth-month rice
harvest and a dangerously low store of food forced
the regime to seek extra food deliveries from other
Communist countries.
31. During 1970 and in the future, the USSR
apparently will supply most of North Vietnam's
imported food needs -- primarily wheat flour.
Since mid-1969, food deliveries from Communist
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China have been declining, while food imports from
the Soviet Union have been increasing. The USSR
reportedly has agreed to supply North Vietnam
with 600,000 tons of wheat flour during 1970, and
in anticipation of this North Vietnam has been
constructing bakeries, wheat noodle factories,
and other flour-processing facilities in the
country with the help of other Communist countries.
Prospects
32. North Vietnamese agriculture faces a host
of war-associated problems in 1970. Laborers
and managerial cadres are still being taken from
agriculture for military service, production of
domestic fertilizer has not been fully restored,
and organizational and control problems are still
extant, To regain pre-bombing levels of per capita
output, the country must not only make up the de-
cline in output during the bombing years but also
must catch up with the growth in population. This
would mean an increase in output of milled rice
of about 450,000 tons over last year's estimated
2.7 million tons, or a 17% rise. Such a rise is
highly unlikely this year even with extremely
favorable weather conditions.
33. The regime's concern over agricultural
troblems was evident in the 1970 state economic
plan, which placed considerable importance on
increasing agricultural output. A February 1970
article by Le Duan that spelled out long-term
gc.als for the country indicated that emphasis is
to be given to increasing the output of food-
stuffs for domestic consumption and industrial
crops suitable for exports that would earn the
foreign exchange needed to purchase indu3trial
equipment. North Vietnam has by this time almost
exhausted the area of land that can be added to
paddy production without prohibitively costly
investments in land clearing and water control
facilities. Thus, to bring about an increase in
rice production, the regime is concentrating on
increasing yields. Pre-bombing yields of paddy
in North Vietnam averaged about 1.8 tons per
hectare for each crop. The regime goal, +t least
for double-cropped land, is to increase th,i
average yield per crop to 2.5 tons per hectare.
These yields may be compared with average yields
per crop per hectare of 2.0 tons in South V?,etnam,
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030049-5
SECR Elf
less than 1.0 ton in Laos, 1.3 tons in Cambodia,
and 1.5 tong in Thailand.
34. North Vietnam in apparently planning the
widespread use of a high-yielding strain of rice
which, from the limited information available,
seems to have characteristics similar to the
Philippine Iit-8 "Miracle Rice". The regime claims
that the new strain wan developed entirely with
North Vietnamese resources, but outside help prob-
ably was obtained either as a source of genetic
material and/or in the form of technical assistance.
It is possible that the strain was obtained from
South Vietnam, which has had some success with
cultivation of miracle rice.
35. Viracle rice appears to be nuitable for
North Vietnamese climatic conditions. It can be
grown during either growing season no long an
water in available in proper quantities. There
are problems to overcome, however. The new rice
requires more careful control of irrigation water
levels and considerably more nitrogenous fertilizer
per hectare if increased yields are to be obtained.
Miracle rice is much shorter than ordinary rice and,
while this characteristic reduces the danger of
lodging, it also increases the danger of drowning.
Because of the heavy rainfall during the tenth-
month growing season in North Vietnam, flooding of
paddy fields and drowning of rice plants is a
danger which would restrict the use of the miracle
rice during that sear-on. The new rice will there-
fnre bra t~' d pri,'arII" d'rI.nq the Ir fth-month
season.
36. The shorter growing time of the new strain
permits the crop to he planted two months later
than the normal fifth--month rice. This would
lessen the manpower strains associated with the
overlapping of the harvesting of the tenth-month
crop and t}.e planting of the fifth-month crop.
Some quick-arowinu spring rice has traditionally
been grown during the spring season, but the area
has been small. In 1969 the spring rice area
amounted to about 100,000 hectares, or slightly
above 10% of the total fifth-month rice area. The
regime plans to double the spring rice area in
1970; most of the increase will probably be planted
in the new high-yielding rice strain.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030049-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030049-5
Sl c .1:'.1'
37. To make full use of the yield potential of
the new strain, North Vietnam would have to in-
crease considerably the amount of nitrogen applied
to rice fields. Up to .1.969, North Vietnam obtained
most of its nitrogenous f.er.tilize_r imports from
other Communist countries either an grants or on
long-term credits. Therm imports were primarily
ammonium nulphate -- an inexpensive widely used
fertilizer with a relatively low nitrogen content.
In 1969, North Vietnam purchased from Japan at a
coat of almost $5 million about 75,000 tons of
urea -- about half of all the fertilizer imported
during the year. Urea, which is a much more
efficient nitrogenous fertilizer than ammonium
nulphate and contains about twice the nitrogen per
unit weight of fertilizer, could br_ uned to great
advantage on the new rice. Although the total
weight of fertilizer imported in 1?69 was about
the some an in 1968, the preponderance of urea in
the total rained the amount of nitrogen imported
to a level 50% above the 1968 level. Imports of
urea from Japan have continued during 1.970. Such
purchases represent a considerable drain on North
Vietnam's very limited hard currency holdings,
however. It in doubtful, in the longer term, that
the regime would authorize purchase of sufficient
urea to permit widespread cultivation and maximum
yio.ldn from the miracle rice.
38. Planned incrranc-n in the output of indur-
trial crops arc, to cott,,o Iaro c'ly IFc.iiii
the area under cultivation rather than by increaninq
yielun. The 1970 (;(pal tuz I.fl Ui tFl:.il i:rvi F
portedl,y in to increan- the area under cultivation
by 39% above the larcrest area ever achieved. Such
an increase in highly un1ikc+ly in one yc-tir in view
of the much slower rate of rirowth in industrial
crop area that prevailed in pre-bombino years and
the lingering effects, of the war. Moreover, the
parallel effort to incrc-ape output of the miracle
rice, which in cultivated at the name time a!, mc?nt
AL ?t_.. l wA. r.