ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ACADEMIC TRAINING FOR STUDENTS FROM THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: October 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Assessment of the Soviet Program
to Provide Academic Training
for Students from the Less Developed Countries
Secret
ER IM 68-127
October 1968
Copy No. 75
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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Foreword
The program of Soviet academic training of
nationals from leas developed countries has grown
since its inception in 1956 from a modest effort
to train an elite cadre of Communist sympathizers
into a sophisticated program for professional train-
ing. The size of the program has expanded rapidly
as a result of the development of state-to-state
relations between the USSR and developing countries
and because of the pressures from newly emerging
states for increased opportunities to train their
nationals. Kremlin leaders undoubtedly view the
results of the program favorably and will continue
to use it as a permanent part of their program for
penetrating less developed countries. The Soviet
training effort, although modest in comparison with
Western programs, is a matter of increasing concern
to the Free World as the pool of personnel return-
ing from Soviet training expands. This paper dis-
cusses the development of the program and its rele-
vance to Soviet objectives. It also tries to assess
the impact of the program and its future delineation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1968
Assessment of the Soviet Program
to Provide Academic Training for Students
from the Less Developed Countries
Summary
Nearly 19,000 students from less developed
countries have received academic training in the
USSR under a special program inaugurated in 1956.
Half of these students have come from Africa,
nearly one-third from the Near East and South
Asia, and the remainder from Latin America and
the Far East. Training has been heavily weighted
toward specialization in the fields of engineering,
medicine, mathematics, the natural sciences, and
law and economics.
Patrice Lumumba
University
--
established in 1960
training nationals
for the express
from the emerging
purpose of
countries
--
currently is training about one-third of the
11,000 to 12,000 students enrolled in the USSR.
The remainder are studying at some 170 higher
educational institutions throughout the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet program began as an adjunct of
Moscow's trade and aid offensive in the newly
emerging states. The USSR recognized that many
of these countries lacked trained personnel to
administer the new organs of state economic and
political power which were being created. Through
intensive indoctrination and training of selected
nationals, the USSR sought to establish in the new
nations a pool of trained personnel, sympathetic
to Soviet institutions and policies, from which
future political leaders and administrators would
be drawn.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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The early years of the program were charac-
terized by Soviet recruitment of pro-Soviet
students and by massive doses of political indoc-
trination. When these policies eventually pro-
voked violent protests from some of the new states,
the USSR began to accept students selected by
their own governments, and the more obvious forms
of indoctrination were brought to an end. The
Soviet authorities still believe that exposure to
Soviet cultural and academic life will enhance
the USSR's prestige among influential groups in
the new countries and that some of the trainees
ultimately will assume important posts in their
countries' political and economic structures.
So far, however, Moscow's academic training
prcgram. has had a modest impact. Although the
6,000 people who have already returned from
Soviet training are a significant addition to
the pool of trained manpower in the developing
countries, the Soviet program is overshadowed by
the long-standing training provided by Western
countries, whose colleges and universities cur-
rently are educating an estimated 113,000 students
from the developing countries. Nevertheless, in
Moscow's view the program is succeeding, and the
modest annual outlay of $35 million to $40 million
for foreign academic training, over the long term,
may produce more durable ties with some developing
states than will result from the much more costly
financial outflow associated with the Soviet eco-
nomic aid program.
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Development of the Program
The Number and Origin of Students
1. Since the inception in 1956 of the Soviet
academic training program for students from less
developed countries, an estimated 18,800 students
have gone to Soviet institutions of higher learning.
As is shown in Table 1, the number of students de-
parting for study in the USSR averaged less than
300 annually during 1956-59; accelerated rapidly
during 1959-62, reaching a peak of more than 3,500
in 1962; and then declined gradually to only about
1,500 in 1967.
Departua.rs of Academic Students
from Less Developed Countries
for Training in the USSR
1956-67
Persons
Near East
Year
Total
Africa
Par East
Latin
America
and
South Asia
1956-59
1,110
75
25
20
990
1960
1,610
425
315
150
720
1361
2,110
555
225
215
1,115
1962
3,570
1,960
265
305
1,040
1963
2,890
1,860
140
255
635
1964
2,250
1,395
130
260
465
1965
1,940
1,120
245
230
345
1966
1,805
1,035
40
305
425
1967
1,530
950
20
235
325
2. The annual fluctuations in the number of de-
partures reflect the development of the program over
time and relate to the number of places made avail-
able for training foreign personnel by Soviet authori-
ties. In 1960 the USSR increased the facilities for
training students from deve-loping countries by
allotting additional places at state universities
and by providing approximately 500 places at Patrice
Lumumba Friendship University, which was opened in
1960 especially to meet the needs of students from
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the developing countries. Thus the number of students
departing from the less developed countries for study
in the USSR rose in 1960 by more than 40 percent over
the cumulative total for the preceding four years.
By 1962, as the enrollment levels at Patrice Lumumba
and other Soviet universities increased, the number
of departures rose to more than twice the 1960 level.
Present capacity, estimated at 11,000 to 12,000,
probably was not reached until 1965 and is now vir-
tually completely utilized. Since then, new students
have gone to Soviet universities to fill vacancies
rather than new places. With fewer places available
for new students in recent years, the number of
annual departures has leveled off and in 1967 had
fallen to approximately the 1960 level.
3. Of the total number trained between 1956 and
1967, approximately 50 percent have come from
Africa, 32 percent from the Near East and South
Asia, 11 percent from Latin America, and 7 percent
from the Far East. In addition to the record level
of new enrollees in 1962, the year also marked a
dramatic shift to Africa as the chief area of student
origin. Beginning in 1960, as many African countries
gained their independence and sought educational
opportunities for their untrained peoples, the number
of African applicants to Soviet universities s':elled.
By 1962 the number of African students departing for
academic training in the USSR rose to 1,960, or
almost five times the 1960 level,
4. In 1962, African students in the Soviet
Union came from 29 countries, compared with 11 in
1961. Although the number of departures from
African countries began to decline in 1963, the
reduction in the number from most other areas was
proportionately greater, and African nationals have
accounted for 55 to 65 percent of the total number
of new students from less developed countries in
every year since 1962., The largest number of African
students studying in the Soviet Union have come from
Somalia, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. Together they
have sent a total of more than 3,500 students since
1959.
5. The shift to a predominantly African stu:! nt
body in the USSR during the early 1960's reduced
the importance of the presence of Near East and
South Asian students, who had accounted for about
50 percent of the total before 1962. With the large
increase in the number of Africans in 1962, the
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Near East - South Asian departures were less than
one-third of the total. The decline from 1,115 in
1961 to 325 in 1967 in the number departing from
this area is accounted for largely by the reduced
number from Iraq. Departures from Iraq fell from
approximately 700 in 1961 to an estimated 25 in
1967 as the Iraqi government adopted restrictive
measures to control the number departing. Smaller
declines occurred in the number of departures from
Afghanistan, Syria, the UAR, and Yemen.
6. Students departing from Latin American
countries have been increasing as a percentage of
the total, because annual departures from Latin
America have remained relatively stable, at 250 to
300 per year, while departures from other areas
declined.
7. The importance of the Far East as a source
of student trainees evaporated after the 1965
attempted coup in Indonesia. Prior to that time,
more than 1,000 Indonesian students, or more than
70 percent of the total number from the Far East,
had gone to the USSR for training.
Academic Facilities and Curricula
8. Although students from less developed coun-
tries are studying in some 170 academic institu-
tions of higher learning scattered throughout the
Soviet Union, about two-thirds are in Moscow.
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University -- named for
the radical. leftist Premier of Congo (K), murdered
in early 1961 -- is by far the most important school
in the USSR for training nationals from the develop-
ing countries, and in 1967 it accommodated about
one-third of the total number of these students.
9. Lumumba University was established in 1960
to provide specializes: facilities for educating
students from the less develcped countries. As part
of Moscow's drive to reduce the traditional ties of
the newly emerging states with the Free World, the
University was set up to cope more effectively with
problems peculiar to students from vastly different
cultural and educational backgrounds. The University
consists of one preparatory and six specialized
faculties that offer 69 academic degrees. During
the 1967/68 academic year the school had an enroll-
ment of more than 3,600 students from less developed
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countries and about 500 from the USSR, who presumably
keep the foreign students under surveillance.
10. Other Soviet institutions of higher learning
open to foreign students include: state universi-
ties in Moscow, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Kiev, Odessa,
Minsk, Tashkent, Kharkov, and Lvov. In addition,
polytechnical, agricultural, medical, and other
specialized institutes throughout the Soviet Union
receive foreign students..
11. Educational policy in the USSR is subject
to rigid central planning, and universities are
under the direct control of the Ministry of Higher
Education. The Minister of Education, who also
is a member of the Central Committee, dictates
policy and program content and is able to manipulate
the role of ideology and academic studies in the
education process.
12. The average course of study for foreign
students at Soviet universities and specialized
institutes is five to six years, including one to
two years of preparatory instruction in Russian,
elementary sciences, and the humanities. Soviet
preparatory training for foreign students is con-
ducted through special faculties at ten Soviet
institutions, including Lumumba and Moscow State
Universities. These faculties employ expert
language teachers, special textbooks, and teaching
aids to help supplement the secondary training of
new students and to provide a more uniform academic
base for students from different educational back-
grounds. In contrast with the educational equiva-
lence standards imposed on foreign applicants by
the United Kingdom, through its A Levels, and the
United States, by its College Board Examinations,
the USS1 has not established a standard device for
accrediting previous education.. This plus the fact
that all courses in the USSR are taught in Russian
has made preparatory work a prerequisite to the
Soviet foreign academic training program.
13. Following preparatory training, students
enter regular university faculties where they may
pursue one of aver 300 specialties offered by the
Soviet educational system. No Soviet institution
offers a program in the liberal arts comparable to
that offered by many Western schools. For the most
part, students go directly into a specialty and
pursue narrow courses of study that emphasize the
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acquisition of technical skills. Field work is
required of Soviet students to provide practical
application of their studies; this requirement is
believed also to apply to students from less de-
veloped countries. In the 1966/67 school year,
students at Patrice Lumumba were enrolled in the
following major fields of study:
Percent
Engineering
39
Agriculture
7
Medicine
16
Mathematics
Science
and Natural
11
Philosophy
and History
9
Law and Economics 18
Each of these general fields of study _s broken
down further, such as mechanical engineering which
in turn includes the following specialities:
agricultural machinery, machine tools, casting
equipment, automobiles, tractors, and aircraft
engines. Students are required to spend at least
3,500 hours in their major field of study, which
is almost 1,000 hours more than is required, in
a much broader study frame, by most Western schools
for a Master's degree. On the successful comple-
tion of requirements, which include course work,
a diploma project, and Soviet state examinations,
students are awarded a diploma, which the USSR
claims is equivalent to a Master of Arts or Master
of Science degree in Western universities. This
is a special degree awarded to students from de-
veloping countries. Master's diplomas in Russian
and in Western European languages also are given
on the decision of the state examination commission
to foreigners graduating from Soviet universities.
Recruitment
Scholarship Provisions
14. Foreign nationals studying at institu-
tions of higher learning in the USSR receive all-
expense scholarships from the Soviet government.
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These include stipends of about $90 per month for
students at preparatory schools, $100 for under-
graduates, $110 for post-graduates, and $167 for
advanced trainees.* In addition, the Soviet
government provides all foreign students with free
tuition and medical care, transportation to the
USSR and back to students' home countries at the
end of their course of study, an annual book
allowance of up to $55 for post-graduates and
advanced trainees, and an allowance to purchase
warm clothing on arrival in the USSR.
15. Scholarships are awarded by the Soviet
government and directly by the Patrice Lumumba
Friendship University to students who have ful-
filled the following admission requirements:
(a) For undergraduate courses
at universities or technical,
medical, or agricultural institu-
tions, applicants must be between
17 and 35 years of age and must
have completed their secondary
school education;
(b) Post-graduate courses are
open to university graduates up
to 40 years of age; and
(c) Advanced training or re-
fresher courses are open to
specialists and teachers who
have completed their higher
education. There is no age
limit for this group.
16. Initially, these requirements were inter-
preted very loosely, and students were accepted
with little previous schooling. Patrice Lumumba
originally provided for the admission of applicants
who had not completed their secondary education as
a means of attracting students from lower economic
and social strata. The Soviets discovered, however,
that the "poor students," for whom Patrice Lumumba
University had been established, also were poorly
qualified for academic study. The rat_o of
'E Based on a ruble-dollar ratio of one ruble to
US $1.11.
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was high, and some 850 students were returned home
by 1967 because of academic failure. Their inability
to meet minimum academic standards contributed to
widespread dissatisfaction among students and was
an important factor in the demonstrations of African
students in December 1963. These demonstrations
provided the Soviets with an opportunity to introduce
a more rigid interpretation of admission standards
and, to impose controls over student behavior while
they were in residence at Soviet universities.
Soviet regulations introduced in early 1964 restated
the requirement for certificates attesting to an
adequate secondary education. They also provided
for the expulsion of students who did not complete
individual plans of study within the established
time periods or who violated study discipline or
the rules of an institution. While these regulations
were probably directed at eliminating the dissidents,
they also suggest the further development of a more
academically oriented Soviet program. Poverty and
poli`i'al affiliation became less critical deter-
minants of eligibility for study in the USSR, and
the emphasis on academic achievement increased.
Recruitment Methods
17. The USSR recruits students for academic
training through bilateral agreements or under the
sponsorship of UN agencies, with the a proval of
the applicants' governments.
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19. More often in recent years, scholarships
have been provided through official channels under
bilateral cultural or student exchange agreements
or under the auspices of UN agencies. Applications
under bilateral accords or under UN programs gen-
erally are made through the Ministries of Education
in the candidates' countries. Applications for
study at Patrice Lumumba University are made
directly to the University or through Soviet embas-
sies and consulates. Many developing countries,
aware of the threat of illegal recruitment, have
forbidden direct applications to the University.
In 1962, India established a selection board espe-
cially for students applying to Patrice Lumumba,
and many countries have begun to administer Soviet
s(holarships through special boards. Moscow also
has begun to realize that political and economic
convictions alone are not appropriate criteria for
academic achievement and is applying stricter admis-
sion standards.
Soviet Objectives
20. The Soviet Union's sophisticated program
of academic training for students from developing
countries fits within the framework of overall Soviet
objectives for penetrating the less developed coun-
tries of the Free World and thereby promotes Soviet
foreign policy aims. The new program differs sig-
nificantly from the training of foreigners within
the USSR during the Lenin-Stalin era, which empha-
sized the preparation of revolutionaries who were
already committed to the overthrow of established
governments. The training of foreign revolutionaries
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still continues in Moscow and is carried on through
Higher Party Schools and other means.
21. The shift from an ideological to an academic
focus began after the 20th Party Congress in 1956,
when the scope and character of Moscow's program
for educating personnel from developing countries
was substantially revised to conform to Soviet poli-
cies of so-called peaceful coexistence. The new
tool, therefore, was forged in the early years of
Moscow's "trade and aid offensive" in the less de-
veloped countries. Its creation reflected a need
that was quickly made evident to Moscow in many of
the newly emergent nations of Asia and Africa,
namely the lack of indoctrinated or trained cadres
with whom Moscow's representatives could work in
promoting the spread of Communist influence. During
the early post-Stalin period, from 1956 to 1960,
the USSR tried to insure the creation of cadres
sympathetic to Communist philosophy by insisting
that foreign students take as much as 500 hours of
economic and political indoctrination, concurrent
with professional course work. Between 1960 and
1962, however, the required specialized courses in
Communist ideology were reduced and eventually
eliminated because of objections of the students'
home governments. As Moscow pushed forward its
scheme for training administrators, engineers,
doctors, and other professional personnel, formal
indoctrination was largely confined to after-school
activities, to Russian language courses, or to rele-
vant courses such as economics and political science,
The transition to a more thoroughly academic program
reflected the desires of developing nations that
began to exert pressures on the Soviet Union in
their state-to-state relations. Following the
formalization of cultural exchanges through bilateral
agreements, the less developed countries have par-
ticipated directly in the selection of students for
training in the USSR and have restrained the Soviet
Union in the execution of the more blatant indoc-
trination aspects of its education program.
Long-Run Objectives
22. Since the mid-1950's, Soviet goals in Free
World less developed countries have been restated
within a longer time frame,, and programs are being
tailored to accomplish Soviet objectives more
gradually. Because of its altered timetable for
effecting revolutions in less developed countries,
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the Soviet Union also has adopted a long-term per-
spective with respect to its training program for
foreign students. In the long run, the USSR hopes
to establish Communist societies in less developed
countries and expects that training foreign nationals
in academic subjects will help to accomplish that
goal.
23. By providing professional academic train-
ing, the USSR is creating a pool of elite cadre
from which developing countries may draw at least
some of their political and economic leaders, par-
ticularly in view of the shortage of trained per-
sonnel in these countries. It is hoped that these
cadre will be favorably inclined toward the USSR
in spite of the reduced ideological content of the
academic program. Although the changed philosophical
guidelines for Soviet external relations have
altered Soviet strategy vastly in the educational
field, the USSR hopes that some trainees will
assume important positions in local political party
structures and public media on their return home
and that intercultural exchanges, increased eco-
nomic relations, and military dependence will lead
to increased Soviet influence and eventually to
communism in the less developed countries.
24. Khrushchev, in his speech at the inaugura-
tion of Patrice Lumumba University in November
1960, stated that the purpose of the University
was to provide higher education and that there
would be no attempt to inculcate Communist ideology.
He added that, nevertheless, the Soviet Union
"would not take it amiss" if a student decided that
he approved of Marxism-Leninism. By teaching a
common language, through familiarization with the
structure of Soviet institutions, and by making
Russian culture available to foreign students,
conditions are believed to be favorable for ex-
panding Soviet influence to shape economic and
political developments in developing countries.
Short-Run Objectives
25. Following the establishment of diplomatic
and economic relations with the emerging countries,
the USSR recognized that the education of less
developed country nationals would be a major step
forward to create and maintain satisfactory rela-
tions with the less developed countries. By pro-
viding education for these nationals, the USSR also
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expected to undermine Western prestige and influence
by decreasing the latter's monopoly on higher educa-
tion; to enhance Soviet prestige by spreading its
reputation for industrial, scientific, and intellec-
tual achievements; and to strengthen the bonds of
understanding between the USSR and the less developed
c-,untries through close cultural contacts. Training
in the Russian language and familiarity with the Soviet
institutional structure are intended to establish
organizational and personal links between the USSR
and nationals of less developed countries that might
enhance the Soviet image and produce lasting re-
lationships. In the end, the USSR hopes that these
conditions will provide the foundation for revolu-
tionary situations.
Assessment of the Program
The Less Developed Countries' Point of View
I3onefito from the Program
26. The less developed countries have been
receptive to the programs of academic training
offered by the USSR because of their expanding
requirements for higher education. Confronted
with an urgent need for skilled personnel at a
time when their rapidly growing populations in-
tensify the competition for a limited number of
places in Western institutions, the governments of
developing nations have welcomed the opportunity
for higher education in the USSR. The five-fold
expansion between 1960 and 1967 of Soviet facili-
ties for training nationals from less developed
countries has provided places for some 11,000 to
12,000 students, most of whom otherwise would not
have received advanced education. Since 1956,
approximately 6,000 students from less developed
countries have completed academic training in the
USSR. It is estimated that about 2,500 f these
students were trained as engineers, 1,000 as
doctors, and 750 as mathematici.ins and scientists.
For many countries, especially in Africa, the injec-
tion of these skills, although modest in nurrzer,
constitutes a significant addition to their reservoir
of educated nationals and relieves to some extent
the critical shortages of professional personnel.
The 1,500 degrees awarded to Africans by Soviet
universities between 1963 and 1967 have added sig-
nificantly to the total number of degree holders in
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many of these countries. The 6,200 students froo
Sub-Saharan Africa in the, USSR at the end of 1967
constituted an c?stimatod 25 percent of the total
number from thin area that were studying abroad.
In 1965, while than 50 Yemenis had university
degree_n, several hundred were being trained in
Soviet universities. Although many students may
have preferred Western education, the lower admis-
sion standards and more generous, financial arrange-
ments in Soviet institutions have made education
in the USSR more fearsible for these students than
27. Fewer students from developing countries
have nought Soviet academic training because of
ideological persuasion; their motivations have been
a desire for professional training in the face of
limited alternatives. For the most part, these
ntudents now go with the approval of their govern-
mcnts, and their applications are processed through
the legal apparatus established by their governments.
Probably no more than 15 or 20 percent of those
studying in the USSR in 1.967 had come without the
sanction of their own gover.nmc'ntn; in 1960 the num-
ber wao an estimated 50 percent.
8. In spi to of th?? problemrs t hat. they have
had in adjusting to :;oviet social and institutional
patt' rn::, aftit, r an initial period mc,:t students have
dd,ju:.t('ci because they are not wi I Iing to sacrifice
what might be their only opportunity to receive an
education. fly the end of 1966, at leant 1,200
=:tuclentn had left the USSR before completing their
educational programs, but up to 70 percent of these
probably departed because the academic work was too
difficult..
29. In addition to student dis:ratisfaction
tha .:tri from tht hie of abi11ty to at:l ry
:scholar;tic requirements, frictions have occurred
because many students have found it difficult to
conform to the conditions of a hi,jh1y conservative
educational establishment. Students originating
from countries that are undergoinc, rapid political,
:social, and economic change have found racial dis-
crimination, curtailed personal freedom, and con-
stant r.urveillance upnetti,nq and inconsistent with
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Soviet propaganda about the USSR. Nevertheless,
in 1967 there were 8,000 applications for some 600
places at Patrice Lumumba University.
,,'valuation of Training
30. ror the most part, less developed coun-
tries are satisfied with the quality and character
of Soviet training. Afghanistan, the UAR, India,
Niger, Somalia, and Uganda, among others, have ex-
pressed satisfaction with the quality of academic
training received by their students in the USSR.
Sierra Leone reportedly ccnsiderr- some aspects of
Soviet technology an more advanced than that of
the West and urges its students to seek training
in the USSR. The emphasis of Soviet education on
narrow specialties may serve the immediate require-
ments of some less developed countries more effec-
tively than the broader liberal arts programs of
the West. Several graduates of Patrice Lumumba
University have been awarded advanced degrees in
the United States, and Western businessman who
have worked with African graduates of Soviet schools
have commented favorably on their performance.
Although graduates from Soviet institutions gen-
erally are not as well trained as those educated
in the West, the disparity in largely a function
of the difference in preparatory education and the
lower level of skills that the foreign students in
the USSR bring to their advanced studies. To help
overcome this problem, many lens developed countries
includinct Mali, Condo (B), Somalia, and the Sudan
are permitting the Soviets to teach Russian in
their countries, and since 1964 the USSR has been
more careful in screening candidates for scholar-
ships.
31. Nevertheless, the governments of many
Latin American countries, and of Ghana, Iraq, and
Lebanon, have been critical of the quality of
Soviet education and in some cases have not
accepted Soviet degrees until additional course
work wan completed. In Chile, an in most other
Latin American countries, academic credentials of
returnees from the USSR are not recognized, and
they ave unable to work in their profesions.
Some counties, notably Lebanon ant: Ghona, have
imposed stringent resting requirements on students
returning from for.Nign universities, a measure
probably directed agairnt Communist-trained
graduates, ,nd some countries are negotiating
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diploma equivalence agreements with the USSR. By
and large, in spite of some deficiencies of their
education, Soviet-trained students have had few
difficulties in finding jobs on their return.
1?i.nk of 1'o/t:tiaal Iniloc'trinat.lon
32. Initially, many less developed countries,
especially in Africa, were permissive in their
attitudes toward student training abroad because
of their urgent need to replace trained foreign
personnel withdrawn by former metropolo countries.
Countries are increasingly aware of the need to
relate education directly to their development
needs and also are awakening to the dangers inherent
in educating their students in the USSR. Recognizing
political conformity as endemic to Soviet society,
most lens developed countries -- even those with
close economic and political ties with the USSR,
such as the U1R -- are ?mposiny restraints on the
selection of students for training in the USSR and
have tried to control their activities in the USSR.
This is being done largely through bilateral agree-
ments that provide developing countries with some
leverage and control of their nationals. The Ivory
Coast, for example, recently has considered signing
a cultural agreement with the USSR in order to con-
trol the students that had gone to the Soviet Union
without its sanction and to establish machinery to
reduce the number of illegal departures in the future.
3 -3 . ':'1 facilitate and tea tnutl1 for the selection
process, most of these clc'_,ernments have introduced
measures to sere?+?n ipplicatits for their maturity
and reliability. They have tried to send students
that can differentiate between fact and ideology.
A number of countries, including 'T'anzania and Kenya,
have established scholars-hip committees to process
student applications. Burma, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Nepal, and Nic{eria are among those that require
the Minister of Education. to approve all applications;
and a few countries have gone no far as to require
exaf?inatIonn to tc.:.t applicants' loyalty to their
own government. Students from those countries that
went to the USSR without permission of their govern-
ments or who engaged in political activity while in
the USSR face the risk of being arrested or may be
denied employment on their return home. The home
government also m.iy refuse to reissue their passports
or to issue entry visas to allow their return.
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34. In many cases the less developed countries
have trier to maintain a continuing control over
their students while they are in the USSR, even of
those whose departure they did not approve. India,
the UAR, and Iraq have maintained a cautious view,
and the Indian government has made its diplomatic
mission in Moscow responsible for careful supervision
of grantees. The Indian Minister of Education con-
trols the courses of study that its students can
undertake, and several countries do not allow them
to take courses abroad that are available in their
own country.
The Soviet Perspective
In the Program Achieving Ito Objcotivoa?
35. From the Soviet point of view, the program
is probably achieving its goals. The availability
of opportunities for higher education in the USSR
Is reducing the former almost complete Afro-Asian
dependence on Western education; it is enhancing
the Soviet reputation for academic achievement in
some less developed countries; and it is strengthening
Soviet relationships with educated nationals of less
developed countries. The USSR probably is reinforcing
its ties with foreign nationals who were sympathetic
to Communism before going to the USSR; it undoubtedly
has won over a few new supporters; a few have become
disaffected; but the great majority probably accept
the experience for its educational value and in the
process develop professional and cultural ties with
Moscow. Soviet recruitment enables the USSR to
ferret out for training Communist sympathizers that
later may play leadership roles in the less developed
countries.
36. It is still too early to assess the probable
impact of Soviet education on personnel from less
developed countries and eventually on their govern-
ments. The estimated 6,000 nationals from developing
countries that have been graduated from Soviet insti-
tutions of higher learning have not yet begun to
exercise important influences on their governments.
Western programs have been of long standing, and
in 1967 alone, more than 65,000 nationals from less
developed countries were being trained in the West
;excluding the United States) and an additional
48,000 in the United States. Table 2 compares the
Soviet program in 1Q67 with those of Western coun-
tries.
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Estimated Number of Academic Students
from the Less Dec,eloped Countries
Being Trained in the USSR, Western Countries,
and the United States, by Area
1967
Persons
USSR
Western
Countries 1
United States
Total
10,995
6b,G00
48,270
Africa
6,455
17,000
5,535
Far East
500
7,500
4,045
Latin America
1,155
8,500
14,410
Near East and
South Asia
2,885
32,000
24,280
a. Including Western Europe, Australia, Canaaa
and Japan. Estimates for these Western countries
are based on 1964 data, the latest year available.
37. The fact that Western institutions are
training more than ten times as many students from
developing countries than the USSR does not dilute
the impact of Soviet education by this amount. In
somc countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the balance is in the Soviet favor. But even in
countries where Western training far outweighs the
number trained in Soviet institutions, Moscow may
have an advantage since there are no "programs"
in the West. Students go to Western schools of
their own selection, without intercession of the
host government; there are no national objectives;
and there is no indoctrination. Moreover, for the
achievement of long-run Soviet objectives, they
need not havu a majority. A small revolutionary
nucleus can '.. certain circumstances effect a
government takeover. Nor does it appear that the
Soviet Union is concerned about the relative academic
merits of its own program compared with those of the
West. For the most part, the students being trained
in the USSR could not meet Western entrance require-
rr>th hts, but the USSR has been al le to train these
F..-.ple to make a contribution on their return to
tneir homelands.
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38. In Sub-Saharan Africa these countries have
become increasingly dependent on the USSR for
advanced education. In the 1967/68 academic year,
approximately 6,200 students from Sub-Saharan Africa
were being trained in the USSR, compared with 5,225
in the United States. In some countries such as
Mali, the contrast is marked: more than 300 were
being trained in the USSR and only 10 in the United
States. Moreover, African students may be more
vulnerable to indoctrination than students from
other areas because often they are less sophis;,i-
cated than students from areas where there has been
more cultural interchange, and they react more
violently to their environment (as is demonstrated
by the iaet that they have accounted for most of
the student discontent in the USSR).
Evidence of Ideological Changes
as a Result of Training
39. The relationship of ideological change to
academic training in the USSR is difficult to
measure, and the results of an attempted correla-
tion probably would bye of limited validity. There
are no firm data as t,D which of the returnees are
sympathetic to Communist philosophy or what activi-
ties they pursue on their return. To be effective,
Communist supporters may lie low until opportune
situations arise. The consensus has been that suc-
cessful indoctrination is largely a function of the
selection process, and the political orientation of
most students has been altered only slightly as a
result of their training in the USSR.
It is impossible to estimate the
number that became indoctrinated as a direct result
of their Soviet education.
40. Most of the developing countries that are
aware of the dangers of Soviet indoctrination appar-
ently have not detected major changes in the
political and economic views of returning students.
Careful student selection and control of student
activities in the USSR presumably are considered
adequate safeguards, and most countries have indi-
cated that their returnees have been affected only
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slightly. With the reduction of the number of
students going to the Soviet Union through illegal
recruitment channels, the number of pro--Marxist
returnees should be reduced.
Influence of Returning Students
41. The impact of Soviet academic training on
the political and economic processes of most less
developed countries has been negligible. Except
in a few countries, such as Yemen and many in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where- the pool of educated personnel
is very small, the importance of such training in
creating a cadre of personnel trained in the USSR
rather than in the West also has been small. Soviet-
educated students returning to the more progressive
developing countries have tended to enter the pro-
fessions -- engineering, medicine, and law; chose
returning to other less developed countries apparently
are marked for positions in the government, the
military establishment, and teaching. A number of
countries have sent junior government officials to
the USSR for training to reduce the serious shortage
of skills in the government hierarchy. The Central
African Republic, Cameroon, and Sierra Leone, among
others, have marked students educated abroad for
positions in the government. Of 40 students recently
returned to 13 countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
from training in the USSR, 11 were employed as
teachers and 25 were employed by their governments.
Most of the government employees were in technical
ministries, but four of these were placed in top-
level positions. They included a Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Commerce,
an Assistant to the Vice President, and a cabinet-
level officer ii economics. A Soviet-trained
Somalian, Hassan Hagi Omar Amei, was elected to
the Somalian National Assembly in 1964 on his
return from Moscow State University where he had
studied International Law. In spite of his out-
spoken anti-Western attitudes, Hassan was appointed
in July 1967 to the sensitive post of Minister of
Information. Later he was reassigned as Minister
of State for Rural Development and Self-Help Schemes.
25X1
Information is not avai
able to judge the extent of Soviet-trained students
who have turned agents, but their number is believed
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to be small and undoubtedly they were recruited from
students who came to the USSR with some Communist
persuasions.
42. In the long run, returning students may
exert more important pro-Communist influences in
their home countries through membership'and activities
in social, political, and economic organizations.
This factor is especially critical for Latin American
countries whose trainees in the USSR were recruited
illegally and who are presumed to be Communists.
The activities of this group, that often defy sur-
veillance, may constitute a threat to their govern-
ments.
Outlook
43. In ;ap*e of sporadic student discontent and
other relat:-,,i problems, Moscow is expected to continue
to use acadei.ic training as an important element of
its strategy for establishing Soviet influence in, less
developed countries. While there is no precise
measurement of the program's accomplishments or of how
Soviet attitudes will affect its implementation in
the future, qualitative judgments point to a positive
Soviet assessment.
44. The student training program is a low input/
high yield effort. It involves an annual outlay of
$35 million to $40 million which produces a continuing
stream of young people exposed to Soviet culture.
For most, it is the only foreign experience they
will have. In the Soviet judgment, this expenditure
may produce stronger ties with some less developed
countries than result from the $150 million to $200
million annual net outflow from economic aid programs,
some of which are fraught with difficulties and end
in failure.
45. In the Soviet view the education of nationals
from developing countries is not directly competitive
with Western training, which will always be a larger
program. Students will continue to come to the Soviet
Union because of limited opportunities elsewhere, and
the experience of recent years when applications for
training in the USSR have exceeded the number of
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places, at times by more than 15 to 1, may be ex-
pected to continue. In the future, the academic
background of recruits will improve. As the develop-
ing nations seek new opportunities to educate their
rapidly growing populations, the competition for
admission to Soviet universities will become keener,
stricter admission standards will be imposed, and
the quality of Soviet education for nationals of
the developing countries will be improved. The
fragmentation of skills associated with Soviet edu-
cation may be too narrow for application to Western
institutional structures. Nevertheless, narrow
specialization fulfills the immediate technical re-
quirements of the developing nations. Although
Soviet training may lack the breadth of scope to
produce able administrators, from the Soviet view
this is not critical, because political leaders
often do not come from academic backgrounds.
46. In 1968 an estimated 1,500 to 1,700 new
students from less developed countries will enroll
in Soviet institutions of higher learning, reflecting
places vacated by returning peak-year enrollees to
their homelands. It is expected that the USSR will
add facilities for educating students from the develop-
ing countries in the next several years. The number
added may be 1,000 to 1,500, or possibly more, de-
pending on the Soviet assessment of the return on
this program and the competing requirements for new
facilities by Soviet students. Even without any
addition to its present facilities, however, the
level of new enrollments will be somewhat higher for
a few years and then gradually stabilize at 1,800
to 2,000 per year. The rapidly expanding enrollment
of children in primary schools of the less developed
countries between 1950 and 1966 (during which period
the number doubled) will exert continuin!j pressures
on the governments of less developed countries to
provide additional opportunities for tho higher
education of their nationals. Because there will
be an ever-increasing shortage of faci%.ities, some
countries may be willing to accept Soviet conditions
for acceptance of their students. These could include
the reintroduction of ideological trai,iir.g and a more
rigid, doctrinaire program. This kind of shift in
emphasis would conform to the current har,3 line
attitude of Kremlin leaders.
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