INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM INDONESIA'S TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600020126-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 126
• Publication Date: September 1, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
5 Ex,
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Indonesia's Transport Problems
Confidential
ER IM 69-124
September 1969
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Indonesia's Transport Problems
Introduction
Indonesia's transport system has been in poor
condition for years as the result of war damage,
withdrawal of Dutch administrators and ships, and
the economic disruptions and poor management of the
Sukarno regime. The Suharto government, realizing
that a viable transport system is essential for
political control and economic development of the
more than 3,000 islands of the archipelago, has taken
steps to improve the situation with foreign assist-
ance.
This memorandum will discuss the basic problems
and assess the impact of the poor transport service
on the economy. It will examine the priority given
to transport in the new Indonesian five-year plan
and consider whether large amounts of new investment
are needed immediately for transport or whether there
could be adequate improvement in the near future with
modest investments and with more emphasis on manage-
ment and greater operational efficiency.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current In-
telZigenee.
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Status of the Transport System
1. During their long colonial rule in
Indonesia, the Dutch built an efficient transport
system that connected producing areas with ports
and population centers and facilitated political
and military control. Shipping was the system's
backbone for some 3,000 islands of the archipelago.
Land routes were mostly short links from the agri-
cultural and mineral producing areas to the ports,
but they also connected surplus and deficit areas
within the islands.
2. This transport system was extensively
damaged during World War II and the conflict that
preceded Indonesian independence in 1949. Restora-
tion was assigned a high priority after independence.
Except for motor transport, nearly all transport
facilities were nationalized. The system improved
rapidly until about 1957 when transport as well as
other sectors of the economy began to show the
cumulative effects of Sukarno's economic and politi-
cal mismanagement.
3. Merchant shipping suffered most during
Sukarno's rule. In 1957, Sukarno evicted the Dutch
shipping company that accounted for about 80 percent
of all interisland tonnage. Indonesia lost not only
the company's ships but also about 90 percent of
the operating personnel as well. Although the
government gradually chartered or purchased more
than enough replacement tonnage, the newly hired
Indonesian personnel were ill-trained and service
deteriorated. While the volume of shipping avail-
able increased rapidly after 1957 (see Table 1),
operating efficiency decreased markedly. During the
early 1960's, more than half of the merchant fleet
was inoperative and most of the ships still working
were used to only 30 percent of capacity. There
were incredible port delays. The causes were mani-
fold and included poor organization of port and re-
pair facilities, lack of spare parts, and red tape.
Shipping was also disrupted seriously during the
confrontation with Malaysia beginning in late 1963.
Some improvements have been made since 1966, but
sailing boats are now handling about half of the
interisland shipping.
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4. Motor transport, of minor importance
before independence, expanded rapidly until about
1957 when that system also began to deteriorate.
The vehicle inventory grew markedly (see Table 2),
but an increasing proportion of the vehicles were
inoperative for want of mechanics and spare parts.
The spare-parts problem was complicated by the
great variety of foreign models in the inventory
and the cutback by some countries in foreign aid
used to purchase spare parts. By 1966 at least
half of the trucks and buses in the country were
inoperable. Since then, spare parts have consti-
tuted an increasing proportion of automotive
imports and fewer stalled vehicles have been ob-
served on the streets and roads.
5. The road network also deteriorated after
1957 and adversely affected road transport. By
the end of the Sukarno era, sections of many roads
were impassable and much of the remainder was so
run down that wear and tear on vehicles was extreme-
ly high. The result was high transport costs. In
addition, most roads and bridges were built to pre-
war structural standards and were inadequate for
modern traffic. Only 3 percent of the country's net-
work was designed for axle loads of 5 tons or more,
about 22 percent for 2.75 to 3.5 tons, and 75 percent
for 1 to 1.5 tons. Only 19 percent of the roads now
have asphalt or bituminous surface, 41 percent are
gravel, and the remainder are earth. Road conditions
in Javz, improved noticeably during 1967-68 mainly as
the result of Food-for-Work programs and the formation
of civic action groups. Thus far, the improvement
has been limited for the most part to main roads
between major cities. Roads in outlying areas have
received little attention.
6. Intra-city transport developed even more
acute problems than road transport generally, as
rapid population growth and even more rapid urbani-
zation coincided with a marked decline in buses.
In Djakarta in 1966-67, for example, open trucks
were used for passengers, and hundreds of two-
wheeled, horse-drawn carts carrying four to six
passengers functioned as public carriers. Recent
reports indicate that the situation in Djakarta has
improved in terms of safety and the amount of
transport available, but tremendous problems remain.
Other cities have made less progress.
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7. The railroads weathered the Sukarno years
better than road and water transport and actually
could handle more freight than was offered. Dur-
ing Sukarno's rule, rail transport shifted from a
predominance of freight traffic to passenger traf-
fic. This shift reflected the concentration of
railroads in densely populated Java, relatively
low rail passenger fares, the decline of the sugar
industry for which the railroads were principally
built, and competition for freight from road
transport. About 3,000 miles of meter-gauge rail-
ways on Java and Madura serve all principal cities
on the islands and extend to outlying areas. The
remainder of the country's railroads -- about 1,000
miles -- consist of four unconnected lines on
Sumatra that principally carry mine and plantation
output to the ports. The rail equipment inventory
currently is below pre-war levels (see Table 3),
nearly two-thirds of the entire rolling stock is
over 40 years old, and two-thirds of the locomotives
are steam powered. There was almost no capital
investment in railroads from the early 1930's un-
til 1949, and subsequent investment failed to cover
even replacements. Track and bridge maintenance
was neglected. Poor management and serious over-
staffing also contributed to the exceedingly low
operating efficiency.
8. Civil air transport, like motor transport,
grew rapidly following independence although service
was limited. After World War II the Dutch airlines
did not resume service in Indonesia but instead pro-
vided advisers and technical assistance to Garuda,
the Indonesian national airline. After the Dutch
withdrew in 1957, Garuda hired other foreign ad-
visers and technicians. Routes were limited to
serving only about 50 domestic points. Garuda and
another small national company that operated feeder
service on outer islands monopolized domestic ser-
vice. Garuda also operated a few international
routes, and losses on these routes were more than
compensated from domestic revenues. By the end of
the Sukarno era, however, air transport was run down
and operating in the red because of taxes, dete-
riorating management,, and a lack of investment in
airports and ground support facilities (which were
not under Garuda control). Nearly half of Garuda's
fleet of 35 planes were old DC-3's; spare parts were
not always available, partly because of lack of
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foreign exchange; operation of the planes was un-
predictable with poor runways; and planes were
underutilized because of lack of lighting and
communications equipment at airports. During 1968,
Garuda's performance improved appreciably in qual-
ity of service and operations. Surplus employees
were discharged and new planes ordered. Because
of limited airport services, however, the existing
fleet is still not fully utilized.
Major Problems in the Transport System
9. A basic problem in all modes of Indonesia's
transport is the dire shortage of competent adminis-
trative, managerial, and technical skills. This
shortage affects government control of transport
organs, daily transport operation, and maintenance
of network and equipment as well as planning for
transport development. For example, the central
government directorate responsible for detailed
planning of national roads has only 20 civil
engineers for a country one-fourth the size of the
United States. This deficiency is common to all
sectors of government and private business, as
only about 120 engineering graduates are available
each year for the public and private sectors com-
bined. In the case of transport this shortage is
aggravated by an overly complicated organizational
system. Of all the transport systems, port opera-
tions probably have the most complicated and over-
lapping administrative responsibilities. Control
of ports is vested in the General Directorate of
Sea Communications, but in the major ports responsi-
bility is divided among the heads of the shipping
regions, a port authority, a port council, a techni-
cal advisory staff, and the local harbor state enter-
prise. Port operations, dredging of ports and ac-
cess channels, and maintenance of navigational aids
are under separate agencies.
10. Another problem is the poor financial
position of the various transport agencies and their
lack of working capital and investment funds. Most
have large debts, and sometimes large uncollectable
claims, often with other state enterprises and
agencies. As a result, private and state enterprises
are reluctant to contract with transport agencies
because they might not get paid. Lack of funds
also has restricted imports of replacement parts.
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Foreign countries have extended credits for trans-
port systems, but local transport agencies often
have had insufficient local funds to buy the needed
foreign exchange.
11. The development of the transport system
in Indonesia after World War II was financed main-
ly by foreign capital. Loans, grants, and long-
term credits extended by all donors for economic
purposes totaled $3.1 billion from 1950 through
1964 of which about $536 million, or 17 percent,
was allocated to transport projects. The merchant
marine received 38 percent, road transport 32 per-
cent, railroads 25 percent, and civil aviation
5 percent. Much of the foreign investment in trans-
port was spent on new transport equipment. Rel-
atively little was spent for spare parts, repair
shops, maintenance, and training of administrative
and technical personnel, which were needed to uti-
lize the new equipment efficiently. Government
controls resulted in some improvement on this
score in 1967 and 1968 -- about half the value of
material imports for the transport sector consisted
of spare parts, a much larger proportion than in
previous years. A little less than half the value
of the imports during 1967-68 was financed by
project aid. Project aid would have been larger
had suitable large-scale projects been available
for financing as individual projects, but by far
the highest priority requirement in transport has
been the repair and rehabilitation of existing
equipment and facilities.
12. Government freight rate policies also
have contributed to the financial problems of the
transport agencies. The government controls
freight rates encept for road transport for which
it fixes a maximum. The Sukarno government kept
freight rates very low, making transport agencies
dependent on inadequate budget subsidies. Effi-
ciency of operation declined because of this lack
of funds. Since early 1967 the Suharto government
has raised rates in an attempt to make transport
agencies cover their costs. By setting rates in
relation to present high costs of operation, how-
ever, all rates are now high and the more ineffi-
cient modes -- water and rail transport -- have
relatively higher rates. Thus truck transport is
used whenever a shipper has a choice of modes as
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he does on Java where rail, truck, and coastal
shipping are usually available. This situation
has left rail transport in particular, and water
transport in some areas, with unused capacity and
has further lowered their efficiency.
13. The accumulated backlog of needed repair,
rehabilitation, and new construction is formidable.
It results principally from the shortage of funds,
dissipation of purchasing power by inflation, and
mistakes in planning and priorities. The backlog
includes rebuilding nearly the entire road and
rail networks in addition to repairing or replac-
ing a major share of the equipment and facilities
in water and air transport.
Adequacy of the Transport System
14. Although there is general agreement that
the Indonesian transport system needs improvement,
opinions vary regarding the adequacy of the current
transport support to the economy. Indonesian
government officials take the most pessimistic view
cf the situation, repeatedly saying that transport
service is insufficient. The International Mone-
tary Fund, in a mid-1968 report, likewise implied
that transport was inadequate:
T:ie requirements for new equipment,
spare parts, supplies and raw materials
for relieving the existing transport
bottlenecks are very large. The road
system ... is inadequate for the current
volume of traffic. Interisland shipping
suffers from inadequate dockyard facili-
ties and navigation facilities. ... A
shortage of locomotives, an inadequate
supply of coal, spare parts, and sleepers,
and the or condition of tracks, bridges,
and co':ttmun:Nations equipment have adversely
affected rail transport. The situation has
not changed materially since the end of
1966 because of the shortage of resources.
American observers in Djakarta have not specifically
assessed the adequacy of transport but have cited
examples of nonavailability of transport (roads
blocked and ports and airports closed) and of inef-
ficient transport service (slow traffic on dete-
riorated roads, shortages of buses, broken-down
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vehicles, and long delays in ports). In early 1968
the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) took the position that Indonesia
has a basically sound transport system which, if
efficiently operated and maintained, could adequately
serve present transport requirements:
In the longer run Indonesia must
plan on larger investments in this field.
However, because of the decline or stag-
nation of trade in recent years, the
physical capacity of the transport sys-
tem is, with some exceptions, not a
bottleneck at present.
The IBRD report also noted that the high cost of
transportation and the poor utilization of equip-
ment on hand are more important problems than is
the physical capacity of the transport system.
15. Indonesia's transport system handled
without significant difficulty the increased demand
for transport created by the bumper rice crop in
1968 -- an increase of 11 percent over 1967. In
addition, there was a slight upswing in industry
and construction that also made increased demands
on the transport system. This situation suggests
that the transport system is able to support the
economy at present despite its deteriorated condi-
tion. The overall transport system has been able
to perform as well as it has since 1962 despite
almost complete neglect mainly because of the sub-
stantial imports of motor vehicles. Motor trans-
port accounted for about 80 percent of the tons
carried in 1962 and at least 90 percent in 1967.
During 1968, repair of vehicles previously out of
service probably pushed this percentage even higher.
Another factor in the capability of the transport
system to support the economy at present is the
ease with which a developing economy can resort to
primitive transport. Primitive forms of transport
are still commonly used in Indonesia and are quickly
expanded to meet shortfalls in modern service.
This has been the case in water transport and in
intra-city transport, as already mentioned. While
this situation is indicative of the adaptable nature
of Indonesian transport, such a transport system
r;annot be relied upon to continually support a viable
economy.
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16. The existing transport capacity is very
unevenly distributed throughout the country.
While transport facilities on Java, the location
of a major r,hare of the economy and the transport
system, appear to have been adequate to meet de-
mand in recent yaars, transportation on the outer
islands, including parts of Sumatra, has been less
abundant and is in poorer condition. Some areas
that formerly produced for export are now isolated.
Other areas, which have food surpluses and could
be developed to produce for the domestic market or
for export, lack transportation. In general,
development of the outer islands is limited by poor
transport. Nevertheless, the outer islands have
received a substantial share of new foreign invest-
ment, about 80 percent of the total of $534 mil-
lion approved as of April 1969. Of the 114 proj-
ects (excluding petroleum), 68 are located in Java
and 46 in the outer islands. Projects in the outer
islands were mainly in mining, fishing, fores-
try, projects which for the most part provide their
own transportation. Smaller, less self-contained
projects that would employ a numbei of people and
help develop a broad-based economy in the outer
islands have not been forthcoming, partly for lack
of transport.
Plans for Transport Development
17. A general plan for transport rehabilitation
and development is set forth in the new Indonesian
five-year plan that began on 1 April 1969. Accord-
ing to the plan, about one-fifth of the state
development funds are to be channeled into transport,
second only to the agricultural sector which will
get nearly one-third (see Table 4). The relative
allocation to transport is about the same as that
recorded in 14 ECAFE countries during 1956-60.
Furthermore, the plan indicates that investment in
transport will be relatively small during the first
year and that the sources of investment will be pre-
dominantly domestic. Only, 38 percent of transport
development funds are expected to come from foreign
aid compared with about 60 percent for the whole
economy.
18. The largest share of the transport invest-
ment in the five-year plan is allocated to road
transport -- nearly 50 percent of the total. Water
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transport has second priority with nearly 25 per-
cent of the total. The remaining investment is
to be allocated about equally to rail and air
transport. These priorities appear to be in the
right order of magnitude for a number of reasons.
Road transport has become the major form of transport
and is most suitable to support rehabilitation and
expansion in a mainly agricultural economy. The
road network is badly deteriorated and will need
even larger investments in the long run if not re-
habilitated in the next few years. Water transport
facilities have also deteriorated badly and are
handicapping Indonesia's domestic and international
shipping. Rail and air transport, although in need
of considerable investment, play relatively minor
roles in Indonesia's transport picture. Priorities
during the first year of the plan, however, place
relatively less emphasis on road transport and more
on rail and water transport. This is a temporary
expedient and reflects work already underway to
rehabilitate shipping as well as orders already
placed for new railroad locomotives while major road
projects are still being prepared.
19. The planned amount of investment in trans-
port appears realistic to accomplish the goals set
for rehabilitation, but the goals themselves are
exceedingly modest compared with the need. For
example, a comparison of the funds allocated for
rebuilding roads and bridges with World Bank esti-
mates of the cost per mile of road construction in
Indonesia shows that the goal probably can be ac-
complished with the designated funds. The goal,
however, calls for only about 11,000 miles, or
about 20 percent of the road network, to be repaired
or upgraded during the five-year period (see Table 5),
compared with an earlier official assessment that
about 85 percent of the network was in bad condition.
In the case of railroads, only about one-tenth of
the rail line is to be rebuilt during the five years.
Water transport plans are also conservative -- the
fleets are not to be expanded although about 80 per-
cent of the ships are to be rehabilitated or replaced.
Fleet rehabilitation has been allocated only 15 per-
cent of the water transport funds and shipping facil-
ities the remainder. The rehabilitation goals
probably were determined by considering the expected
availability of funds and the physical capability
of Indonesia to achieve the goals. It seems very
unlikely that Indonesia, even with substantial
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foreign assistance and aid, will be able to re-
build more than an average of 2,000 miles of road
per year during the next five years. Also appro-
priate is the emphasis to be placed on reconstruc-
tion of roads on Sumatra where the major share of
exports are produced. More than 50 percent of the
road work is scheduled to take place on Sumatra
(see Table 5".
20. Provisions for foreign technical assist-
ance are the most significant aspect of the trans-
port development. International and bilaterr.i
agencies are making a major effort to meet the
most pressing needs, both technical and administra-
tive, within the transport sector. A number of
foreign teams are already at work. In 1968 a
Dutch group studied interisland shipping and, as a
result, a 14-man technical team has arrived to work
with the government in improving shipping. West
Germany is providing similar technical aQ:iiistance
to rail and air transport. In September 1968 the
United Nations Development Program provided a $3.5
million loan for foreign assistance to improve the
road network and coordinate all forms of transport.
The coordination aspect of this contract is impor-
tant in that it provides help in coordinating the
development of all modes of transport, including
the budgeting o:E transport investment and operating
funds, an area in which Indonesia has done poorly.
Consultants for the study, KAMSAX (Denmark) and
Louis Berger (USA), inventoried the most important
roads in the country as the first phase of their
work and presented an interim report in April 1959,
proposing an urgent rehabilitation program covering
7,000 miles of roads in 20 provinces.
21. The International Development Agency (IDA)
also is providing technical assistance and aid. In
June 1969 a $28 million loan was granted for high-
way improvements during the next four years. In-
cluded in the grant is $5 million to be used for
technical assistance. The IDA project will concen-
trate on rehabilitation of about 2,000 miles of the
7,000 miles of roads proposed by the UN Development
Program survey. In making the loan, IDA states that
it is impractical for Indonesia to carry out at this
stage the whole of the rehabilitation program pro-
posed by the consultants, because of technical and
managerial constraints. The IDA project will also
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include rehabilitation and improvement of workshops
and highway maintenance facilities in 20 provinces,
introduction of inventory and costing techniques,
and implementation of training programs for all
phases of highway work.
Conclusions
22. Even though the transport system of
Indonesia is in. very poor condition after years of
mismanagement and shortage of funds, its physical
capacity is generally adequate for the current
needs of the depressed economy. Some transport
routes on Java, where economic development and the
transport system are concentrated, have surplus
capacity at present, but transport service on the
outer islands is scant.
23. However, if the level of economic activity
is to rise, the transport system must he further
rehabilitated and its efficiency improved. Indo-
nesia's principal transport problems are inadequate
funds and a shortage of competent personnel. The
general shortage and mismanagement of the funds
contributed to the deterioration of the transport
network and the high unit cost of transport opera-
tions. The rate of disinvestment in transport was
undoubtedly greater than in any other sector of the
declining economy during the latter years of the
Sukarno regime.
24. Indonesia is receiving the help of foreign
experts in solving its transport problems. The
experts have been given the authority to develop a
coordinated transport policy, to reorganize transport
administration, and to review rehabilitation plans
and help implement them in all modes of transport.
Government organs controlling rail, water, and air
transport have already been streamlined. Training
of managerial and technical personnel is being
included as part of each foreign aid loan or grant
to transport. The foreign experts have propc,,;ed
that new expenditures to replace old transport
equipment, except in a few cases, be delayed until
the networks have been improved and the efficiency
of operations with the existing inventory improved.
This advice is being followed.
25. The government's new five-year plan
(1969/70-1973/74) gives a reasonable priority to
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transport investment -- about 19 percent of the
total, exceeded only by agriculture which is to
receive about 30 percent. The plan gives highest
priority to projects for which the rate of return
on the investment will be very large -- namely,
rehabilitation of the highway network and repair
of ships and port facilities. The planned physi-
cal improvements together with better organization
and management should result in a much better
transport system.
26. This approach to Indonesia's transport
problems probably is the most economical and will
be sufficient to prevent transport from becoming a
bottleneck in the economy during the next few years,
It cannot be expected, however, that the basic
weaknesses in the transport system, in particular
the shortage of skilled personnel, will be overcome
quickly.
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Table 1
Interisland and Coastal
International
Year
Thousand Million Metric Tons
Deadweight Tons a/ Carried
Thousand
Deadweight Tons
1952
216.4
3.4
N.A.
1956
256.3
N.A.
N.A.
1957
124.2
5.2
96.8
1958
172.1
4.9
94.3
1959
245.0
5.3
113.4
1960
320.5
5.7
150.1
1961
422.4
5.8
187.0
1962
432.3
5.5
239.4
1965
N.A.
1.6
N.A.
1966
N.A.
0.9
N.A.
1967
320.0
1.2
N.A.
1968
306.2
c/
N.A.
354.4
1969
plan
266.4
c/
N.A.
334.4
1973 plan 266.4 c/ N.A.
354.4 d/
a. cxclud-ng Sh-`.. of lee.; t%an 509 gross register tors. Chartered
t:inr.age r.creaaed frog r.~gl gi ble in 195c" to 176,)",0 tons in 1g6=. :a a
for 10,67 ' S t i _ l _r.c l:cde ao^, c3tartered tonnage, but data for 1~"8 and lan
data apparently do not.
b. Chartered to?:naoe r;ade more than half of the to-a;: for each year.
Data for 1.11, 68 and the r7,-- data include 21 chartered ar:i1ss (about 2-13,000
oh-ps.
tons) in a tctal fleet 3.1
C. ~~er.t-ont e ~', t:taz1.n' about 40,000 tons, were sofa any there are
ne :.a'ra'er ]~Q~ Jr~.. .~. -:a: `a .:.~:2 .l. i.4 .~/: /s .i re to be sol . -re rva-.ear
plan .~ e:1.:r, Cam.... , or e 4?3e f e ee; ;o ineG a 4
s _J th nh are :o oe rehab ili:a:ed 2r ..^J.-.:.-and
0 rmore'ea:~~: %. ar rr ... +0:3L of 131 shit: ith 272, JJJ ..ror.J. orr?-r :=~~
other tor:_ % are to be r= la?ea dur r. he ve tiara.
d. our:_ e-: . . d (i :;no) are lanced to re7 racea duri~ g : :e
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Road Network and Motor Vehicle Inventory
Motor Vehicle Inventory (Thousand Units)
Year
Road Network
Passenger
(as of 1 January)
(Thousand !tiles)
Total
Trucks
B
uses
Cars
1939
32.8
70.0
9.7
7.2
53.1
1952
Zn.B
75.0
27.1
8.5
39.4
1957
49.2
136.1
51.4
11.5
73.2
1962
49.3
227.5
76.1
19.2
132.2
1965
50.0
269.8
84.6
18
4
166
8
1966
50.0
292.0
102.5
.
19
6
.
169
9
1967
50.9
298.7
95.1
.
18.6
.
185.0
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7ailroad network and Rolling Stock Inventory
Rolling Stock Inventory (Units)
Railroad Network a/ Freight Passenger
Year (Miles) Locomotives Cars b/ Cars
1939 4,600 1,070 27,185 3,309
1952 4,130 1,054 22,771 2,743
C? 1957 4,130 1,152 22,751 3,085
O 1962 4,130
Z 1,193 c/ 23.856
J 1968 4,130 757 d/ 9,686 e/1,229 E/
by 1973 444 rebuilt 65 diesels 400 20
a. Approximate-',:. 7 rerce]:t is or . avta and Madura, and 30 ercent ,'a r. ",
tra; 2, 950 lea a 3's" I-Zuo . 7 he rer;a rder cons various r.ar 'o:2r
gauges.
b. Rai ivay o'i-:ed; private car o r.era increased 542 in -
Z idiG to 2, Oa 2
in 1992.
C. Of this total, 980 (82 percent) ::ere steam Zoec ot~..ve,? and at Leas '8
reer.tJ were lore than ~ Many = ~ ~
(57 e 35 ye;,ars Zd. o- these Z oco.o f ives fro:a
,
QD e data s^ s
were e t uae~ o '-~?r.. the O:tZd have u^2B>: adjusted a::Jf::;ard to be T'eQi'' .?
tic.
d. The rur"ber of stear LLaco7otives more that 40 years old reduced to about
300.
e. Plot including about 15,000 freight cars more than. 40 years old.
f. ,Tot r.cZulir. ut
g aoo 200 rassenger cars more than. 40 years old.
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Table 4
Planned Expenditures in the State Development Budget a/
1969/70
1969/70
- 1973/74 Plan
Billion
Rupiahs
Percent
Billion
Rupiahs
Percent
Economic
94.4
77
829
78
Agriculture and irrigation
35.1
28
319
30
O
Transportation
23.6
19
204
19
z
Industry and mining
18.3
15
130
12
Electric power
10.9
9
100
9
Communications and tourism
3.5
3
26
2
tv
co
Villages
3.0
2
50
5
z ' Social
19.6
16
172
16
,'a
Health and family planning
4.6
4
42
4
C"
Education and culture
10.5
9
95
9
Other
4.5
4
35
3
General
9.3
8
58
5
Defense and security
4.0
3
28
3
Other
5.3
4
30
3
a. Exclusive of domestic and foreign private investment and funds accw..ulated
by state enterprises. These sources could contribute an additional 361 bil-
lion rupiahs during the five-year period of which about 8 percent would be used
in the transport sector. Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
Planned Reconstruction of Road Network
Road Network as of
Reconstruction of Road Network
July 1967 a/ (1969/70 - 1973/74 Plan)
Thousand
Miles
Percent of
Total
Thousand
Miles
Percent of
Total
50.9
100
10.7
Java and Madura
17.3
34
2.7
25
Sumatra
17.7
35
5.6
53
Celebes
7.4
15
1.0
9
Kalimantan
3.2
6
0.5
5
Others
5.4
11
0.9
9
Bali
N.A.
N.A.
0.3
3
Lesser Sundas
N.A.
N.A.
0.4
4
a. About 12 percent are national roads, 28 percent are provincial roads,
and the remainder are county roads. About one-half of the national roads
have a paved surface, the other half gravel surface. Provincial roads
consist of 36 percent bituminous-treated surface, 55 percent gravel, and
9 percent earth. County roads are 6 percent paved, 33 percent gravel, and
61 percent earth. Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
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MALAYO-POLYNESIAN
INDONESIAN
Q Jevonaso Q Minangknbou
Sundonase ?allneso?Snsok
? Madurese Dataks
Coastal Malays Atlahnoso
Other Indonesian:
01hct Sumatra (I ). O)hel llmneo (7). Mmahassan I o
Ooronlalo 14), mount (5). lotadls((,). t annq (1).
Ilan?)al Idl. bungku hta)asarese 6g-s,!0),
M.na IlulunI1111.Suladlallan(17).Nina Sumlu(13),
Ambon-TIn? . 141. Soulli 11almaheran (15) . hlehnefun (16).
Q PAPUAN
~Chlm?sr wub Iy !Ilslrlbllled,but
mainly cm?nnlrnted In urbmr
nuns throughout Indnnesln
POPULATION
Parsons par squar" In/19
0 IJ 26 i 130 7
0 .5 110 .50 100
Pnraons Pnr squnra kllonlntnr
Ilnned un 11)01 cnnnun
0
SUMAT
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 D N
NATRA
Bac lieu
SOUTH
VIETNAM oCON SON
S' 0 U 7' II
NULAU
NAIUNA
BESAR
Me1ebp
IPULAU
;EBATIK
POPULATION
Persons per iquure mile
o- I- 7. 7h 1- ~o ?e~
O J Io JU IUU
Penun, per square l ibmeler
.."d on 11161 "'Imm
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~iden
quITON
rORTUGUESE
SUMBA v K ?en TIMOR TIMOR
ORTUGUESE
TIMOR
WEST
NEW GUINEA
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'3 Panda 1111ah+1' ~"'~,-~
VEGETATION
Oroadlonf eVor) roan forest
Q Oroadionf deciduous forest
Swamp forest
Mangrove and nips palms
Q Alpino vegetation
Crossland
Q Cultivated nron
aumuAVVn FLORES
BALI '06g~4 prase
SUMUAV Knp~0~
o n
?ULAU MIANGAS
( lndoneala)
I
J.PULAU?PUIjAU NANUSA
C/ jr E B E S
If
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Rubber rico, copra coffee, tobacco Q
(smnllholdor cull(vnIIna)
losinto CIIIIVnllon)
Rico
Rico find corn
Copra
Forest, will) scattered grassland, and
cultivated plots
R Rubber Ni Nickel
C Coffee Sn Tin
6 Oilfield 'A I Bauxite
III Oil refinory c Coal mine
Tin Smaller A Thermo oioclric poworpinnt
JU Ilydroolectrlc poworplnnl
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
 "TIVITY
coffee, tobacco
Vatlon)
Palm all
I Nickel
i Tin
Unuxlto
Cool mine
Thermo electric poworplnnt
Hydroelectric powerplant
o ol.yl~ -or
CELEBES crPAM
A m
SUMBAWA
FLORES 0.
ORTUGUESE
TIMr1R
PHIL,1PPIN1';
0"
INDONESIA
International boundary 990s Province cap!tal
Province boundary ----+--