ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

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CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8
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RIPPUB
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S
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20
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December 22, 2016
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September 29, 2009
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44
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Publication Date: 
October 9, 1974
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Secret Economic Intelligence Weekly Secret CIA No. 8223/74 9 October 1974 Copy N2 405 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Secret 25X1 US Trade Surplus with Western Europe Mounts; The surplus jumped from $1 billion in the first seven months of 1973 to $3 billion this year, with both US agricultural and industrial exports showing strength. (See page 7.) OPEC: Mammoth Oil Receipts; The OPEC countries will receive about $94billion for their oil in 1974$33billion in the first half, $61 billion in the second half. (See page 2.) LDCs Doubly Hit by Trade Trends; The trade balance of non-OPEC developing countries has been worsening with the industrial countries as well as with the oil countries. (See page 3.) LDCs: Financial Resources Dwindling; The successful financing of the large first-half trade deficit masked an increasingly serious payments position. (See page 6.) USSR: Long-Range Prospects for Hard Currency Trade; The sharp increases in world prices for oil, gold, and other primary products have dramatically improved Soviet ability to import Western plants and technology over the next several years. F______1(See page 8.) French Negotiators are currently in Moscow to offer the USSR approximately $1 billion in long-term credits at 7.3% to 7.7% for purchases over the next two years. Paris wants to conclude a new accord with the USSR bofore pursuing discussions on the proposed gentlemen's agree- ment among the EC, Japan, and the United States on export credits. Moscow is sure to use any low rate other Western countries. China-Philippines Trade Agreement; Chinese oil will be exchanged for Philippine lumber, coconut products, sugar, and copper.F_____1 (See page 13.) Bonn Moves to Reshape EC Agricultural Policy; West Germany is tired ci paying steep food prices and the lion's 25X1 Italy's Industrial Production slipped last month. August statistics show that factory output decreased 4.6% from August 1973, suggesting that the expected downturn in economic activity has begun. On the positive side, the trade deficit shrank to the lowest level this year and a surplus of $89 million was recorded in the non-oil account. Canada's New Legislative Program, outlined at the opening of Parliament, includes measures to create a national petroleum corporation and to require more processing of raw materials in Canada. Another bill calls for Ottawa to intervene whenever a foreign-owned com- pany is prevented from filling export orders because of the policy of the company's government. Prime Minister Trudeau should have no trouble getting his program enacted, since he now has a commanding parliamentary majority. 25X1 OECD Secretary-General Concedes Economic Weakness; Van Lennep now doubts early upturn in the industrial economies. (See page 12.) Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 daily movements. Soviet Attempt to Buy Grain; The current effort to buy 3.4 million toms from US dealers coincides with crop difficulties, which have caused us to trim our estimate for 1974 from 198 million to 195 million tons, 10 million tons below plan. (See page 12.) Gold was fixed at $155.10 per ounce in London yesterday afternoon, down slightly over the week, which saw sharp North Korea's Economic Tilt Toward the West (See page 25X1 13.) USSR: Sugar Outlook Dims; Unseasonal cold weather is cutting the crop at least 5% short of plan. The Economic Situation in South Vietnam, September (See page 12.) 1974 (See page 13.) Mexico: Continuing Heavy Need for US Corn; Early frost, drought, and hurricane Fifi are frustrating Mexican efforts to reduce dependence on US corn. (See page 12.) Recent Data Concerning Internal Economic Activities (See page A-1). Recent Data Concerning External Economic Activities (See page A-2.) The Dollar closed mixed against major foreign currencies last week. The European joint float currencies gained from 1% to 1.3% against the dollar while the lira, French franc, and Japanese yen declined. The British pound remained unchanged. ft Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 BONN MOVES TO RESHAPE EC AGRICULTURAL POLICY Chancellor Schmidt's initial rejection of the recent EC decision to raise agricultural support prices is another skirmish in a protracted struggle to revamp the CAP. The compromise worked out last week is merely a short-term, patchwork solution. West Germany is pushing hard for reform because it is fed up with paying the lion's share of spiraling EC bills while other members reap most of the benefits. This year, Bonn is financing 28%% of planned Community outlays of $6.1 biAion. About three-fourths of the EC budget goes to support the CAP. EC agricultural policy has been in trouble for several months: ? rising production costs have cut into farm incomes despite increasing CAP assistance; ? cessation of official purchases of beef because of overburdened storage facilities has allowed market prices to fall below support levels; ? France and Belgium have Unilaterally introduced treasures to assist their farmers, in violation of EC rules, to the annoyance of the Germans in particular; ? border taxes imposed to offset currency changes have continued to hamper operation of the complex pricing system; ? Italy has imposed import-deposit requirements that interfere with agricultural trade within the EC; and ? sugar shortages in the United Kingdom have dramatized Dritish objections to EC membership (the EC has niled out special relations with sugar-exporting Commonwealth states). In exchange for its final acquiescence to a 5% rise in support prices, Bonn was promised that the increase would be deducted from next spring's scheduled Note: Comments and queries regarding the Economic Intelligence Weekly are welcomed. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Secret adjustment. It also extracted pledges that future unilateral measures would be submitted to the Community for prior approval and that the CAP would be subjected to a fundamental review. Bonn's desire to reduce the costs of CAP implies that the relatively inefficient West German farmer may be headed for more difficult times despite his political clout. The non-farm segment (90%%) of the population has become more and more critical of rising food prices. Recent studies claiming that farm incomes exceed the national average have been widely publicized in the West German press, fueling consumer dissatisfaction with high food prices. The government seemingly views CAP reform as a key part of its anti-inflation fight. OPEC countries will earn more than $100 billion from oil exports in 1974. Because of the average two-month payments lag, they will actually receive about $94 billion -- $33 billion in the first half and $61 billion in the second half. Second-half payments will fully reflect last January's price increases and most of the July increase. OPEC Oil Receipts, 1974 1st Quarter 2d Quarter 3d Quarter 4th Quarter Total Total Estimated receipts (excluding retroactive 11 22 31 30 94 payments) Estimated retroactive pay- 11 21 24 25 81 ments by oil companies .... 1 7 5 13 Oil receipts in the second half will be boosted by anticipated retroactive payments of $13 billion. When concessionaires complete such payments in early 1975, OPEC revenues should level off. Receipts will bulge in October as a result of quarterly payments to certain producers and a probable $2.2 billion retroactive 2 Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 payment to Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, extra large amounts of oil money mry flow to the New York market. A similar bulge in July was handled smoothly by private markets, but both Western bankers and officials for OPEC countries note that the Eurodollar market is now saturated with short-term oil dollars LDCs DOUBLY HIT BY TRADE TRENDS The trade balance of non-OPEC developing countries has been worsening, not only with oil countries but also with industrial countries. Data for the first half of 1974 show a $3 billion adverse shift in their trade with Japan, West Germany, and the United States alone, compared with first half' 1973. This was on top of a $14 billion deterioration in their balance with OPEC countries. In trade with all OECD member countries, the deterioration was an estimated $4 billion. The tables present data on the merc1 andise trade of five major developed countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, and Canada) with the OPEC and non-OPEC developing countries. The remarkable increase in exports to the non-OPEC countries in the first half of 1974 is attributable more to price than to volume increases. The deterioration in the trade balances of non-OPEC developing countries wider these circumstances suggests that the oil burden of developed countries is being partially shifted to these countries. The non-OPEC countries are trapped between an inelastic demand for grain and fertilizer and limited ability to raise theirown exports to the recession-hit developed countries. Furthermore.:,rtain of these countries - such as Brazil, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea - regard capital goods and industrial raw materials as vital to their growth and are unwilling to cut back these imports. 3 Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Secret Merchandise Trade, Selected Developed Countries' Exports Imports Trade Balance Exports Imports Trade Balance Trade Balance Change United States Total trade 33,217 33,270 -53 48,052 46,992 1,060 1,113 Developing countries 9,201 9,139 62 15,210 17,894 -2,684 -2,746 OPEC 1,699 1,831 -132 2,740 6,505 -3,765 -3,633 Other 7,502 7,308 194 12,470 11,389 1,081 887 United Kingdom Total trade 14,609 16,242 -1,633 18,196 23,834 -5,638 -4,005 Developing countries 3,161 3,528 -367 3,589 6,484 -2,895 -2,528 OPEC 852 1,361 -509 1,030 3,923 -2,893 -2,384 Other 2,309 2,167 142 2,559 2,561 -2 -144 West Germany Total trade 29,810 22,787 7,023 43,033 30,000 13,033 6,010 Developing countries 3,288 3,580 -292 5,495 6,681 -1,186 -894 OPEC 982 1,459 -477 1,609 3,965 -2,356 -1,879 Other 2,306 2,121 185 3,886 2,716 1,170 985 Japan Total trade 15,927 14,284 1,643 23,589 26,367 -2,778 -4,421 Developing countries 6,252 5,517 735 10,60_3 13,922 -3,309 -4,044 OPEC 1,102 2,660 -1,558 1,975 8,924 -6,949 -5,391 Other 5,150 2,857 2,293 8,638 4,998 3,640 1,347 Canada Total trade 12,282 11,321 961 15,614 15,209 405 -556 Developing countries 985 1,019 -34 1,366 2,083 -717 -683 OPEC 152 404 -252 154 1,145 -991 -739 Other 833 615 218 1,212 938 274 56 1. Official data of value of exports and imports, by country of origin and by country of destination, converted to US currency and/or f.o.b. values where required, with the following exceptions: for Canada, reexports arc excluded from developing country data; for the United States, exports are f.a.s. and imports are on customs value basis; and for Japan, certain trade data have been interpolated for developing countries. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 United States' United Kingdom' West Germatyt Japan' Canada' All Countries2 Argentina First half 1973 Exports 116.8 127.5 180.1 58.5 5.2 1,488 Imports 171.1 53.4 104.3 74.4 22.3 926 Trade balance -54.3 74.1 75.8 -15.9 ?17.1 562 First half 1974 Exports 180.3 121.6 136.5 70.2 10.4 1,840 Imports 238.2 46.6 153.8 152.2 18.8 1,350 Trade balance -57.9 75.0 -17.3 -82.0 -8.4 490 Brazil Trade balance change -3.6 0.9 -93.1 -66.1 8.7 -72 First half 1973 Exports 569.2 149.0 256.2 138.3 37.7 2,645 Imports 745.1 125.9 320.1 229.0 38.5 2,500 Trade balance -175.9 23.1 -63.9 -90.7 -0.8 145 First half 1974 Exports 740.6 202.1 251.2 228.3 49.8 3,076 Imports 1,488.8 158.9 683.1 551.9 113.1 5,008 Trade balance -748.2 43.2 -431.9 ?323.6 -63.3 -1,932 India Trade balance change -572.3 20.1 -368.0 -232.9 -62.5 -2.077 First half 1973 Exports 207.4 150.4 53.6 244.8 15.8 1,353 Imports 198.8 166.4 99.9 152.7 84.6 1,213 Trade balance 8.6 -16.0 -46.3 92.1 -68.8 140 First half 1974 Exports 270.5 199.3 71.4 323.3 22.3 N.A. Imports 202.4 147.5 178.1 276.2 47.9 N.A. Trade balance 68.1 51.8 -106.7 47.1 -25.6 N.A. South Korea Trade balance change 59.5 67.8 -60.4 -45.0 43.2 N.A. First half 1973 Exports 467.8 23.7 570.0 38.3 38.5 1.241 Imports 606.9 25.6 421.8 72.5 25.3 1,720 Trade balance ?139.1 -1.9 148.2 -34.2 13.2 -479 First half 1974 Exports 604.5 59.8 516.5 78.3 65.4 N.A. Imports 795.7 48.7 669.3 127.5 42.9 N. A. Trade balance -191.2 11.1 -152.8 -49.2 22.5 ?795 Pakistan Trade balance change ?52.1 13.0 -301.0 -15.0 9.3 -316 First half 1973 Exports 16.7 36.9 21.2 78.5 3.9 520 Imports 10!.5 33.8 38.5 33.9 7.2 4(13 Trade balance .84.8 3.1 -17.3 44.6 -3.3 117 First half 1974 Exports 30.5 51.8 27.6 37.4 8.6 1993 Imports 225.4 51.6 57.6 86.1 56.0 315 Trade balance -194.9 0.2 -30.0 -48.7 -47.4 -116 Paraguay Trade 7alance change -110.1 -2.9 -12.7 -93.3 -44.1 N. A. First half 1973 Exports 8.6 17.8 20.3 4.9 0.4 74 Imports 14.0 4.9 9.8 1.7 0.2 49 Trade balance -5.4 12.9 10.5 3.2 0.2 25 First half 1974 Exports 8.6 15.1 11.6 4.6 1.0 223 Imports 12.8 7.7 13.7 22.6 0.3 27 Trade balance -4.2 7.4 -2.1 2.0 0.7 -i Philippines Trade balance change 1.2 -5.5 -12.6 -1.2 0.5 N.A. First half 1973 Exports 273.8 9.2 47.8 336.2 4.6 862 Imports 211.9 28.8 33.8 267.1 13.5 662 Trade balance 61.9 -19.6 14.0 69.1 -8.9 200 First half 1974 Exports 428.7 16.2 47.0 505.2 6.1 1.0824 Imports 372.8 56.7 74.4 410.2 21.6 I ., ,4 Trade balance 55.9 -40.5 -27.4 95.0 .15.5 -112 Trade balance change .6.0 -20.9 41.4 25.9 -6.6 N.A. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Secret Trade Balances, Selected Developing Countries (Continued) Million US 5 United Stalest United KingdomI West CennanyI Japans CanadaI All Countries2 Sri Lanka First half 1973 Exports I 14.5 26.6 6.4 17.9 4 0 181 mports 14.4 13.1 6.2 0.9 , 3 1 185 Trade balance 0.1 13.5 0.2 8 0 . 0 9 4 Exports I 20.7 29.6 1.5 . 9.6 . 6.6 . 7393 mports 9.9 10.5 19.1 20.3 2 2 561 Trade balance 10.8 19.1 -7.6 -10.7 . 4 4 178 Taiwan First half 1973 Trade balance change Exports I 10.7 799.4 5.6 47.4 -7.8 92.3 18.7 343.8 . 3.5 72 6 N.A. 1 768 mnorts T d 457.3 23.2 75.7 672.1 . 14 3 , 1 445 ra e balance E 342.1 24.2 16.6 .328.3 . 58 3 , 323 xports I 1,012.9 76.9 121.4 476.9 . 106 3 1 4053 mports 806.6 57.0 174.2 1,085.1 . 23 6 , 1 2 1 1 Trade balance T d 206.3 19.9 -52.8 -608.2 . 82.7 , 1 ) 144 Zaire First haif 1973 ra e balance change Exports I -135.8 30.1 -4.3 25.1 ?69.4 31.1 -279.9 27.3 24.4 2 4 N. A. N A mports T 47.0 12.5 41.2 23.2 . 0 6 . . N A rade balance ?16.9 12.6 ?10.1 4.1 . LS . . N A Exports 2 29 45 4 . . Imports T d . 77.9 . 23.2 50.0 56.7 58.1 21.2 2.6 2..i N.A. N A ra e balance 48.7 22.2 -6.7 36.9 0 3 . . N A Trade balance change ?31.8 9 6 3 4 . . . . . 32.8 .1.5 N.A. I, Data ual Jevcloped country ofOcial trade publicatlom of exports and import valus, by nnmtry of Jextinatimn ad by cuuatry of origin. 2. bola IMP have databeen converted to US currency and/or f.o.b. bails where required, with the following exceptions: for Canad ma, reexports are excluded from developing country data, and for the United States, exports are f.a.s. and imports are on customs value bails. data, except data for South Korea for first bat- 1974. 3. firs) quarter 1974. 4 January-May 1974. x X x X LDCs: FINANCIAL RESOURCES DWINDLING The successful financing of' large trade deficits by non-OPEC LDCs in the first half' of' 1974 masked an increasingly serious payments position. The short-term outlook is for further deterioration in LDC trade balances with both OPEC and developed countries. Private credit will be harder to obtain. A substantial drawdowll of' reserves during the ne; t 12 months is likely, and forced cutbacks in imports may be necessary in some cases. The non-oil LDCs had an estimated current account deficit of' $8 billion to $9 billion in the first half' of' 1974. Preliminary data indicate that they received aid of' $6 billion to $7 billion and arranged for medium-term Eurocurrency loans of $4.2 billion. As it result, reserves increased by $2 billion to $32.5 billion, which is widely scattered except for Brazil's $6 billion. In the first half of' 1973. in contrast, when prices of many commodities other than oil were soaring, reserves rose by $6 billion with net capital inflows of' only $2 billion. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Because of' further increases in rr-_: s, thr LDC oil import bill will be about $1 billion to $2 billion higher in the second half than in the first. Furthermore, the LDC trade deficit with the developed countries will worsen until the developed economics pick up. Unless measures are taken to reduce imports, the LDC current account deficit will rise by another $2 billion to $3 billion in the second half' of 1974. The LDCs cannot count on maintaining or increasing their present borrowing levels from private capital markets. Unless they receive sharply higher aid payments, they will be hard pressed to cope with their rising deficit. US TRADE SURPLUS WITH WESTERN EUROPE MOUNTS Western Europe's massive trade deficit with the oil producers this year is being aggravated by a deteriorating balance with the United States. In the first seven months, US exports to the area grew by 42% from the year-earlier level - almost twice the rise for US imports. The US surplus with Europe jumped from $1 billion (imports f.o.b.) in the first seven months of 1973 to $3 billion this year. The gain covered about one-fifth of the rise in the US oil import bill. Weak demand in the United States held the growth in US import volume to a mere 1% while prices rose by 2317o. Purchases of steel, machinery, clothing, and certain agricultural products actually declined in real terms. In contrast, purchases of European petroleum products showed a large increase in volunv . On the US export side, sagging grain sales were offset by increased soybean shipments and by sharply higher prices for agricultural products in general. Industrial exports remained strong, with a 41% gain evenly divided between volume and price increases. Above-average increases in volume were posted for metals, wood products, and textiles. The slump in the international airline industry caused the volume of aircraft exports to dip. In a reversal of recent trends, the US trade deficit with West Germany narrowed to $770 million. Revaluation of the nark has been an important factor in declining US purchases of German automobiles and other durables. The US trade balance also improved wit;: all other major countries in Western Europe. 7 Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 STAT Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 US - West European Trade1 Million US $ Jan-Jul 1974 US Balance Jan-Jul US Exports US Imports 1973 1974 Total Western Europe 16,766 13,506 922 3 260 Of which: European Community 12,897 }0,951 512 , 1 946 Of which: Belgium/Ltu:embourg 1,362 928 185 , 434 France 1,683 1,199 322 484 Italy 1,671 1,544 96 127 Netherlands 2,331 814 1,119 1,517 United Kingdom 2,580 2,310 -117 270 West Germany 2,943 3,711 -1,042 -768 The US surplus with Western Europe is expected to climb to $5 billion by yearend. Although the volume of US agricultural sales will be held down by disappointing grain harvests, prices should be well above the level prevailing earlier this year. Growth in bilateral industrial trade in the last live months of 1974 will be sluggish, since GNP gains in both the United States and Europe are expected USSR: LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS FOR HARD CURRENCY TRADE* The sharp increases in world prices for oil, gold, and other primary exports have dramatically improved Soviet earnings in hard currency markets. In 1974 the USSR will probably achieve a trade surplus with hard currency countries of $1 .5 billion in contrast with the deficit of $1.75 billion in 1973. The USSR almost certainly will continue to earn ample foreign exchange to pay for all the Western plants and technology it can absorb over the next few years. * This is an abslrarct of the forthcoming ER IR 74-27, USSR: Long-Range Prospects for Hard Currency Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Swrrwl Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 This striking improvement in Soviet export prospects presents Moscow with policy choices it lacked when large trade deficits had to be covered by Western credits and drawdowns of gold holdings. Soviet officials now have more flexibility in weighing: ? the extent to which the USSR seeks and uses Western credit, i.e., cash will be paid unless terms are deemed especially favorable; ? the choice between sales of gold and the buildup of' gold reserves; and ? the terms offered to Western countries on commodity payback ventures. Outlook for 1974 Soviet exports probably will rise by 55% in 1974, chiefly because of the more than doubling of the price obtained for oil - $10 or more per barrel in 1974, compared with an average of $4.50 in 1973. Oil alone could earn the Soviets $3 billion in 1974, and total hard currency exports may reach $7.5 billion. At the same time, the record grain harvest of 1973, which permitted the rebuilding of stocks, will mean substantially reduced outlays for agricultural products. Outlook after 1974 Merchandise Exports Although price increases in international markets are expected to tail off after 1974, world demand for many of the USSR's major exports - such as oil, natural gas, coal, timber, and diamonds - should remain strong. The USSR should also be able to increase the physical volume of exports of these and other goods. During the remainder of the 1970s, earnings from exports alone could support an annual import growth of 221h. In the 1980s, export growth probably will slow down as the quantity of oil available for export diminishes and deliveries of natural gas to Western Europe level off. The annual rate of import growth sustainable from merchandise exports will fall to roughly 10%. Commodity Payback Ventures Additional export revenues may be earned from commodity payback ventures. The Soviets have concluded a number of these ventures involving Western assistance Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 USSR: Hard Currency Balance of Payments Million US $ Exports ( f.o.b.) 4,817 7,500 Imports (f.o.b.) 6,566 6,000 Merchandise balance -1,749 1,500 Net services and transfers -127 -94 Current account balance -1,876 1,406 Not medium-term and long-term capital 1,0092 552 Basic balance -867 1,958 Non-monetary gold 950 3 Net short-term capital, change in foreign currency balances, and errors and omissions 83 N.A. 1. Estimated. 2. Including Soviet compensation payments of $24 million in accordance with US lend-lease "pipeline" agreements. 3. About $300 million to date. in the development of natural gas, chemical, timber, and coal resources in return for long-terns Soviet raw material exports. exports from such deals could increase Soviet import capacity by roughly $4 billion annually in 1981-85, at a time when export earnings from traditional transactions are expected to decline. In contrast to the long-term effects of commodity payback ventures, a decision to sell gold would have an immediate impact on Soviet import capacity. At the estimated long-run price of $ 150 per ounce, sales from current production alone could increase the average annual import capacity by about $1.7 billion over the short run and by roughly $2 billion in 1981-85. Although the USSR will continue to draw on the large volume of Western credit already extended, Moscow may have little need to solicit additional credits to increase imports substantially during 1975-80. If they chose, however, the Soviets could increase credit drawings by up to 25% annually in 1975-80 without incurring serious problems of debt management. As long as Western governments continue Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 to offer long-term credits at interest rates below expected world inflation rates, Moscow presumably will continue to rely heavily on credits while curtailing exports of gold and/or goods whose real worth is expected to increase over time. The use of credit in 1981-85 will be determin' d in part by the size and composition of Soviet debt carrying over from 1980. To compensate partially for the expected decline in the growth of merchandise exports, the Soviets might make extensive use of Western credits. heavy drawings could increase annual import capacity by $3 billion or more at the expense of' greatly increased debt and debt service. likely Policy Options and Import Growth In 1975-80 the USSR has a number of' options made available by the striking switch in its balance-of-payments position. Without an undue increase in its debt service, the USSR could sustain an average annual growth of' hard currency imports of up to 30% in money terms and perhaps 201% in real terms. Because a ~Inajor portion of increased imports will consist of advanced Western plants and technology, the USSR undoubtedly can not assimilate imports at this capacity level. At the same time, past Soviet policy suggests that augmented import capacity will not be used to support a massive increase in imports of' consumer goods or to build large hard currency balances. Most likely is a cnmbination of' ? increase in the rate of growth of' imports (but short of potential maximum growth); ? discreet use of Western credits; ? sales of' gold below current production levels, and ? signing of' commodity payback deals only under favorable terms. In 1981-85, Moscow's policy mix will be af'f'ected by (I) the extent to which credit was used in 1975-80 and (2) the degree of Soviet foresightedness in arranging commodity payback deals. Even under the most favorable conditions and with maximum credit use and sale of all current gold output, the annual average growth of import capacity in 1981-85 probably would not be much more than 1511" in money terms, considerably less in real terms. Nonetheless, the $30 billion in annual import capacity forecast for this period almost certainly will be adequate to satisfy Soviet needs for Western equipment, technology, and other goods. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Secret Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Notes OECD Secretary-General Concedes Economic Weakness Secretary-General Emile van Lennep now doubts that the OECI)'s projection of an early upturn in the industrial economies will materialize. Our estimates put growth for the six major foreign OECD economics at an annual rate of only 1.51%, in the second half of' 1974, compared with the OECD's 3.7'/x. Van Lennep maintains his position that an economic slowdown must be accepted to wind down inflation. STAT Soviets Attempt to Buy Grain The current Soviet attempt to buy 2.4 million tons of' corn and 1 million tons of' wheat from US dealers reflects shortfalls in Soviet production this year. We have just trimmed our estimate of the 1974 grain crop from 198 million to 195 million tons - 10 million tons below the official goal and 5 million to 15 million tons below requirements. Unfavorable weather has reduced the wheat crop to an estimated 85 million tons -- the smallest since 1969. Perhaps 20(lo of' tile corn crop will not mature in time to be harvested for grain because of' late planting and a cool growing season. Moscow's entry into the grain market suggests that the regime will not jeopardize its livestock expansion program by permitting a sharp rundown in carryover stocks of' grain, estimated at 20 million to 30 million tons. USSR: Sugar Outlook Dims The sugar be~.:c crop has been hurt by late-summer cold weather. Undersized sugar beets in several important producing areas and extensive flowering in other areas will lead to a crop at least 5% short of the planned goal of' 91.3 million tons. Nonetheless, coupled with the usual imports from Cuba of about 2 million tons, this year's crop should cover domestic requirements. Mexico: Continuing Heavy Nee,] for US Corn Widespread crop damage in Mexico has tripled the earlier estimate of corn import needs in 1974/75 to 1.3 million tons. Foodgrain imports - 90% of' which traditionally come from the United States - thus will probably continue at the high level of the previous two years. Corn production in 1974/75 1, now put at Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 oecrey 8.1 million tons, 15% below initial forecasts. The crop has been reduced by early frost, which destroyed 700,000 tons, and by scattered damage from drought and I?urricane Fifi. China-Philippines Trade Agreement The recent agreement between Manila and Peking provides a solid basis for expansion of trade and reduction of the Philippines' near-total dependence on Arab oil suppliers. China has pledged "considerable" t. ude oil exports, and Manila is expected to request 15,000 b/d (811o of annual requirements) in 1975 for openers. Manila expects the figure to rise to 50,000 b/d by 1979. Philippine exports to China will feature lumber, coconut products, sugar, and copper. North Korea's Economic Tilt Toward the West (ER IR 74-25, October 1974, North Korea has quietly turned to the West as a major source for its modern machinery and equipment. This shift in policy reduces Pyongyang's longstanding dependence on the USSR and other Communist countries for capital equipment. Since 1970, North Korea has signed contracts with firms in Japan and Western Europe for almost $600 million worth of industrial plants and related equipment, a sizable portion on credit. The Economic Situation in South Vietnam; September 1974 (ER IR 74-26, September 1974, Declining food prices slowed the rate of inflation in September; the overall price index is up by nearly 40`% this year. This issue also discusses (1) improvement in Saigon's rice stock;, over last year, (2) evidence that monetary expansion has contributed to inflation in 1974, (3) continued erosion of real incomes, and (4) progress in providing credit for industrial expansion through South Vietnam's two main industrial credit banks. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R001500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 INTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS GNP' Constant Market Prices Average Annual Growth note since W Ind HOLES ustrial ALE PRICES Average Annual Growth hate Since Percent Changd latest tram Previous I Yuar Previous Quarter Guenter 1910 Earlier Quarter Percent Change Latest from Previous I Year 3 Months Month Month 1970 li United States 7411 -0.4 3,6 -1,2 -1.8 Uni ted State s Aug 74 2 4 9 8 Ear er 5 27 Earlier 9 32 Japan 74 II 0,6 5.7 -3.3 2.4 Jap an Aug 74 . 1.0 . 11 3 . 32.8 . 14 9 West Germany 74 II - 0,7 3.1 1,1 - 2.9 We st Germa ny Jun 74 0.2 . 7.0 13.1 . 10.3 France 73 IV 1.8 5.8 5,7 7.3 Fra nce Aug 74 -0.7 12.4 30.3 -2.5 United Kingdom 74 I -3.5 1.9 -4.4 -13.3 Uni ted Kingd om Aug 74 1.3 11.3 25.3 19.3 Italy 73 IV 1.9 3.7 5.3 7.7 Ital y May 74 0.7 14.5 48.3 44.1 Canada 7411 -2.7 5.0 2.3 -10.3 Can ada Jun 74 0.1 10.9 23.5 16.1 Average Annual Growth Rate Since Average Annual Growth Rate Since Percent Change Latest tram Previous I Year 3 Months Percent Change Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier*, Month Month 1970 Earlier E li United States Aug 74 I -0.4 I 4.0 -1.0 1.3 Uni ted State s Aug 74 6 4 11.2 ar er 2 13 Japan Aug 74 -2.2 5.6 -4.9 -11.6 Jap an Aug 74 . 11.5 25.4 . 15.4 Waist Germany Jun 74 -2.8 2.7 1.1 -2.2 We st Germa ny Aug 74 8.1 6.9 2.5 France Jun 74 0.8 6.2 5.0 2.2 Fran ce Aug 74 8.2 14.5 13.4 United Kingdom Aug 74 0 2.5 -0.2 5,4 Unit ed Kingd om Aug 74 10.4 16.8 8.4 Italy Jul 74 -2.5 5.0 4.2 1.8 Ital y Aug 74 10.3 20.5 28.9 Canada Jul 74 0.8 5.8 1.9 -5.0 Can ada Aug 74 6.7 10.8 12.7 RETAIL SALES' Current Prices Average Annual Grorgh Rate Since Average Annual Growth Rate Since Percent Change Percent Change Latest tram Previous I Year 3 Months Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier" Au 74 U it d S Month Month 1970 Earlier Eas ip " n e tates g 0.8 10.1 9.9 13.5 Unit ed States Aug 74 0.3 5.9 5.4 9 d Japan May 74 4.7 13.0 15.9 -1.7 Japa n Jun 74 1.6 17.9 15.7 17.6 West Germany Jun 74 -1.5 7.7 2.0 1,5 Wes t German y Jun 74 2.0 9.2 5.3 10 4 France May 74 6.2 8.5 18.1 1.3 Fran ce Jun 74 1.3 12.7 10.7 . 15 6 Uni::.l Kingdom Jun 74 3.3 11.9 14.7 8.3 Unit ed Kingdo m Aug 74 1.2 P.8 0.8 . 3 5 Italy Apr 74 0,9 17.4 27 0 34 0 . . . Italy Jan 74 0.1 20.7 22.7 22 5 Canada Jul 74 1.7 12.4 16.2 24.6 . Cana da Aug 71 -0.7 12.3 7.3 I Year 3 Months I Month Representative Rates Latest Date Earlier Earlier Earlier United States Dealer-placed finance paper Sep 25 1 10.93 8.75 9.00 12.00 Japan Call money Sep 18 13.00 8.75 12.83 13.75 West Germany Interbank loons (3Months) Sep 25 9.40 13.84 9.60 9.50 France Call money Sep 18 13.50 10.75 14.50 13.75 United Kingdom Sterling interbank loan (3 real Sep 25 11.77 13.13 13.27 12.84 'Saaaanully adjusted. " Canada r fi S 25 Average ter latest 3 months compared nance pape ep 11.19 8.75 11.00 11.78 with average for previous 3 months Euro?Dollars Three-month deposits Sep 25 11.60 10.80 13.41 13.91 . 9 October 1974 Office of Economic Research/CIA taaalt'- Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8 EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS EXPORTS" f.o.b. United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada IMPORTS" f.o.b. United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada TRADE BALANCE' f.o.b./f.o.b. Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada Aug 74 Aug 74 Aug 74 Aug 74 And 74 Juu 74 Aug 74 -1,031 16,184 -2.859 -8,008 -4,050 592 4,865 7,907 4,044 3,237 2,270 2,897 Million US$ Million US S 1974 1073 I 8,370 1 03,2881 44,014 34,365 58,603 30,297 23,403 13,288 21,189 22,847 42,466 23,434 18,618 9,401 18,329 Million US S Million US $ 1974 1913 Aug 74 9,502 85,402 44,870 Aug 74 4,474 35,390 19,926 Aug 74 6,007 42,419 32,617 Aug 74 4,489 33,157 22,621 Aug 74 3,986 31,400 21,385 Jun 74 2,827 17.338 10,708 Aug 74 2,886 20,597 14,884 1973 -856 2,721 9,849 813 -2.787 -1,307 1.445 Aug 74 Aug 74 Aug 74 Aug 74 Aug 74 Jun 74 Aug 74 Million UL $ 1974 1-1,132 1 -2,113 391 1,840 -445 -749 -556 11 United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada Percent Clmn9u 43.8 51.7 38.0 29.3 25.7 41.3 29.8 Percent Change 46.8 77.6 30.1 46.0 47.2 61.9 38.4 Chaotic -1,257 -3,752 6,335 -3,672 -5.299 -2,743 -853 Million US $ 1974 1973 Change 74 II -2,740 -954 -2,164 1.210 Aug 74 -233 -9,204 -6,020 -3.263 Jul 74 288 5,073 4.929 144 73 IV -431 N.A. 2.471 NA. 741 84 84 -1,033 1.117 14 1 - 2,037 -2,037 975 -3,012 741 -195 -195 -235 40 United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada End of Billion US $ Jun 1970 Aug 74 15.5 14.5 Sep 74 13.2 4.1 Jul 74 33.9 8.8 Aug 74 8.5 4.4 Sep 74 7.2 2.8 Jun 74 5.3 4.7 Sep 74 5.8 4.3 1 Year Earlier 12.9 14.8 34.1 11.2 6.4 6.0 5.7 'Seaao~ally adjusted. "Coev.ned into US dollars at current market telex of exchange. 9 October 1874 Months Earlier 14.9 13.4 33.8 8.1 6.1 6.7 6.1 A2 EXPORT PRICES USS United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada EXPORT PRICES National Currency United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada IMPORT PRICES National Currency United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada Percent Change-- Latest fruit Previous Month Month 1970 Aug 74 5.7 12.9 Aug 74 0.1 16.1 Jul 74 2.2 15.3 May 74 0.6 14.3 Apr 74 5.9 12.5 Apr 74 5.8 13.3 May 74 1.5 14.9 Percent Chanuo Latest from Previous Month Month 1910 Aug 74 5.7 12.9 Aug 74 4.1 11.3 Jul 74 3.4 5.4 May 74 0.7 10.4 Apr 74 3.8 12.0 Apr 74 5.6 13.8 May 74 0.8 12.4 Percent Change Latest frann Previous Month Month 1970 Aug 74 Jul 74 May 74 Apr 74 Apr 74 May 74 EXCHANGE RATES Spot Rate As of 4 Oct 74 JapanlYenl West Germany (Deutsche France (Franc) (pound United Kingdom Sterling) Italy liiral Canada (Dollar) US S Pet Unit 0.0033 0.3830 0.2110 2.3350 0.0015 1.0158 19.8 17.3 6.8 16.0 21.5 26.0 10.6 Average Annual Growth Rate Since I Your Earlier 27.9 25.3 7.9 19.7 23.:1 29.4. 44.1 3 Months Earlier 43.9 - 0.1 17.9 50.1 109.7 73.9 59.3 Average Annual Growth Rate Since I Year Earlier 27.9 42.8 18.0 29.4 28.8 39.6 38.2 3 Months Earlier 43.9 39.8 23.0 48.8 57.7 63.6 48.5 Average Annual Growth Rate Since I Year Earlier 53.4 77.8 32.7 63.0 61.6 90.8 28.7 18 Dec 1971 2.86 23.43 7,16 10.39 12.38 1.C0 19 Mar 1973 -12.17 8.16 4.26 -5.12 -14.86 1.81 2.6 0.4 4.0 3.5 5.4 3.4 Dec 66 21.06 52.35 4.51 16.33 -5.87 10.13 TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES"' United States Japan West Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada 1'1 Dec Dec 66 1971 14.15 '- 4.89 12.81 -0.71 30.31 13.35 16.49 - 3.15 34.75 20.54 27.00 25.88 7.73 1.14 19 Mar 1973 1.70 12.53 8.33 - 5.61 - 6.14 ? 18.74 2.78 3 Months Earlier 34.9 16.6 21.8 74.4 89.5 163.4 54.2 2' Sep 1974 -0.65 1.73 0.24 0.09 -0.33 0.08 27 Sep 1974 -0.26 -0.96 1.08 - 0.66 0.61 -1.23 "'Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized cuuntrias to reflect the competitive impact of exchange-rate variations among the major currencies. Approved For Release 2009/09/29: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500150044-8