INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOUTH VIETNAM: THE GROWING MANPOWER SQUEEZE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600020088-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: June 1, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
.South Vietnam: The Growing Manpower Squeeze
USAID review completed
Secret
ER IM 69-86
June 1969
Copy Nb. 72
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WARNING
'T'his document contains inforination affecting tlle national
defense of the United States, within tlle meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1969
South Vietnam: The Growing Manpower Squeeze
Summary
The very rapid increase in South Vietnam's
military forces during the past several years,
together with the prospect of burgeoning military
manpower requirements in the near future, poses
difficult problems for Saigon. With probably less
than one-half million men in the age group available
for military service, the regime will be hard-
pressed to fulfill any sizable expansion of its
military forces without drafting men over the
present age limit -- 38 -- or lowering the fitness
requirements. Either course of action is likely
to impair the quality of the military forces and
complicate Allied efforts to increase the effective-
ness of South Vietnam's military participation in
the war. Further aggravating the problem of finding
military manpower is the high level of desertions
and casualties. Such attrition was equal to almost
one-fourth of the total force level in 1968 and is
likely to grow as South Vietnam takes over a greater
burden of fighting the war.
With more than 1 million men in the regular,
territorial, and paramilitary forces, South Vietnam
has an estimated 5 to 6 percent of its popularion
under arms -- the highest ratio in the world. Such
a military effort has cut deeply into the country's
limited supply of skilled manpower at the very time
that civilian manpower demands have also risen to
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence,
and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs.
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meet needs created by a wartime accelerated urbani-
zation. The current level of military mobilization
is undoubtedly having a significant effect on the
civilian economy. At present there does not appear
to be a general labor shortage, but further large
increases in the size of the armed forces are
certain to shortchange the civilian economy by
creating additional inflationary pressures and by
drawing away skilled and semiskilled workers.
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1. As the tempo of combat in South Vietnam
has increased and Saigon's participation in the
conflict has grown, the government of South Vietnam
has been compelled to dig deeply into its manpower
resources to meet military manpower requirements.
The Communist 1968 Tet offensive spurred the Saigon
regime into greater efforts to mobilize the popula-
tion and to increase the country's commitment to
its own defense. The General Mobilization Act of
15 June 1968 called for the mobilization of most
males between the ages of 16 and 50, with those in
the 18-38 age group liable for service in the
regular and territorial forces. Males in the 16-17
and 39-50 age groups are eligible only for part-
time service in the newly created People's Self-
Defense Forces, although those 39 to 43 years of
age may be given noncombat assignments in rear
service units.
2. Since 1967 the number of men serving in
South Vietnam's regular and territorial forces has
increased nearly one-third, and the total number of
men in all South Vietnamese military and paramilitary
forces has risen to more than 1 million. As a
result, the share of the population under arms has
climbed to an estimated 4.8 percent (5.8 percent if
the paramilitary forces are included),* the highest
in the world. In Taiwan, for example, this ratio
is 4.1 percent; in North Vietnam, 2.8 percent; and
in th~ Soviet Union, 1.4 percent.
3. In meeting its n ilitary manpower require-
ments, South Vietnam has, had to shortchange the
burgeoning civilian manpower demands (particularly
the demand for skilled labor) generated by an
accelerated wartime urbanization. An estimated 30
to 40 percent of the country's population is now
located in or near the main population centers.
The migration from rural to urban areas, which has
been particularly rapid since 1964, stems largely
from the intensification of military operations in
the countryside and the job opportunities created
by the US military buildup. In addition, the expan-
sion of the South Vietnamese military forces has
* If only the South Vietnamese controlled population
is included, the estimated shares are 5.8 percent and
6.8 vercent, respectively.
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been accompanied by an increased flow of military
dependents to the cities. This population influx
has also increased the manpower demands for
industry, commerce, civil service, construction,
and public services, at a rate faster than the
supply of available human resources.
4. As a result of all of these pressures, the
country's manpower pool has been strained and
Saigon will be hard-pressed to fulfill any antici-
pated expansion of its military forces. Moreover,
the manpower shortage has been and will continue
to be an important contribution to inflationary
pressure.
Growth of South Vietnam's Military Forces
5. South Vietnam's military az.d paramilitary
forces have nearly doubled since 1963. At the end
of March 1969, South Vietnam had more than 1 million
men under arms (see Table 1).
6. The manpower for the Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces (RVNAF) -- the Regular Forces and the
Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) -- consists of
volunteers and draftees, with the former having
accounted for 70 to 80 percent of the total during
the past three years. The manpower input for 1966
totaled about 205,000 men, but fell to 164,000 in
1967 (see Table 2). The number soared to nearly
315,000 in 1968 as a result of Saigon's 1968 post-
Tet mobilization program. The number of conscripts
more than doubled, and voluntary enlistments jumped
about 85 percent. The latter increase probably
reflects in large part the effort of many to avoid
the draft in order to join the territorial forces
and remain close to their home areas. The strength
of RF/PF forces increased by more than 90,000 during
1968. The paramilitary forces, staffed almost
entirely with volunteers, '.creased by an average
of about 30,000 men annually during the last three
years.
Attrition of South Vietnam's Military Forces
7. While the South Vietnamese forces have re-
ceived sizable inputs in recent years, their
attrition also has been high. This attrition has
consisted almost entirely of desertions and combat
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VL V1lL 1
Growth of South Vietnam's Military Forces
1963 - March 1969 a/
March
1963
1966
1967
1968
1969
Total RVNAF b/ 397.4
622.9
643.1
819.2
842.5
Regular Forces 216.0
322.9
342.9
426.9
434.5
Regional Forces 85.9
149.9
151.4
219.8
232.0
Popular Forces 95.5
150.1
148.8
172.5
176.0
Total paramilitary
forces c/
128.4
113.0
155.7
178.9
181.6
National Police
19.7
58.3
73.4
78.4
77.1
Revolutionary
Development Cadre
0
0
37.0
45.9
47.3
Civilian Irregular
Defense Groups
18.0
34.7
38.3
42.3
44.0
Truong Son Cadre
0
0
6.7
7.0
7.3
Armed Propaganda
Teams
0
0
0
3.8
4.0
Kit Carson Scouts
0
0
0.3
1.5
1.9
Total South
Vietnam forces
525.8
735.9
798.8
998.1
1,024.1
a.
Data are for end of period
shown.
b.
Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces.
c.
Armed Combat Youth are included in the total from 1960
through 1966; the organization was disbanded in 1967.
casualties (see Table 3).* Losses of 1.52,000 in
1966 and 122,000 in 196? equaled about 75 percent of
total accretions for each of these years. In 1968,
* There is no information available on other
types of attrition, such as retirement. However,
the magnitude of other attritive factors is not
considered significant.
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South Vietnamese Military
Volunteers and Conscripts
1.966 - March 1969
Manpower Input
Para-
Volun-
Con-
military
Volun-
teers
scripts
Total
teers
1966
159.1
46.1
205.2
28.2
Monthly average
13.3
3.8
17.1
2.4
1967
115.8
48.5
164.3
33.1
Monthly average
9.6
4.0
13.7
2.8
1968
215.3
99.1
314.4
28.8
Monthly average
17.9
8.3
26.2
2.4
1969
January
8.3
6.8
15.1
2.7
February
11.1
7.0
18.1
1.4
March
20.6
5.4
26.0
1.8
losses jumped to 203,000, but were only about two-
thirds of total accretions because of the sharp rise
in personnel inputs.*
Desertions
8. The major share of RVNAF losses has been
through desertions; during the 1966-68 period,
desertions account:d for nearly two-thirds of total
attrition. Desertions totaled about 116,000 in
* The net accretion of the input and attrition data
does not coincide with the actual annual growth of
regular and territorial forces. For the 1965-68
period, the actual force growth was about 35,000 men
greater than the data for the net accretion (inputs
mir;us desertions and casualties). Most of the annual
differences probably result from lags and errors in
South Vietnamese reporting.
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Soltth Vietnamese Military Losses
'966-68
Thousand Men
1966
1967
1968
Total losses a/
152.5
122.1
203.4
Net desertions
116.4 b/
77.7
116.1
Cas':ialties
36.1
44.4
87.3
Killed in action
11.9
12.7
24.3
Wounded, nonfatal c/
20.9
29.4
61.1
Missing/captured
3.3
2.3
1.9
a. Paramilitary not included.
b. Gross desertions.
c. There is no information concerning the number
of wounded who return to action. However, South
Vietnam only includes those whose wounds are
serious enough to require hospital care. There-
fore, the number returning is not believed to be
large enough to affect significantly the aggregate
analysis.
1966, dr-pped to 78,000 the next year, and jumped
to 116,000 during 1968.* In addition, an average
of 8,600 men deserted annually from the paramili-
tary forces during these years.
9. The average monthly
per thousand troops
in
1967
than that recorded
in
1966.
1968 increased to 12.7 per thousand troops.
Although the rate during the first quarter of 1968
continued to reflect the downward trend of 1967
(averaging 7.7 per thousand troops), it jumped
sharply after March, reaching a high of 17.3 in
October. Averages of about 15 per thousand re-
corded during the third and fourth quarters of
1968 were the highest since a South Vietnamese
crackdown on desertions in mid-1966. The rate sub-
sequently began to decline, falling to 8.3 in
* Figures for 1966 are gross desertions; for 1967
and 1968 they are net desertions (gross desertions
less returnees).
desertion rate of 10.5
was substantially less
However, the rate for
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February 1969. In March the rate rose to 10.7,
and the quarterly rate remained well above the
average for the first quarter of 1968,
10. A particularly significant trend is the
comparatively high rate of desertions among the
major combat units which are expected to eventually
reNIace US combat forces. Desertions from regular
combat units during 1.968 were at a rate estimated
to equal about one-third of the strengths of these
units. Thus the overall desertion rate for the
RVNAF is substantially reduced by the lower rate of
desertions among RF and PF units. The rate among
the regular units in 1969 has continued at a high
level. The March rate for the ten infantry divi-
sions of the South Vietnamese Army ranged from
13.5 per thousand to 50.4 per thousand with an
overall divisional average of 28.4 per thoiisand.*
Casualties
11. The other major element in available attri-
tion data is combat casualties. The country's
battle casualties have risen sharply as RVNAF
participation in the war has increased. These
totaled more than 87,000 in 1968, about double the
casualties sustained in 1967 and more than 140 per-
cent greater than those in 1966. Combat deaths in
these years averaged about 30 percent of total
casualties. There are no casualty figures available
for the paramilitary forces before 1968. In 1968,
paramilitary units suffered nearly 14,000 casualties,
of which about 3,600 were combat deaths.
Manpower Pool
12. Any assessment of Saigon's ability to main-
tain (and expand) its military forces depends for
the most part on estimates of the country's avail-
able manpower. Estimating the size of the pool,
however, is complicated by a lack of accurate demo-
graphic information on South Vietnam. South Vietnam
i4 All deserters are not necessarily lost to the
military forces since many are redrafted. There is
no information on the number so reclaimed, but it is
not considered to be large. Howei'cr, the resulting
turnover, when added to the normal personnel turnover,
is likely to have a serious impact on a unit's per-
formance and efficiency.
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is one of the few countries that has never had a
national census, and the most recent area census
was a pilot study of Phuoc Tuy Province undertaken
in 1959. Currently, the most widely used popula-
tion figure is an estimated 17.2 million in 1968,
but other estimates range from as low as 15 million
to as high as 19 million. An additional obstacle
to estimating the South Vietnamese manpower pool
is the impossibility of determining with any great
degree of accuracy the share of the population
under the effective control of Saigon.
13. The most recent estimate of South Vietnam's
population distribution was undertaken by the US
Agency for International Development in 1967.
According to this study, there were about 3.5 mil-
lion males in the country between the ages of 15
and 49. Using these figures as a base, the manpower
pool available to South Vietnam is estimated to be
about 2.1 million men and those in the 18-38 group
at more than 1.3 million. However, more than 1 mil-
lion men already were under arms at the end of
March 1959, leaving a residual of some 350,000 men
available for induction into the military forces.
Since most of the eligible draftable population
already have been conscripted, any sizable number
of future conscripts must come from those reaching
18 years of age. It has been estimated that
320,000 South Vietnamese reach the age of 18 each
year, more than half of them males. Eliminating
those ostensibly under Viet Cong control and those
unfit for service, the estimated annual accretion
would be about 100,000. Thus the estimated total
draftable manpower in the 18-38 age group available
at the beginning of 1969 was about 450,000, or --
with a range of about 20 percent each way to take
account of the considerable possibility of error
inherent in any projection based on the very incom-
plete Vietnam census data -- from 350,000 to 550,000.
Impact on the Labor Force
14. Although the pool of draftable males has
become relatively small, there is no indication
that the mobilization program has created any
general labor shortage. It has, however, cut
deeply into the country's limited supply of
skilled manpower. The impact has been particularly
severe in urban areas, where the Lulk of the
skilled labor is located. Nearly one-third of
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some 6 million South Vietnamese estimated to be in
the civilian labor force are engaged in nonagri-
cultural pursuits, primarily in the cities and
towns. Since the South Vietnamese have greater
control over the urban areas, it seems likely that
a disproportionate share of the draftees are coming
from these areas.
15. Approximately 90 percent of the 220,000
Vietnamese civil servants are considered to ze
skilled. Perhaps 60 percent of the 154,000 Viet-
namese employees of the US sector of the economy
can be classified as skilled and semiskilled.
Civilian government employment was frozen at the
30 Apr.11 1968 level, and drafted personnel have
riot been replaced. The impact of mobilization has
been felt most in such highly technical government
operations as the Saigon Metropolitan Water Office
and Directorate of Civil Aviation and in such pri-
vate companies as Esso Standard Eastern, which
employs a large number of technically trained,
draft-eligible young men.
'6. The mid-June mobilization bill provided for
limited deferments for police, Revolutionary
Development Cadre, technical specialists, and
teachers, as well as for public health and educa-
tional personnel serving in the countryside. In
September 1968 the government decided to exempt
from the draft all primary school teachers serving
in hamlets and to allow all secondary and primary
school teachers on the government payroll in larger
towns to continae teaching after attendance at a
nine-week :military training course. In the private
sector, agreement was reached with the Ministry of
National Defense (MOND) in October 1968 on deferment
criteria affecting employees in more than 1,000
manufacturing and commercial firms. Approximately
40,000 men in the civil service and private sectors
have received deferments.
17. Mobilization at the present rate in :ombina-
tion with the lack of a well-defined deferment policy
for skilled civilian personnel will further deplete
the number of needed administrators, managers, tech-
nicians, and skilled craftsmen who are as necessary
for effective civilian operations as they are for
the armed forces. There are some 20,000 third-
country nationals employed in South Vietnam (pri-
marily skilled workers and technicians from South
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Korea and the Philippines) , but their number
not likely to increase significantly, in view of
the political sensitivity which surrounds their
employment. Moreover, with few exceptions, these
nationa.s are employable only in the US sector.
Some of ';ne tightness in the skilled labor market
may be loosened as the US military construction
program is phased .ut. One major US contractor
already has indicated that it plans to lay off some
9,000 skilled and unskilled workers.
18. Unless South Vietnam alters its draft
regulations, it is likely to be hard-pressed to
meet its future military .nanpowF;: requirements.
Not only will the military begin to encounter
shortages of skilled personnel, but difficulty
in tapping the existing manpower pool also is
likely to emerge. Even if attrition of Saigon's
military forces during 1969 does not reach last
year's level, it is likely to remain high as RVNAF
combat participation continues to increase.
Military replacement requirements alone are li..kely
to be between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Combat
casualties currently are at an annual rate of
more than 80,000 men. Desertions are running at
a rate of more than 100,000 annually and are likely
to remain high as the number of 18-year-old draftees
increases.*
19. Even assuming the unlikely event that the
entire crop of new 18-year-olds is drafted in 1969,
Saigon would still have to find upwards of 50,000
men to fill the remaining estimated gap. Additional
nu;lbers would be required if further expansion of
force levels is planned or if South Vietnam seeks to
replace any US troops withdrawn during the year.
Saigon has in fact announced that it plans to in-
crease its regular forces by at least 71,000 men
during 1969 in the expectation that some US troops
will start to withdraw this year.
It A recent study indicated that the high desertion
rate in 1968 was due in large part to the sizable
numbers of new men being drafted. It indicated that
perhaps 80 percent of the deserters were men with
less than six months of military service. These
men presumably succumb quickly to the pressures of
severed family ties, unfamiliar surroundings, and
poor morale.
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20. Thus, with a remaining manpower pool of
draft age probably smaller than half a million,
Saigon would have to draft men over 38 and/or
lower the fitness requirements to fill its manpower
need. Drafting men in the 39-44 group would in-
crease the availability pool by more than 250,000
men. Lowering standards so that only 25 percent
are rejected would add an additional 10',000 men.
In both cases, however, it is likely that the
quality of manpower would be -owered.
21. Some manpower in the prime 18-38 age group
ostensibly would be available should the South
Vietnamese wrest additional area: from the Viet
Cong. But these incremental additions could not
be very large, as less than 550,000 men in the
15-49 age group and less than 350,000 men in the
18-38 age group are estimated to be under Viet Cong
control and la~ge numbers of them have already been
recruited or conscripted by the enemy. The exten-
sion of South Vietnamese control could, however,
deny some of these ircr,aments to the Viet Cong and
cut the manpower pool available for enemy recruit-
ment. In assessing the South Vietnamese overall
recruitment capability, however, the problem of
population control must be kept in perspective.
In a real sense, thB Viet Cong probably have easier
access to manpower in some areas ostensibly under
South Vietnamese control than does Saigon, while
the reverse is not the case. Some estimates indi-
cate, for example, that in the "C" category (the
lowest level) of South Vietnamese controlled
areas, perhaps only half the population is effec-
tively under government control.
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