THE CURRENT CAPABILITES OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600020123-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: September 1, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Current Capabilities of the Trans-Siberian Railroad:
A Preliminary Review
DIA review
completed.
Secret
ER IM 69-121
Sep}ember 1969
Copy No. 5j
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Feduded lion, ouiomade
downprodinp and
- d.cI ,i itnlinn
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Current Capabilities
of the Trans-Siberian Railroad:
A Preliminary Review
Introduction
This memorandum represents a preliminary study,
and its conclusions should be viewed as tentative.
A study in depth is under way, but its findings
will not be available for several months. The
present publication has been prepared in view of
the current need for an estimate of the capabili-
ties of the Trans-Siberian Railroad because of
the possibility that Sino-Soviet border clashes
may escalate into large-scale warfare. It provides
a brief description of the Trans-Siberian Railroad
(see the map), its increased traffic handling
capacity -- including the impact of dieselization
and electrification -- and a review of the plans
for further upgrading. The section of this memo-
randum "Capability for Military Support" gives a
preliminary estimate of the ability of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad to support a military build-up
and/or operations in the Far Eastern Sino-Soviet
border regions. It is assumed that the major
build-up would take place east of Lake Baykal.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated with the Office of Strategic
Research and informally with the responsible
analysts in the Defense Intelligence Agency.
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Dr,lAtCUL' 1
USSR: Trans-Siberian Railroad
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SECECE'i
1. The route referred to as the Trans-Siberian
Railroad is a composite of segments of four connect-
ing railroad systems extending eastward from Omsk in
Western Siberia to Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan,
a distance of 6,581 kilometers (km), or 4,089 miles
(see the map). These segments and the railroad systems
that administer them are as follows:
a. Omsk to Mariinsk: West Siberian
Railroad, 1,003 km;
b. Mariinsk to Petrovskiy Zavod: East
Siberian Railroad, 2,071 km;
c. Petrovskiy Zavod to Arkhara:
Transbaykal Railroad, 2,298 km; and
d. Arkhara to Vladivostok: Far
Eastern Railroad, 1,209 km.
2. The Trans-Siberian Railroad system, double-
tracked throughout its entire length, is the life
line of the Soviet Far East. East of Tayshet, the
eastern terminus of the South Siberian Railroad, it
is the only through rail line across Siberia.
Furthermore, there is no parallel highway transport
system and only minor water transport is available.
Air transport is used extensively for passenger
traffic and to some extent for lightweight, high-
value goods, but air transport is not practical, in
peacetime at least, for bulky freight with a low
value-to-weight ratio. Some freight is shipped from
Soviet European ports to Soviet Far Eastern ports
by sea, but since the closure of the Suez Canal this
trip takes 40 to 45 days. Under emergency conditions,
this sea route could be greatly expanded since the
USSR has become a major maritime power. The Far
Eastern ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka have a
combined daily military unloading capacity of over
60,000 metric tons. The Northern Sea route through
the polar seas is almost unused for through shipments
from the European USSR to the Soviet Far East.
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3. The sparsity of lines and the vulnerability
of the Trans-Siberian have long been a matter of
prime concern to Soviet economic and military plan-
ners. In the 2,400 km between Mogocha and Vladivostok,
the railroad is seldom more than 80 km from the fron-
tier with China and in many places it is no more than
15 km removed.
4. The Trans-Siberian Railroad and its branches
serve three major ports, all on the east coast:
Nakhodka, Vladivostok, and Sovetskaya Gavan'. The
branch line serving Nakhodka, now the most important
Far East commercial port, is a single-track line
winding 164 km through mountainous terrain from the
branching point at Uglovaya.* The 800-km branch line
from Volochayevka serves the port of Sovetskaya Gavan'.
However, the lack of a permanent bridge across the
Amur River at Komsomol'sk, where the river is 3 km
wide, limits the use of the port.**
5. The Trans-Siberian has international con-
nections with the standard gauge systems of Communist
China and North Korea.*** There are three lines
connecting with China: one line extends south from
Zaudinskiy, just east of Ulan Ude, crosses into
Mongolia at Naushki and extends through Mongolia to a
transloading station at Erh-lien-11.ao-t'e on the
Chinese border. The second line extends southeast
from Tarskaya to the transloading yards at Zabaykal'sk/
Man-chou-1i. A branch from this line also extends
to Choybalsan in Mongolia. The third line extends
northwest from Voroshilov on the Far Eastern System
to the Chinese border at Sui-fen-ho. The transload-
ing facilities are at Grodekovo, about 18 km inside
* This branch actually terminates at Tikhookean-
skaya, 10 km beyond Nakhodka station.
** Railroad cars are ferried in summer and a
temporary bridge is erected on the ice in the winter.
In the spring and fall (about 100 days), trains can-
not cross the river.
*** The Trans-Siberian, like nearly all Soviet
mainline railroads, employs 5 foot gauge. Standard
gauge is 4 feet-8-1/2 inches.
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chlnsk
Luke
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S/BER/AN
Irkutsk"
CURRENT STATUS OF THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD
July 1969
NAMES ANO BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Existing electrification
Electrification underway or
planned for the near future
0 100 2YO 390 4qO 500 Statute Miles
1~~T1 I ~
0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometers
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Double track (51-011)
Single track (51-011)
I I Single track (41-8%11)
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Karymskoyo
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Choybalson
'KhIIok
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ovskly Zavod)
Sul?foAhdoa
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the Soviet border. The line connecting with the Korean
railroad extends from Baranovskiy on the Far Eastern
System to a transloading yard at Kasan, about 3 km
from the Korean border.
Traffic and Capacity
6. Normal economic traffic on all sectors of
the Trans-Siberian mainline is believed to be at a
level well below the normal sustained capacity of the
line.* Traffic has been increasing steadily over
the entire line, but greatest growth during the last
decade has been in central Siberia between Omsk and
Irkutsk, coinciding with the Soviet emphasis on the
economic development of that area. Density of traf-
fic between Omsk and Novosibirsk on the West Siberian
segment is heavier than on any other section of the
Soviet railroad system, mainly because of the heavy
coal traffic moving from the Kuznetsk Coal Basin to
the Urals. This section has reached a traffic density
of more than 90 million metric tons per kilometer of
route, more than five times the average of 16.8 mil-
lion tons for the entire railroad system of the USSR
in 1968. Recent Soviet reports state that a freight
train passes a given point of this route every eight
minutes, a total of 180 trains per day, which over
time would balance out to roughly 90 trains each
way per day (TEWPD). The USSR announced that it has
achieved a train density for that section of 120
TEWPD, which is probably near the capacity for this
sector.
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7. Heavy traffic also characterizes the entire
West Siberian Railroad and segments of the East
Siberian Railroad between Mariinsk and Slyudyanka,
located at the southern tip of Lake Baykal. From
Novosibirsk to Slyudyanka the traffic drops to well
below 90 TEWPD, but capacity is estimated at more than
100 TEWPD. East of Slyudyanka both traffic and
capacity decline.
8. The most restrictive section of the route
lies to the east of Lake Baykal, between Ulan Ude
on the eastern end of the East Siberian Railroad and
Khilok on the Transbaykal Railroad, a distance of
293 km, but the capacity of this section is at least
50 TEWPD.* Fragmentary data for earlier years and
recent passenger schedules suggest that about 65 per-
cent of this capacity was being utilized for normal
economic traffic. Current traffic data for this
section of railroad are not available.
9. Normal eastbound freight traffic through
the restrictive sectior (Ulan Ude-Khilok) probably
has reached an annual level of about 15 million tons.
A breakdown of this traffic, by major commodity
category, is estimated in the following tabulation:
Million Tons Per Year
Percent of Total
Petroleum
5.0
32
Coal
2.8
18
Agricultural
2.6
17
Ores
0.9
6
Wood
0.5
3
Other
3.7
24
* This estimate assumes automatic or semiautomatic
block signaling and diesel motive power on this
segment of the Zine. Lack of information on the
distance between signals and on the adequacy of
various supporting facilities (yards, sidings, and
maintenance shops) limits the ability to estimate
with any precision. Under short-term emergency
conditions or with unexpected improvements, the esti-
mate m.-.ght be at least doubled.
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Improvement -- Electrification and Dieselization
10. A series of improvements to the Trans-Siberian
Railroad have increased the traffic capacity of all
segments, so that capacity probably now is well in
excess of normal traffic. A significant volume of
normal traffic has been diverted from the western
segment of the Trans-Siberian ka_lroad by the con-
struction of the South Siberian Railroad, which was
electrified while under construction. The principal
factor in the increased freight capacity, however, has
been the replacement of steam locomotives on all
sections of the Trans-Siberian route by either diesel
or electric locomotives. Generally speaking, dieseli-
zation with ancillary improvements increases the
capability of a given segment of a railroad route by
at least 50 percent in terms of the number of trains
that can be operated daily. Electrification brings
an even greater increase.
11. Decisions about electrification or diese li-
zation of various sections of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad have been based largely on the volume of
traffic, but other factors such as steepness of grades,
suburban passenger traffic, and the availability
and cost of electricity have been important in
decisions about some stretches. The Omsk-Novosibirsk
section was among the first to be electrified. Some
of the steepest grades (2 percent) on the route
occur between Irkutsk and Slyudyanka, and this sec-
tion was also one of the first sections to be
electrified.*
12. At present, over 40 percent of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad has been electrified. Electrifi-
cation has been completed from Omsk to Slyudyanka,
some 2,601 kilometers. Electrification is also
under way from Slyudyanka to Petrovskiy Zavod, a
distance of 473 kilometers. This is to be completed
by 1970. Also electrified are a 112-km section of
the Far Eastern Railroad from Ussuriysk to
* Grades are as steep as 2.8 percent on the Nakhodka
branch.
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Vladivostok and the 164-km branch to the port of
Nakhodka. Diesel motive power has effectively re-
placed steam on all other mainline sections of the
route, although steam locomotives are still used for
passenger traffic and for switching at many stations
along the route.
Other Improvements
13. A number of other improvements ha,,e been made
on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, mostly in the past
decade. Automatic block signals are now on all of
the electrified sections, and centralized traffic
control has been installed on the more heavily used
segments. Automatic block signaling is also in use
on all of the nonelectrified sections of the East
Siberian Railroad. Automatic block signaling probably
is being installed on some other sections, but semi-
automatic block signaling is still in use on many
sections. According to Soviet railroad officials,
all locomotives running in automatic block territory
are also equipped with cab signals and with automatic
stop devices. The principal means of communication
is the telephone, but radio stations supplement the
telephone on some sections of the route. All rail-
road stations are connected by the independent rail-
road telephone network. Considerable funds have also
been expended in recent years to improve the roadbed
on the mainline and to mechanize the principal yards.
Heavier rails, weighing at least 50 kilograms and
up to 65 kilograms per linear meter, have been laid
on the sections with the most traffic. Presumably,
sidings have been lengthened and more yard tracks
and diesel maintenance facilities have been installed
to realize fully the advantages of diesel and elec-
tric traction; however, complete information on these
points is not available.
Problems and Plans
14. Aside from problems brought on by the in-
creased traffic load, the Trans-Siberian Railroad,
like many rail lines in the USSR, suffers interrup-
tions of traffic by weather or other acts of nature.
On the electrified sections east of Novosibirsk and
extending to Slyudyanka, operations often are
hindered by ice buildup on the overhead catenary
system in wintertime. Also frozen switch points
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and damage to roadbed and communications equipment
occur frequently, particularly in Siberia where the
temperature drops to -40?F. for at least 60 days of
the year. Floods from spring ',iiaws and buckling rails
from frost heave also cause frequent traffic d:L'srup-
tions.
15. The USSR plans further imp:?ovaments for the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. These include the electri-
fication of an additional portion of the East Siberian
Railroad from Petrovskiy Zavod to Karymskaya, a dis-
tance of 510 km. When the current electrification
program is completed (presumably in the early 1970's),
about 56 percent of the route will be electrified
and 44 percent dieselized. Other improvements which
are planned are a permanent bridge across the knur
River at Komsomol'sk, reconstruction of the portion
of the line between the Amur River port of Pivan' and
Sovetskaya Gavan', and a rail ferry connecting this
line with Sakhalin.
Capability for Military Support
16. Soviet troops operating in the Siberian or
Far Eastern areas are supplied primarily by rail.*
Presumably, most of a military buildup would follow
the present pattern of deployment and be concentrated
in the border regions east of Lake Baykal. The sec-
tion of route with the lowest estimated capacity, the
Ulan Ude-Khilok segment, would set the limits of mili-
tary support which the Trans-Siberian route could
provide.**
* Under emergency conditions, supply by sea through
Far Eastern ports could be greatly expanded over a
period of more than 45 days. Substantial suppZemen-
tary airlift capacity is also available on short
notice.
** Soviet operations against Sinkiang would be
logistically supported by the Kazakh Railroad System,
which has a line running to Druzhba near the Dzungarian
gate, a traditional invasion route. We have not esti-
mated the military support capabilities of this route.
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17. Using minimum capacity estimates for the
section east of Ulan Ude, and allowing for normal
trat,'.ic requirements, the unused capacity available
could handle at least 17 additional TEWPD when the
military buildup began. At an average of 1,200 tons
per train, this would permit a military movement of
20,400 tons.* The 17 TEWPD could move slightly less
than one half division per day -- based on an estimate
of 38 trains needed to move a division.** Soviet
forces east of Lake Baykal have been more than doubled
between 1966 and 1969, from 11 to at least 25 divisions
anA from 7 to 15 air regiments.
18. Military resupply, using the available capacity
of this section of the line, would permit the movement
of 27,200 tons at an average of 1,600 tons per train.
Thus the available capacity would be adequate for the
resupply of about 27 divisions, based on the require-
ment of about 1,000 tons per day per division under
average combat conditions.*** These figures include
tarti;a1 air support and are based on the present
ratio of ground to air units in the area. Military
resupply requirements are about 550 tons a day for a
motorized rifle division and 600 tons a day for a
tank division for average combat. These figures
are increased to 675 and 750 tons, respectively, for
attack conditions. Tactical air support is supplied
by fighter and light bomber/reconnaissance regiments
which require a daily average of 350 and 650 tons,
respectively, for the initi'-1 combat stage (calcula-
tions based on DIA estimates).
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19. The principal elements in these requirements
are POL and ammunition, and both of these items are
available only to a limited degree in the eastern
areas of the USSR. Most of the rations would also
have to he shipped because these regions are food-
deficit areas. Only water, the third largest but a
still minor category of supply, could be provided
locally. The more general Class II and IV military
supplies, primarily spare parts, medical supplies,
construction materials, and personal supplies, would
be available only in limited quantities in the local
areas. The Soviet Union has had ample time to support
the troops presently stationed in these areas with a
substantial supply of all classes of supplies, al-
though the actual level of stockpiles is unknown.
20. In an emergency additional buildup of Soviet
forced on the Chinese border, the total capacity of
the Trans-Siberian route would be subject to military
priority. The estimated capacity of at least 50 TEWPD
would permit the transit of about one and one-third
divisions per day through the bottleneck sector, and
troops and supplies probably would be moving each way
in the sectors east of Lake Baykal. The real bottle-
neck, however, is the west-to-east movement because
most of the additional troops and most of their
supplies would come from west of Lake Baykal. In an
emergency, the east-to-west traffic would retain
much more of a normal pattern.
21. For any situation short of an emergency,
priorities would have to be established to achieve
the desired balance between military and civil traf-
fic. The urgency of the military buildup would
determine the amount of the traffic capacity to be
switched from civil to military use. It may be seen
from the tabulation in paragraph 9 that some 50 per-
cent of the civil movement eastward through the
restrictive sector is fuel -- petroleum (32 percent)
and coal (18 percent). Agricultural goods (17 per-
cent) and other freight (24 percent) -- including
consumer goods and industrial equipment -- represent
the other major categories of normal economic ton-
nage. Normal deliveries of all economic goods could
be reduced at least for a short period by cne-third,
and an additional capability of some 9 trains per day
would be gained. Total capacity for military move-
ment under these conditions would then be 26 trains
(31,200 tons) per day.
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Conclusions
22. The Trans-Siberian Railroad is the only
through route across Lastern Siberia and the Soviet
Far East. It is double-tracked along its entire
length, from Omsk in Western Siberia to Vladivostok
on the Pacific coast. There is little supplementary
inland water transport and almost no highway movement.
Since the USSR is a major maritime power, it could
organize a sealift from the 131ack Sea to the Far
Eastern ports. Such a sealift probably could be made
available within two months of a decision to do so,
and could provide a substantial supplement to the
Trans-Siberian Railroad.
23. The growing volume of traffic over the past
decade has necessitated a number of improvements on
the Trans-Siber.L* an. Major programs of electrification
and dieselization have been carried out, and steam
motive power for mainline freight movement has been
eliminated. These improvements have increased the
capability of the route to a level believed to be
well in excess of normal traffic demands. Moreover,
improvements now under way and planned will further
increase the capability of the route to meet the
long-term demands of economic growth in the regions
through which it passes.
24. The capability of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
road to support military reinforcement and resupply
in the Soviet frontier regions east of Lake Baykal
is limited by the Ulan Ude-Khilok section. This
bottleneck section has a capacity to handle at least
50 trains each way per day (TEWPD), or about 80,000
tons.
25. Preliminary estimates of logistic support
capabilities of the Trans-Siberian, under wartime
conditions, are as follows:
a. With normal civilian traffic flowing,
about 17 military trains a day could be accommodated.
Theoretically, this would be enough to support 27
divisions in combat. Since all elements of a large
military force are unlikely to be engaged simultaneously
in combat for extensive periods of time, a force some-
what larger than 27 divisions and their supporting air
regiments could probably be sustained in wartime.
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b. If normal civilian traffic were cut one-
third, about 14,000 tons of additional capacity (some
nine additional trains) would be made available for
military movement. Total capacity available to the
military under these conditions would permit combat
resupply of existing units east of Lake Baykal and
reinforcement at nearly one-fourth of a division a
day.
c. The theoretical limit of troop movement
with no civilian traffic moving from west to east
would be at one and one-third divisions a day.
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