INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM PETROLEUM IN NORTH VIETNAM AT THE OUTSET OF 1970: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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' I_ /r',, Vb0F`-e v r / '/(-f 0
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Petroleum In -North Vietnam At The Outset Of 1970--
A Review Of Developments During 1969
ER IM 70-18
February 1970
Copy No. 3 u
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
dcfen.e of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
f*duded glom auinmo0t
downgmdinry and
dnclauif colion
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1970
Petroleum In North Vietnam At The Outset Of 1970:
A Review Of Deve opments During 1969
Introduction
The capability to import, store, distribute, and'
consume petroleum is critical to the North Vietnamese
support of its military forces and its civil economy.
This memorandum examines activities that affected
that capability during 1969 and describes the petro-
leum economy at the outset of 1970.*
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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Petroleum Supply and Demand
1. North Vietnam imported almost 390,000 tons*
of petroleum products in 1969, only slightly less
than the record level of 400,000 tons in 1968. As
in earlier years,, motor gasoline and diesel fuel oil,
in approximately equal shares, accounted for about
85% of the imports; kerosine, aircraft fuels, lubri-
cants, and specialty products made up the remainder.
The total value of these imports was about $16 mil-
lion. Monthly imports are shown in Table 1 and are
compared with earlier periods in the chart.
2. Monthly imports in 1969 followed the cyclical
pattern that-has been evident since 1966. During
the summer months, petroleum deliveries are generally
lower than the average for the rest of the year.
This probably reflects seasonal changes in demand in
North Vietnam.and the reduced availability in the Far
East of Soviet oil supplies and shipping during the
,navigation season on the Northern Sea Route.
3 North Vietnamese consumption of petroleum
in 1969 probably was about 384,000 tons, an average
of 32,000 tons per month.** The estimated monthly
Unless otherwise indicated, all tonnages are in
metric, tons.
*'* It is not possible to quantify consumption by
type's of equipment or consuming sector, because of
inadequate data on numbers and use. Estimates of
consumption are derived basically from analyses of
estimates of imports, storage capacity, and stocks-on-
hand and are probably accurate within plus or minus
10%., Average monthly imports during the 24-month
peric .i ending in December 1969 were about 33,000 tons;
observed imports, which represent about 95% of total
estimated imports? are highly accurate. Estimates
of storage capacity,
ably accurate., cou accommodate, over time, the in-
terim stock levee calculated from estimated imports
and consumption. If consumption was substantially
lower than estimated, the usable storage would have
been inadequate. [footnote continued on p. 3]
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North Vietnam: Imports of Petroleum
by Month, 1966-69
30
0
Month J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M
1966 1967 1968
I
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North Vietnam: Imports of Petroleum
by Month, 1966-69
Average
Average
1966 1967 1968 1969
a
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North Vietnam: Estimated Monthly Imports
of Petroleum, by Type of Carrier
1.969
Month
Tanker
Cargo Vessel
Rail
Total S/
January
36.4
1.8
1.2
39.3
February
25.8
2.5
1.2
29.6
March
23.2
1.4
1.2
25.8
April
16.3
3.3
1.2
20.8
May
30.0
5.1
1.2
36.3
June
21.0
2.7
1.2
25.0
July
20.5
1.6
1.2
23.3
August
20.8
3.2
1.2
25.2
September
21.8
1.6
1.2
24.6
October
49.7
2.8
1.2
53.6
November
43.9
5.7
1.2
50.9
December
29.0
2.8
1.2
33.0
Total a/
338.4
34.6
14.4
387.4
a. Because of rounding, components may not add
to the totals shown.
average in 1968 was 30,000 tons. This moderate
increase in estimated consumption is consistent with
the substantial imports and use of petroleum-con-
suming equipment and the probable increased level of
activity resulting from the bombing halt.
If consumptiion was substantially higher, there would
have been excess storage capacity and there would be
no reason for North Vietnam to continue its expansion
of the storage system. Moreover, if consumption was
substantially higher than estimated, countrywide
stocks-on-hand would have declined to levels danger-
ously low for a wartime economy dependent on outside
sources of supply.
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4. Supplies of petroleum,on hand in North
Vietnam are estimated to have been about 105,000 tons
on 31 December 1969, about the same as a year earlier.
At the consumption rate estimated for 1969, year-end
stocks would represent 100 days of supply. Petro-
leum supply and demand balances for recent years are
shown in Table 2.
Table 2
North Vietnam: Petroleum Supply and Demand
Thousand Metric Tons
1966
1967
1968
1969
Stocks on hand, 1 January
46
52
65
102
Imports
237
256
400
387
Total supply
283
308
465
489
Less total demand
231
243
363
384
Consumption
190
240
360
384
Losses
41
3
3
Negl.
Stocks can hand,
31 December
52
65
102
105
Petroleum Imports -- Origin and Transport
5. The USSR supplied 90% of the total petroleum
delivered to North Vietnam in 1969 compared with less
than 80% in 1968. The decline in deliveries from
Communist China from almost- 18% in 1968 to about 6%
in 1969 probably reflects the end of the transfer 'of
petroleum delivered in earlier years to China for the
North'Vietnamese account from Romania and the USSR.
The East. European countries continued to provide only
about 5% of North Vietnam's oil imports.
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6. More than 95% of the imports were delivered
by ship. Table 3 shows the origin of these seaborne
imports of petroleum in 1969. The overwhelming share
of the petroleum imports originated in. the Soviet Far
East and were delivered in small 4,000-DWT tankers,
a procedure in efrect since October ..966. In the
last quarter of 1969, however, several larger tankers
were employed, including one of 20,000 DWT, the
largest ever to visit North Vietnam. Although tankers
must discharge their cargo into lighters while at
anchor, the rebuilding of bulk storage tanks and re-
lated pumping facilities at Haiphong and expansion of
the lightening fleet in 1969 make it possible for
North Vietnam to discharge these large tankers with-
out undue delay.
North Vietnam: Seaborne Imports of Petroleum,
by Origin and Type of Ship
1969
Thousand Metric Tons
Origin
Tanker Cargo Total
Percent of
Total
USSR
318.9
16.0
334.9
89.8
Black Sea
19.8
11.9
31.7
8.5
Far East
299.1
4.1
303.2
81.3
Communist China
8.5
12.6
21.1
5.7
Romania
11.0
2.7
13.7
3.7
Hungary
0
2.3
2.3
0.6
Bulgaria
0
0.9
0.9
0.2
Poland
0
0.1
0.1
Negl.
Total
338.4
. 34.6
373.0
100.0
Percent
91 9 100
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Petroleum Storage
Principal Storage Terminals
7. Immediately following the bombing halt in
November 1968, the North Vietnamese began reconstruc-
tion of some of the tanks at the principal storage
terminals that had been damaged severely in the in-
tensified bombings in mid-1966. Using steel salvaged
from the damaged tanks, large welded-steel tanks
were constructed on the existing foundations.
8. At the Haiphong terming'., seven tanks with a
total capacity of about 6,800 tons had been restored
by the end of 1969, and two tanks with a total capacity
of about 1,000 tons were under construction.. At the
Hanoi terminal, where tankage had been completely
destroyed, ten tanks with a total capacity of about
7,100 tons were constructed; and at Nguyen Khe, three
tanks with a total capacity of about 2,800 tons were
rebuilt. Capacity was also increased at these
terminals by a negligible amount through the instal-
lation of small horizontal tanks.
9. Storage capacity at the principal terminals
was more than doubled during 1969 largely through this
reconstruction program. At the beginning of 1970,
total storage at these terminals was almost 38,000
tons, about 40% of the total capacity (about 101,000
tons) existing on 1 January 1966. Table 4 shows the
estimated storage capacities at the principal terminals
at the.outset of recent years.
10. The North Vietnamese had already demonstrated
a capability to accept, store, and distribute pe'.ro-
leum supplies sufficient for their needs on a rou?.ine
basis. However, restoration of tankage at the prin-
cipal terminals, particularly at Haiphong, together
with the coastal shuttle of petroleum from the port
of Haiphong to the pipeline terminus at Vinh, has
enhanced and expanded that capability. As a result,
North Vietnam was able to handle a record quantity of
imports -- more than 100,000 tons -- in the period
October-November 1969.
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Dispersed Storage Sites -- Tanks
11. This storage system -- consisting of small
horizontal tanks buried in shallow excavations and
covered with earth -- was modified and expanded again
during 1969. It is difficult to be precise about the
net change in the number of sites or total capacity
of this system during 1969. An indeterminate number
of sites were abandoned and tanks were relocated from
one site to another during 1969. Moreover, some
sites that may have existed during 1968 wsre not
identified until 1969.
12. There probably were at least 200' sites with
an estimated total capacity of between 70,000 and 80,000
tons at the outset of 1970, compared with at least
150 sites with an estimated total capacity of between
50,000 and 60,000 tons a year earlier. This apparent
increase is attributable to the expansion of the
system in association with the pipeline south from
Vinh and to the expansion of the storage and distri-
bution outlets elsewhere in the south following the
suspension of bombing. The dramatic shift southward
in the geographical distribution of these storage
sites is shown in the following comparison of the
probable dispersion of these sites on 1 January 1970
and 1969.
As of I January 1970 As of 1 January 1969
Location
Capacity
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Percent Capacity Percent
of (Thousand of
Total Metric Tons) Total
Above 21?
23
31
28
Between 20?
and 20? 59' 16,
21
12
Between 19?
and 190 59'
6
8
5
Between 18?
and 18? 59'
16
21
8
Between 17?
and 17? 59'
14
Total 75 a/
100
5.5 a/ 100
a. . Tots s represent the midpoint of the estimated range
of capacity.
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Dispersed Storage Sites -- Drums
13. Containers (of various small sizes but ex-
pressed in terms of 55-gallon drum equivalents)
continue to be used extc.nsiveiy in North Vietnam
for the storage and distribution of petroleum. There
probably was the equivalent of about 500,000 drums,
representing storage capacity of about 85,000 tons,
at the outset of 1970.* This increase of about
100,000 drums froi% a year earlier resulted from the
higher level of petroleum imports on dry cargo ves-
sels during 1969.
Other Storage
14. No change was observed in the bulk petroleum
storage facilities at military and industrial in-
stallations -- about 5,000 tons. There also is an
indeterminate but presumably sizable "floating"
storage capacity represented by barges, rail tank
cars, and tank trucks in North Vietnam.
Summary of Storage Capacity
15. The estimated total storage capacity on
1 January 1970 probably exceeds the total that was
available in North Vietnam prior to the bombings.**
The following tabulation summarizes the changes in
storage capacity in recent years.
The drum-equivalent inventory is based on the
tonnage of petroleum shipped to North Vietnam in
containers on dry cargo vessels since the beginning
of 1966, reduced by 10% to reflect estimated losses
from attack and normal use.
** At the start of 1966 the principal storage
terminals had an estimated capacity of about 101,000
tons, and only limited storage capacity was provided
by drums and dispersed tanks.
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Principal storage
terminals 18 16 17 38
Dispersed storage
sites (tanks)
30 to 40
40 to 50
50 to 60
70 to 80
Dispersed storage
sites (drums)
28
50
65
,85
Military and
industrial sites
(tanks)
5
5
5
5
Total 81 to 91 111 to 121 137 to 147 198 to 208
16. It is not practicable for all of this storage
to be used at 100% of capacity. On the basis of mili-
tary and civil experience, the practical limit on the
use of tank capacity is 75% on the average; on drum
capacity about 50%. The storage capacity in North
Vietnam used in such a manner would, on the average,
accommodate between 12,7,000 and 13',000 tons of petro-
leum, corresponding to at least 120 days of supply
at the average consumption rate estimated for.1969.
"Floating" storage, not included in this summary, would
accommodate additional supply.
Other Developments
Pipeline System
17. North Vietnam's petroleum pipeline system, first
observed in July 1968, continued to be extended and
improved-during 1969.* There now are about 150 miles
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of pipeline serving a variety of storage and distri-
bution points in North Vietnam between Vinh and the
border of Laos at the Mu Gia Pass. From the Mu Gia
Pass a 30-mile extension of the system into Laos has
been identified (see the map).
18. A 10-mile segment of pipeline, the operational
status of which is unknown, has been identified
recently in Laos, west of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
No extensions of this segment have been located, but
this short section almost certainly has, or will have,
its origin in North Vietnam. The apparent alignment -
of the new segment and the distance -- about 60 miles -
and formidable terrain between the new segment and the
presently identified southern terminus of the Mu Gia
extension, suggest that the two probably are not con-
nected. It is more likely, although there is no
firm evidence, that the new segment represents part
of a separate system with its origin in the vicinity
of Dong Hoi or Quang Khe on the southern coast of
North Vietnam, and passes across the area immediately
north of the DMZ into Laos. Such a system would
provide North Vietnam with an independent and reason-
ably secure petroleum supply route supplied by coastal
shipping from Vinh and/or Haiphong for servicing the
petroleum consumers in the Panhandle regions of North
Vietnam and Laos.
Exploration for Oil
19. No new oil exploration activities in North
Vietnam were identified in 1969. The drilling rig
identified in November 1968 in the vicinity of Thai
Binh in the Red River delta had been removed as of
9 September 1969. Three drilling rigs reportedly
arrived from Romania early in 1969, but their location
and activity have not yet been determined.
Imports of Pipe
20. North Vietnam imported about 6,000 tons of
steel pipe, not otherwise identified, from Japan in
October 1969. Although this pipe may be used to
expand the North Vietnamese pipeline system, the
characteristics are substantially different from any
pipe observed in the system. Data on identified pipe
follow:
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Location of Pipelines and Major Petroleum Storage Facilities, I January 1970
ouanaphrabong-
T
Udon Thanl
Lei Cheu
Petroleum pipeline
0100--
Existing Possible
? Principal storage site
Railroad
Road
Trcll
Dion Man'
Phu
NORTH VIETNAM
~Tuyon JI
~pumaR
Nghln Lo Yen Onj:-
Thnl
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t11 IIANOI
Aft,
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,i 'Dec 1 Uuanr! Nhnn
lieu }Inlplten
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4Dona \` [` \\all
VIETNAM
..r.r.r.on.
..r ~~u r.q.urm
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Inside Length of Weight
Diameter Section per Foot
Tons (Inches) (feet) Pounds)
Line pipe
identified in
North Vietnam -- 4 20 2.3 to 9*
Japanese pipe
Type A 736 10.7 23 to 39 32
Type B 5,243 6.26 32 to 39 13.7**
21. If, as seems likely, the imported pipe is for
oil-related activities, the small amount of typo A
would be suitable for use as a tanker discharge line
or for internal distribution at the Haiphong terminal.
Type B would provide for about 160 miles of pipeline
with a daily throughput capacity of about 2,200 tons
or double that of the present 4-inch system in North
Vietnam. Additional pipeline of such length and
capacity would far exceed foreseeable needs.
22. The Japanese pipe may be intended for use
in oilfield activities. No imports of pipe for use
with the Soviet and Romanian drilling rigs have been
observed.
Conclusions
23. In 1969, North Vietnamese petroleum supplies
continued to be adequate for military and civil needs,
and the capacity to handle and store petroleum in-
creased.
* Most of the line pipe in the North Vietnamese system
is estimated to weigh between 2.3 and 4.6 pounds par
foot.
*t This pipe may consist of two grades of different
unit weights, the arithmetical average of which is
13.7 pounds per foot.
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24. Using steel salvaged from storage tanks that
were damaged during the bombings, North Vietnam ro-
constructud oil storage capacity at throe of the might
principal terminals. As a result, the total storage
capacity at the outset of 1970, including dispersed
tanks and drums, probably exceeds the total capacity
existing in North Vietnam prior to the bombings.
Moreover, the storage capacity available at the
Haiphong terminal, the principal oil import point in
North Vietnam, now permits the delivery of oil imports
in large tankers, without excessive delays, on a
routine basis. This was demonstrated by the import
of 100,000 tons of petroleum in October-November 1969,
about 25'@ of the total for the year and a record level
for a 60-day period.
25. The fully operational pipeline now provides
an economical and efficient all-weather petroleum
supply route from Vinh to various storage and con-
suming points within the Panhandle of North Vietnam
and into Laos. A newly observed segment of pipeline,
the ultimate limits of which are'not yet identified,
may be an extension of the existing operational pipe-
line system through the Mu Gia Pans or, as seems more
likely, it may be part of a separate, more secure
supply route from the coastal areas of Dong Hoi/Quang
Kh e .
26. There was no evidence of petroleum shortages
in North Vietnam during 1969, and the USSR continued
to provide timely shipments in adequate quantities.
Imports and consumption of petroleum in 1969 were
essentially unchanged from a year earlier, and
stocks-on-hand at the outset of 1970 were sufficient
for 100 days of supply.
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