PETROLEUM IN NORTH VIETNAM AT THE OUTSET OF 1968: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500220029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: March 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

 0- /h /oEa /im (mod'--~~
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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Petroleum in North Vietnam at the Outset of 1968:
A Review of Developments During 1967
Secret
Copy No. 63
ER IM 68-27
March 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
C%CLDDF.O f11OM AUTOMATIC
M)NN(I I1 ADIND AND
DCCLAANIPICATION
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This memorandum makes estimates of the supply
of petroleum in North Vietnam during 1967.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Petroleum in North Vietnam at the outset of 1968:
A Review of Developments During 1967
Summary
North Vietnam appears to have overcome the
effects of the intensified bombing of petroleum
storage facilities that occurred in the last half
of 1966. During 1967, petroleum imports, consump-
tion, stocks, and storage capacity all increased,
and there was no evidence of shortages.
North Vietnam imported an estimated 256,000
tons* of petroleum in 1967, a moderate increase
over the previous peak level of 237,000 tons in
1966. About 90 percent of the imports were
delivered by tanker, principally from the Soviet
Far East, on a routine schedule. North Vietnam's
sizable fleet of oil barges and other lighters
makes it possible to discharge tankers while at
anchor in Haiphong harbor without serious delays.
North Vietnam is capable of handling petroleum
imports at a considerably higher rate than the
monthly average in 1967 of 21,000 tons. Imports
were almost 37,000 tons in May 1967 and more than
34,000 tons in January 1968.
Metric tons are used throughout this memorandum.
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Economic Research.
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Despite the loss through airstrikes of about
1,400 tons of storage capacity at the principal
storage terminal at Do Son and another 3,000 tons
at dispersed storage sites in 1967, there was a net
increase in storage capacity of about 30,000 tons
during the year. No effort was made to restore any
of the principal terminals that were damaged,
suggesting that the North Vietnamese no longer con-
sider these vital to petroleum distribution. In-
stead, they have continued to ex and and modify their
dispersed tank site system
capacity also was increased by the addition of a
sizable number of petroleum drums. North Vietnam now
has storage capacity sufficient to maintain between
100 and 120 days of supply. There is, in addition,
"floating" storage capacity represented by the oil
barge fleet and the rail tank car and tank truck
parks.
At the outset of 1968, North Vietnam probably
had on hand about 65,000 tons of petroleum, equiva-
lent to about 100 days of supply at the 1967 esti-
mated rate of consumption and 13,000 tons more than
a year earlier.
precautionary move in the event of
the closing of Haiphong, or may simply reflect
anticipated increases in consumption. Petroleum
consumption also increased by about 25 percent, to
an average monthly rate of about 20,000 tons in
1967. This was the result of increased activity in
truck transport, greater use of petroleum-driven
electric power generators, and the higher level of
logistic support to forces in Laos and South
.Vietnam.
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Petroleum Supply and Demand
1. North Vietnam imported about 256,000 tons of
petroleum in 1967, an increase of 8 percent over the
237,000 tons estimated for 1966. Imports in 1967,
all in the form of refined products, had a value of
2. Consumption of petroleum in 1967 is estimated
to have been about 20,000 tons per month, or 240,000
tons for the year.
I IConsumption was about 25 percent greater
than in 1966, reflecting the increased activity in
truck transport caused by the interruptions in rail
transport, the greater use of petroleum-driven
electric power generators caused by the loss of fixed
powernlants, and the higher level of support to
forces in Laos and South Vietnam. The total demand
for petroleum, however, was only slightly higher
than in 1966, as the estimated loss of petroleum
through bombing in 1967 was only about 3,000 tons,
compared with at least 41,000 tons the year before.
3. There was no evidence of any serious
shortage of petroleum in North Vietnam in 1967 or of
failure on the part of the suppliers to make
adequate and timely deliveries of petroleum. North
Vietnam's ability to import sufficient amounts of
petroleum on a routine basis suggests that problems
caused by the destruction of many of its principal
storage terminals since mid-1966 have been overcome.
The estimated supply on hand at the beginning of
1968 was about 65,000 tons, equivalent to about 100
days of supply at the 1967 rate of consumption. The
supply of petroleum on hand at the outset of 1967
probably was 52,000 tons, and the levels of supply
in North Vietnam during the year probably were never
?less than about 75 days. It is thus apparent that
the bombing of petroleum targets did not seriously
weaken the economy of North Vietnam, did not produce
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shortages of petroleum, and did not diminish North
Vietnam's capability to support military activities
or the infiltration of men and supplies into the
South. The petroleum supply and demand in North
Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 is summarized in Table 2.
Petroleum Imports - Origin and Transport
4. As in earlier years, the USSR was the
principal supplier of petroleum to North Vietnam in
1967. Rumania and Hungary again provided only token
supplies.
6. Historically, most petroleum imports have
been delivered to North Vietnam by sea.
The destruction in 1966 of the
principal storage terminal at Haiphong, which had
served as North Vietnam's only bulk petroleum import
facility, has made it necessary for tankers to dis-
charge their cargoes into barges while at anchor in
the Haiphong harbor. This discharge procedure is
now well developed and there were no serious delays
to tankers making deliveries to North Vietnam in
1967.
7. The Black Sea was the principal area of
,loading for petroleum shipments to North Vietnam
prior to October 1966. Since that time, however,
most of the petroleum shipments have originated
from Soviet ports in the Far East. Deliveries are
made by small Soviet tankers on a routine schedule
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and, periodically, by larger Soviet tankers. Ship-
ments from the Black Sea by tanker were made only in
the first half of 1967
The
Suez v~ana closure as had no a
n effect on
delivery of petroleum in bulk. The delivered costhe
p
of packaged petroleum in dry cargo ships around the
Ca
e
f
p
o
Africa has increased, but only moderately.
Storage
Principal Storage Terminals
9. At the beginning of 1966, there were nine
principal storage terminals with a combined capacity
of about 100,000 tons. By 1 January 1967, bombing
had reduced the number of terminals to seven with a
.total capacity of less than 18,000 tons. With the
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loss of the principal terminal at Do Son during the
year, six terminals with a total capacity of 16,000
tons remained on 1 January 1968. Of these six, only
four are considered to be operational; two had only
nominal capacity. The North Vietnamese have made no
effort to restore any of the damaged terminals,
suggesting that this type of storage no loner is
considered essential.
Dispersed Storage Sites - Tanks
10. The dispersed storage tank system, far less
vulnerable than the principal storage terminals to
airstrikes, is the keystone to North Vietnam's petro-
leum import and distribution procedures. This s stem
was expanded and modified during 1967.
11. The dispersed tank sites, and the drum
sites described below, were bombed during 1967. A
complete assessment of damage is not possible, but
the total storage capacity destroyed at dispersed
tank and drum sites probably' did ,,.,t- 2 00
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Dispersed Storage Sites - Drums
12. Petroleum containers (of various sizes but
expressed in terms of 55-gallon-drum equivalents)
represent an increasingly important means of storing
and distributing petroleum in North Vietnam. On the
basis of the tonnage of petroleum imported on dry
cargo ships and of estimated losses from bombing and
from normal use in 1967, North Vietnam probably had
an inventory of 300,000 drums at the outset of 1968.
This is equivalent to storage for about 50,000 tons
and is a net increase of about 130,000 drums, or
22,000 tons, above the inventory of 1 January 1967.
Other Storage Sites
13. An estimated 5,000 tons of bulk storage is
available at industrial and military installations
for the exclusive use of the installations they
serve. The capacity at these sites probably did not
change during 1967. There is also an unknown but
important amount of "floating" storage capacity
represented by barges, rail tank cars, and tank
trucks in North Vietnam.
.Summary of Storage Capacity
14. Petroleum storage capacity as of the
beginning of 1967 and 1968 is summarized as follows:
Thousand Metric Tons
1967
1968
Principal storage
terminals (tanks)
18
16
Dispersed storage
sites (tanks)
30 to 40
40 to 50
Dispersed storage
sites (drums)
28
50
Military and indust
i
l
r
a
sites (tanks)
5
5
Total 81 to 91 111 to 121
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Thousand Metric Tons
Supply 1966
Stocks on hand, 1 J:xnuary 46 52
Imports 237 256
Total supply 283 308
Consumption 190 240
Losses 41 3
Total demand 231 243
Stocks on hand, 31 December
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